

**THE SONORAN TRIUMVIRATE:  
PREVIEW IN SONORA: 1910-1920**

**by  
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## PREFACE

The history of Sonora during the years 1910 to 1920 is significant in that Sonora was the home state of the three men who dominated the national government for fifteen years after Carranza's death in 1920: Adolfo de la Huerta, Plutarco Elías Calles and Álvaro Obregón. Of the three, Calles emerged as the dominant figure in Sonoran politics just as he would later come to dominate national politics. Sonora, from 1910 to 1920, offered a preview of many of his later practices and policies.

This work does not pretend to be a systematic analysis of the events in Sonora or a definitive biographic study of the three major participants; too much data is unavailable to approach either goal. Rather, this is an attempt to record the attainment of political power by the triumvirate and what use they made of that power.

Many persons have helped to make this work possible, and to them I express my gratitude. To Señores Enrique Macías Buelna and Sergio Antonio Flores Ruíz and their staff at the Archivo General del Estado de Sonora, and especially to Max for fetching and carrying, my warmest thanks. I must acknowledge the help of Señora Dolores Martínez de Murillo and

her family; of Manuel Martínez, an admirer of Pancho Villa, and Alicia Guerra. In addition, I am grateful to the two lawyers in the Government Palace who took the time to whip out a formal petition to the Governor to enable me to work in the archives; to the staffs of the Latin American collection at the University of Texas and the Houston Public Library. I am indebted to Neill Macaulay of the University of Florida for his helpful suggestions in the preparation of this manuscript; and I am eternally indebted to Teresa Alessi, who introduced me to the people of Arizpe and helped in the difficult transcription of tape recordings. My thanks, too, to the people of Arizpe who remembered for me. To my family, for their patience and encouragement, and to my business associates for their understanding and tolerance, I owe more than thanks.





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**Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate Council  
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**Chairman: Neill Macaulay  
Major Department: History**

**Beginning in June, 1920 the national government of Mexico was dominated for fifteen years by three men from the state of Sonora: Adolfo de la Huerta, who served as president until December, 1920, had been both elected and appointed governor of Sonora; Álvaro Obregón, who succeeded him, was the nation's pre-eminent military man who had successfully guided the military aspects of the revolution; Plutarco Elías Calles, who became president in December, 1924, also had been an appointive and elective governor in Sonora.**

**The attitudes and policies of the three men could be expected to reflect their prior stands, and in many instances, did so. Thus the political observer could deduce as each**

man took office what to expect from his presidency. De la Huerta, from his prior roles, could be expected to be a peace-maker, a go-between and an arranger of compromises, who nonetheless retained a radical revolutionary streak. Obregón could be noted as an able manipulator of men, but his position on many revolutionary programs would be unclear due to his preoccupation with the military phases of Huerta's overthrow during the years after he joined the movement. Calles could be expected to hang onto his power, once attained, by any means available, and to be constantly involved in political intriguing. It was largely due to his machinations that Sonora was plunged into a disastrous civil war in 1914 which placed José María Maytorena, the constitutionally elected governor, on one side and Calles on the other. The Sonoran conflict came to involve the entire nation and caused continued warfare at a time when Mexico should have been settling into peace. Carranza did not take advantage of his opportunities to prevent the war, and possibly even had reasons to encourage it.

As military governor and governor, Calles issued numerous decrees and circulars, some of which accepted Carranza's reforms of the Plan of Guadalupe and some of which were creations of his own. Notable was his ban on alcoholic beverages, his promotion of education, his land use and tax reforms, and his expulsion of the clergy. Enforcement of these rulings, however, was usually arbitrary. His attempts to remedy the monetary and economic crises suffered by Sonora frequently brought him into conflict with Carranza. To retain his control of the state he

utilized an army, supposedly necessitated by the continual difficulties with the Yaqui Indians.

De la Huerta served Carranza in the Secretariat of Government, then returned to Sonora as governor in 1916 to introduce a new issue of paper money. During his term he promulgated a radical labor program, which alienated the mining industry, and attempted implementation of land reforms.

Obregón, after heading the army and serving as Secretary of War, returned to Sonora to become quickly a wealthy businessman. His political ambition was widely known and became a factor in national politics in 1917. His presidential aspirations led to the uprising of 1920, the death of Carranza, and the achievement of national power by the Sonoran triumvirate.

CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION: BEFORE 1910

The state of Sonora is the second largest in Mexico, encompassing 70,477 square miles, half of which includes the botanical province known as the Sonoran Desert.<sup>1</sup> The northwestern panhandle, from the Colorado River eastward to the area of Altar, is known as the Altar Desert, a region of scattered vegetation, drifting sand and steep volcanic mountains. Mean annual rainfall varies from four inches west of Puerto Penasco to eight inches in the region of Altar, but as elsewhere in the desert province, some areas receive no rain for years on end, and rains, when they come to a locality, are generally heavy. In the northwest, winter rainfall during December, January, and February exceeds the summer rains of July, August and September. Temperatures vary greatly, from occasional below freezing days in the winter to record heats in summer. Temperatures usually exceed one hundred degrees during June, July, August and September, with the world's record heat being recorded in San Luis, Sonora on August 11, 1973: 134.4°F in the shade.

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<sup>1</sup>The principal sources for this discussion of Sonora's geography are Roger Dunbier, The Sonoran Desert; Its Geography, Economy and People (Tucson, Arizona, 1968), 1-98; Jorge L. Tamayo, Geografía general de México (México, D.F., 1962), 4 vols., scattered references.

Vegetation is denser in other portions of the desert province; especially toward the south where, with the increase in rainfall, it becomes almost a forest, albeit low, tangled and spiny. Daily temperatures are somewhat cooler than in the northwest; nonetheless, they climb daily over 100°F during the summer months. Winter temperatures often are uncomfortably cold, but frosts are rare and the growing season throughout the desert permits the maturation of two crops per year. The summer rainy season raises humidity, increasing discomfort so much that Sonora even today maintains the custom of the siesta; all businesses except restaurants, hotels and service stations are closed from one o'clock to three o'clock in the afternoon. Sunset brings little relief from the heat. Mean annual rainfall in the eastern part of the desert ranges from eight to fifteen inches with isohyets running approximately parallel to the coastline and increasing to the east.

Geologically, Sonora belongs to the Basin and Range province which begins in north central Arizona. Within this province one is forever encircled by isolated fault block mountains which form roughly parallel and discontinuous ranges separated by continuous basins. Through the desert portion of Sonora the basins are very wide, but moving eastward out of the desert into the piedmont of the Sierra Madre Occidental the ranges increase in width and become higher, and the basins narrow into river valleys. Temperatures

become more moderate with the increase in altitude and the annual rainfall increases in the area around Álamos to thirty inches per year. In the Cananea area, where the Sonora and Moctezuma Rivers originate, rainfall reaches twenty-five inches per year. The mountains form a barrier to communications with Chihuahua on the east, and until the end of the first quarter of the twentieth century Yaqui and Mayo Indian rebellions often closed the narrow corridor giving access to Sinaloa. Sonora is a broken country, difficult of access.

The rivers of Sonora are, for the most part, seasonal or intermittent; the Yaqui and the Mayo are the only rivers which carry any quantity of water throughout the year. Until the twentieth century, however, the rivers were the only utilized water sources in the state; the Ópata and the Pima tribes had settled along the river terraces and developed a primitive, but productive, irrigated subsistence agriculture which persists, little changed, to the present. The rivers imposed the pattern of settlement and established the line of communications. Villages strung along the river valleys communicated with ease. The distances between villages were short and for much of the year the river bed, or a portion of it, made a level, albeit dusty roadway. However, mountain ranges effectively limited east-west communications in the colonial era, as well as today. Each valley was an isolated, independent and self-reliant world.

Sonora's physical isolation supported the growth of a certain independence in political and economic affairs. The great distances from Mexico City and the difficulty of communications resulted in Sonora's often being ignored in Mexico City, and Mexico City's often being ignored in Sonora. Proximity to the United States meant that Yankee ideas and Yankee dollars could exert powerful, if unwanted, influence, especially after the 1880's. Because of distance the central government, both colonial and independent, seldom furnished leadership, thereby permitting opportunists to agitate and involve the state in repeated power struggles.

The first Spaniards to enter the area today known as Sonora were probably members of a slave-seeking party under Diego de Guzmán which arrived at the Yaqui River in October, 1533, where they fought a battle with the Indians who lived there.<sup>2</sup> Alvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca, Estebanico, Alonso del Castillo Maldonado, and Andrés Dorantes, the survivors of

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<sup>2</sup>The following is a partial list of the sources used for this resumé of the history of Sonora prior to the revolution. General: Hubert Howe Bancroft, History of the North Mexican States and Texas (San Francisco, 1886 and 1889); Eduardo W. Villa, Compendio de historia del estado de Sonora (México, D.F., 1937). Colonial: Fanny Bandelier, translator, The Journey of Alvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca (New York, 1922); Sidney B. Brinckerhoff and Odie B. Faulk, Lancers for the King (Phoenix, 1965); Herbert E. Bolton, Coronado on the Turquoise Trail (Albuquerque, 1949); Elliott Coues, translator, On the Trail of a Spanish Pioneer: The Diary and Itinerary of Francisco Garcés (New York, 1900); George P. Hammond, "Pimería Alta after Kino's Time," New Mexico Historical Review, Vol. 4, No. 3 (1929), 220-238; George Hammond and Agapito Rey, Narratives of the Coronado Expedition (Albuquerque, 1940); Ignaz



Pánfilo Narváez expedition's shipwreck on the Texas Gulf Coast, wandered over part of the state to reach the Yaqui River in 1536, although there is no certainty of their route. The party encountered artifacts which indicated the Spanish presence, and began to hear tales of Spanish slave raids.

On their arrival in Mexico City, the new viceroy, Antonio de Mendoza, discussed their travels with them. Mendoza decided to use to his own advantage the good influence of Cabeza de Vaca with the Indians, to help him build an empire in competition with Cortés. Mendoza would

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Pfefferkorn, Sonora: A Description of the Province, translated and annotated by Theodore E. Treutlein (Albuquerque, 1949); Roberto Ramos, ed., Descripción hecha en el año de 1778 por el Padre Fray Agustín de Morfi, sobre Arizpe, Sonora, capital que fue de las provincias internas (México, D.F., 1949); Mario Hernández Sánchez-Barba, La Última expansión española en América (Madrid, 1957); Edward H. Spicer, Cycles of Conquest: The Impact of Spain, Mexico and the United States on the Indians of the Southwest, 1533-1960 (Tucson, 1962); Theodore E. Treutlein, "The Economic Regime of the Jesuit Missions in Eighteenth Century Sonora," Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 (1939), 289-300; Rufus Kay Wyllys, "Padre Luis W. Velarde's Relación of Pimería Alta, 1716," New Mexico Historical Review, Vol. 6, No. 2 (1931), 111-157. National: Daniel Cosío Villegas, ed., Historia moderna de México (México, D.F., 1955-1972), Vols. 1-9; Roberty M. Utley, Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indians, 1866-1891 (New York, 1973); James D. Cockcroft, Intellectual Precursors of the Mexican Revolution, 1900-1913 (Austin, 1968); Rodolfo F. Acuña, Sonoran Strongman: Ignacio Pesqueira and His Times (Tucson, 1974); Robert D. Gregg, The Influence of Border Troubles on Relations between the United States and Mexico, 1876-1910 (Baltimore, 1937); Max L. Moorhead, The Apache Frontier (Norman, Oklahoma, 1968); Alfred Jackson Hanna and Kathryn Abbey Hanna, Napoleon III and Mexico: American Triumph over Monarchy (Chapel Hill, 1971); Robert M. Forbes, Crabb's Filibustering Expedition into Sonora, 1857 (Tucson, 1952); C. L. Sonnichsen, Colonel Greene and the Copper Skyrocket (Tucson, 1974).

send a small advance party to prepare for a larger force of conquerors. Thus, a party guided by the slave Estebanico and including Father Marcos de Niza went northward through Sonora in 1539; Estebanico separated from Father Marcos and hurried on before him; he met death in northern Sonora. Father Marcos, following Estebanico's path, allegedly arrived near Cibola, but the hostility of the Pueblo Indians prevented actual entry. His fantastic account of the journey and the riches awaiting the conquerors of the northern towns, possibly written in collaboration with Mendoza, did what the Viceroy wanted it to do: it lured troublemakers away from New Spain.

Hernando Cortés saw Mendoza's expedition as an infringement on his rights to explore the north, and he also dispatched an expedition in 1539. This exploratory effort, a sea expedition under Francisco de Ulloa, followed the coast to the mouth of the Colorado River. Unlike Marcos de Niza, Ulloa reported no wealthy cities; he could describe only the arid desolation of the Sonora coastal desert.

The glowing reports of Fray Marcos aroused enthusiasm among the wealth-seeking Spaniards, and Viceroy Mendoza and Francisco Vázquez de Coronado, governor of New Galicia, easily found men willing to undertake a mission of conquest. Early reports by one of Coronado's men, Melchor Díaz, sent to verify the priest's tales, described nothing remotely akin to Fray Marcos' picture. The fledgling expedition almost died at birth; it took all of Coronado's persuasive powers

to revive interest. The advance party arrived in the Sonora River Valley in May, 1540, and continued up that natural roadway past friendly Indian settlements into Arizona. In the meantime, an associated seaexpedition had sailed up the coast to the Colorado River and up that river to its juncture with the Gila. The main body of Coronado's expedition arrived in Sonora after his departure, and organized a town in the Sonora River Valley, while awaiting orders from Coronado. In October, 1540 Melchor Díaz arrived to take command in Sonora and the main body moved up to join Coronado.

Díaz set out to make connections with the sea expedition, traversing the desert to the coast, which he followed until he crossed the Colorado River and then veered into California. Neither Coronado's expedition to the great plains nor his collateral expeditions found any great source of gold or mineral wealth, and their portraits of Mexico's northwestern territories did not encourage a great rush of settlement. The Spanish moved only to occupy lands along the Rio Bravo del Norte (Rio Grande) among the docile Pueblo Indians.

In the 1560's Sinaloa and Sonora became a part of the province of New Biscay (Nueva Vizcaya), which had its capital in Durango, with the appointment of Francisco de Ibarra to conquer and rule the northern regions not yet under Spanish dominion. Ibarra crossed a part of Sonora traveling to Sinaloa, but made no effort at conquest; that would occur peacefully through the efforts of the clergy. Sonora remained a pathway to the north for occasional explorers, though

Spanish dominion ended at the Sinaloa River. Spain's hold on New Galicia was tenuous, but during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Franciscan and Dominican orders worked earnestly to bring the natives south of the Sinaloa River into the Church and civilization.

The Company of Jesus arrived in New Biscay in 1590 and in 1591 entered Sinaloa, where they established a mission on the Sinaloa River. In 1605 they moved to the Fuerte River, but advance to the Mayo and Yaqui Rivers was delayed until the more ferocious tribes which occupied those valleys could be pacified. Campaigns between 1602 and 1610 subdued the tribes, and the first mission in Sonora was established on the Rio Mayo in 1613. The Mayo Valley was divided into three districts with missions at Etchojoa, Navojoa and Camoa. So well was the mission system accepted, that by 1620 the Jesuits claimed 30,000 converts among the Mayos. The Yaquis, too, became converts in 1617, and settled into eight pueblos along the river.

Once past the Mayo-Yaqui barrier the missions progressed rapidly along the north-south valleys inhabited by the sedentary Ópata and Pima tribal groups, which easily adopted to mission life. By 1648 the missions reached to Bacoachi on the Sonora River, to Cucurpe on the San Miguel River and Bavispe on the Bavispe River. Northeastern expansion stalled on the border of the area ravaged by the wide-ranging Apaches, and western expansion was contained for many years by the

recalcitrant Seri of the western desert.

Sinaloa and Sonora, which was already known by that name, were considered as one province until 1640 or 1641, when the two were temporarily separated, and a new capital, San Juan Bautista, was established in the Sonora River Valley. The division persisted until possibly 1650, when the provinces were reunited. In 1693 the provinces were again separated and Domingo Jironza Petríz de Crusate, the ex-governor of New Mexico, became the captain-governor and promptly began a campaign against the Apaches and allied bands who were raiding on the northeastern frontier.

The missionaries advanced with the benefit of presidio soldiers; the first rush of Spaniards into Sonora did not come until the discovery of silver in Álamos in 1684. By 1678, there were thirty priests in Sonora serving approximately 40,000 persons; of those possibly 500 were Spanish or mixed blood. Jesuit documents from about 1688 list small mining camps in the Sahauripa-Arivechi and Batuc areas and mention a mining camp on the lower Yaqui River with thirty Spaniards. There was only one permanent garrison, at Fronteras, positioned to stave off Apache raids.

The only likely remaining field for missionary endeavor lay among the Upper Pima tribes and the related Papagos, who farmed along the desert rivers of northwestern Sonora. Their conversion was due primarily to one remarkable ar-thritic priest, Father Eusebio Francisco Kino, who came to Sonora first in 1685, visited California, and then returned

to Sonora to work and explore. It was Kino who opened an overland route to California, which would be followed in 1776 by Juan Bautista de Anza (the younger) when he led colonists from Sonora and Sinaloa to settle San Francisco. Before his death in 1711 Father Kino established missions in the inhospitable desert from the Magdalena River on the south to the Santa Cruz River in the north. Kino always had trouble securing priests to serve in his missions, but the combination of royal indifference and active opposition from the military government after 1703 made his task impossible. After his death only two priests remained active in his mission sphere although another arrived in 1720; the missions were abandoned. Not until 1730, with the arrival of several new priests, was any further attempt made to reach the Indians.

The cruelties and oppressions of the Spanish soldiers and the servants of the clerics in the missions in the Pima presidios sparked a revolt at Tubutama in which a priest was killed. In retaliation Jironza's men massacred fifty Indians, then thinking the deaths would intimidate the surviving Pimas, the soldiers left to fight Apaches. As soon as they were safely gone, the Pimas resumed the wholesale destruction of mission properties in Father Kino's domain. Governor Jironza called on the presidios for aid and the soldiers, in a campaign for which no details have been preserved, forced the Indians back to the missions. Through

missionary influence a general pardon was granted to the Indians.

In 1696 another uprising was planned by a native neophyte who accused the Spanish of taking Indian lands, and making his people virtual slaves. The Pimas had suffered more deaths and cruelties at the hands of their Spanish protectors, he said, than they had from the Apaches. Jironza, with the help of loyal Indians, succeeded in putting down the revolt. More Apache wars followed in 1698, and in 1699 the Seris began a long war against Spanish encroachment.

Kino's problem with the Spanish in Sonora stemmed in part from a change in government. Jironza was replaced in 1701, and his successors reflected the more general attitude of the Spanish settlers. Even the army was composed largely of men seeking wealth, and chasing Apaches would not make them rich. The miners and settlers wanted laborers, and Apaches did not fill that need. With the tales of Pima treachery then current, it was not difficult to find excuses to enslave the Pimas, although Spanish law forbade the labor of mission Indians in repartimientos for twenty years after their baptism.

During the first quarter of the eighteenth century Sonora suffered from neglect. The military commanders were noted for their corruption, and the ranks were never filled, but the scant records available indicate that there were some campaigns against the Apaches. In a 1724 report a

royal inspector made a statement which would be current for the next one hundred and fifty years: The whole province was threatened with ruin by Apache raids, unless a more effective means of defense would be devised. In 1730, the Seris and other coastal Indians again became a menace.

The provincial government was reorganized in 1734, when Sinaloa and Sonora were reunited under one government. The provincial capital was located in Sinaloa, but for all practical purposes it was at Pitic or at San Miguel de Horcasitas, because public affairs forced the governor to spend most of his time in Sonora. The governor was also the commandant of all military forces; under him were the presidio captains to handle the military affairs and the alcaldes mayores to administer civil affairs. There was a rebellion in the Pima mission in 1737, and in 1740 and 1741 a serious revolt by the Yaquis and Mayos occurred, probably as a result of conflict between the Jesuits and the settlers.

In 1736 a very peculiar mining discovery was made in the upper Altar Valley (to the west of Nogales near today's international boundary) on a small ranch known as Arizona or Arizonac. Supposedly, an Indian had revealed the existence of rich deposits of silver; the silver, when located, lay on or close to the surface in massive balls and chunks, one of which weighed more than 2500 pounds. Word of the strike brought the vagabond miners, common to the era, rushing to the site; their mining camp was named Real de Arizona. Word of the unusual nature of the mine also brought Captain Juan



Bautista de Anza, acting as judicial officer in the north, from the presidio at Fronteras. Anza ordered a halt to all mining pending a legal decision on the ownership of the mine. Anza asked for a viceregal opinion on what portion belonged to the crown; he wondered if it might not be classified as a hidden treasure, or a "growing place" to which the king would have exclusive rights, instead of the usual one-fifth interest. The Viceroy decided in favor of the miners, but a royal decree in 1741 declared it to be a "growing place" which would be worked for the royal treasury. By the time the decree was issued the mine was no longer being worked; it was either exhausted or Indian hostilities had driven the miners out; Arizona was abandoned as a mineral district, but remained as a mission area, known as San Antonio de Arizona. Later attempts to relocate the mines were not successful, and Arizona riches remained a legend and a lure for later adventurers.

Don Agustin Vildasola became governor in 1741, and new presidios were established at Pitic (today Hermosillo) to protect the inland Indians from the coastal Seris, and at Terrenate to protect the Upper Pimas from the Apaches. The new governor complained about the Jesuits and his lack of money and authority---even more so after the Viceroy, in an economy drive, ordered the new presidios closed and the new province defended by the Spanish settlers. The Governor persuaded him to keep the presidios open by pointing out that the Spanish were few in numbers, scattered

in location, and too poor to take time away from their employment for military purposes.

Vildasola had stirred up so many factional disputes that he was replaced in 1749 by Diego Ortíz Parilla, on the recommendation of a visitador general. The visitador made recommendations for changes to be made by the new governor, which actually stated only that the existing laws be obeyed; he also made a complete report on the Indian problems, which threatened to eradicate two hundred years of missionary work, and made suggestions for their resolution. As usual there were no practical results.

In 1751 there were nine Jesuits working in the Upper Pima missions and eighteen others scattered among the older missions. In November 1751, a Pima leader, who had been made a captain general of the western Pimas as a reward for leading his people in warfare against the Seris, incited a rebellion among the Pimas. When the war ended in 1752 all of the missions and towns of the northwest had been destroyed and approximately one hundred Spaniards killed. The Pima leader appeared before Governor Parilla to explain the reasons for the outbreak: the culprits were the Jesuits. The Christian fathers, he stated, had usurped the best Pima lands, and Indian cornfields often lacked water because the Jesuits had diverted it to water their own. His arguments impressed the Governor, who pardoned him.

Recriminations on the causes and the suppression of the uprising flew between the Jesuits and the Governor. The

Governor utilized all the charges made against the Jesuits by the jealous and greedy settlers, and the Jesuits pointed out the humaneness of their mission system. Repercussions from the Pima War continued for several years; in the meantime a new governor arrived and the Seris made peace overtures. The Seris' demands, however, could not be met and their war continued. In 1755 Juan de Mendoza became governor and began to press the Seris militarily until they again sued for peace. They asked only for time to collect their scattered families; when this was granted they moved into the Cerro Prieto, between Guaymas and Hermosillo, which was easily defended. Governor Mendoza tried in vain to capture their stronghold, until he was killed in 1760 by a dying Seri chief.

To counter Apache raids, expeditions were sent into the haunts of the Apache in northern Arizona, but the Apaches had no permanent villages, no crops, and no property which could be destroyed, so the forays accomplished little. It often happened that, with the presidio forces occupied away from their bases, the Apaches slipped in behind them to range at will.

The already bad conditions deteriorated after Mendoza's death; the Jesuits increasingly lost control of the Indians; missions, mines and towns were abandoned, and the native and Spanish populations declined. In 1766 the government decided to act; the first remedy to be attempted was a military expedition under the general supervision of the

vistador general, José de Gálvez. But before the arrival of the expedition a decree from Spain announced the expulsion of the Jesuit order from all Spanish territories.

Father Ignaz Pfefferkorn, one of the deported Jesuits, described the conditions in Sonora at the time of their departure. The chance to convert the Apaches had been lost, he said, through the treachery of Spanish soldiers, while Apache and Seri depredations caused many Spanish colonists to leave. The mines were abandoned, not only because of the Indians, but also because they required large investments and the costs exceeded the profits. Only areas within sight of the villages were still planted, because more distant fields could not be protected, and the stock raising industry was ruined by thieving Indians. In a land of abundant cattle, the well-to-do Spanish scorned beef and served mutton. Wooden ploughs were still used, since iron was too expensive. The alluvial terraces were very fertile and farmers secured good crop yields without fertilizer, but seeds of European plants were difficult to obtain and required diligence that Sonoran farmers would not give. Some sugar cane was grown although there were no mills for commercial refining, and the cane was milled and cooked to make panocha (a brown sugar candy still much prized).

The Ópatas raised cotton and made a coarse cloth for clothes, but the other Indians were content to be naked.

The Spaniards demanded linen clothes, which came from Mexico City at great expense, although they might demean themselves to wear cotton undergarments which, not being visible, would not reflect disgrace on the wearer's noble heritage. Indian cotton was used to cover Spanish tables.

To operate a mine, new or old, Pfefferkorn reported, the prospective operator must notify the governor and pay a small tax, before he would be given permission in the name of the king, with the understanding that he must begin work within two months. The mines yielded great wealth, but soon they would fill with water or the quality ore would be depleted. Silver was discovered at Cananea in 1762, Pfefferkorn noted. He had visited the site of the Real de Arizona, so he knew the mine had been worked. Most Spaniards who acquired wealth from mining spent it on real property and livestock, and the Apaches deprived them of both. By 1770, the province had five gold mines in operation, six silver mines, and one lead mine. All of the other minerals were neglected. The missions' agricultural surpluses were sold to the mining settlements.

The king allotted three hundred pesos per year for each missionary in Sonora. In the case of the Jesuits, before their expulsion, the total allotment went to the Jesuit factor in Mexico City who acted as purchasing agent for the missions; up to one half of their funds, however, was spent on freight. It cost six pesos to send twenty-five pounds the seven hundred miles from Mexico City

to Sonora. The mission at Cucurpe spent two hundred pesos per year on white wax for candles and wine for the Mass. Ten gallons of Spanish wine cost sixty pesos--the cost of sixty sheep in Sonora. Local products would not suffice; Sonoran wax was of a poor quality and smelly, and the Jesuits had failed in their wine making attempts. The candles burned during Holy Week alone amounted to twenty-five pounds, the equivalent in cost of fifty sheep, fifty pounds of salt, seventy-five pounds of chocolate, or two hundred pounds of cloth.

As protection against the Apache, the king maintained five companies of calvalry, each with fifty men and three officers. Pfefferkorn did not think too highly of their capabilities. The position of frontier captain was given in Mexico City to a man who could prove his military worth with a 12,000-14,000 peso cash payment; no military experience was necessary. To command such a price, the position had to afford lucrative opportunities for graft since the yearly salary for a captain was only six hundred pesos, and it did. The captain bought all of the company's supplies by means of purchase orders which he would send to a merchant acting as his agent in Mexico City. The merchant would have received the money allotted to the captain from the King's treasurer in Mexico. The goods were delivered to the captain at Mexico City prices plus shipping costs, and he had an upper and lower

price limit for which he could sell. Naturally, he charged the fixed upper price to the soldiers, who had to buy their food, clothing, equipment, and six required horses from him. In good years, when Mexico City prices were low, he could make fifty percent, minus the freight charges, on every item sold. His men were paid four hundred pesos per year; most of that salary probably returned to the captain for purchases. Many times, the captains had extra goods which were sold at even higher prices to the Spanish settlers.

Pfefferkorn stated that he knew of no heroic deeds by the soldiers. They did chase the Indians, but they seldom caught them. Their orders, he said, were to range over the country to drive out the Indians, "but the King orders in Madrid; and in Sonora one does what he wishes."<sup>3</sup>

Pfefferkorn also had some pithy comments about Spaniards in Sonora. Besides the governor, the officers and the merchants, there were few full-blooded Spanish in Sonora. There were mestizos, mulattoes, and lobos, none of whom could become priests. There were a few Creoles, but most of the "people of reason" were rabble attracted by the mines. He noted that the Spanish had a real genius for idleness, that they would walk nowhere on foot, and that they were lackadaisical farmers. The only real work which interested them was cattle raising. Expert horsemen and potentially

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<sup>3</sup>Pfefferkorn, Sonora: A Description, 295.

excellent soldiers, they were eager to volunteer, and when accepted, received no training. Soldiering was a happy life for them because it involved nothing of what they considered work; there was no fixed term of service and they took no care of their equipment.

Long-awaited military aid finally came in 1768 in the form of one hundred Catalán volunteers. The visitador José de Gálvez left the actual military operations to Colonel Domingo Elizando while he went to California for an inspection tour. The official reports filed at the end of the campaign in 1771 told of a victory over the marauding Indians, but private correspondence indicated that the victory was something less than complete. Attempts to rout Seris from their mountains failed and peace talks in 1769 and 1770 fared little better; the reason for the Seris' decision to lay down their arms in 1771 is not known.

At the end of 1771 Sonora was again free of Indian rebellions and the presidios could defend the frontier from Apaches. As a result of recommendations made by José de Gálvez for the defense of the Spanish frontier, four presidios were assigned to Sonora, Fronteras, Altar, Tubac and Terrenate. None were new, but they were to be moved so that they would be separated by approximately forty leagues, each manned by forty-seven officers and men, plus ten Indian scouts. Apache raids diminished for a few years, but overall, the effect was minor.

The missions abandoned by the Jesuits were placed under



the care of a royal commissioner, who wasted or embezzled the properties, contributing to the decadence of the missions. Whereas missions in Sinaloa were to be secularized, those in the Yaqui River Valley in Sonora were to be turned over to the Franciscans. A year's lapse between the departure of the Jesuits and the arrival of the Franciscans gave the Indians an independence which made them reluctant to return to the confinement of mission life. The friar's jurisdiction was over the Indians alone; they could do nothing about the contentious Spanish settled in the vicinity, and in the entire northern half of the state, only two churches served the Spanish.

As a result of his visit to North America, Gálvez formulated plans for the reorganization of the government, which included plans for the separation of the northern provinces from viceregal jurisdiction. By a royal order of August 22, 1776, the provinces of New Biscay (which had come to denote Chihuahua and Durango), Coahuila, Texas, New Mexico, Sinaloa and Sonora, and the Californias were designated Interior Provinces. The Provinces were to be ruled by a combined governor and commanding general who would be independent of the viceroy, though judicial authority would remain in Guadalajara. His chief duty was the defense of the frontier, but the imperfectly defined range of his power led to later clashes with clerical and civil authorities.

The new governor, General Teodoro de Croix, arrived in 1777 and made an inspection tour of the eastern portion of the

Interior Provinces. Their immensity led Croix to recommend that the provinces be divided into eastern and western divisions. The great distances, which had caused the separation from Mexico City, made it impractical to attempt to rule Texas from Sonora. Croix selected Arizpe as capital for the Interior Provinces because of its central location between Coahuila and California.

In 1785, with a change in viceroys, the provinces came under the limited control of the viceroy, and at the same time they were divided into three separate military commands: Texas, Coahuila, New León, and New Santander; New Biscay and New Mexico; and Sinaloa, Sonora and California. The complicated relationship between the commanders of the separate provinces was too cumbersome for success, and in 1787 the two western provinces were united to form the two provinces originally proposed by Croix. In 1788 the commanders were once more made subject to the viceroy, but with some independent authority. In 1792, after another reorganization, New León, New Santander and the Californias remained subject to the viceroy, but the other provinces regained their independent command. The introduction of the intendancies in 1786 seemed to make little difference in the north; Sinaloa and Sonora became the intendancy of Arizpe. Governmental reorganization did not end the Indian hostilities and the century closed with Sonora having progressed little economically and socially, and religiously, having regressed.

The revolt against Spain passed almost unnoticed in Sonora

although Hidalgo had partisans there. An attempt by the rebels to capture the north was abruptly ended when a force under Jose María González Hermosillo was routed in Sinaloa. Further efforts were forestalled by Hidalgo's defeat and flight. The province was required to contribute to the support of the royal armies after 1811 and there was some interruption of commerce, but Sonora furnished no soldiers to either side. Indian depredations continued undiminished, and in 1820 the Ópatas, the most docile and civilized of the tribes, rebelled.

In the same year governmental changes were effected by the liberalized Spanish constitution with the establishment of the provincial congress in Arizpe, which was also given power over the Californias, and of town councils (ayuntamientos). Within a year, however, independence from Spain was being celebrated throughout the provinces; its only immediate result in Sonora was the creation of a military district with the same geographical limits as the intendancy, but subject to the commandant in Chihuahua. This lack of understanding of the problems of the northwest caused protests, and proposals for the division of Sonora from Sinaloa.

The northern provinces supported the destruction of the Empire and the creation of a federation in 1822. But not until 1824 did a congress with representatives from Sonora and Sinaloa meet in Sinaloa to discuss the reorganization of the northern provinces. While the congress met,

the Yaquis revolted, making separation seem less desirable to the Sonorans. The delegates decided to retain their combined status and in October, 1825, the State of the West was created, with five departments, and the capital in Villa de Fuerte, Sinaloa. The new state had its own commanding general, with residence in Arizpe, and nine frontier garrisons. The separation controversy had not been laid to rest and the legislature was forced to reconsider the subject; in October, 1830, the division of Sonora from Sinaloa was agreed to by the Congress in Mexico City.

The Yaquis had seen independence as a chance to gain the privileges of citizenship, but they were disappointed. While local administration did not change, intruders were no longer excluded and settlers began to encroach on lands the Indians regarded as theirs. Moreover, they were now expected to pay taxes from which they previously had been exempt, and in 1825, when tax assessors appeared, they protested to the authorities. The official response was the arrival of troops to enforce the assessment, and the Yaquis resisted under a leader generally known as Banderas. This persuasive leader kept the Yaquis (soon joined by the Mayos) in the field for two years, but the original motivation for the war became obscured and for many it degenerated into raids for booty. When the government made partial concessions the rebels yielded in April, 1827. A law in September, 1828 confirmed their citizenship, and made them eligible for military service, education, and land distribution. The

Yaquis rebelled again in 1832 when a decree suppressed the office of general held by Banderas. Banderas was captured and executed early in the struggle, which lasted for nine months. The new Yaqui leader managed to discourage another attempt at revolt in 1834.

Sonora, despite its remoteness, was soon involved in the disputes racking the central government. Political liberalism as it developed in early republican Mexico included strong anti-church and anti-military programs, and often unthinking support for the federalist form of organization as established in the Constitution of 1824. This form of liberalism reached its apogee in 1833 under the presidency of Valentín Gómez Farías, and resulted in a series of revolts by horrified conservatives. The clergy and the army issued the Plan of Cuernavaca, which demanded the nullification of all of the laws and decrees passed under Gómez Farías, and a strong central government. Out of the confusion and into the presidency walked the man whom conservatives lauded as one of their own, a man who blew with the political winds, General Antonio López de Santa Ana, now rid forever of his disguise as a liberal.

The new president threw out the liberal Congress and installed his own hand-picked legislators. The new Congressmen, extreme conservatives all, restructured the government in conformity with the Plan of Cuernavaca, eliminating the federal system in October of 1835. Sonora became a Department with four prefectures and Manuel M. Gándara as

the new governor. Opposition to the congressional action resulted in the Texas war, and Santa Ana had to have the glory of leading the Mexicans into battle again.

One of Santa Ana's subordinates in that war was General Jose Urrea, a native of Tucson, Sonora. Urrea led the assault on the presidio of Goliad, and oversaw the mass execution on Santa Ana's orders of the three hundred men captured there. His military prestige was not diminished by Santa Ana's defeat and denunciations, and in 1837 he was named military commander of the Department of Sonora. Strangely enough, Urrea was a known federalist, and in December he led Sonora in a rebellion against centralism.

Urrea's protest was announced in the Plan of Arizpe of December 27, 1837 and was directed specifically against the Siete Leyes of 1836 which enforced the centralist government by eliminating popular elections of the president and extending the presidential term to eight years, and by creating a Poder Conservador which watch-dogged all legislation. Anastasio Bustamante, who was elected president for an eight-year term under the Leyes, took office in April, 1837. The Plan called for a government that would be popular, representative and federal. It called on the President, General Anastasio Bustamante, to convoke a special national Congress to last six months, for the sole purpose of reforming the Constitution of 1824. The states which supported and adopted the Plan were to organize an interior provisional

government and promulgate the reformed Constitution. The Plan was a repudiation of unrestrained centralist power, and seemed to assume that all states would support it. Did Urrea intend to form a separate federation of assenting states? The intentions are not clearly stated.

Governor Gándara convoked the special congress in accord with the Plan in March 1838 and then tendered his resignation as governor in favor of Urrea, as he had earlier agreed to do. The legislature ratified Urrea as governor and military commander, then notified President Bustamante that (1) the state would never renounce the prerogatives of sovereignty; (2) the change had been instituted by a Congress unqualified to take such actions and done without the expressed approval of the majority of the nation, hence Sonora felt no compunction to accept it; (3) Sonora had declared it wanted the popular federal form of government.

With the federalist ideas firmly in control in Sonora, Urrea assumed the task of converting other states. With three hundred men he sailed to Sinaloa where he easily defeated several small forces, but was himself defeated when faced with government forces under General Mariano Paredes. Ten states had seconded his plan, including Michoacán and San Luis Potosí, but the uprisings there were quickly squelched. So Urrea could count on little help, as he marched east from Sinaloa with the remnants of his column.

With the alternatives of annihilation by a powerful army under President Bustamante, or of accepting a generous amnesty offered to all federalist rebels, Urrea and most of the federalist forces surrendered.

In June, 1839 the Minister of War ordered Urrea to leave the country. He was taken under guard to Veracruz where he escaped to join a federalist general still in the field. The combined armies of President Bustamante and General Santa Ana, again popular in spite of his loss of Texas, easily defeated them, but Urrea evaded capture. Refusing to give up his support of federalism, Urrea returned to Arizpe where he assembled the surviving veterans of his Sinaloa column and, in an audacious move, marched on Mexico City, surprised the garrison there, and seized and held the capital city for ten days. Urrea hastened to talk to Bustamante, but instead of deposing him, as would have been normal under the circumstances, he chose to petition again that Bustamante use his power to reinstate the federal system. This the president agreed to do, and the gullible Sonorans believed their cause was won. They could not hold Mexico City, the center of conservatism, and had to evacuate.

As soon as Urrea had left Sonora for Sinaloa, Gándara changed his political coat back to centralist and led a counter-revolution. For aid, he turned to the Yaquis and Papagos, promising plunder as a reward for their services.



Urrea returned once to put down his enemies in Sonora, but when he left again to pursue the federalist wars, Gándara gained control of the state.

For several years Gándara and Urrea battled for control of Sonora with Gándara using the Indians, to the detriment of the rest of the population. Urrea was defeated in November, 1844 and he fled south. On the national stage the federalists were successful and expelled the dictatorial Santa Ana in late 1844; with his overthrow federalism was reinstated in Mexico. Sonora once again became a state and the governmental offices established under the centralists were abolished. The Constitution of 1831, now reinstated, was reformed in 1848 and the state was divided into nine partidos which were later recreated as prefectures. The prefectures, or districts, were subdivided, on the basis of population, into several units. The largest of these units was the municipality, which was governed by a town council, and the major town in each district was designated as a cabecera, which acted as the district seat of government. Also within the district were smaller population units, all subject to the district prefect. At one level, a town might be ruled by three justices; at a still lower level was the town with only one justice; this justice supervised the police commissioner who acted as mayor and town council in the smallest unit.

The change in governmental form in Mexico was once more

a prelude to war, although it was not a contributing factor in itself. In April, 1846, war began with the United States, and Santa Ana, again espousing federalism, took office to save the Republic. As in 1833 he promptly left the presidency to the old liberal, Valentín Gómez Farías, and took the field to build his military lustre; serving under him as before was his erstwhile enemy, General José Urrea. And while Santa Ana was once again leading powerful Mexican armies to inglorious defeat, Sonora got a small taste of the war with a blockade and some naval skirmishes, and the appearance of Stephen Kearney's ragtag force in Arizona. The war, however, left Sonora relatively unscathed: it was the peace that left the scar. By the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which ended the war, the United States acquired California and New Mexico and Sonora's previously undefined northern boundary was fixed at the Gila River.

While negotiations were under way to end the war, another event occurred which was to cost Sonora more territory and bring invaders to her borders. On January 24, 1848, James W. Marshall discovered gold in the Coloma Valley of the American River in California. Sonora learned of the strikes in August, and thousands hurriedly left for California over the old trails blazed by Kino and Anza. The acquisition of California and Arizona by the United States had brought the Yankee to Sonora's doorstep, and the political chaos in Mexico and the state made Sonora appear to be a plum ripe for

picking, the next logical step in United States expansion. Gandara had managed to retain power until the elections of 1848, and a new governor, José Aguilar, took office in April, 1849. Pressures by the Gándara faction made the office untenable, and he retired in 1851.

In 1851, the central government of Mexico granted a large territorial concession for mineral exploration to the "Compañía Restauradora de los Minas de Arizona." The organizer of this company was Jean-Baptiste Jecker, of "Jecker, Torre y Compañía," and the project had as supporters the governor of Sonora and the French minister to Mexico. The door was now open for the stage appearance of the most fantastic figure in Sonoran history, the Count Gastón Raousset de Boulbon.

Raousset, the son of an ancient French family, dreamed of restoring the Divine Rights of the French Kings and conquering territory in foreign lands that would add to French glory. His dreams led him to settle in Algiers, where he lived the life of an adventurer and lost his fortune. After the proclamation of the Republic in 1848 he returned to France, having decided that perhaps the republican form of government was suitable for France. He promptly announced his candidacy for Deputy, and to support himself and to further his political career he launched a periodical which had little chance of success. His own class, the aristocracy, viewed him as a traitor, and to the

republicans he was an intruder. So at thirty years of age this man of ambition found himself without friends and without money in his own country.

Raousset began to listen seriously to the tales of newly discovered and illimitable wealth in California, and raised enough money to secure a third-class passage to America. He arrived in California in August, 1850, but a few months in the mining camps convinced him that he would not recoup his fortunes there. Returning to San Francisco, he worked as a stevedore, also unprofitably, then began buying cattle in Los Angeles to sell in the gold camps. Neither was that profitable.

The Mexican consul in San Francisco, aided by the French consul, had begun to promote settlement in Sonora, partly to replace the thousands of its already small population who had followed Anza's trail north to the gold fields. Particularly, he tried to entice French colonists, with some success. The French possibly had something other than colonization in mind, for France had secretly sought a foothold in Mexico for some years. Then Raousset reappeared in San Francisco, his visions of easy wealth shattered. The colonization scheme might have reawakened his old dreams of conquest for France, or perhaps he had heard of the legendary Arizona wealth from Sonoran forty-niners. He was eager to go. The French consul recommended him to the French vice-consul in Guaymas, who in turn wrote to the French minister in Mexico City. The minister then personally got

in touch with Raousset and recommended that he come to Mexico City.

Armed with laudatory letters from the consular officials, the Count arrived in Mexico City and was quickly introduced to Jean-Baptiste Jecker. The two men immediately signed a contract under which Raousset was to raise and arm, at the Jecker company's expense, one hundred and fifty men in California. This small army was to furnish protection from the Apaches for company men who would explore and exploit their gigantic concession in the Arizona mining region. For his efforts Raousset would receive half the profits and half the properties.

With the fund of thirty thousand pesos entrusted to him for recruiting and outfitting, Raousset collected two hundred and forty men, all French, bought four cannons, and rented a ship. On June 1, 1852 he landed in Guaymas where he was happily received by the people of the port, who thought he would open a rich new area for the state. His arrogance and martial air, and the four cannons, convinced some residents, however, that he had come for some ulterior purpose, and they promptly communicated their fears to the state's military commander, General Blanco de Estrada, in Arizpe.

The Commander ordered the count to move his men out of the port, but he refused. Intervention by the Jecker representative averted open hostilities; he attended to the formalities for landing that the Count had ignored, and

sought permission for him to continue the trip to Arizona. General Blanco gave permission for the trip, providing the intruders followed the route he laid out for them and that the Count came to Arizpe to explain his conduct. Raousset had no intention of following anyone's itinerary but his own, and in addition, he accused Blanco of representing a rival mineral company, which had been founded in Sonora simultaneously with the Compañía Restauradora. After a brief delay in Hermosillo, where he quarreled with Jecker's representative over accounts, Raousset marched north to Magdalena, which he made his headquarters. He intended to use Magdalena as a base from which to seize Hermosillo and Arizpe.

General Blanco belatedly realized Raousset's intentions and ordered the garrison in Hermosillo reinforced. During a rapid march to the town, Blanco lost numerous men and armaments, and arrived there with only one hundred and sixty men. In Hermosillo he found sixty additional volunteers, all untrained. He had no time to prepare for defending the town, however. Raousset arrived before the General had anticipated, attacked at eight-thirty in the morning, and at ten-thirty the town belonged to the French. Blanco retreated across the Sonora River to Villa de Seris, and then to Guaymas to establish a center of operations.

Raousset egotistically believed himself already the owner of Sonora. To the residents of Hermosillo he proclaimed that he brought liberty to the state, never

understanding that to the people of Sonora he represented a rival mining company vying for a concession, not a foreign liberator. He convinced himself that he would be joined by those disaffected with the government and various outstanding citizens. He lost no time in approaching them, but their lack of response convinced him that his conquest was imaginary and that his position was extremely precarious. Not knowing then what to do with the territory he held, he petitioned Blanco for a peaceful embarkation, enforcing his request with pleas from governmental officials he held as hostages. General Blanco acceded to this demand, requiring only the surrender of the arms and munitions. Raousset and his men sailed away.

In March, 1853, the conservative centralists returned to power in Mexico City and Santa Ana was formally given dictatorial powers. His Most Serene Highness dissolved the state governments and appointed new officials. Sonora became a department with a council to replace the legislature, and Manuel M. Gándara, who had been re-elected in 1852, was not installed until confirmed as an appointee of the central government. The capricious Santa Ana changed his mind the next year and replaced Gándara with General José María Yáñez, a more capable military man. Blanco had been removed for his generosity to Raousset, and now the latter was preparing another filibustering expedition.

Early in 1853, he began the formation of a new force in California to take Sonora, using as a pretext an alleged breach

of promise by the Mexican president to give him protection against the Apaches. Again, his efforts were abetted by the French consul in San Francisco and the French minister in Mexico City. The latter, believing that the new President, Santa Ana, would agree to the entry of agricultural colonists who were not from the United States, encouraged Raousset to adopt this guise. But Santa Ana was not deceived. He learned from the United States' press and from private sources what was in the wind, and sent orders to the military commander in the state to prepare a defense. All able men in the state between sixteen and fifty years old were called to arms, federal taxes were pledged for their support, and the surrounding states were ordered to help.

Santa Ana's unexpected reaction caused the French minister to write to the consul in San Francisco that he should advise Raousset that he would no longer have official support. Raousset then declared that he would call off his invasion since he had no grudge against the present Mexican administration; in fact, he would offer his services to Santa Ana. The President, thinking he had frightened Raousset, accepted with alacrity, and once again, the Count journeyed to Mexico City. There he presented an absurd military and colonization project for Sonora. To end the Apache menace in Arizona and Sonora the government should give him fifty thousand pesos, a five hundred man army, with himself as commander, of course, which would operate against the Apaches independently of the other forces in the state.



The government would pay for all campaigns; for his share he asked a rather large salary, the rights to one-half of all mines, current and future, in Arizona, and other equally outrageous benefits. Santa Ana could not sustain such proposals, but as a gesture offered to commission Raousset a colonel in the national army. That dreamer of grandiose dreams was insulted and angered and left Mexico City vowing a terrible revenge.

Back in San Francisco, Raousset conceived the idea of provoking a federalist movement in Mexico which would restore the Constitution of 1824 and awake the not-yet-moribund federalist-centralist controversy. When the movement triumphed, as he was certain it would, he would declare Sonora, Baja California, Chihuahua, Durango and Sinaloa as seceded and form a new nation. Naturally, Raousset envisioned himself as chief of this new nation. For this new enterprise, he gathered fifteen hundred men. In the meantime, William Walker, a United States citizen, had also decided that he wanted to rule a part of Mexico, and invaded Baja California while Raousset was still making preparations. The Walker filibustering expedition prompted the Mexican government to order that all individuals forming parties of armed adventurers be shot without trial.

Santa Ana knew of Raousset's continuing activities. To counter them, he told the Mexican consul in San Francisco to enlist all who wanted to aid Mexico, except United States citizens, to come to Mexico at government expense to serve

in diverse army units. If, after one year's service a man desired to leave the army, the government would furnish him lands and the means to work them. Three hundred and eighty-six men, all French, quickly volunteered to go to Mexico and were sent to Guaymas early in April, 1854.

Shortly after this group sailed from San Francisco the Mexican consul there wrote to the military governor of Sonora, General José María Yáñez, warning him to maintain a careful vigil over the arriving Frenchmen. For Santa Ana's proposal had fitted nicely into Raousset's plans, and among the newly arrived group were some of his most trusted cohorts. Shortly after arrival in Guaymas, they organized themselves into the "French Battalion." The consul's warning was unneeded; Yáñez knew everything happening within the group from the moment it landed.

Raousset himself arrived July 1, 1854. After meeting with the officers of the French Battalion and taking over its command, he met with Yáñez and declared himself to be at his service to fight Apaches. Yáñez told Raousset that he must leave the country immediately, and the Count responded with several proposals that Yáñez knew were simply ploys to gain time. The Mexican commander played the game, watching each move of the Frenchmen, and waiting for them to initiate hostilities. There was irony in the fact that most of the army of Frenchmen had been housed, fed, and armed by his own government.

The expected battle came on July 13. When the smoke

cleared, the Count and his men were prisoners of a smaller Mexican force. A council of war condemned Count Gaston de Raousset Boulbon to death, and he was executed on August 12, 1854.

Before Raousset had completed his preparations for his second invasion of Sonora, Santa Ana bartered away another piece of the territory which the Count hoped to rule. In part, this territorial loss stemmed from the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which set the Sonoran boundary at the Gila River but described only vaguely the line's continuation from the Gila River to El Paso. The border there was based on an 1847 reprint of an 1828 plagiarism of an 1826 reproduction of part of an unsurveyed 1822 publication. The inaccuracies could cost the United States three million acres of fertile land in the Mesilla Valley in New Mexico, which alone probably necessitated a new treaty.

A definitive boundary demarcation was necessary for other reasons. Article II of the treaty committed the United States to prevent Indian raids across the border, and Mexican claims for Apache depredations quickly mounted. In addition, the United States was interested in a southern railroad route to California which would avoid the high mountains. Santa Ana, who needed money to pay the army that kept him in office, agreed to the sale of a strip of land from the Rio Grande to the Colorado River, the Gadsden Purchase. Thus Sonora lost more territory to the United States, a loss

which would in later years, with the coming of the railroads, tie her economy to that of the United States.

The Southern Pacific railroad was still thirty years in the future, and the border area in 1853 could hardly be called civilized. Apaches and renegades from both sides of the border ranged at will through the area. The United States built Fort Buchanan twenty miles east of Tubac, now in Arizona, to stop the Apache raids in 1856, and with this seeming protection, prospectors flocked to southern Arizona. The Arizona Mining and Trading Company, organized in San Francisco, reopened the old mines at Ajo, and other miners allegedly found the fabled mine of Arizonac, which still lay in Sonoran territory. Sonoran troops chased the straying miners from the state.

The political chaos in Mexico and Sonora was to grow even worse before it got better. Yáñez was recalled because Santa Ana disapproved of his magnanimity to Raousset's men. He was followed by two replacements before Santa Ana finally went into exile in August, 1855. The second of these resigned in September, 1855 when the news of Santa Ana's fall arrived in Sonora, and Gándara seized the offices of governor and commanding general. The central government had other ideas and named José de Águilar and Pedro Espejo to the respective posts, but Gándara, backed by the council, refused to publish the decree appointing them. He succeeded in forcing the deportation of Espejo, then yielded the governorship to Águilar, who was his brother-in-law. Gándara retained the title of

military commander. His actions were opposed by a young colonel in the national army, Ignacio Pesqueira, who was illegally removed from his military command for his opposition.

With near anarchy existing in the state, two Californians arrived in Guaymas to push a colonization plan; they were Henry A. Crabb and his brother-in-law, Agustín Ainza, supposedly related to a prominent Sonoran family. Through family connections in Sonora, the two men approached several political figures, including Governor Águilar and Ignacio Pesqueira. Águilar opposed the plan, but Pesqueira secretly supported it as a means of securing power for himself. Gándara accused Águilar of encouraging an invasion, and used that untruth as a basis for a revolt. He arrested and replaced Águilar, but Pesqueira came to the rescue, and routed Gándara at Ures on July 15, 1856. The rest of the state quickly fell under his power, and Gándara appealed to the Yaquis and the clergy for support. A series of defeats for Gándara followed, after which he fled to Chihuahua, leaving his brother to carry on the fight in Sonora. The reform movement had taken office in Mexico City after Santa Ana's exile, and a new constitution was promulgated in February, 1857, and, after a year of turmoil in Sonora, Pesqueira, as a supporter of the liberal reforms, became the military and political governor of the state.

Henry A. Crabb had not given up his colonization scheme. He entered the state at the oasis town of Sonoita in the northwest, and from there sent a letter on March 26, 1857, to

the prefect of the Altar District. In it he stated that he had come in conformity with the colonization laws of Mexico and by specific invitation of some of the most prominent citizens of Sonora. He came, he said, with a hundred men as a vanguard of nine hundred more, all of whom hoped to make their homes in Sonora. He was well armed, but that was customary when crossing the Apache-infested regions. Crabb further stated that he knew that Mexicans and Indians were being aroused against him, and wells were being poisoned. Such measures would lead to retribution, he warned, but he would not draw the first blood.

Crabb's letter was forwarded to Pesqueira, who had learned previously of Crabb's imminent entrance into Sonora and had ordered that the invaders be fought without quarter. To the people of Sonora he proclaimed that they must prepare themselves to reject the invaders who posed as colonizers and bringers of civilization. He reminded Sonorans that Texas was lost because of treasonous colonizers.

Three hundred men raised by the prefect of Altar rushed to Caborca to intercept the filibusterers. The Crabb party arrived in Caborca on April 1 to find the Sonoran defenders barricaded in the church. After five days of stalemated fighting, reinforcements from other districts entered Caborca, and the next day burned Crabb's men from their stronghold in the houses surrounding the church. A summary trial condemned the captives, including Crabb, to

death, and all were executed two days later.

Gándara resumed his conflict with the liberal faction in mid-1857, as the conservative influence waxed in Mexico City. Yaqui aid was enlisted again, and with clerical backing the crusade against the liberals continued, with Sinaloa becoming the battlefield at the close of 1857. Pesqueira went to Sinaloa and remained to aid the liberals until 1860. While he fought in Sinaloa, Gándara again aroused the Yaquis, and the Ópatas joined them with Gándara claiming the governorship of Sonora. Pesqueira had to get help from Sinaloa to dislodge him.

With this outbreak of the Civil War in the United States both sides courted Pesqueira to obtain the rights of passage for war materials, but the French intervention distracted Sonoran attention from the neighbors on the north. A large contingent of state troops was sent to fight the French in Sinaloa in 1862, and Pesqueira received fulsome praise from Benito Juárez for his efforts against the invaders. But almost all of the troops deserted before meeting the enemy. Their loyalties lay in their villages, not with Mexico, for which they paid taxes and received nothing. The army rank and file were conscripts and the state had no money, so it could not buy their loyalty.

Napoleon III wanted to acquire the legendary Sonoran mines and tried to persuade Pesqueira to join the French. After being rebuffed, he appealed to Maximilian to cede

Sonora to him, but Maximilian refused and Napoleon did not push his desires. Sonora remained relatively uninvolved, although French naval forces several times blockaded Guaymas. Gándara launched an abortive revolt in 1862, after which he retired to Mexico City; Pesqueira was re-elected governor in 1863.

The French finally landed in Guaymas in March, 1865, and with them came Gándara. Pesqueira had had three years in which to prepare, but his troops were inexperienced and badly armed, and he decided to retire rather than waste manpower on a certain defeat. He retreated to Hermosillo, which the French attacked and took in July. Conservative uprisings prodded by Gándara erupted over the state. The Yaquis, Mayos, Ópatas and Pimas joined, and soon much of the state belonged to the French. After Hermosillo fell Pesqueira had fallen back to Ures which was in turn besieged; with its fall he fled to the United States, not out of cowardice, but because of personal misfortune. He was ill, his young son died in flight, and his ill wife died a few months later. His wife's brother remained to lead the resistance until Pesqueira returned in March, 1866.

Many of the French troops were withdrawn to meet possible intervention by the United States when the Civil War in that country ended, and native monarchists had to struggle on their own. With help from Sinaloa the liberal elements began to regain control, and town after town was recaptured, slowly,



with heavy losses and deliberate destruction. The decisive battle was a victory by the liberals on the Guadalupe Plains near Ures, on September 4, 1866, and on September 15 the remaining French troops sailed from Guaymas. The Yaquis and the Mayos were not subjugated until November.

Pesqueira was re-elected in 1867 and 1873. The Yaquis, angered by continued encroachments on their lands, revolted in June, 1867; a massacre of the Indians in the church at Bácum preceded the peace in 1868. A new state constitution was promulgated in 1873, which led to a short revolt in Álamos; then, with the state at peace, Pesqueira retired to his ranch in 1874.

State elections were held in 1875. Pesqueira did not seek the governorship, but backed his relative, Colonel José J. Pesqueira, for governor while he himself ran for vice-governor. José's opponent for the governorship was Ignacio's brother-in-law, General Jesús García Morales, and the organizer of the opposition in Álamos was a young political newcomer, Ramón Corral. The Pesqueiras' opposition carried the districts of Álamos, Altar, Arizpe and Magdalena, but violence and military force prevented their success in the five other districts and the state legislature nullified the votes of the first four. The election abuses caused Sonorans to feel that Pesqueira had imposed his candidate, and, under General Francisco Serna of Altar, dissidents proclaimed the Plan of Altar and petitioned the President to

nullify the elections and appoint an interim governor. In the initial armed conflicts the rebels were defeated, and they crossed to the United States to regroup. The Yaquis rebelled in September, and Serna successfully resumed his campaign in November, causing the Governor to appeal to Mexico City for help.

President Lerdo de Tejada named General Vicente Marischal as the new military commander in the state and he arrived in March, 1876. Marischal saw his role as that of mediator, not as a prop for Pesqueira's government. On March 14, he declared martial law in the state and assumed political control

Porfirio Díaz had announced his Plan of Tuxtepec on January 1, 1876 in opposition to the candidacy of the incumbent president, Sebastiano Lerdo de Tejada. National elections held in October, 1876 favored Lerdo, but the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, José María Iglesias, denied their legality and claimed the presidency for himself. Marischal and Pesqueira supported Lerdo, but a decisive victory by Díaz forced Lerdo to flee to the United States, and Iglesias took office in November; shortly afterwards he would yield the presidency to Díaz. In the meantime, the Pesqueiras conferred at Ignacio's ranch and then José J. told Marischal that his commission was no longer valid and that the power had reverted to him. When Marischal refused to yield the government, the Pesqueiras revolted; but Pesqueira popularity had waned, and

Ignacio fled to Chihuahua when the first attack failed.

With the election of Luis Emetario Torres in 1879, a new political triad appeared to dominate Sonoran politics, that would retain control of the state until deposed by the revolution in 1911. Carlos Ortíz succeeded Torres in 1881, but political pressures forced him to seek a leave of absence. He was replaced by Ramón Corral, the second member of the triad and at the time Senator in Mexico City, who had been a member of the legislature which had battled Mariscal. Torres was re-elected in 1883 and 1891, but in the latter year, in accordance with a previous agreement, he took a leave of absence and the Vice-Governor, Rafael Izábel, the third member of the triad, served the entire term.

The election of 1887 made it obvious, if it had not been before, that the Torres-Izábel-Corral faction had the backing of the central government. José María Maytorena, Sr., of Guaymas, who claimed to represent the liberal element of the state, wanted to be governor. A newspaper in Álamos launched his candidacy in December, 1886, and was followed by other papers and the formation of political clubs. The state suspected that Luis E. Torres would run again, but he surprised the populace and announced the candidacy of his brother, Lorenzo. Ramón Corral, who had been Secretary of Government for the state, was named as the vice-gubernatorial candidate. Sonorans wondered if the governorship would become a dynasty, as was the case in other states; they speculated

that one could determine the length of tenure for the dynasty by the number of brothers the candidate had. Torres responded to Maytorena's opposition with the use of federal military forces.

The elections were held April 24, and Maytorena's supporters insisted that their candidate won; the Governor, fearing a rebellion, called out the troops. The opposition was not prepared to resist militarily, so there was no bloodshed. Immediately after being sworn in, Lorenzo Torres took a leave of absence, leaving the governorship in Corral's hands. Until he left the state to serve as the governor of the Federal District and later as Secretary of Government in Mexico City, Ramón Corral was a member of the state government continually from 1882, although not always in an elective capacity.

In 1901, President Díaz became ill, and seemingly for the first time he and Mexico thought about his mortality. Díaz solved the problem by amending the constitution to provide for a vice-president, at the same time extending the presidential term to six years. There was much speculation and political excitement over the idea of a new office to fill, and there was a long list of potential candidates. Elections were to be held July 11, 1904. Díaz sent a list of his choices for the various offices to the governors in late June. All the important people in the capital were shocked by his vice-presidential choice: Ramón Corral, a

man they had not considered because he was a nobody.

A simulated convention was held and Corral was officially named as candidate, scarcely one week before the elections. There was no time to build opposition. The results of the elections in the Federal District were speedily tabulated in Mexico City on election day, and at ten-fifteen that evening the unanimous choice was Díaz and Corral. A committee went to tell Corral that he had won; he prudently replied that he did not know if the results would be the same all over Mexico.

The political stability which was the result of repression permitted Sonora, as the rest of Mexico, to make some economic and even some social progress. Corral's slogan was "Government for All," but the "All" did not include the poor or the Indians, since the intellectuals of his era judged those groups to be inferior. Despite their ignoring them, however, the economic and social programs current in Mexico helped numerous Sonorans, for the state did not suffer many of the abuses caused by twisted interpretations of the Constitution of 1857.

It was in their concern with education that the triad revealed a progressive spirit. Corral, especially, was a fanatic about improving education in the state. Ortíz had opened the first secondary school in Hermosillo, the "Instituto Sonorense" in July, 1822. Hermosillo had become the state capital in 1870; prior to that Ures had served, and

it was in Ures that the state's most advanced educational facilities were found. The Hermosillo school proved to be impractical and revealed the truly sad state of education in Sonora; there were very few students eligible for entry because few had completed the necessary primary work, and it was too expensive for most students. Wealthy parents opted to send their children to the United States to study. The "Colegio Sonora," soon to be the state's pre-eminent secondary school, opened January 1, 1889 in Hermosillo; among its young teachers in the early 1890's were several men who would later be important in the revolution, Plutarco Elías Calles, Francisco Chapa and Epifanio Vieyra. One of the early students was Adolfo de la Huerta.

The population of the state was widely scattered in small settlements and ranches, making the founding of schools very difficult. Corral pushed for the opening of more schools and insisted that qualified teachers be brought in to supplement the few competent ones in the state. Educational councils were established in the principal towns. Funds were always a problem; in 1871, 1872 and 1873 the state spent 12,000 pesos per year on education, but by 1880 the figure had risen to only 15,000 pesos. Figures are not available for appropriations from 1881 to 1910, but educational progress was evident. Between 1895 and 1910, the percentage of adult Sonorans knowing how to read grew from twenty-three percent to thirty-four percent.

Contributing very importantly to the economic advance during the Díaz era was the suppression of the old scourge of Sonora, the Apaches. Between 1790 and 1810, the Spanish had gained some control over them through the use of bribes, which were paid if the Indians remained near the presidios. However, the newly independent nation could not afford the costs, and the raids again escalated. The Yaqui wars in 1827 and 1832 drew men from the northern presidios and the Apache depredations extended past Arizpe to the vicinity of Ures and Hermosillo. The populace left the smaller communities in the north, mines were abandoned and missions were deserted. After the Yaquis were suppressed, there was a concerted effort to eradicate the Apaches, but citizen zeal languished after several victories. The Governor was determined on extermination, and with the inducement of a generous bounty for each Apache scalp, waged a successful campaign until the Indians retired to the north. The condition of the central government and its involvement in the war in Texas prevented any help from that quarter. By 1850, the northern frontier was practically deserted, with a population only in the larger towns, such as Altar, Magdalena and Arizpe.

As most of Mexico settled into quiet after Díaz took over, more and more troops could be dispatched to the frontier, with varying success. The United States had attempted to contain the Apaches by putting them on reservations after 1872, while at the same time furnishing them with rifles for

hunting. Furious Sonorans claimed that the United States wars against the Indians only served to drive many of them into Mexico; and when Apaches left the reservations, as they did in 1885, they had the latest weapons. Because of the flights from the reservations, the United States made several reciprocal-crossing agreements in order to pursue the marauding Indians. The capture of Geronimo in 1886 effectively ended Apache threats from the United States, though some renegades continued causing sporadic trouble into the 1890's.

Maritime commerce had been slow to develop in Sonora, although Guaymas was an excellent port. A large part of the state was outside the area of commercial influence of the border ports as well; due to poor communications and distance, production and consumption was localized. The towns near the northern frontier, such as Altar, Arizpe, Magdalena and later, Cananea, relied on the United States for supplying their necessities.

Until late in the Díaz era and the development of the mines and the railroad, Sonora produced little but agricultural products which had no market because of the lack of transportation. Some cotton fabric of poor quality, used in serapes and blankets, was produced, but there was no wool because almost all the sheep had been taken or killed by the Apaches. There were several cartmakers and saddleries, and palm straw hats and mattresses were also produced, mostly for local markets. The state lacked good wood workers, ironworkers,



silversmiths, tailors, tanners and shoemakers, so their products had to be imported.

Cattle were Sonora's most important agricultural product, but the internal tax structure hindered their movement. Too, they were of inferior quality, range cattle unhindered by fences, so that blood lines were lost when introduced, which was seldom. For at least half of every year, they were pitifully thin because of lack of forage during the dry seasons; they were usually marketed at the end of a rainy season. Under normal conditions, there was little market in the United States for Sonoran cattle, except for their hides.

Under the Díaz policy of encouraging foreign investments, several large stretches of land were sold to American cattle companies in Sonora and other northern states. The Sonora Land and Cattle Company acquired about 1,300,000 acres and the West Coast Cattle Company, about 230,000 acres. The Cananea Cattle Company, with approximately 700,000 acres, was formed in 1901 as a subsidiary of the Cananea Consolidated Copper Company. The American companies utilized more advanced stock-raising techniques than Mexican ranchers, and fenced their pastures and introduced blooded herds to upgrade the native cattle.

The average size of an hacienda in Sonora ranged from 5000 to 7500 acres. Although some of the abuses common in central Mexico were found on the haciendas in Sonora, they were not prevalent. A peon in the Guaymas district was paid six to eight pesos per month, plus about a bushel of corn,

wheat or garbanzos; his counterpart in central Mexico made twenty-five centavos per day. The debts owed to the hacendado were limited by state law in December, 1881 to the equivalent of three months' pay, but in 1883 the limit had to be raised to six months' pay. The owners used the debt as a means to keep the workers on the land.

Around Banámichi, the aparcería, a work system similar to the tenant farmer system in the southern United States, was used frequently. The hacienda owners furnished the land, work animals, seeds and implements, and the aparcero received two-thirds of the crop. If the owner furnished only the lands, the tenant received three-fourths of the crop.

Aside from the cattle lands which fell into foreign hands, foreign owners took over some of the most productive and fertile agricultural lands in Sonora, those located in the Yaqui River Valley, and not with happy consequences. The state government and the national government disliked seeing the well-watered lands claimed by the Yaquis going uncultivated when good lands were in demand. A national law had ordered the surveying and colonization of vacant lands; the survey would be conducted by private companies which would receive as compensation up to one-third of the lands which they surveyed. The remainder of the lands belonged to the government and could be sold to individuals or companies. In either case land ownership was to be limited to 6200 acres.

The law was subject to much abuse, and attempted

implementation in 1885 led to a Yaqui revolt. In 1887, the law was suspended until the Yaqui case could be studied; it was decided to establish a legal fund for each Yaqui pueblo, allotting so much per family, or per single male.<sup>4</sup> The Yaquis, who had always declared that God gave the river to the Yaquis, not a piece to each Yaqui, did not favor the division. The plan was opposed also by mine and ranch owners, who wanted cheap labor. The surveying continued, and by 1892 lands had been allotted to seven Yaqui pueblos and four Mayo pueblos. An uprising in 1886-1890 did not stop the building of canals by concessionaires, nor the arrival of colonists; it merely gave the federal army, which had nothing else to do, some valuable field experience. The largest grant went to Lorenzo Torres and his family, nearly one million acres. The lands around BÁCUM and CÓCORIT were divided in 1904; they were parcelled out not to the Indians, but to the colonists. The Sonora and Sinaloa Irrigation Company received 400,000 acres in the 1890's; when that company was sold to the Richardson Construction Company of Los Angeles, the lands acquired by the latter near BÁCUM and CÓCORIT raised the total to equal

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<sup>4</sup>The fundo legal denotes municipal lands under the control of the town council. Unlike the ejido, the lands are not common lands, but may be sold for town lots or farms, or donated to the indigent; they are not strictly agricultural. The state legislature establishes the legal fund for each town and it may be increased at the discretion of the state legislature.

that belonging to the Torres family. Richardson paid six pesos and sixty centavos per hectare (2.471 acres).

There were more Yaqui wars in 1902 and 1908; indeed there was seldom truly peace. The campaigns were ruthless and cruel, with innocent Indian women and children dying or being divided among the "civilized" population. The Yaqui responded with equal brutality. Attempts to bring peace met with little success, and one of the plans proposed was that of deporting the Yaquis. Ramón Corral bore the onus of the plan, but it was not his; the Secretary of War suggested it, as did the Governor of Sinaloa, who wanted slave labor for his hacienda. The Governor of Sonora in 1902 approved a plan to move them elsewhere in the state, but the most severe punishment was the transfer to other states, principally to Yucatán. Governor Torres considered the deportation a magnanimous gesture on the part of the government; at least the Yaquis were alive. Díaz decreed the deportation in 1908; one colonel stated that he had shipped 15,700 Yaquis to Yucatán in the succeeding three years at sixty-five pesos each. However, he said he only received ten pesos for each; the Secretary of War took the rest. Torres said the claim was not true, and denied that there was a plot to take the Yaqui lands.

Mexico was not a metal consumer under Díaz, although the mining of minerals and petroleum constituted her largest industry. The market lay outside the country. To make the

mining profitable in remote areas like Sonora, cheap transport had to be available, and that came with the railroad. Mineral products, which had been Sonora's chief economic resource throughout the colonial era, yielded a total income of 4,243,683 pesos during the period 1867 to 1870.

There had been numerous proposals for railroads since 1861, and several concessions had been granted, including an extortionate one under Pesqueira, but it was not until 1880 that work actually began from Guaymas to Hermosillo with American capital. In 1882, the track reached north to Nogales, which was connected to the Southern Pacific Railroad at Benson, Arizona, the same year. The railroad, earlier opposed in Mexico City because it would tie Sonora more closely to the United States, had been planned to join the capital via Guadalajara. Work began southward from Guaymas in 1904, and westward from Mexico City. By 1909 the stretch from Guaymas reached Mazatlán; the revolution interrupted construction and the railroad was not completed until 1927.

There were several short railroads built specifically to serve a particular mining area, most of which were destroyed during the revolution beginning in 1911, or in the Yaqui war. The census of 1910 showed branches leaving the main north-south line at Navojoa for Álamos; from Corral, near Cócorit, up the Yaqui River past Tórin to Tonichi; from Nogales to join the branch from Naco to Cananea; from Agua Prieta eighty-two miles south to Nacozari; from Torres

to Minas Prietas to the Yaqui River and from Sierra Pinta to Bahía San Jorge. There were no east-west connections across the Sierra Madre Occidental; a traveler from Chihuahua to Sonora had to utilize the United States lines, or travel to Mexico City and then to the west coast, then go via boat to Guaymas.

Sonora had, and has, extensive coal deposits which were worked, but the coal for the railroads came from Colorado and New Mexico. The state's coal production was over 50,000 tons per year after 1902. Coal was necessary for smelting and refining of ores, but Sonoran coal was never used by the northeastern mining companies. State coal powered the small steam flour mills and cooked the food.

Copper was not an important mineral until the end of the century and the influx of American money. American-owned claims were scattered over the large Arizpe district and around Moctezuma and Altar. The Guggenheims gained control of the mines at Pilares de Nacozari in the early 1890's, and sold them to the Phelps-Dodge interests in 1897. The Nacozari mining camp was linked to the Douglas, Arizona smelters and foundries of Phelps-Dodge in 1901, when the company completed a railroad, but the most important copper mining center in all Mexico was developed in the hills surrounding Cananea, where Colonel William Cornell Greene built his empire.

Cananea was an old community, originally a Pima Indian village already in existence when Father Kino came to Sonora in 1687. Since those early days the area had been known to be rich in minerals, especially copper, but the Spaniards who came to Sonora were interested not in copper, but only in the gold and silver which is often found in association with copper. The surface deposits had been worked for their precious metal contents by a Spanish soldier who did well until they were exhausted; the subsurface deposits were known but remained untouched. Apache raids, long distances, and high costs prevented any subsequent development of importance until the nineteenth century. In 1820 the mines were reopened, but once again they were worked only for the precious metals. A smelter was built near Cananea Vieja, which functioned until the Apaches forced its abandonment.

In 1862 and 1863 several California companies exploited mines in the state, with an investment of more than 3,000,000 pesos in machinery and salaries. The French intervention and the lack of government assistance in fighting the Apaches forced the companies to abandon their efforts before any real developments had been made. Until late in the century Sonora had no refining facilities, especially necessary for the low-grade ores which were plentiful, and state law forbade the export of rock minerals until 1868; in that year the law was modified and a state tax imposed on the value of the gold and silver content of the ore being exported.

When General Ignacio Pesqueira became governor, he acquired the mining properties from some families who had unsuccessfully attempted to develop them. Pesqueira had considerable wealth and was able to build and man a fort to protect his mines. He rebuilt and enlarged the smelter into an elaborate facility for that time and place, turning out partially refined copper (matte) from all the mines in the area. The matte went to Guaymas by ox-team, and then to Swansea, Wales for refining. Even with the long sea voyage he made a profit. After Pesqueira's death, his enterprise declined, but other operators moved into the area, mostly men from the United States.

William Cornell Greene was one of the Americans looking for mining properties near Cananea in the late 1880's and early 1890's. Under Mexican law no foreigner could own land within one hundred kilometers of the border, but the exceptions ruled more often than the law, since the Díaz government actively promoted foreign investments. Greene began building his empire by leasing the Pesqueira properties and organizing the Cananea Copper Company on December 3, 1896, after a merger with another group of mine holders. Three more mines were added to the original holdings in 1898.

After much financial maneuvering and long courtroom battles in the United States, Greene incorporated the Cananea Consolidated Copper Company, S. A., as a Mexican corporation in Nogales, Sonora, on October 9, 1899. Two



days later he deeded all of his Mexican holdings, twenty-four mines and groups of mines, to the new company, soon to be known through Sonora and southern Arizona as the 4C's. Then in February, 1900 Greene and some of his financial friends formed a holding company, the Greene Consolidated Copper Company, to which he turned over all of his capital stock in the 4C's.

The 4C's wasted no time in exploiting its mines, but a multitude of problems went along with exploitation. The mines and smelters had to have workers. The workers had to have a place to live; they had to be able to buy food and clothes; there had to be schools, town buildings, a cemetery, a jail and parks for a community. Before any of these there had to be land. Since mineral rights were separate from surface rights, Greene had to buy a large tract around the mines. The company set aside land and furnished a part of the money needed for civic buildings for the town it was creating and the company built stores, a bank, a hospital, a school, a slaughterhouse, a laundry, an ice-plant, and a church, and pumped in an adequate water supply. On October 13, 1901 the state legislature granted Greene's new town the status of municipality.

The mines could not be run profitably without adequate transportation and this, too, the company had to provide. A branch of the Southern Pacific Railroad ended at Naco, Arizona. All material entering or leaving Cananea had to

travel forty-five miles of poor road in horse-drawn wagons, and communications were no better by way of Magdalena. By the end of 1900, there were 1800 horses pulling company wagons over the Naco road, an expensive and slow method. To replace the horses, Greene bought steam tractors to pull the ore wagons; their weight necessitated rebuilding the road. The best solution, he knew, was a railroad, but he could not get the Southern Pacific to build an extension. So he built it himself, inaugurating service in January, 1902. The railroad became a part of the Southern Pacific system in July, 1903.

Colonel Greene's Cananea became the setting for what many Mexican historians refer to as the opening battle of the revolution, the strike against the 4C's in 1906. The town furnished the perfect ambience for the growth of the syndicalist-socialist-anarchist political clubs mushrooming throughout Mexico, formed by followers of the Flores-Magon brothers, Antonio I. Villarreal or others, most of whom were in exile in the United States. Through the presence of American miners and occasional agitators, the community was made aware of the unionizing efforts in the mines north of the border. Most importantly for the revolutionary movement, Cananea had a small middle class to furnish leadership, men of some education who were storekeepers, company clerks, etc.

There were several of these supposedly secret societies

active in Cananea and its associated mining camps. Early in 1906 a new club, the "Liberal Humanity Union," was formed by Manuel M. Diéguez, Esteban B. Calderón and Francisco M. Ibarra, acknowledged leaders in this underground political world. Lázaro Gutiérrez de Lara, a lawyer and president of the other liberal club in Cananea, joined the new group also. Gutiérrez was a socialist and a member of the Liberal Mexican Party which worked to organize labor in the northern Sonora mining camps, with aid from the Western Federation of Miners in the United States.

The social and economic conditions in Cananea furnished them with a plethora of inequities and injustices which members of the Union could exploit with their developing nationalistic fervor. The numerous company officials and supervisory personnel were all foreigners, mostly from the United States, and showed in many cases the American disdain for all Mexicans as inferiors. Hence there was a built-in antipathy available for exploitation. To make matters worse, a part of the ordinary workmen were also from the United States and were paid double the wage earned by Mexicans in the same category, seven pesos to the Mexican's three and one-half. In this situation national differences created economic injustices. All economic realities could be successfully made to focus on this one point. The new society played on the worker's discontent, reiterating the wage differential and the government's culpability. The

Union incited the workers to a strike, but warned them that the government would view a strike as insubordination; Diéguez, personally, did not favor a strike.

The strike began peacefully with the early morning shift on June 1, 1906, but degenerated into violence before the morning was over, when the workers learned that the 4C's was not disposed to grant their demands. Greene pleaded with the workers to go home, and pointed out that their wage was already double that of all other miners in Mexico. Their prices in the company store were the lowest in all Mexican mining camps. He also reminded them that Díaz, under pressure from other mine owners who considered the high wages as unfair competition, had asked for a reduction in their pay.

The initial violence occurred at the company lumberyard, where the managers were killed and the yard burned; from there it spread like a brush fire among both labor and management. Greene called on Governor Izábel for help, and notified Douglas, Arizona, of what was happening. Knowing that Izábel could not get troops there for two days, American volunteers filtered across the border to aid Greene, stirring an international incident. After the arrival of Emilio Kosterlitsky's rurales the next day, the Americans returned to Douglas without firing a shot, and calm descended on Cananea, since no one wanted to be in Kosterlitsky's bad graces. Twenty of the ringleaders were arrested, and

some, like Diéguez and Esteban B. Calderón, were sentenced to serve fifteen years in San Juan de Ullus prison; others, like Gutiérrez, escaped to Arizona. The workers returned to the mines, partly at Greene's urging, and partly due to the speech made by General Luis E. Torres, in which he promised that everyone not back at work in two days would be drafted and sent to fight the Yaquis.

The miners at Cananea gained nothing immediately from the strike, but over the next few years the workday was gradually cut back to eight and one-half hours, pay increased by about one hundred pesos per year, and Americans, who made up thirty-four percent of the work force in 1906, were reduced by 1912 to only thirteen percent.

The 4C's was already in financial trouble when the strike began, and late in 1906 the Rockefeller-owned Amalgamated Copper Company forced a merger, with Greene yielding his directing role. In May, 1907 refined copper brought twenty-five cents per pound; in September, the price dropped to fifteen and one-half cents, with no takers. The company curtailed production and finally shut down to make repairs. Resuming operations in 1908, the 4C's was producing six million pounds per month by October 1911, for a price of nine and one-half to ten cents per pound.

Díaz told the United States ambassador in June, 1906, that the twenty leaders at Cananea were only a handful of those holding the same sentiments, and asserted that Cananea

was only the beginning. Because of United States surveillance, the arrests of leaders, and the capture of membership lists in El Paso, the armed cells scattered over Mexico could be crushed. Raids in Arizona netted fifteen leaders from Sonora who were sent to San Juan de Ullua; that prison came to hold almost one thousand men, of whom five hundred died. Some of the Sonorans were eventually given provisional freedom by the Díaz government; others, like Diéguez, were not freed until pardoned by Madero.

The arrests did not stop the formation of political clubs in Sonora. In Guaymas, an anti-Díaz group, with Adolfo de la Huerta as one of its most active young members, held its meetings on park benches to evade the scrutiny of the police. The group supported Bernardo Reyes when he was a potential candidate for vice-president in 1910, and when Reyes left the scene, formed the nucleus of the Maderista anti-Re-electionist Club in Guaymas, with Eugenio H. Gayou, Carlos E. Randall, Carlos Plank, Plutarco Elías Calles, and José María Maytorena among its members. In all the state's larger towns, local intellectuals ignored the official opposition to associate with men of like political thought.

## CHAPTER II MADERO AND MAYTORENA

The famous James Creel interview of February 17, 1908 with Porfirio Díaz was printed in Mexico City in El Imparcial on March 3. Díaz told Creelman:

It is an error to suppose that the future of democracy in Mexico has been endangered by the long period in which one president has occupied the post. I can say sincerely that the post has not corrupted my political ideals, and that I believe that democracy is a true and just principle of government, even when in practice, it is only possible for highly advanced nations.

I will see with pleasure an opposition party in Mexico.

He further stated that he would retire in 1910.

Such a seemingly sincere declaration had the immediate result of legitimatizing the heretofore clandestine activities of the nation's politically ambitious. The highest post open for newcomers, however, turned out to be the vice-presidency; as Díaz announced on May 30, 1908 that he, after all, would be a candidate for the presidency. The political clubs which had continued their precarious existence after the persecutions of 1906 now had several potential candidates; early opposition to Díaz centered around General Bernardo Reyes, although liberals had to close their eyes to his past record in order to support him. Reyes knew

what the consequences of opposing Díaz could be and insisted time and again that he would not be a candidate. Even after he announced his own support of incumbent Vice-President Ramón Corral, Reyes' candidacy was pushed; hope sprang eternal until Díaz sent him to Europe on a military study assignment in November, 1909.

To replace Reyes as a presidential alternative for the voters there was a small, kindly man from a powerful and wealthy Coahuila family, Francisco I. Madero. Madero appeared on the political scene with the publication of a thin volume entitled The Presidential Succession in 1910.<sup>1</sup> In it he raised questions about Díaz' successors, using the phrase that was to become the national slogan in the near future: "Real suffrage, no re-election."

Díaz, at first, paid little attention to the upstart politico who seemed to present no threat; but as 1910 approached, the President was forced to concede that Madero had a large following. Unofficially, Díaz ordered that Madero be prevented from making public speeches, and that hotels refuse lodging to his party. The antagonism of Díaz did not deter Madero and he continued to tour the country in a pre-campaign swing.

On January 7, 1910 Madero, his wife and two friends arrived in Guaymas, Sonora where he was greeted by José María Maytorena. The anti-Re-electionist Club in Guaymas

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<sup>1</sup>James D. Cockcroft, Intellectual Precursors of the Mexican Revolution, 1900-1913 (Austin, 1968), 124.



had decided to hold a rally in the plaza; to do so they needed the approval of the prefect. The Club sent Eugenio E. Gayou and Carlos E. Randall to obtain the permission, which was refused without explanation. The secretary of the Club, Adolfo de la Huerta, then appealed for the permit. Again it was denied, but the prefect explained that the Governor had issued strict orders to prevent Madero from making contact with the public. Madero spoke to a private gathering at the Hotel Albin that evening, excoriating the Indian policy of the Díaz regime with tears pouring down his cheeks.

Madero traveled to Navojoa the next day hoping to confer with Benjamín G. Hill, the recognized opposition leader of the Álamos district and a member of the town council of Navojoa. Hill was in Álamos at the moment, so Madero was received by two of Hill's active collaborators, Flavio A. Bórquez and Colonel Severiano Talamante. After talks with other followers in the area, he moved on to Álamos to consult with Hill.

Álamos officials would not permit a public meeting. To circumvent them, one of Madero's supporters arranged a private dance, to which were invited the known political independents in the district, thereby giving Madero the opportunity to make his views known. Hill, learning that an attempt might be made to assassinate Madero, furnished him

with a bodyguard for the rest of his tour through Sonora.

Madero traveled to Hermosillo, where he met an enthusiastic reception, despite the Governor's pressure. None of the major hotels would accept him as a guest, however, and he was forced to lodge in a small hotel near the railroad station. The town's coachmen also refused his trade, except for the most popular and best-known coachman in the capital, who put his carriage at Madero's disposition. In spite of the intense winter cold and threats of reprisals, a crowd gathered before his out-of-the-way hotel, and Madero went out to meet them informally. The police were present in force, mingling with the crowd to learn the names of the adherents, who could be jailed on the charge of being "enemies of order." When a crowd spontaneously called for Madero to make a speech, his efforts were greeted with derisive shouts and insults by government agents, making it impossible for him to be heard.

Madero did not spend the night at his small hotel. A partisan, fearing further molestation on the part of the authorities, insisted that the Madero party sleep in his home, and there numerous visitors came to discuss their disgust with the government.

After two days in Hermosillo, Madero went to Nogales, bypassing Cananea, the most populous town, because of threats against him; from Nogales he entered the United

States to go to Chihuahua.<sup>2</sup>

Anti-Re-electionist delegates met April 16, 1910 in Mexico City and named Madero as their presidential candidate, and Francisco Vázquez-Gómez as vice-presidential candidate. Madero went to Veracruz to begin his campaign, going from there to Puebla and Monterrey. In the latter city he was arrested, charged with sedition, and imprisoned. The nation voted for a new president on June 26; no one was surprised at Díaz' overwhelming victory. With the election quietly over, Díaz permitted Madero liberty under surveillance in San Luis Potosí, where he had been transferred, until the pomp and circumstance of the centennial celebration was safely past. Then Madero was able to elude his watchdogs and flee to Texas.

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<sup>2</sup>Gustavo Casasola, Historia gráfica de la Revolución Mexicana (10 vols., México, D.F., 1973), I, 143; Charles Curtis Cumberland, Mexican Revolution: Genesis under Madero (Austin, 1952), 92-93; Roberto Guzmán Esparza, Memorias de Don Adolfo de la Huerta según su propio dictado (México, D.F., 1957), 42; Antonio G. Rivera, La Revolución en Sonora (México, D.F., 1969), 174-178; Stanley R. Ross, Francisco I. Madero; Apostle of Mexican Democracy (New York, 1955), 89-90; Alfonso Taracena, La Verdadera Revolución Mexicana; Primera etapa (México, D.F., 1960), 89. Material covering Madero's trip through Sonora is sparse and inconsistent. Rivera gives the most complete review but has Madero arriving in December, 1909 at Navojoa, which is doubtful since Guaymas is the port. Taracena says he was in that town on January 8. Rivera and De la Huerta agree that he was in the Hotel Albin in Guaymas on January 7, and De la Huerta claims to have pressed the subject of the Yaquis. Taracena said he made the Indian speech in Navojoa, but it is not mentioned by others as being there. Casasola agrees only that he was in Hermosillo January 11 and 12, and tells of the arrest plot. Ross mentions the attempt on his life, and Cumberland, the Hill bodyguard.

From San Antonio Madero issued his Plan of San Luis Potosí which called for an armed rebellion to begin on November 20. There, also, on November 6, he met with collaborators and formed a provisional government, designating José María Maytorena, who was present, as the provisional governor of Sonora. He also commissioned Benjamín G. Hill and Adolfo De la Huerta as colonels in the provisional armed forces.

However, prior to Madero's naming of his provisional officials, another junta of pro-Madero revolutionaries met in September in San Isidro, Chihuahua and named Juan Antonio García as governor from Sonora.<sup>3</sup>

In September Maytorena had moved to Nogales, Arizona to coordinate the efforts of the anti-Re-electionists who had taken refuge in the southern part of that state. Joining him there at his request were De la Huerta, Carlos E. Randall, Eugenio H. Gayou, and Carlos Plank. The rival claims for leadership had to be resolved, but Maytorena had left the document naming him governor at his home in Guaymas. After De la Huerta risked going to Guaymas to obtain it from Maytorena's sister, all the maderistas present decided to recognize Maytorena as governor. García accepted the decision without protest. While the others worked as propagandists and fund raisers in Arizona, De la Huerta slipped

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<sup>3</sup> Rivera, La Revolución, 180.

back into Mexico to establish connections with revolutionary juntas inside the country.<sup>4</sup>

The anti-Re-electionists in Sonora had not been idle. In Cananea a new group of leaders had developed to replace those arrested in 1906. Among these, Juan G. Cabral was the cashier in the rebuilt lumberyard, Salvador Alvarado was a small merchant, and Pedro F. Bracamonte was a mechanic. Cabral, especially, had been active in the opposition since his school days; as a seventeen-year-old student, he had attacked the state and national authorities in a speech in La Colorada, his family's home. Only public indignation had prevented his arrest at that time.

The Cananea club had worked fervently to promote rebellion. By early 1910, its members had accumulated arms and set the day for the commencement of hostilities as June 19. One of the members weakened at the last moment and denounced the conspiracy to the authorities. Cabral learned of the betrayal and warned Alvarado; together they fled to Arizona where they shortly afterward established a small store in a mining camp in which numerous Mexican laborers resided. All profits gained from the enterprise they invested in arms and ammunition. Late November, 1910 saw them crossing the border to begin a military campaign in Sonora.

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<sup>4</sup>Ibid.; Guzmán Esparza, Memorias, 12-13.

Benjamín G. Hill of Álamos was born into a well-known family in that town, and he, too, had several years of revolutionary activity behind him. After 1908, he corresponded with various revolutionary groups, but particularly with the Puebla unit. The increasing threat of rebellion throughout the state provoked reprisals from the Governor, and Hill and his associate, Flavio A. Bórquez, were arrested and imprisoned in Hermosillo.<sup>5</sup> Others of the group escaped into the mountains, hoping to join the rebellion in Chihuahua. The family of one refugee attempted to persuade him to throw himself on the mercy of the Governor, but he refused, saying, "I'm no jailhouse hero".<sup>6</sup> He joined Colonel Severiano Talamantes and his sons in the mountains and headed to Chihuahua.

Maytorena continued to work in southern Arizona, traveling between Nogales and Tucson enlisting the aid of wealthy Mexicans, recruiting volunteers and buying arms and ammunition. The Díaz government was fully aware of the preparations being made on United States soil, and Francisco León de la Barra, the Mexican ambassador, protested in Washington.

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<sup>5</sup>The exact dates for Hill's imprisonment could not be ascertained. Consul Louis Hostetter of Hermosillo said that he was in prison for three months. United States, Department of State, Records Relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico, 1910-1929 (microfilm, Washington, D. C., 1959), 812.00/2061. Hereinafter cited as USDS, 812.00/varying numbers. Rivera (La Revolución, 183) said that Hill attended the junta of notables in Hermosillo, so he must have been arrested immediately after the junta disbanded. Why he was released in time to take part in the campaign at Álamos remains a mystery.

<sup>6</sup>Rivera, La Revolución, 171.

Philander Knox, the Secretary of State, replied to the complaint, stating that being a revolutionary in another country did not make Maytorena's presence illegal, nor was it illegal to ship munitions from the United States for any reason. It was illegal, he said, to use the United States as a base to mount a military expedition.<sup>7</sup>

The Arizona-Sonora boundary had few soldiers on either side in late November, 1910. The United States had a cavalry company patrolling between Naco and Douglas, about thirty miles of empty desert. Mexican federal forces in the north included approximately eighty-five men at Cananea, sixty at Agua Prieta, forty at Naco, and twelve at Nogales.<sup>8</sup> Most of the border was unpatrolled, unfenced and absolutely open to smugglers. Customs agents and army officers had no doubt that arms crossed the border easily and frequently. There were too many railroad records of weighty shipments of arms and ammunition; they did not tally with the recorded sales in the neighborhood. One hundred and forty-one pounds of guns and 3105 pounds (about 27,000 rounds) of ammunition arrived in Nogales during November and December, listed as such, but were not sold in the local stores.<sup>9</sup> Large shipments

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<sup>7</sup> Knox to Francisco León de la Barra, Jan. 24, 1911, USDS, 812.00/654.

<sup>8</sup> Dye to SecSt, Nov. 27, 1910, USDS, 812.00/528.

<sup>9</sup> Dye to SecSt, Jan. 7, 1911, USDS, 812.00/637.

of sizes not generally used in the United States had an obvious destination.

It was rumored in southern Arizona that Maytorena planned an uprising in Guaymas for the last days of November, but it did not materialize; Cabral and Alvarado did cross the border then and seized a village south of Agua Prieta.<sup>10</sup> Another small force of rebels, or possibly bandits, appeared in late December in the Moctezuma district, where there were no federal forces. The prefect and a group of thirty volunteers pursued them, capturing their mules and provisions.<sup>11</sup> Another raid on Tepache in the same district a month later met with the same fate.<sup>12</sup> The Minister of War announced, possibly to instill confidence and forestall more rebel attempts, that the revolutionary character of the movement had ended.<sup>13</sup>

Public confidence was expressed by the federal government in Mexico City; in Sonora, however, Governor and General Luis Torres had to face reality. Early in January, Vice-Governor Alberto Cubillas, acting for Torres, who was

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<sup>10</sup>Dye to SecSt, Nov. 27, 1910, USDS, 812.00/528

<sup>11</sup>Hostetter to SecSt, Dec. 30, 1910, USDS, 812.00/620.

<sup>12</sup>Dye to Secst, Jan. 7, 1911, USDS, 812.00/637.

<sup>13</sup>H. L. Wilson to SecSt, Jan. 10, 1911, USDS, 812.00/626.



on leave to organize the state's military defense, sent a circular telegram to all the prefects. He instructed them to order the municipal presidents to invite all the eminent men in their municipalities to join them in a trip to Hermosillo. More than three hundred men overflowed the reception hall of the government palace in the capital; among the faces were many representatives of the Madero faction.<sup>14</sup>

The Governor asked that someone from each district supply him with information on the general conditions and political attitudes in each area. Governor Torres also inquired as to how the government ought to face the menace to public tranquility which was undoubtedly coming. From the questioning he hoped to determine each man's private attitude toward the administration. Those attending were not deceived by the questioning, and their replies were reserved.

During the second session of the "junta of notables," as Rivera called it, the Governor pleaded eloquently to those present to be "men of order;" painting them a tragic picture of a nation torn by anarchy, in the hands of bandits or the lower classes. He appealed to them as the upper classes to maintain the integrity of their social position.

The strongly pro-Díaz elements responded by volunteering assistance from their districts. Having noted what would

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<sup>14</sup>The following account of the junta at Hermosillo is taken from Rivera, La Revolución, 182-191. No other source mentions this junta.

be forthcoming, the Governor rose to speak again, and this time he had a surprise for the assembly. He tied his plea for public order to the local elections, which were to be held in April, then declared that Vice-President Corral had obtained from Díaz the right for Sonora to hold free elections for state representatives and local officials.

The audience greeted his announcement with wild enthusiasm. One of the delegates present from Navojoa answered with an oration declaring that the military movement already begun was revolutionary, despite statements to the contrary. Arms alone would not stop it, he said; the rights of the people must also be recognized.

While the crowd was still signaling its approval of this second speech, General Torres received a telegram which obviously upset him. The meeting was interrupted and, amid frenzied speculation, reset for the afternoon. Only then did the state's premier citizens learn that rebels had attacked Sahuaripa. General Torres met with the prefects and municipal presidents, and directed them to organize contingents in their areas of jurisdiction by any means necessary, including impressment.

The military commander in Ures did resort to impressment. He sent squads out in the middle of the night to several of the neighboring communities where they aroused the farmers from their beds and marched them off under guard to Ures. The new recruits were treated more like prisoners

than citizens, and among themselves decided to escape to join the rebels. In order to lull their guards into a relaxed vigil they pretended to become resigned to their service, then, on a pre-arranged signal, they overpowered them and fled with all available arms. They were pursued immediately and forced to fight, but surprisingly, there was no response to their shots. They waited. A federal officer approached under a white flag and said that they could return to their homes without fear of future molestations if they would surrender the arms they had. The farmers accepted the offer and the terms were honored on both sides.<sup>15</sup>

In Arizpe, Prefect Ignacio P. Pesqueira, a porfirista, recruited a small force from among the townspeople, and the local schoolboys also formed a squad. But in Arizpe, as in most of the isolated villages throughout Sonora, the locals were apolitical or porfiristas, with little interest in political reforms or in leaving their village to fight. They were absolutely content to till their small plots or to herd their cattle, and were more concerned with the rain or lack of rain than with who ran the state. The men and schoolboys of Arizpe drilled and stood sentry duty, and when the maderistas appeared the male residents vanished. To avoid any chance of impressment, the wealthier men headed north to cross the border into Arizona; the farmers, herders and laborers took refuge in the mountains until the maderistas

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 193-195.

moved on. The women and small children remained alone in town. Unfortunately, the Sonora River Valley, in which Arizpe is located, also contained the major population centers in the state and offered the easiest access, other than by railroad, to the north. So time and again, throughout the revolution, Arizpe was overrun by retreating or advancing forces; in between, life continued peacefully. Only those who subsisted on the edge of the law, not bandits but not settled farmers either, the adventurers, the ne'er-do-wells joined the ranks of the passing armies.<sup>16</sup>

It was not in the border districts that the first important fighting occurred, but in the central sierras east of Hermosillo. Colonel Severiano Talamantes had assumed leadership in the Álamos district after the imprisonment of Hill, and he and his men were en route to Chihuahua through Sahuaripa when he learned that that district was already under the control of rebel leader Juan Antonio García. Sahuaripa had been taken without fighting because the prefect's men had all deserted him. For several weeks Sahuaripa became a staging center for rebel contingents that were preparing to move into other areas. Its strategic location, however, as a gateway for invasion from Chihuahua, assured that the Governor would attempt to retake it.

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<sup>16</sup> Interviews with Ignacio L. Pesqueira, Mariana Corella, Elena Sotomayor de Pellat, and María Jesús Fuentes in Arizpe, Sonora on October 5 and 6, 1974. Pesqueira told of his trip north to the border in 1911 as a young man of twenty. His

Colonel Talamantes remained in Sahuaripa with a garrison of only seventy-two men as the other maderistas dispersed. The town was as fortified as was possible, given the paucity of armaments of the maderistas. On January 27, three hundred cavalry under the command of Colonel Francisco Chapa. (or Chiapa), ex-schoolmaster and now prefect of Moctezuma, and five hundred infantry under Colonel Pedro Ojeda, advanced on the town. After two days of fighting another small rebel force slipped into town; however,

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father, Ignacio F. Pesqueira, the son of Governor and General Ignacio Pesqueira, had been prefect in Arizpe until illness forced him to resign. He had gone to Arizona, but the son had remained behind against his mother's wishes. Learning that his father was not expected to live, he and a ranch-hand set out for Querobabi to catch the train for Nogales, without thinking to carry provisions. The sighting of some Yaquis en route caused them to veer to the north. At a ranch where they asked for food they were able to obtain only an orange; so they shared the orange for lunch. At another ranch, twelve miles out of Magdalena, they again tried to get food, or at least food for the horses. The horses were fed, but the two men had only coffee and a cigarette for supper, and a cigarette for breakfast. On arrival in Magdalena they learned that the town was suffering from a yellow-fever epidemic, and if they entered they would not be permitted to leave. They had to enter to find something to eat although almost every house in town had a yellow flag.

Colonel Emilio Kosterlitsky of the rurales (Gendarmeria Fiscales) was in command in Magdalena, and told him that to leave he would have to get the permission of the Governor. Back at his hotel his friends told him to speak authoritatively to Kosterlitsky; to let him know who was boss. The next day he again approached the Colonel, this time saying simply that he was leaving. Kosterlitsky laughed and said that he must be the son of the General (Pesqueira), and let him leave. However, only persons going to ranches could use the train; there were no passengers to Nogales or Hermosillo because of the epidemic. So the two went by horse to Terrenate, then south to Estación Llano by train to await a train for Nogales. There was no normal movement because the troops were being shuttled here and there, and the two men also wanted to avoid the soldiers.

"instead of shooting bullets at the enemy, he spit harangues at his troops."<sup>17</sup> The new arrivals slipped away again without making their presence felt. Early in the third day the eleven remaining defenders, including the Colonel and his two sons, used up their ammunition and were forced to surrender. After a summary court martial the Talamantes were shot on January 30.<sup>18</sup> Sonora had its first martyrs.

Even as Sahuaripa fell into the hands of the federals, the tide was turning against them. Maderista forces increased until the average operating unit numbered two hundred and fifty to three hundred and fifty. Flexible and highly mobile, they easily lost themselves in the mountainous eastern half of the state, living off the land. Communications were poor or entirely lacking in most areas, making it relatively easy for them to avoid the federal troops whose movement was largely along the railroads. The maderistas had no supreme commander, thus there was competition. Bandits calling themselves maderistas could pillage and destroy with impunity in the remote mining camps which were their favorite targets.

The revolutionaries were greatly abetted by the scarcity

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<sup>17</sup> Rivera, La Revolución, 208.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., 203-210. United States consular reports placed the number captured as forty-five. Ellsworth to SecSt, Jan. 31, 1911, USDS, 812.00/783.

and incompetence of the federal troops. United States Brigadier General W. S. Schengler, visiting the Arizona border on an inspection tour early in February, stated that west of Ciudad Juárez there were few Mexican troops worthy of the name "soldier." Furthermore, he said, "the inferiority of the enlisted men is only equaled by the incapacity of the officers in command of them."<sup>19</sup> Numerous small settlements had no government troops nearby; their conquest was merely occupation. Cabral and Alvarado had occupied one such mining camp on the railroad south of Agua Prieta late in November, without any conflict with federal troops. From there they unsuccessfully attacked Fronteras, then crossed the divide to the Sonora River Valley. Arizpe, the major population center on the upper river, offered no resistance on March 7, when they entered; in the one hundred miles between Arizpe and Ures was no village populous enough to hinder their approach. The maderistas already held Ures; the lieutenant in command of the garrison had joined rebel ranks bringing with him one hundred men and one hundred rifles. In Ures the rebels from the north and central districts congregated to prepare an attack on Hermosillo.

General Torres could not permit the maderistas to retain control of Ures because of its proximity to Hermosillo. He forced them into a battle near the town at the San Rafael

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<sup>19</sup> Schengler to Adj. General, March 5, 1911, USDS, 812.00/974.

ranch; after three bloody days the rebels, who held the mill buildings, evacuated when they learned the federals intended to dynamite the mill. They retreated to Ures and then dispersed into small bands to continue their guerrilla warfare. The federal troops moved into Ures unmolested, but as the threat to Hermosillo had been relieved, Torres moved them out of necessity to the north where the rebels were again gathering.<sup>20</sup>

For the next month, the northern border towns and railroad centers were the objects of federal soldiers and rebels. Control passed back and forth as the thinly spread federals moved from one area to another. Cabral sent an ultimatum to the public officials of Cananea: leave or fight. Colonel W. C. Greene, who resided in Cananea even after he lost control of the 4C's, rode out to Cabral's camp to confer with him. He decided that Cabral had enough troops to easily overpower the tiny federal garrison, so he advised the Governor by telegraph to evacuate his men and save lives. To cinch his argument he pointed out that the miners would all join Cabral, given an opportunity. The porfiristas quietly left town at four o'clock on May 15; one hour later

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<sup>20</sup>Rivera, La Revolución, 215-225; also, a series of letters and telegrams from Consul Hostetter in Hermosillo to the Secretary of State, beginning March 9, 1911 through April 6, 1911, all in USDS, 812.00/984, 1074, 1109, 1120, 1142, 1166, 1254, 1289 and 1302.



Cabral entered.<sup>21</sup>

After Cananea fell into maderista hands General Torres withdrew his inadequate garrisons from the other northern towns to reinforce Hermosillo. By mid-May the Altar district was already completely abandoned by all government troops and there was no communications from that region. Possibly five hundred to eight hundred rebels ranged at will through the desert mountains, but claimed to be independent socialist (or magonists) units which cooperated with the maderistas.<sup>22</sup> Only Nogales, on the border, and Magdalena and a few small hamlets along the railroad to Hermosillo, and Guaymas remained under his control. Governor Torres could see no use to continue fighting since the people wanted a change in government and peace.<sup>23</sup> He was spared a probable attack on Hermosillo by maderista successes in Chihuahua and elsewhere.

In the Alamos district, meanwhile, a separate war was fought. The United States consular agent in Alamos reported on

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<sup>21</sup>C. L. Sonnichsen, Colonel Green and the Copper Skyrocket (Tucson, 1974), 253-254; Green to SecSt, May 13, 1911, USDS, 812.00/1749 & 1753; G. A. Wiswall to SecSt, May 13 & 14, 1911, USDS, 812.00/1754 & 1757; Dye to SecSt, May 13, 1911, USDS, 812.00/1759.

<sup>22</sup>Dye to SecSt, May 3, 1911, USDS, 812.00/1688; Hostetter to SecSt, May 1, 1911, USDS, 812.00/1748.

<sup>23</sup>Hostetter to SecSt, May 13, 1911, USDS, 812.00/1913.

March 3, that the revolutionaries in the field were mostly miners and ranchers from isolated mountain districts, not representative of the men who were behind the revolt and who would form the government. In Álamos, the adherents comprised the majority of the leading families, and nearly all of the local citizens who had no dependence on the federal government. Part of the district was isolated by nature, another part by the burning of railroad bridges south of Corral, near Esperanza. There were frequent clashes with indecisive results.<sup>24</sup>

The maderistas had made contact with the Yaquis early in the campaign, and the Indians joined because of Madero's promise to restore their lands. Fructoso Méndez organized some of them to aid the rebels around Álamos.<sup>25</sup> In March, Chief Bule, who had been cooperating with Torres, notified the Governor that Yaqui sympathies now lay with Madero because the Indians had no hope of justice from Díaz. They withdrew into the mountains to fight in their own fashion.<sup>26</sup> Then early in May, a rebel chief asked the revolutionary junta in Nogales to send someone who could convince the Yaquis to cooperate in the taking of Estación Ortiz. The

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<sup>24</sup>M. S. MacCarthy to Hostetter, March 5, 1911, USDS, 812.00/984.

<sup>25</sup>Rivera, La Revolución, 201.

<sup>26</sup>Ellsworth to SecSt, March 22, 1911, USDS, 812.00/1082.

junta suggested De la Huerta, knowing the history of his long friendship with the Indians.<sup>27</sup>

De la Huerta and Carlos Plank, who wanted to accompany him, caught a freight train for Hermosillo where the Yaqui chief resided. The latter sent an emissary to arrange a meeting; on his return the two rode south to Cruz de Piedra on a railroad handcar handled by two friends of De la Huerta's. At their destination, they met General Sibalaume, one of the

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<sup>27</sup> De la Huerta's friendship with the Indians was a family inheritance. Early in the nineteenth century three brothers left Spain for America. One settled in Argentina, another in Mexico City, and the third, Torcuato de la Huerta, settled in Huiviris, one of the eight Yaqui pueblos. He devoted himself to mining and agriculture, teaching the Yaquis better farming methods, and introducing better cattle raising methods. He was a peaceful man, beloved by the Yaquis.

In 1838, the Mexican government made war on the Yaqui. When Torcuato learned of the impending war he went to talk with the leader of the expedition and to explain that the Yaquis were at peace and had done no wrong. The expedition leader ignored his pleas and continued his preparations, and Torcuato continued his pleading. The General then ordered him arrested as an accomplice of the Indians, but a Frenchman with the federal troops, Juan Marcor, believed De la Huerta and helped him escape. He returned to the Indians, and with the arrival of the troops, was again arrested, and killed. The bloody campaign that followed ended with the defeat of the Yaquis.

With the death of Torcuato, his family moved to Guaymas, where his son married the daughter of Juan Marcor and was one of the defenders of the city against Conde Gastón de Raousset Boulbon. This was the father of Adolfo de la Huerta.

The Yaqui tribe had consecrated Torcuato de la Huerta for his defense of them and his name passed to succeeding generations. Rivera, *La Revolución*, 22 footnote. It was because of these family connections that De la Huerta had such influence with the Yaquis; presumably, also, his grandmother had been a Yaqui, for portraits indicate a not far-removed Indian bloodline. De la Huerta mentions telling Rivera of his family's Yaqui connections.

Yaqui war chiefs, and together they traveled to Ortíz, which the federals abandoned. Sibalaume wanted to pursue the withdrawing troops but De la Huerta managed to distract him with a phonograph that he found in a local shop, the first phonograph that the Chief had ever seen.<sup>28</sup>

Even as De la Huerta dealt with the Yaquis, events elsewhere in the state made his efforts superfluous. On May 19, Manuel Bonillas arrived in Nogales en route from Ciudad Juárez to a maderista governorship in Sinaloa. While in Nogales he sent a circular telegram addressed to all "Chiefs of the Anti-reelectionist forces at all stations in Sonora and Sinaloa," in which he declared that Madero had asked for a cessation of hostilities. Bonillas further asked the Ferrocarril Sud-Pacífico de México to deliver his message to any known rebels along their telegraph line.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Guzmán Esparza, Memorias, 13-14. The Yaquis had a complex government for each pueblo which was a hangover from the Spanish Jesuits. Each town had a series of officials elected annually from a slate nominated by the local clergy. There were five governors in each town, one with civil jurisdiction, one with military jurisdiction, one with church jurisdiction, and two officers who attended to the rituals related to the supernatural. All officers were equal and all were called governor. The military organization was entirely separate; the war chiefs were recognized as able in war, and were referred to as "generals." Luis Bule, Luis Espinoza, Sibalaume and others were all chiefs, and there was a distinction among these as to whether they supported the government or the rebels, or whether they fought only for the Yaquis. Edward H. Spicer, Pótam; A Yaqui Village in Sonora, American Anthropological Association, Vol. 56, No. 4, Part 2, Memoir No. 77, Aug. 1954, 55-71.

<sup>29</sup> Dye to SecSt, May 21, 1911, USDS, 812.00/1954.

The railroad refused the use of their telegraphic facilities to publicize the Madero message, thus delaying the announcement of peace in the more remote parts of the state. Benjamín Hill, released after three months in prison, once again was in command of forces in the Álamos district, preparing to advance on Álamos, which was still under federal control. He had reached Minas Nuevas, a mining camp about five miles from the town, when word of the peace agreement reached him. He refused to accept the report from the Álamos Committee of Public Safety until he could be sure of its authenticity.

The United States consular agent in Álamos intervened with the railroad for the use of their wires to check on the veracity of the peace report. The local prefect refused to request the confirmation from Hermosillo, thinking that it might be interpreted as a sign of weakness if the hostilities continued. General Torres, in response to the agent's request, affirmed to the prefect that Díaz and Corral had resigned two days before and that the nation had a new cabinet. A telegram from Madero on the same day ordered Hill to suspend his attack. Hill decided that the peace messages were authentic, and on May 25, announced the cessation of hostilities in a proclamation from Minas Nuevas.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> MacCarthy to Asst. SecSt, May 25, 1911, USDS, 812.00/2056; Hostetter to SecSt, May 27, 1911, USDS, 812.00/2061. Hill had several motives for prolonging the state of rebellion: he had made extravagant pay promises to secure volunteers; the rebels were slow in forming a new state government; and he desired to revenge himself on the prefect who had had him arrested.

De la Huerta and Plank were still working among the Indians at Cruz de Piedras when they heard of the peace declaration. De la Huerta was content to remain there, but Plank, whose father had been killed by Yaquis, preferred to leave. They went to Guaymas to seek confirmation of the peace and to contact the revolutionary junta in Nogales.

While in Guaymas, De la Huerta met an old friend from Navojoa, the proprietor of a flour mill, who, as a man of some wealth, had been a porfirista. The miller, together with a young man he introduced to De la Huerta as Álvaro Obregón, were fleeing the maderistas, and had arrived in Guaymas from Yavaros, a small port south of the Rio Mayo. Obregón, upon learning that De la Huerta was a maderista, asked him what the maderistas had gained, and would gain from the revolution. De la Huerta, in his idealistic fashion, assured him that they had gained much already in achieving the right to hold free elections, and spoke of the benefits for the humble people which could accrue from the labor movement and the destruction of the hacienda system. And could an enemy, or one who had been neutral, Obregón wondered, become part of the maderista movement if he had popular support? "If an enemy has popular support he is no longer an enemy."<sup>31</sup> Obregón never forgot De la Huerta's sincere belief in brotherhood and forgiveness, and the goals of the maderistas, although he would later describe them as

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<sup>31</sup> Guzmán Esparza, Memorias, 21.

"dreams of a man who is not seeing reality."<sup>32</sup>

From Guaymas, De la Huerta went to Cananea to join Eugenio H. Gayou, chosen by Madero to act as provisional governor and to receive the submission of the porfirista troops in that area. From there he returned to Guaymas with a stop in the state capital. In Guaymas, he discovered that his old schoolmaster, Francisco Chapa, the prefect responsible for the shooting of the Talamantes, had been arrested and sentenced to death. De la Huerta pleaded with Maytorena to intercede with Madero in behalf of the schoolmaster, which he did, although Gayou would offer no assistance. Madero ordered that he be sent into exile in the United States.<sup>33</sup>

While Gayou acted as governor in the north the porfirista government to function in Hermosillo. The House of Deputies chose Abelino Espinoza to act as interim governor on May 27; late that same night General Luis E. Torres, Alberto Cubillas, and Colonel Chapa left Hermosillo secretly on a special train

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<sup>32</sup>Ibid., 20-21. In his memoirs, Obregón glosses over this period of his life, never mentioning his early acquaintance with De la Huerta nor his flight from the maderistas. De la Huerta (Ibid., 20) points out that the story of his flight was published in Excelsior by his nephew. Obregón says he sympathized with the maderistas and felt ashamed of his lack of involvement; he had done nothing except protest when the municipal president tried to make him sign an act of adhesion to Díaz. Álvaro Obregón, Ocho mil kilómetros en campaña (México, D.F., 1959), 5-6.

<sup>33</sup>Guzmán Esparza, Memorias, 14.

for Nogales.<sup>34</sup> Their absence was not noted until the next morning; then the populace went wild with one-half day of mob rule, until the interim governor called out the troops and restored order.<sup>35</sup> Nogales still had a federal garrison; the lack of communications and conflicting reports left them in confusion. On his arrival, Torres informed the porfiristas of the true conditions within the state, and all municipal officials and federal troops crossed the border on June 2,<sup>36</sup> leaving the state completely in maderista hands.

Two days after he took office, Governor Espinoza resigned and the legislature elected Francisco de P. Morales to the post. Three days later, with Maytorena's return to the capital, Morales resigned and Maytorena suggested Gayou to replace him. Gayou took office on June 1; he served until July 4, when he handed the office to Carlos E. Randall so that he could enter the political campaign as candidate

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<sup>34</sup>Rivera says Torres left on May 22, but De la Huerta sent a telegram from Guaymas on May 23 asking about the peace, and Torres answered. The U. S. consul gave his departure date as May 27. The De la Huerta telegram was printed in El Correo de Sonora, a Guaymas newspaper, on May 24.

<sup>35</sup>Hostetter to SecSt, May 29, 1911, USDS, 812.00/2088.

<sup>36</sup>Dye to SecSt, June 3, 1911, USDS, 812.00/2067.



for the vice-governorship.<sup>37</sup>

The rebels had gained control of Sonora, but they appeared in some ways better prepared to fight than to rule. Although officially the state was at peace, peace was not yet a fact because there existed too many factions whose only unity lay in their desire to depose Díaz. The political campaign which began with the cease-fire added to the turmoil, especially in Cananea.

Juan Cabral had established a provisional government after he occupied the town.<sup>38</sup> A new newspaper, La Verdad, began publication shortly afterward, showing marked animosity toward the copper companies and to foreign capital, and increased labor agitation. In addition, dissension among opposing camps of maderistas caused tension; they resisted attempts to disarm them, and their presence was more menacing than protective. The soldiers demanded from the government 50,000 pesos which they did not receive. They refused to accept a discharge, disarmed the police, released the prisoners from jail, then arrested Cabral and forty of his men. For four days in mid-July, Cananea had no police protection; when the police resumed their duties and released

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<sup>37</sup> Archivo General del Estado de Sonora, Tomo 2662. Hereinafter cited as AGES + varied numbers. Almada says that Gayou handed over the government on July 23 after his opponents said he could not be a candidate because he was the interim governor. Francisco R. Almada, La Revolución en el Estado de Sonora (México, D.F., 1971), 56.

<sup>38</sup> Dye to SecSt, May 19, 1911, USDS, 812.00/1930.

Cabral, he ordered the soldiers confined to barracks until discharged.<sup>39</sup> Governor Randall met with the rebellious men personally and smoothed things over; the troops yielded their arms.<sup>40</sup> During the interim of Gayou and Randall many of the maderista troops were released from service, each with fifty pesos as severance pay and a railroad ticket to the station nearest his home, leaving only eight hundred and fifty regular troops plus some irregulars.<sup>41</sup> It was necessary to retain about half of the soldiers until after the elections; thirty per cent returned to private life and work; twenty per cent to private life and no work.<sup>42</sup>

In the south the aroused Yaquis ranged through their valley destroying garbanzo crops and looting stores. Attempts to calm them failed until Gayou enlisted De la Huerta's help. The vice-presidential candidate, José Pino Suárez, and Manuel Bonillas were to speak to the Indians on Madero's behalf. De la Huerta went to Cruz de Piedra where he sent an envoy to call the chiefs. He took them to Guaymas to outfit them, with government funds, in attire suitable to the occasion, then they went to Cruz de Piedra to meet Pino Suárez and

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<sup>39</sup> Dye to SecSt, July 17, 1911, USDS, 812.00/2235.

<sup>40</sup> Hostetter to SecSt, July 19, 1911, USDS, 812.00/2243.

<sup>41</sup> Almada, La Revolución, 56.

<sup>42</sup> Dye to F. M. Dearing, Aug. 15, 1911, USDS, 812.00/2307.

Bonillas. The two visitors made brilliant orations, but De la Huerta noticed the Indians looking at each other perplexedly; finally one said to him that they did not understand what was being said. De la Huerta told the orators that the flowery speeches were not necessary; all the Indians wanted to hear was that they would be given the lands which they considered to be their legitimate property.<sup>43</sup> A compromise was reached with the Yaquis whereby they agreed to turn over their arms and to keep out of the towns and villages. A commissioner was to go to Mexico City to discuss the problems, and until a settlement was agreed on the government was to provide for them.<sup>44</sup>

Madero selected General B. J. Viljoen, a former Boer who resided near Las Cruces, New Mexico, to act as the Indians' emissary to Mexico City. The De la Barra government made an offer to set aside lands for the Yaquis and many agreed to accept them. On Viljoen's second visit to the tribe, some of the chiefs demanded more lands, in exchange for which they promised to guarantee the tribe's behavior and to turn over Indian criminals to civil authorities. Viljoen took the chiefs to Mexico City to discuss their desires with Madero, but nothing came of the talks.<sup>45</sup> De la Huerta opposed

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<sup>43</sup> Guzmán Esparza, Memorias, 15.

<sup>44</sup> Hostetter to SecSt, June 16, 1911, USDS, 812.00/2174.

<sup>45</sup> Hostetter to SecSt, Dec. 14, 1911, USDS, 812.00/2661.

Viljoen's appointment and prevailed on Madero to remove him.<sup>46</sup>

The principal preoccupation of Sonora after the peace was the imminent elections for governor, vice-governor and deputies to the state Congress, and electioneering started immediately. Maytorena, although not a part of the military structure, had played an obvious role in the victory of the maderistas and had been Madero's choice for governor, which gave him an unquestionable advantage over other potential candidates. He had never assumed the office on a provisional or interim basis, so there was no question of re-election.<sup>47</sup> In Guaymas, his home, a new club, the Partido Maytorenista was organized to support him, with Adolfo de la Huerta as its president. The club's vice-gubernatorial choice was Maytorena's close associate, Eugenio H. Gayou, and for deputy, De la Huerta was selected. Another club, Democrático guaymense, seconded their choices.

In Ures the liberal club General Ignacio Pesqueira backed Maytorena for governor, but for vice-governor selected Francisco de P. Morales, the ex-interim governor. Ignacio

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<sup>46</sup> Guzmán Esparza, Memorias, 42.

<sup>47</sup> The following account of the election campaign and the election is based on Guzmán Esparza, Memorias, 22-25 and Rivera, La Revolución, 238-246 unless otherwise noted.

Bonillas, Manuel Mascareñas and Joaquin Urrea were named as candidates for governor by clubs formed in various areas of the state.

Roberto V. Pesqueira, who had nominated Bonillas, proposed holding a convention, whose delegates would select the candidates for governor and vice-governor. His suggestion was accepted and the convention met in Hermosillo; its preferences were Maytorena and Gayou. Some delegates were not satisfied because numerous towns that favored other men had not sent delegates to Hermosillo. To squelch these complaints the victors suggested another convention, this one to be held in Guaymas.

In Guaymas, Pesqueira presented Bonillas as a vice-gubernatorial candidate, but the results were the same; Maytorena and Gayou were still sustained by a majority. The other aspirants, except Morales, withdrew from the race. He alone offered competition to the convention nominees.

De la Huerta went to the northern districts to champion Maytorena with good success, as the conventions showed. In his absence Plutarco Elías Calles approached Maytorena with the proposal that the latter aid him in becoming a deputy for the Guaymas district, saying that De la Huerta, with his business background, could be easily placed in some other job in the government. Although Calles had a long revolutionary history, his friendship with Alberto Cubillas and his municipal presidency under Díaz made his sincerity suspect. Maytorena either could not, or would not, refuse his help and

had Calles presented before the two clubs in Guaymas, both of whom rejected him. So a third club formed to advance his candidacy for deputy, while supporting the Maytorena-Gayou ticket. Calles realized that he stood little chance against De la Huerta, and apologized to him for his actions when the latter returned from his tour of the north. De la Huerta, with his forgiving nature, accepted the candidacy as normal, and the two men remained friends.

In the north, where Morales was strong, the campaign was active. George A. Wiswall, the United States consular agent in Cananea, described the political picture in that town. There was, he said, more freedom of speech and of the press than before, but both were abused. The numerous rallies displayed an unintelligent patriotism proving, he thought, that the people were far from being capable of controlling themselves politically. Political agitators added to labor discontent by stirring up feelings against the American-owned mining companies in Cananea. They accused the Díaz regime of accepting bribes in return for mining concessions which did not give a fair return to the native laborer, and blamed mine owners for economic conditions. Music, speeches, handbills and newspapers attempted to arouse the workers from their traditional political lethargy.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>48</sup>Dye to SecSt, June 24 and July 11, 1911, USDS, 812.00/2195 and 2226; Dye to Dearing, August 15, 1911, USDS, 812.00/2307.

The anti-Re-electionist Party was the only party in the north, but the reyistas supposedly had a strong secret organization along the border. Its members were mostly men formerly prominent in state politics who had been in exile and were now returning. They claimed that both Maytorena and Gayou were reyistas, although Morales was known to be anti-reyista. They offered no candidates but indicated they would use their money and influence to run the state, without further armed conflict.<sup>49</sup>

The southern districts did not display too much enthusiasm over the race. Alamos accepted Urres's withdrawal with grace; his name had been entered over his own objections. Guaymas, too, was quiet. In Hermosillo, supposedly a Gayou stronghold, although there was traditionally an enmity between Hermosillo and Guaymas, political agitators fomented strikes among farm laborers to gain votes for Gayou. The strikers demanded that the hacienda owners wipe out their peonage debt and raise wages; the strike was quickly settled without damage, with the owners meeting the demands.<sup>50</sup>

The state voted on Sunday, July 30, without disorder.

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<sup>49</sup> Dye to Dearing, Aug. 15, 1911, USDS, 812.00/2307. Maytorena had supported Reyes after the Creelman interview; his conservative attitude toward property would cause him to be called a porfirista.

<sup>50</sup> Hostetter to SecSt, Aug. 8, 1911, USDS, 812.00/2346.

Voter turnouts were larger than usual in Nogales, but in Cananea only 1300 out of a possible 3000 votes were cast. Everyone feared that the race between Morales and Gayou would be a potential source of trouble; most people expected that the loser would take up arms. Morales followers claimed that he had won at the polls, but that the legislature, which, by law, was supposed to officially declare the winner, was controlled by Gayou supporters. The total official count was not announced; Law 98 of August 18 declared that Maytorena won by a majority of 23,600 votes, and Gayou by a majority of 12,469.<sup>51</sup>

The list of new members of the Twenty-third Legislature published in La Constitución on August 31 included Adolfo de la Huerta representing Guaymas, Ignacio Bonillas for Magdalena, Ignacio L. Pesqueira from Arizpe, Carlos Plank from Hermosillo, and Flavio A. Bórquez from Álamos.<sup>52</sup> Calles' attempt was unsuccessful and he polled a total of seventy votes in the entire Guaymas district.<sup>53</sup>

Of the thirteen deputies elected, six were partisans of Gayou and six others called themselves independents. The thirteenth deputy was De la Huerta. Although elected on

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<sup>51</sup>Dye to Dearing, Aug. 15, 1911, USDS, 812.00/2307; Hostetter to SecSt, Aug. 8, 1911, USDS, 812.00/2345; La Constitución, official newspaper of the State of Sonora, Aug. 22, 1911.

<sup>52</sup>La Constitución, August 31, 1911.

<sup>53</sup>Guzmán Esparza, Memorias, 24.



the ticket with Maytorena and Gayou, De la Huerta insisted, much to their annoyance, that politically he owed nothing to either, and could vote as he pleased since he claimed his prestige as a revolutionary was scarcely lower than theirs. He would, he told them, vote with the government when the government was right.

In forming his government, Maytorena utilized the civilians who had cooperated with him against the porfiristas, as well as the military leaders who had acted independently in Madero's behalf. Carlos E. Randall became treasurer-general and Gayou functioned both as vice-governor and as chief of the newly created War Section. To be Secretary of State, Maytorena named Ismael Padilla, whose only qualification was that he was a friend. As prefects of the districts of Sahuaripa, Ures and Moctezuma he named Colonel Juan Antonio García, Colonel Anacleto J. Girón, and Lieutenant Colonel Pedro F. Bracamonte, respectively.<sup>54</sup> Each retained his command in order to replace the federal garrisons in his assigned district. Colonel Benjamín G. Hill had been appointed prefect of the Arizpe district, with residence in Cananea, prior to the elections in order for him to become the civil and military superior to Colonel Ramón V. Sosa and Lieutenant Colonel Isidro E. Escobosa.

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<sup>54</sup>Their commissions as officers were informal, their rank depending on the number of men under their command.

Escobosa favored Morales and obstructed Gayou's propaganda in the north during the campaign; Hill had been put there to correct the situation, although his impartiality must be noted. The prefect installed in Hermosillo had short tenure; he despised Gayou and had aided Morales.<sup>55</sup>

After De la Huerta's inauguration as a deputy Calles entreated him to help him obtain the post of police commissioner of Agua Prieta. De la Huerta told him he did not think the job worth having, but Calles insisted that the village, as a port of entry to the mining district, afforded an opportunity to begin a lucrative freighting business. He did wonder whether his proposed scheme was legal, and De la Huerta assured him that it was since police commissioners did not have to relinquish their private businesses. Calles convinced De la Huerta that the frontier town's job was what he wanted and the Deputy discussed the appointment with Gayou. The Vice-Governor had another man in mind for the town, a man of rather unsavory reputation, but perhaps what the bandit-ridden area needed. De la Huerta argued that Calles was equal to the task of taming Agua Prieta; other towns could use his friend's services. Gayou yielded and extended the berth to Calles, his first revolutionary office.<sup>56</sup>

Elections for municipal officials were held shortly after the state elections. In the municipality of Huatabampo on the

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<sup>55</sup>Rivera, La Revolución, 242-243.

<sup>56</sup>Guzmán Esparza, Memorias, 24-26.

Mayo River there were two candidates for the presidency: Álvaro Obregón and Pedro Zubaran, the son-in-law of the revolutionary martyr, Colonel Severiano Talamantes.<sup>57</sup>

Zubaran was known as a sincere revolutionary and seemed to be the more popular of the two candidates. José J. Obregón, the municipal president and brother of Álvaro, was one of Zubaran's backers. Obregón's neighbors knew him as an adherent of Ramón Corral; moreover, Benjamín G. Hill believed that Obregón had denounced him to the authorities. His chances of winning election were very slim, but Obregón solicited the votes of the Mayo Indians through the governor of the Mayos, who was an old friend. The Indians complied with the chief's request, with the result that Zubaran carried the village vote and Obregón carried the vote of the countryside, which was more numerous.

The Zubaran council slate won because the Indians could not memorize all the names presented. The council, in deciding the validity of the votes, threw out the Indian ballots which were all written in the same hand, as naturally they would be since Obregón had sent an aide to fill in the ballots because the Indians were not literate. Zubaran was declared to be the new municipal president. However, since there had

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<sup>57</sup> The following account is based on Guzmán Esparza, Memorias, 26-28 and Rivera, La Revolución, 247. Huatabampo was in the Álamos District, as was Navojoa, and Benjamín G. Hill was an important political figure there.

been election irregularities, Obregón could and did appeal to the state legislature, although not through the deputies from his district who were his enemies, but through De la Huerta. That Deputy, after hearing Obregón's presentation, believed that he had a justified complaint and laid the case before the legislature for rectification. In so doing he made a life-long enemy of Flavio A. Bórquez, one of the deputies from the Álamos district, who accused Obregón of being the denouncer of the Talamantes. De la Huerta was forced to go to Navojoa to investigate this charge and decided that it was based on rumors without any proof. He pressed Obregón's cause in the legislature, which recognized Obregón's victory; Zubaran was deposed as municipal president and Obregón took the office in January, 1912.<sup>58</sup>

The apparent harmony among the maderistas after the elections degenerated into petty brawling, banditry and open warfare as the Maytorena faction began to consolidate its power. The antagonisms of the campaign were not forgiven nor forgotten, as the new prefect of Ures, Colonel Anacleto Girón, demonstrated on September 9, when he attempted to arrest Francisco de P. Morales at his home in Ures. Morales'

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<sup>58</sup>Eduardo W. Villa, Galería de sonorenses ilustres (Hermosillo, 1948), 121, records that Obregón's brother opposed him, and also confirms that Obregón was regarded as a científico. Obregón tells nothing of his election or his short term as president of Huatabampo in his memoirs. José María Maytorena, Algunas verdades sobre el General Álvaro Obregón (Los Angeles, 1919), 19, claimed to have in his possession a copy of a telegram complaining that J. J. Obregón sought to impose his brother.

sympathizers fired on the arresting party, preventing the arrest, but Morales was forced to flee Ures for Nogales, Arizona. His loyal partisan, Colonel Isidro Escobosa, moved toward Hermosillo and clashed with a force of maderistas, now called federal troops, and defeated them. After that encounter, Escobosa advanced up the Sonora River Valley, occupied Arizpe, and announced that he was now a magonista.<sup>59</sup> From there, he moved to the Ajos Mountains near Cananea, always a favorite haunt for rebels, bandits and Indians, where he hoped to attract dissatisfied miners. Before he could collect a threatening following, federal troops chased him across the border into the United States, where a warrant for his arrest was issued but never served.<sup>60</sup>

Maytorena had not entered office with a positive, planned program of reforms. The maderistas had never had a chance to participate in government; most of them believed their duty was to preserve the government and maintain the peace,

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<sup>59</sup>Dye to U. S. Embassy, Sept. 25, 1911, USDS, 812.00/2397. The magonistas, or socialists, who had earlier controlled much of the Altar District, apparently had gone underground prior to the election under threat of extermination. They made a sudden reappearance in the news with their capture of Altar on September 26. The Governor purportedly prepared to send troops, but the movement seems to have died from lack of interest. Dye to SecSt, Sept. 27 & 29, 1911, USDS, 812.00/2386 and 2398.

<sup>60</sup>Dye to U. S. Embassy, Sept. 25, 1911, USDS, 812.00/2397; Colonel Charles M. O'Connor to Adj. General, Dec. 9, 1911, USDS, 812.00/2652.

and they planned no changes in the governmental structure which they inherited. This in itself was a covert source of discontent, for many citizens had hoped for an end to the prefecture system which gave the governor control over district affairs.<sup>61</sup>

One problem which the new government agreed should be faced immediately was that of education. The year's violence had closed the state's schools and the early official expenses had drained the substantial treasury which the maderistas received from the old regime. Until the state income returned to normal there was no money to pay teachers or for scholarly materials. The only recourse the state had was to seek a loan from the federal government in Mexico City. To this end Maytorena, after only three months in office, requested a two-month leave from the legislature for a visit to the national capital, which was granted on December 11, to begin the next day. The same session unanimously approved Gayou as the interim governor.<sup>62</sup>

Gayou functioned from December 13, 1911 until March 2, 1912 as interim governor, and also continued to handle the problems of defense and war. It was to the latter function that he was forced to devote most of his time. Minor uprisings by disaffected maderistas erupted and were quickly

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<sup>61</sup>H. L. Wilson to SecSt, Feb. 7, 1912, USDS, 812.00/2776.

<sup>62</sup>Rivera, *La Revolución*, 252; *El Estado de Sonora*, December 19, 1911. The Maytorena government had changed the name of the official newspaper.

suppressed, and the dissidents were killed or fled across the border.<sup>63</sup>

By late February, 1912, in Sonora new groups were forming whose sympathies apparently lay with the rebellions elsewhere in the Republic, those led by Pascual Orozco in Chihuahua and Emiliano Zapata in Morelos, who appeared to be united through Article Three of the Plan of Ayala. Eighty miners held a rally in Cananea the night of February 13, then with the cry of "Viva Zapata!" attacked the police force, killing three officers. They looted several stores, obtaining arms and ammunition, and left for the mountains. State troops made no serious effort to pursue them. The next day the Magdalena garrison went to Cananea to help maintain the peace, and those who remained behind to guard prisoners freed their charges; the prisoners, together with some of the guards fled with a large quantity of arms to the mountains.<sup>64</sup>

Presumably they joined others congregating there. The American consul at Nogales reported on February 29 that several bands had gone to Chihuahua during the past week, although

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<sup>63</sup>H. L. Wilson to SecSt, Feb. 7, 1912, USDS, 812.00/2776; Dye to U. S. Embassy, Feb. 7, 1912, USDS, 812.00/2790; Hostetter to SecSt, Dec. 16, 1911, USDS, 812.00/2663.

<sup>64</sup>Dye to U. S. Embassy, Feb. 16, 1912, USDS, 812.00/2883-1/2. The miners clearly were aware of the Plan of Ayala issued in November, 1911 and Orozco's ephemeral connection with it. Orozco's rebellion did not begin its public phase until February 25, although it had begun privately a week before. This indicates a close contact among the northern dissidents.

there were still bandits in the Cananea vicinity.<sup>65</sup> But in early March evidence indicated that the rebels were moving west toward Sonora as the Orozco rebellion faltered in Chihuahua. Gayou shifted the few troops he had in the north from one town to another to meet rumored threats.<sup>66</sup> He concentrated his largest force in Sahuaripa to prevent the rebels from entering the south central sector. Conditions quickly became serious enough for the legislature to issue a proclamation calling on all citizens to set aside political differences and cooperate to maintain peace and establish order.<sup>67</sup>

In the south the Yaquis remained a menace. Since the state had assumed the responsibility for feeding them, they had been relatively quiet, limiting their depredations to the theft of horses and cattle. But negotiations with the central government brought them no positive results and in December they renewed their long conflict with the state.<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>65</sup>Dye to SecSt, Feb. 29, 1912, USDS, 812.00/3074.

<sup>66</sup>Dye to SecSt, Mar. 9, 1912, USDS, 812.00/3240.

<sup>67</sup>Hostetter to SecSt, Mar. 9, 1912, USDS, 812.00/3272. Gayou had fifty men at Agua Prieta, twenty-five at Fronteras and Nacozari, one hundred and twenty at Cananea, thirty-five at Nogales and Magdalena, and one hundred more in small squads throughout the north, all on the railroads, which allowed them to augment each other rapidly. Dye to SecSt, Feb. 29, 1912, USDS, 812.00/3074.

<sup>68</sup>Solicitor General to SecSt, Jan. 2, 1912, USDS, 812.00/2661; Hostetter to SecSt, Dec. 16, 1911, USDS, 812.00/2663.



The problem was compounded by the fact that the Yaquis still retained the arms furnished them by the maderistas, and the Mayos, seeing the Yaquis' evasion of punishment, emulated them.<sup>69</sup> Many of the younger Indians, born in exile or in the mountains during the campaigns of extermination, knew nothing of the agricultural life of their fathers and could not be counted on to settle into that life, even if land were secured.<sup>70</sup> Neither Maytorena's government nor its successors successfully challenged the Indians during 1910-1920; small contingents of troops and Indians occasionally met in battle; usually the confrontation was between unarmed farmers and armed Indians with foreseeable results.

When Maytorena resumed his office in March, the Orozco rebellion in Chihuahua had assumed menacing proportions. After the defeat of General José González Salas by the orozquistas, the Governor telegraphed President Madero an offer to organize troops to join the army in Chihuahua. Madero accepted, and for this purpose Maytorena had Gayou send a circular telegram to the municipal presidents, asking them to raise forces to cooperate with federal troops. Gayou set up two meetings with the presidents, one in Navojoa for the southern part of the state, and the other in Magdalena.

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<sup>69</sup> Hostetter to SecSt, Jan. 20, 1912, USDS, 812.00/2714.

<sup>70</sup> H. L. Wilson to SecSt, Feb. 7, 1912, USDS, 812.00/2776.

Gayou called on De la Huerta to accompany him to those meetings.<sup>71</sup>

De la Huerta and Obregón had had a fierce disagreement over the attempts of Obregón to involve De la Huerta in the affairs of Huatabampo.<sup>72</sup> The coolness between them had persisted, although the conciliatory De la Huerta, after reflecting on the disagreement, had decided that Obregón had not meant to offend him. Obregón and some of his friends were at the station to greet Gayou, but when Obregón saw De la Huerta get off the train, he turned his back on him. De la Huerta realized that he would have to make the overtures for the renewal of their friendship, and stopped Obregón on the station platform to ask that the affair be forgotten. Obregón happily accepted.

At the meeting Obregón seated himself directly in front of Gayou, and being in a jovial mood, interrupted the talks with unimportant comments, much to the vice-Governor's annoyance. When Gayou asked the presidents how many men each thought he could raise, they answered with small estimates, generally from fifty to one hundred men. But Obregón volunteered to raise one thousand. Gayou was startled, not

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<sup>71</sup>The following account of the recruiting trip to the south is based on Guzmán Esparza, Memorias, 30-32.

<sup>72</sup>Obregón had sought De la Huerta's aid to raise outside money for the installation of a water system in the municipality. De la Huerta found out that the outside money was not needed; that Obregón had simply wanted him involved so he would side with him against the council, which had supported Zubaran. Guzmán Esparza, Memorias, 29.

believing it possible to raise such a large number, but Obregón insisted that he could do it. On the train back to Hermosillo, De la Huerta attempted to explain to Gayou about Obregón's connections with the Mayos, but Gayou retained his impression of Obregón as a braggart.

After the meeting with the municipal presidents in Magdalena, Gayou returned to his office to find a telegram from Madero transcribing a telegram which the President had received from Obregón. The latter, believing that Gayou had not taken him seriously, had wired the President directly. Gayou was angry indeed, and vehemently denounced Obregón. De la Huerta again defended him but could not dispel Gayou's annoyance and disbelief. Several days later Obregón asked for 25,000 pesos for the recruitment, explaining that he needed it to provide for the families of his volunteers.

Gayou again was angry, but De la Huerta insisted that the request was just, since many of the men had families to care for. In spite of this reasoning and the fact that pay was often given for enlistments, Gayou did not answer the telegram; Obregón shortly wired again saying that with his own money and loans from friends he had raised 16,000 pesos and now had 500 volunteers. He said he could raise the rest of the men if Gayou would furnish 9000 pesos. Instead, Gayou told him to come with the 500 men that he had.<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>73</sup>Gayou's refusal to aid Obregón probably stemmed from jealousy and fear as well as a lack of funds. A thousand men under the personal control of one man could be a serious menace to the state government, and to Gayou's position.

The lack of backing by Gayou dissuaded some of the volunteers and Obregón arrived in Hermosillo on April 16 with only three hundred men. He also found great difficulty in obtaining reimbursement for the money that he had put up to raise the troop.

Obregón's men, by his own account, were mostly from the area of Huatabampo and of Indian stock, all farmers and most of them owners of their own farms. They left the village on the evening of April 14, leaving behind a crowd of families come to see them off, including Obregón's three sisters and his two young, motherless sons. His men had only two guns among them; arms were to be furnished by the state. When they reached Navojoa the next day, Obregón asked the president there for any arms that he might have; he had six guns with ten cartridges for each. It was with that grand total of eight guns that the men fought off a Yaqui force which attacked the train later that same day. They arrived in Hermosillo without further incident, and Obregón was confirmed as commander of the troop with the rank of lieutenant colonel; on April 19 the troop, now named the Fourth Irregular Battalion of Sonora, moved to Villa de Seris, a suburb across the Sonora River from Hermosillo, where one of the captains who had some military experience taught the men the rudiments of military discipline.<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>74</sup>Obregón, Ocho mil kilómetros, 7-10. Obregón mentions nothing of the financial arrangements for the troops.

Obregón's battalion remained in Villa de Seris for six weeks and would have been stationed there permanently if De la Huerta had not interceded for Obregón with Gayou. The Chamber of Commerce of Hermosillo knew of Obregón's previous support of Ramón Corral and considered him to be just the man to defend the commercial interests in the capital. They petitioned Gayou to keep him in the city, but Obregón somehow learned of their proposal and begged De la Huerta to use his influence with Gayou. He did not come to Hermosillo to care for such as those, he told his friend; he wanted to go to Chihuahua where he could earn rank and a name for himself. De la Huerta succeeded in his request to Gayou, and on June 2 Obregón left for Naco under the direct command of the vice-Governor.<sup>75</sup>

Sonora had been relatively quiet through March, April and May, despite the numerous groups of rebels or bandits wandering at will through the state. They were isolated, small bands that looted isolated mining camps, ranches and settlements. In Nogales, Manuel Mascareñas, Jr., a former ally of Maytorena, functioned in much the same way that Maytorena had one year before, raising men and money and buying arms to promote a rebellion. Isidro Escobosa returned to carry on his vendetta against Maytorena in late April, and the Yaquis kept the south wondering where they would strike next. In the face of the Yaqui threat, the

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<sup>75</sup> Guzmán Esparza, Memorias, 32.

Álamos district had sent a force under Obregón; it was the only district to do so.<sup>76</sup>

On May 18, Manuel Mascareñas and his associates met in the National Hotel in Nogales, Arizona. An American customs inspector reported to Mexican officials that the commander of the troops in Nogales, Sonora, Francisco I. Reina, was visiting Mascareñas in the hotel. The Mexican chief-of-police and two assistants followed the commander, then reported to Maytorena. Reina was called to Hermosillo and arrested; the next day twenty-three officials and citizens of Magdalena were arrested and taken to the capital, their arrests based on incriminating documents found on Reina.<sup>77</sup>

Scattered federal and state forces began to concentrate in the north near Agua Prieta in late May and early June, but who would command these combined forces remained a mystery. Giuseppe Garibaldi, grandson of the creator of a united Italy, arrived in Douglas, Arizona, supposedly with a commission from Madero to command. Friction between him and the Sonorans prevented his receiving a command, and he

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<sup>76</sup>Hostetter to SecSt, May 4, 1912, USDS, 812.00/3885. The prefect of the Arizpe District, Colonel Benjamín Hill, who was in effect the "de facto" military commander of the northeastern portion of the state, inaugurated a movement at Cananea to raise four hundred volunteers. The consular agent there reported they were to organize on March 24, but the group does not seem to have materialized. Hill did not figure as a leader against the orozquistas. Dye to SecSt, Mar. 23, 1912, USDS, 812.00/3419.

<sup>77</sup>Dye to SecSt, May 20 & 27, 1912, USDS, 812.00/3953 and 4075.

settled down to recruit, although he never took command of the recruits, either.<sup>78</sup> Other contenders for the role or commanding officer were General José de la Luz Blanco, newly arrived in the state, Colonel Heriberto Rivera, and Gayou. Madero finally settled the issue by ordering General Augustín Sanjinés (or Sanginés) to come west from Ojinaga, Chihuahua to take the Sonoran command.<sup>79</sup>

The concentrated troops left Agua Prieta on June 20, crossing the mountains to Colonia Moralos, one of two Mormon colonies situated near Púlpito Pass, the natural northern gateway into Chihuahua. At Colonia Morelos, while awaiting the arrival of Sanjinés and Colonel Blanco, who had remained in Nogales, they were joined by troops defeated in Chihuahua, and a small force of Sonoran irregulars under Salvador Alvarado. Blanco and Sanjinés arrived on July 6, and the new commander named Lieutenant Colonel Heriberto Rivera as infantry chief, and Lieutenant Colonel Álvaro Obregón as cavalry chief. Blanco became commander of the fractional forces which had arrived from Chihuahua.

On July 9 the assembled forces began a slow move to Colonia Oaxaca, through Púlpito Pass, to Casas Grandes, Chihuahua.<sup>80</sup> They left behind a resentful population which complained of troops being quartered in homes, of blatant immorality, thievery, and willful destruction of

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<sup>78</sup> Dye to SecSt, June 8, 1912, USDS, 812.00/4204

<sup>79</sup> Dye to SecSt, June 24, 1912, USDS 812.00/4326.

<sup>80</sup> Obregón, Ocho mil kilómetros, 10-13.

property. To prevent the loss of their horses the village men took the teams to the mountains, leaving their crops unattended and threatened. Two Mormon bishops charged that Sanjines did not enforce discipline and let his men do much as they pleased, leaving restitution to be made by the government.<sup>81</sup>

Enroute to Casas Grandes, the Sonoran column got its baptism of fire in a small skirmish at Ojitos, in which Obregón distinguished himself and gained his first taste of military glory. They arrived outside Casas Grandes on August 12; from there they were to move by railroad to Sabinal and on to Ciudad Juárez, the last remaining stronghold of the orozquistas in the state. By the time of their arrival that city was again in federal hands.<sup>82</sup>

As the Sonorans began their slow move out of the state on July 9, the orozquistas had already begun to penetrate the state in force. Rebel leaders in Nogales, Arizona told the United States consul that the orozquistas would enter in three columns; the northern through the Bavispe-Colonia

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<sup>81</sup> Reports by agents of Bureau of Investigation, transmitted by Justice Dept. to SecSt, July 31, 1912, USDS, 812.00/4542. A statement by M. S. Haymore refuted the bishop's charges, declaring that they were lies. The consul in Nogales said the bishops painted the darkest picture and Haymore the opposite---the truth probably lay somewhere in between. "The Mexican Situation," prepared by J. R. Clark, Jr., Solicitor for the State Department, Oct 1, 1912, quoting a telegram from Consul Dye, USDS, 812.00/5230-1/2.

<sup>82</sup> Obregón, Ocho mil kilómetros, 14-12.



Morelos area; the central column through Dolores Pass; and the southern column from Batopilas, Chihuahua.<sup>83</sup> His information appeared to be accurate, for after Ojitos, the rebels slipped around behind Sanjinés, without any opposition, to menace Agua Prieta. Orozquista pressure caused the garrison to be increased from seventy-five on August 3 to four hundred on August 8.<sup>84</sup>

Maytorena had other problems aside from the growing orozquista threat in the state. His two-month leave had been extended to three months, and he returned to take over in March amid growing reproof in the legislature. The reproof stemmed partly from his lack of dedication to his elected office, partly from disgust at his lack of success in Mexico City, and partly from his lack of a comprehensive revolutionary program for the state.<sup>85</sup> To some lawmakers it appeared that the total of his revolutionary aims had been

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<sup>83</sup> Dye to SecSt, July 16, 1912, USDS, 812.00/4433. During most of the year the invaders would be forced to follow certain routes because of the scarcity of water, but July and August are rainy months and there is water and forage throughout the mountains.

<sup>84</sup> Dye to SecSt, Aug. 3 & 8, 1912, USDS, 812.00/4556 and 4615.

<sup>85</sup> Consul Dye in Nogales mentioned Ignacio Bonillas as an example of the disaffection in the legislature. Bonillas, educated in the United States as an engineer, a man of strong intellect, was president of the legislature, and had attempted reforms, but had lately become discouraged and ceased public activity and was working as a surveyor. Dye to SecSt, Apr. 22, 1912, USDS, 812.00/3742.

to gain power for himself and his friends, Randall and Gayou, to the exclusion of all other elements which had contributed to Madero's triumph. Much of his prestige he inherited from his father, but his reliance on Randall and Gayou steadily eroded that prestige.

The distance between Maytorena and the lawmakers grew even wider when the Governor failed to present an official accounting to the legislature for the funds granted him for his trip to Mexico City. Hostilities were openly expressed in the legislature and as the military situation became more serious the denunciations became more vitriolic. A committee in the legislature began an investigation which revealed considerable graft by the Governor and other officials, but the completion of the investigation was postponed until the rebellion had been suppressed. Ignacio Bonillas stated confidentially to United States consul Alexander V. Dye in Nogales that the Governor and his friends had no desire to suppress the rebellion because it gave them the opportunity to misappropriate military funds for their own use without questions by the legislature.<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>86</sup>Dye to SecSt, Oct. 4, 1912, USDS, 812.00/5201. Neither De la Huerta nor Rivera mention the investigation in their accounts of Maytorena's problems with the legislature, but Salvador Alvarado, in a letter to Carranza, Nov. 16, 1913, noted that the Governor threatened the legislature because of the accounts, but the trouble had blown over because of the arrival of the orozquistas. Alvarado to Carranza, Nov. 16, 1913, as printed in Isidro Fabela, Documentos Históricos de la Revolución Mexicana (México, D.F., 1960), I, 150.

The Governor did have a defender in the legislature: De la Huerta. Although the Guaymas Deputy had not always sided with Maytorena, he realized that the Governor knew little of accounting procedures, and that his expenses were justified. While in Mexico City, Maytorena had visited, and been visited by, numerous other maderista leaders, many of whom needed financial assistance to return to their homes. The impecunious condition of the government did not permit Madero to give them aid. In addition, there had been heavy expenses for entertainment on a level suitable to his position as governor of one of Mexico's reputedly wealthier states. De la Huerta explained the expenses to the legislature, but it was in no mood to listen. Maytorena did not help his own cause; without advising the legislature he left for Guaymas.<sup>87</sup>

As the conflict between the Governor and legislature reached its climax, the state's already feeble military preparedness suffered a major blow which was a personal loss to Maytorena. Vice-Governor Gayou functioned as war minister, relieving Maytorena of the task of raising, equipping and dispersing the state's military forces. He went to Agua Prieta in mid-June with the Fourth Irregular Battalion, then on to Las Cruces, New Mexico, to visit two sons who were attending agricultural college there.<sup>88</sup> One month later, he was

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<sup>87</sup>Guzmán Esparza, Memorias, 33; Rivera, La Revolución, 252-253.

<sup>88</sup>Hostetter to SecSt, June 15, 1912, USDS, 812.00/4278.

reported to be very ill, and on July 20, he died in Los Angeles, where he had gone for an appendicitis operation.<sup>89</sup>

Gayou died as the rebel invasion promised to overwhelm Sonora's military capabilities. As nearly as could be determined, about 1600 rebels entered the central portion of the state in late July, and later arrivals probably raised the total to nearer 2500. They crossed from Madera, Chihuahua and captured the village of Arivechi, where they shot some of the non-combatants. From August 3 to 6, rebels surrounded the nearby town of Sahuaripa, but, realizing they could not secure it because Gayou had massed state troops there, withdrew west to La Dura.<sup>90</sup> The federal commander at La Dura procrastinated about facing the enemy and De la Huerta saw this as an opportunity for Maytorena to recover his lost prestige. He went to Guaymas and suggested to the Governor that he himself lead troops to battle the rebels. Maytorena agreed, and with his brother-in-law, his private secretary, De la Huerta and an indeterminate number of state troops, he caught the train to

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<sup>89</sup>Hostetter to SecSt, July 21, 1912, USDS, 812.00/4496.

<sup>90</sup>USS Vicksburg to SecNavy, Sept. 4, 1912, USDS, 812.00/4887. The rebels entered the central area through Dolores Pass, a narrow and rocky defile where one hundred men could have prevented their passage. But there were none to contest them; the loyal troops stationed there had been recalled and sent to Sahuaripa. Hostetter to SecSt, Aug. 15, 1912, USDS, 812/4723.

La Dura.<sup>91</sup>

The orozquistas were camped in the hills around La Dura. Maytorena resolved to lend his forces in an attack to prove his decisiveness and manliness to all of Sonora. The combat was initiated against the advance posts of the orozquistas and as soon as contact was made Maytorena led the bulk of the force to join the battle. But there was really no battle; the rebels fled in disorganization before the onslaught.<sup>92</sup>

Maytorena may have forestalled a massive rebel assault on some town with his charge, but it appears more likely that the orozquistas gathered at La Dura were following a well-thought-out plan which did not include an important battle there. The rebel forces split into two columns, one moving north and one moving south, with no interference from the federal troops at La Dura.<sup>93</sup>

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<sup>91</sup>The Governor was reported to be at La Dura with 1000 troops, but whether they were all state troops is unknown. No breakdown of the numbers was given, and the number varied from report to report. The numbers were usually exaggerated, anyway, to put each side in a favorable light. Hostetter to SecSt, Aug. 13, 1912, USDS, 812.00/4621.

<sup>92</sup>Rivera, *La Revolución*, 270; Guzman Esparza, *Memorias*,<sup>34</sup>. There is some confusion about this rather unimportant little encounter which had only political significance. Neither man gives it a definite date; Rivera puts it at the end of the campaign, "after September." Consul Louis Hostetter in Hermosillo reported the Governor at La Dura August 13 to 15, and that high water prevented a fight. Hostetter to SecSt, Aug. 13, 1912, USDS, 812.00/4621.

<sup>93</sup>Consul Hostetter complained in Hermosillo that the only move made by the federal troops was to send a two hundred and fifty man escort with Maytorena to Torres, where he took the train for the capital. Hostetter to SecSt, Aug. 10, 1912, USDS, 812.00/4645.

The southern party,<sup>94</sup> whose ultimate objective was probably Guaymas, attacked Álamos on August 22 and were badly defeated, leaving one hundred and eighty-seven dead on the battlefield. They moved on south to other defeats at Boca Sinaloa on August 28 and Agua Caliente in Sinaloa on the same day. One part of this column followed the Yaqui River Railroad to Cócorit, and met defeat at the hands of the town residents.

The force which went north crossed the Yaqui River and turned toward Hermosillo, then veered north again before threatening the capital. They divided again; one band under Emilio Campa approached Ures August 20-21, then rode west to the railroad and began a northward movement, burning the railroad bridges and cutting the telegraph lines. The other band, under Antonio Rojas, bypassed Ures and went to Rayón, then turned back to the Sonora River Valley at Huépac. En route they were joined by Escobosa and his Sonorans, who had attempted to take Moctezuma; all proceeded to Moctezuma.

The government of the state had contributed little to its defense; the occasional resistance came from groups organized by the prefects or commissioners. In reality, the

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<sup>94</sup> The following account of the rebel advance into the state is derived from the reports of consuls Dye, Hostetter and Bowman, and telegrams from Epes Randolph of the Southern Pacific Railroad to C. H. Bates, dated from Aug. 20, 1912, to Sept. 10, 1912, all found in USDS, 812.00/4671-4872.

state had very few troops with which to meet the orozquistas, certainly not enough for defense and offense at the same time. Gayou had shuffled his small garrisons like chess pieces about an entrapped king, back and forth from village and town to face the rebel cavalry, which was not restricted to the railroad tracks.

The orozquistas had missed several opportunities to capture Agua Prieta, and they had not made a serious effort to take Cananea, seeming to prefer raiding ranches and mines. But on September 12, the grouped forces of Rojas, Mascareñas and Campa demanded the surrender of Agua Prieta.<sup>95</sup> Maytorena had pleaded several times, without success, with General Victoriano Huerta, commander of the federal troops in Chihuahua, to return the Fourth Irregular Battalion to Sonora, since they were not being utilized. He then sent his private secretary to El Paso, Texas for a telegraphic conference with Madero, who ordered Huerta to release the Sonorans immediately. The battalion received permission to cross the United States; Sanjinés and four hundred and fifty Yaquis embarked at five o'clock in the evening of September 11, and Obregón's men left at three o'clock the following morning for the seven-hour trip to Agua Prieta.<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>95</sup> Bowman to SecSt, ND, Rec'd Sept. 11, 1912, USDS, 812.00/4877.

<sup>96</sup> Dye to SecSt, Sept. 11, 1912, USDS, 812.00/4882; War Dept. to SecSt, Sept. 12, 1912, USDS, 812.00/4883; Obregón, Ocho mil kilómetros, 21.

They arrived in time to surprise the rebels and forestall any advance on the town.

The expected assault never took place. Alexander V. Dye was instructed by the Department of State to inform both sides that no bullets must cross the boundary into Douglas, and Rojas agreed to delay the attack until he had instructions from headquarters.<sup>97</sup> After a month of intimidation the rebels chose to retreat.

Sanjinés did not believe that the retreat was permanent, and while he sat awaiting the orozquistas in Agua Prieta a telegram announced that El Tigre mining camp southeast of Fronteras also expected their arrival at any time. Sanjinés refused to send any troops to El Tigre, but after solicitation by the El Tigre Mining Company representative, he sent a telegram to Nacozari to order troops sent from there to El Tigre. However, all communication into Nacozari de García, the residential area, was controlled by the Nacozari Mining Company in Pilares de Nacozari; the mining company at first refused to send the telegram because they did not want to lose any of their troops.<sup>98</sup>

The orozquistas attacked El Tigre on September 13 in a fight that lasted all day.<sup>99</sup> Sanjines decided to send two

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<sup>97</sup> Bowman to SecSt, ND, Rec's Sept. 11, 1912, USDS 812.00/4877.

<sup>98</sup> Dye to SecSt, Sept. 12, 1912, USDS, 812.00/4895.

<sup>99</sup> Dye to SecSt, Sept. 13, 1912, USDS, 812.00/4908.



hundred men south to relieve the camp, but could get no trains for transport because the crews were afraid.<sup>100</sup> Sanjinés managed to obtain crews the next morning, and the entire command, except for two hundred soldiers, rode trains to the southeast; they returned that evening.<sup>101</sup> El Tigre was under attack again that morning, and the town fell to José Inés Salazar before noon of September 14. No federal troops nor state troops had arrived to assist El Tigre, although one hundred and sixty soldiers were known to be twelve miles away nine hours before the surrender. Other federal troops arrived after the rebels had evacuated the town on September 15, taking twenty-one bars of silver bullion and one hundred horses.<sup>102</sup>

The federal forces under Sanjinés and the various orozquistas appeared determined not to fight, but this perfect record of avoiding combat was spoiled by an ambitious lieutenant colonel. Sanjinés ordered Obregón and his men to Hacozaari on September 17 as replacements for the soldiers who had been sent to El Tigre. Obregón learned the same day that the rebels had evacuated El Tigre, and requested

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<sup>100</sup> Dye to SecSt, Sept. 13, 1912, USDS, 812.00/4911.

<sup>101</sup> Dye to SecSt, Sept. 14, 1912, USDS, 812.00/4925 & 4926.

<sup>102</sup> Dye to SecSt, Sept. 15 & 17, 1912, USDS 812.00/4932, 4935 & 4950; War Dept. to SecSt, Sept. 15, 1912, USDS, 812.00/4934; Hostetter to SecSt, Sept. 16, 1912, USDS, 812.00/4948. Obregón said sixty bars, the mine said twenty-one. All twenty one were recovered. Dye to SecSt, Sept. 27, 1912, USDS, 812.00/5098.

and received permission to join Salvador Alvarado in Fronteras, which faced a probable confrontation with the rebels from El Tigre. As his command moved north the rebels cut the telegraph wires leaving them with no contact with Sanjinés.<sup>103</sup> Obregón, knowing the enemy was nearby, interrogated all arriving travelers. Two of these informed him that they had seen the rebels riding early that morning, and that they had not stopped. He interpreted that to mean that they had had no breakfast, so would camp early for a meal.<sup>104</sup> Scouts determined that the rebels were encamped about eight miles away in San Joaquín. Obregón quickly entrained his men and surprised Salazar's resting rebels. Within two hours the numerically superior orozquistas were completely routed.<sup>105</sup>

In Agua Prieta De la Huerta received a report that Obregón had fallen into an ambush. When he went to ask Sanjinés to send a relief force, the General wanted to know by whose orders Obregón had left his post. De la Huerta then went to see the commissioner, Calles, who had forty men at his disposal. His men were not subject to orders from Sanjinés, and Calles and De la Huerta set out to the rescue. Passing through a small village they learned by telegraph

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<sup>103</sup> Obregón, Ocho mil kilómetros, 22.

<sup>104</sup> Guzmán Esparza, Memorias, 37.

<sup>105</sup> Obregón, Ocho mil kilómetros, 24-25.

that Obregón was to be congratulated, not rescued.<sup>106</sup>

The encounter at San Joaquín was of little strategic importance, although it prevented an attack on Fronteras. The orozquistas still controlled the mountainous country away from the railroad south and east of Nacozari. It did remove one important leader from the conflict; Salazar was wounded and disappeared from Sonora, possibly to enter the United States for treatment.

There was still a major body of rebels ranging over the countryside to the west of Cananea. Emilio Campa had led his men on a remarkable three week march through some of the most populous portions of the state without a single battle with federal troops, and with the loss of only two men. These two had been killed in El Oro, a mining camp, by the two Americans in charge of the camp. Campa had paralyzed the railroad, destroying communications, moving to the east to the mining camps and swinging back to the railroad, until he reached Santa Cruz, twelve miles south of the border on the railroad between Nogales and Cananea. While Campa was in Santa Cruz, the general superintendent of the Ferrocarril Sud-Pacífico de Mexico, H. J. Temple, offered Colonel José Moreno, the commander of two hundred men in Nogales, the use of a special train to take troops to Santa Cruz, a distance of less than fifty miles. Moreno declined,

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<sup>106</sup> Guzmán Esparza, Memorias, 38-39.

saying it was too dangerous, the train could be dynamited, etc. When it was learned that Campa now had only one hundred and fifty men with him, the train was offered again, and again Moreno declined.<sup>107</sup>

From Santa Cruz, Campa went east and south around Cananea and then circled back to the west to strike the north-south railroad; near Imuris he sacked mining camps, destroyed mail and burned railroad bridges. With federal troops from Santa Ana and Imuris in pursuit he crossed the railroad and plunged into the sparsely-settled northwest, heading toward Altar.

Campa entered Altar, but did not stay. The combined federal forces pursuing him numbered four hundred and fifty men, and Campa could expect defeat. He had nothing to fall back on except the desert, where water and food were scarce, or he could enter the United States. The federal troops had orders not to let him return to the railroad.<sup>108</sup> For several days after deserting Altar, he led the soldiers a merry chase, but each managed to avoid the other.<sup>109</sup> He turned back to the east and he and some companions separated from the main body, possibly because of a quarrel deliberately

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<sup>107</sup> Bowman to SecSt, Sept. 7, 1912, USDS, 812.00/4888.

<sup>108</sup> Hostetter to SecSt, Sept. 16, 1912, USDS, 812.00/4948.

<sup>109</sup> Bowman to SecSt, Oct. 4, 1912, USDS, 812.00/5201.

begun to give him an excuse to leave.<sup>110</sup> On Sunday, September 22, he and his companions were captured in Arizona about thirty miles south of Tucson, and imprisoned there. The day before Colonel Anacleto Girón's soldiers had encountered the main body of Campa's men under Miguel Enciso at Sotol, fifteen miles southwest of Santa Ana and been defeated; they met another federal force the next day and again were defeated.<sup>111</sup>

By the end of September the orozquista rebellion in Sonora was effectively ended. Sanjinés was ordered to grant amnesty to all orozquistas except the leaders, but many of those were already in the United States.<sup>112</sup> Campa remained in jail in Tucson, and other rebel leaders also crossed the border to concentrate in Douglas.<sup>113</sup> Salazar's whereabouts were uncertain, but Rojas and Escobosa still retained control of small bands. Rojas moved south toward Ures where he made a half-hearted attempt to take the town. Escobosa was defeated by federal troops on September 23 and 24, and he and Rojas made overtures concerning surrender to the government. Rojas demanded too much: pay for himself and amnesty for his men. The amnesty was acceptable, but Rojas

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<sup>110</sup> Hostetter to SecSt, Sept. 23, 1912, USDS, 812.00/5126.

<sup>111</sup> Bowman to SecSt, Sept. 23 & 25, 1912, USDS, 812.00/5036 & 5116.

<sup>112</sup> Dye to SecSt, Sept. 27 & 29, 1912, USDS, 812.00/5098 & 5104.

<sup>113</sup> De la Huerta recounted a visit to Tucson shortly after the battle of San Joaquín. A friend there told him

had to leave the state.<sup>114</sup> Rojas left for Chihuahua, Escobosa surrendered in Cananea on October 5, and Enciso yielded on October 15.<sup>115</sup> Except for the Yaqui depredations in the south, Sonora was quiet and in early December the state began disbanding the volunteer forces.<sup>116</sup>

Preoccupation with the rebellion would have forestalled any reforms had any reforms been contemplated. Maytorena, in his annual report in September, could report little social or economic progress in the state; it had been a military year.<sup>117</sup> It was also because of the military that Maytorena requested and received a two-month leave of absence to go to Mexico City.

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of some auspicious individuals who were being held in jail whose identities were unknown to the local authorities. This friend, who was on good terms with the jail officials, took De la Huerta to see the prisoners, and he recognized one of them as Emilio Campa. Campa refused to admit his identity, insisting that he was a laborer come to seek work, until De la Huerta explained that Campa, as a political refugee would not be kept in jail. Years later, Campa visited De la Huerta in New York when the latter was consul general, and thanked him for his advice. Guzmán Esparza, Memorias, 39-41.

The names of the prisoners may not have been released to the public, but the United States authorities were certainly aware of their identities, as were the Mexican consuls. The Mexican Embassy wanted the United States to detain Campa indefinitely, or at least not permit him to return to Mexico. Extradition was out of the question; there was no extradition on political charges. The only case the United States could make against him was for smuggling or violation of neutrality. Dye to SecSt, Sept. 26, 1912, USDS, 812.00/5092; Wilson to SecSt, Sept. 25, 1912, USDS, 812.00/5063.

<sup>114</sup> Hostetter to SecSt, Oct. 10, 1912, USDS, 812.00/5243.

<sup>115</sup> Dye to SecSt, Oct. 6, 1912, USDS, 812.00/5172; Hostetter to SecSt, Oct. 10 & 15, 1912, USDS, 812.00/5243 and 5290

The federal government was supposed to supply and pay the state's auxiliary forces raised to combat the orozquistas, but the aid had been very slow in coming. The state did not have funds available for those expenses and Maytorena desired to discuss the problem with Madero. He talked with the President several times and received promises that the military needs would be regularly met. He also became acquainted with the political malaise which infested the capital, before he returned to Sonora in January.

De la Huerta had also obtained a leave of absence from the legislature in order to join Maytorena at the Governor's request, but the Deputy had several matters of his own to present to the President for consideration. He wanted to press Madero for a new commissioner to the Yaquis; Viljoen's replacement had not been able to reach an agreement. And De la Huerta carried with him to Mexico City, a spineless cactus, developed by the botanist, Louis Burbank, with whom he corresponded. De la Huerta saw the cactus as a boon for the cattlemen of the northern deserts; as a ready source of nutritious food and liquid for their cattle. Through friends he, too, learned of the tension which hovered over the capital, and concluded that an

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<sup>116</sup> Simpich to SecSt, Dec. 10, 1912, USDS, 812.00/5701.

<sup>117</sup> Hostetter to SecSt, Oct. 15, 1912, USDS, 812.00/5299. Includes a copy of Maytorena's Report.

explosion could be expected soon. The cuartelazo of February 9 found him still in Mexico City; that morning he raced to Chapultepec Palace to offer his help to Madero without taking time to put on a shirt.<sup>118</sup>

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<sup>118</sup>Rivera, La Revolución, 278; Guzmán Esparza, Memorias, 45-46. Whether De la Huerta ever had a chance to discuss these subjects is unknown; he says only that he hoped to discuss them, never that he had.



CHAPTER III  
A NEW POWER STRUGGLE: 1912-1914

The Orozco rebellion had faded by December, 1912 but the discontent and unrest lingered in Sonora, where an air of pessimism about the future pervaded business and government circles. Rumors of anti-Madero feeling persisted among the federal troops along the northern border, acerbated by the failure of the central government to issue clothing adequate for the cold, snowy weather of a mountain winter.<sup>1</sup> Blame for their discomfort naturally accrued to the President; federal officers could not make any move without orders from Mexico City.

There were also recurring reports of a renewal of hostilities by rebel chiefs. None of the rebels who had surrendered or had been captured had been punished by local or federal authorities--an unexpected result for the end of a rebellion, and one which many upper-class Mexicans were certain would encourage public disorder. Nor could they have approved the reprimand given by Interim-Governor Padilla to Colonel Emilio Kosterlitsky, commander of the federal corps at Nogales, for capturing convicts who had escaped from the

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<sup>1</sup>Simpich to SecSt, Dec. 10, 1912, USDS, 812.00/5701.

Hogales, Arizona jail, without a prior order by the Governor.<sup>2</sup>

In Cananea the Mexican employees staged a strike against the 4C's on December 18, but a sudden spell of extremely cold weather discouraged many, and about half of the 1755 strikers returned to work on December 22. The company felt the three hundred federal troops stationed in Cananea would be of little help; they were poorly clothed, housed and fed and would probably join the miners in looting if trouble began. The strike leaders managed to prevent violence against the company, and the vital role played by the 4C's in the state's economy caused Governor Padilla to personally take part in the negotiations. No agreement was reached, and the strike ended with the arrest and imprisonment in Hermosillo of the leaders. However, they were released early in January and returned to the mines, a continual source of unease.<sup>3</sup>

Sonora heard the news of the cuartelazo in Mexico City with interest and excitement, but with no immediate action.<sup>4</sup> Maytorena, who had resumed office at the end of January, sent telegrams to all prefects on February 9 telling them of the

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<sup>2</sup>Bowman to SecSt, Dec. 20, 1912, USDS, 812.00/5770. The rebels did return in early January, gathering at Bacadéhuachi, about thirty-eight miles east of Moctezuma. Others assembled in the Ajos Mountains near Cananea, but both groups limited their incursions to thievery. Simpich to SecSt, Jan. 15 to Feb. 10, 1913, USDS, 812.00/5834, 5906 and 6166.

<sup>3</sup>Simpich and Bowman to SecSt, Dec. 14 to Jan. 15, 1913, USDS, 812.00/5692, 5727, 5733, 5737, 5740, 5746, 5750, 5791 and 5906.

<sup>4</sup>Consular reports from Dec. 7, 1912 to Feb. 20, 1913, USDS, 812.00/6166, 6201, 6230, and numerous others.

crisis in the nation's capital. Daily accounts in the state's newspapers repeated the official pronouncements from Mexico City, and were decidedly optimistic.<sup>5</sup> The announcements of the arrests of Vice-President Pino Suárez and President Madero arrived early on February 19, and a few hours later came word that Venustiano Carranza, the governor of Coahuila, and his state legislature had refused to recognize the authority of Victoriano Huerta. The Coahuila legislature gave emergency powers to Carranza and called for the support of other states.<sup>6</sup>

At the time these events occurred, Álvaro Obregón was in Hermosillo with his command, which had been transferred there in mid-December after the orozquists threat had been lifted.<sup>7</sup> In Hermosillo, he received a promotion to colonel, and his troop was still in the capital when Maytorena returned to Guaymas in late January, although Obregón had by then been given verbal permission by the Interim Governor to retire

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<sup>5</sup>Rivera, *La Revolución*, 281-284. Rivera discusses the optimism prevalent because of Madero's faith in Huerta. He also reproduces the stories carried in *El Demócrata* of Ures, February 10 - 15.

<sup>6</sup>The telegram from Henry Lane Wilson, United States ambassador to Mexico, went out on the evening of February 18. USDS, 812.00/6241. Holland to SecSt, Feb. 19, 1913; also Isidro Fabela, *Documentos históricos de la Revolución Mexicana* (Mexico City, 1960), I, 3-6. Cumberland, *The Constitutionalist Years*, 16, says that Huerta's control of communications prevented delivery of the Coahuila message to most states.

<sup>7</sup>The following account of Obregón's movements is from Obregón, *Ocho mil kilómetros*, 26-31.

Upon learning of Obregón's coming separation, Maytorena summoned him to Guaymas, where he arrived on February 10. The happenings in Mexico City occasioned much discussion, but Maytorena reflected the optimism of the news reports and foresaw victory for Madero. The two men also discussed the possibility of Obregón's being a candidate for the state legislature. Obregón refused to consider the idea, he later said, because he did not agree with Maytorena's politics, and told him so. He did promise to seek a candidate in the Álamos district who would support the Governor.

Obregón went back to the capital on February 14, then left for his home in Huatabampo. After visiting with friends and family in Navojoa he reached Huatabampo on the morning of February 19. His reunion with his large family and circle of friends lasted but a few hours; an urgent message from Maytorena in Hermosillo reported the arrest of Madero and Pino Suárez, and urged him to return to the state capital.

Obregón immediately rode back to Navojoa, where his friends decided to join him to offer their services to the Governor. But Maytorena did not think that arms for offense were what he needed at that moment; he needed men to help keep the peace. Obregón was named to the post of military commander of Hermosillo to assure that there would be a loyal man in the post.

Maytorena had not decided on his course of action. While indignation filled the press of most of the state, the Governor vacillated, torn between his friendship for Madero

and his respect for order. The state's municipalities telegraphed their support of his government, and the maderista leaders of consequence, such as Juan Cabral, Salvador Alvarado, Pedro Bracamonte and Benjamín Hill, together with Obregón, came to the capital to persuade him to take some action. The men knew that the Governor had sent his Government Secretary, Ismael Padilla, to confer with Carranza, although they were ignorant of what the talks concerned.<sup>8</sup> Their disgust with his procrastination would have become open animosity had they known that he sent Padilla to Carranza to tell him that the state was quiet and would recognize Huerta.<sup>9</sup>

Obregón and his fellows realized that Maytorena would probably offer his resignation, and they tried to convince him that his constitutional position was a source of strength for an uprising, should it come. Maytorena was unconvinced of the need for public disorder, and his arguments were given strength by a telegram from Padilla announcing that Carranza had recognized Huerta.<sup>10</sup> The Governor could not know that

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<sup>8</sup>Ibid., 30. Rivera, La Revolución, 294.

<sup>9</sup>Alfredo Breceda, México revolucionario (Madrid, 1920), I, 209-216. Obregón (Ocho mil kilómetros, 31) indicates that he was later aware of the purpose for Padilla's visit, but does not state when he learned of it.

<sup>10</sup>Holland to SecSt, Feb. 21, 1913, USDS, 812.00/6302. Carranza told Holland on Feb. 21 that he would support Huerta and repeated his statement to Padilla on Feb. 25.

Carranza was stalling for time;<sup>11</sup> he did know that Sonora was the only state which had not committed itself, and feared the path it would take.

The same men who were pressing Maytorena not to resign were also working to make sure that the legislature, which would almost certainly meet in special session, would be in agreement with them. Hill went from deputy to deputy urging the immediate denouncement of Huerta; Cabral and Alvarado wanted action before the federal troops in Guaymas, Tórin, Naco and Nogales could advance on Hermosillo and prevent it.<sup>12</sup>

Huerta demanded an announcement of their adherence from foot-dragging governors on February 22, but Sonora did not respond. Maytorena called for a meeting of the permanent deputation of the legislature on the same day; the deputation asked the Governor to convoke a special session of the legislature to meet on February 24.<sup>13</sup> When the deputies met, they ordered the Governor to notify Mexico City that, for the present, the state was a spectator and would keep order; when the central government was established the state would recognize it.<sup>14</sup> Maytorena could not make up his mind. On February 24, he sent a note to the legislature and attached

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<sup>11</sup>For an account of Carranza's delaying tactics following the Huerta takeover see Cumberland, The Constitutionalist Years, 16-20.

<sup>12</sup>Rivera, La Revolución, 286.

<sup>13</sup>AGES, 2899.

<sup>14</sup>Hostetter to SecSt, Feb. 26, 1913, USDS, 812.00/6391.

a document from Mexico City which told of the happenings there. In his note he did not mention the assassinations and there was no word of condemnation. He concluded by asking for special powers in war and finance "against future happenings," and also asked for permission to move the capital to any locale which he judged opportune. Law 117 of February 25 gave him the powers sought.

That same day the Governor met with the prefects, deputies and chiefs of the irregular troops who came to discuss what they should do. The group agreed to challenge Huerta, accepting all the consequences. Maytorena did not believe his health and the circumstances would permit him to retain control of the situation, and told them that he had decided to resign. The meeting would not accept his resignation because the cause needed the prestige of a constitutionally elected government.<sup>15</sup>

The Governor notified Mexico City as the legislature had ordered,<sup>16</sup> but he had business of his own to present to that body. Torn by the decision he had no desire to make, he chose not to resign but to ask for a six month leave of absence, this time on the basis of illness. The leave was granted on February 26, and Ignacio L. Pesqueira, the

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<sup>15</sup>Francisco R. Almada, La Revolución en el estado de Sonora (México, D.F., 1971), 75-76.

<sup>16</sup>Hostetter to SecSt, Feb. 26, 1913, USDS, 812.00/6498.

president of the permanent deputation and ex-municipal president of Cananea, was named as interim governor.<sup>17</sup> Maytorena left Hermosillo the next day for Nogales and the United States.

Adolfo de la Huerta and Roberto Pesqueira, a Sonoran representative in the national Congress, left Mexico City together after the arrests of Madero and Pino Suárez, convinced that in northern Mexico they would find those who would rise up in support of Madero.<sup>18</sup> But they found disappointment; the governors in San Luis Potosí and Nuevo León opposed the cuartelazo, but wanted no trouble, and the governor in Tamaulipas approved Madero's overthrow. On the train for Piedras Negras they learned from passengers that Carranza had announced his refusal to recognize Huerta. At Monclova, where the track for Saltillo left the main line to Piedras Negras, Pesqueira and De la Huerta held a telegraphic conference with Carranza. He told them that he had sent two telegrams to Maytorena and had received no answer. Carranza asked Pesqueira to assist the consul in Eagle Pass, Texas (across from Piedras Negras) and De la Huerta to go to Sonora via United States railroads to find out what was happening with Maytorena. Both men assured him that Sonora would follow him, no matter what Maytorena did.

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<sup>17</sup>AGES, 2903, No. 15.

<sup>18</sup>The following account of De la Huerta's trip from Mexico City, and his visits to Villa and Maytorena are from his own account. Guzmán Esparza, *Memorias*, 49-57. The conference with Carranza is confirmed by Fabela, Documentos históricos, 32-33.



Pesqueira and De la Huerta did as directed. En route to Douglas, De la Huerta received confirmation of what he feared had happened in Mexico City: the announcement of Madero's death. In Douglas he paused only long enough to exhort the workers in the Phelps-Dodge foundry to revolt, and to advise an old friend, now commissioner at El Tigre, to act immediately against the federal soldiers who were certain to support Huerta.

When De la Huerta discovered that Maytorena had arrived in Tucson, he resolved to try to induce him to return. From Douglas he telegraphed a friend in Tucson and learned not only Maytorena's address, but also that Francisco "Pancho" Villa was in Tucson.<sup>19</sup> So interested was he in the latter news that, on his arrival in Tucson, he first went to see Villa, with whom he had corresponded in 1911. The two men had a friendly visit, with De la Huerta filling-in Villa on the recent occurrences in the capital.

After his chat with Villa, he talked with Maytorena, who

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<sup>19</sup>General Huerta had accused Villa of insubordination during the Orozco rebellion, and held a quick court martial which sentenced him to death. He supposedly was standing before a firing squad (or on his knees before Huerta, as the Sonora version goes) when a stay of execution arrived from Madero. He subsequently escaped from prison in Mexico City and made his way to Nogales, via Toluca and Manzanillo, where he arrived on January 2, 1913. Four days later he was in El Paso, where he contacted the Governor of Chihuahua, Abraham González. After the death of González and the fall of Chihuahua to the huertistas, he returned to Tucson en route to California to work, but with the money from Maytorena and De la Huerta he returned to El Paso and crossed the border on March 8. His presence in Tucson was reported on March 8 by a Bureau of Investigation agent, 812.00/6731.

had, De la Huerta said, a sick stomach for which he kept a jar of milk setting in the window. De la Huerta tried to persuade him to return, but Maytorena argued:

Why do you want me to return to a situation that I can't cope with because of my illness? Moreover, all were my partisans and now, in this fight, I would have to squeeze the rich in order to get money because only with money can one make this revolution, and I have many obligations. Because of that I left. At the same time I don't have much faith in how the people respond. They have brought me news that already Carranza is in a semi-rebellious attitude, and they are persecuting him in such a way that they will pursue him relentlessly. They won't let him raise his head.<sup>20</sup>

Maytorena indicated that he was in contact with Rodolfo Reyes in Mexico City to try to find out what the new regime was doing so he could determine what to do. De la Huerta knew from personal experience that Maytorena was a brave man, so it could not be cowardice motivating his actions; he decided that Maytorena really did not understand politics and had participated in the revolution without knowing why.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>20</sup>Guzmán Esparza, Memorias, 55-56.

<sup>21</sup>Before Venustiano Carranza clarified his attitude toward Huerta on March 4, Henry Lane Wilson, the United States ambassador, had apparently convinced him that the United States had extended recognition to Huerta. Carranza protested to Washington against the recognition of the usurper on February 25, the same day that Padilla, representing Maytorena, insisted that Sonora would recognize Huerta. Cumberland, The Constitutionalist Years, 22. Padilla brought word back to Tucson of the supposed recognition, but how quickly they learned of the deception is not clear. Maytorena, even in what many regarded as a cowardly exile, considered himself the constitutional governor of Sonora, and asked the United States not to extend recognition until the people of Mexico had the opportunity to establish a government. Maitorena to W. J. Bryan,

De la Huerta wanted Maytorena to talk to Villa, but he refused on the grounds that it would be a violation of the neutrality laws of the United States. De la Huerta conversed with Villa again, telling him of Maytorena's attitude. Villa, in turn, complained that Maytorena had funds sent from Chihuahua by Governor Abraham González for revolutionary purposes, and that he would not give him any of the money to form an expedition. De la Huerta tried to interest Villa in coming to Sonora to fight, but the latter preferred to return to Chihuahua, which he considered his home and where he knew the people and the terrain.

To go to Chihuahua, Villa needed money, and supposedly Maytorena had that. So De la Huerta questioned Maytorena about the funds, but the Governor denied having them, explaining that they had been intercepted by federal forces in Chihuahua. With an effort, the two men raised two thousand pesos (about nine hundred dollars), enough to pay Villa's

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Mar. 7, 1913, USDS, 812.00/6553. (Maytorena personally spelled his name either as Maitorena or Maytorena.) In so doing, Maytorena was taking a stand in keeping with that taken two days before in Sonora, a sign that his moral courage had not completely vanished. He probably did not know of the action taken by the legislature, unless he had been forewarned, since the non-recognition was not announced publicly until March 7, and communications to the north had been cut. Breceda (Mexico, I, 418-419) said that Maytorena quickly came to know everything that happened in Hermosillo through Lorenzo Rosado, the General Government Secretary, who disliked Pesqueira because he felt that he had shunted him aside to handle only routine matters. Rosado used his office as a gathering center for information, all of which he passed on to Maytorena. Maytorena's ranch workers also brought him news on the cattle trains, as the Governor took advantage of his position to export, without having to pay freight costs or export taxes, the cattle from his ranches.

hotel bill and transportation to El Paso, and to purchase some horses. In El Paso friendly merchants supplied other equipment, and Villa crosses the border early in March.

In Agua Prieta, De la Huerta had met Plutarco Elías Calles, who directed him to the foundry to recruit; any rebel action in Agua Prieta had to be covert because there was a strong federal force under General Pedro Ojeda stationed there.<sup>22</sup> While De la Huerta was on his errand to Maytorena and Villa, Calles left Agua Prieta with three companions to go to San Bernardino ranch, where he met the men recruited in the foundry and others who had joined them; they named Calles provisional lieutenant colonel.<sup>23</sup> Calles had previously contacted maderista leaders in the north to invite them to bring their contingents to Colonia Morelos to organize; he went there to meet them. Among those present were Lieutenant Colonel Pedro F. Bracamonte, prefect of Moctezuma, and Captain Arnulfo R. Gómez. On the basis of rank and experience Bracamonte should have been chosen to command the assembled forces, but Gómez suggested Calles and the majority agreed on him.

Besides Calles, various other local leaders in the north had taken the initiative upon the announcement of the cuartelazo and had begun to raise forces to prepare to stave off

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<sup>22</sup>Calles' actions meant that he no longer was the commissioner in Agua Prieta.

<sup>23</sup>Rivera, La Revolución, 290-291.

federal moves against their towns, irrespective of the Governor's policy. The Cananea council, presided over by Manuel M. Diéguez, passed a resolution on February 21 to oppose all orders from Huerta<sup>24</sup> and troops in Agua Prieta threatened to revolt against the new President. Bitterness and resentment grew after the assassination; against the wishes of the mining companies the Cananea council tried to persuade the Governor to secure the removal of the three hundred and twenty federal troops stationed there. Frederick Simpich, the new United States consul in Nogales, added his pleas to those of the council, but the Governor would not reply.<sup>25</sup> Fronteras, an inconsequential town on the railroad between Douglas and Nacozari, became the first town to revolt. when some of its residents disarmed the small federal garrison through deceit on February 27.<sup>26</sup> Nacozari fell to the rebels on the same day.<sup>27</sup> The remainder of the towns stayed alert, but most did not overtly react to the assassinations in Mexico City in February.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>24</sup>Simpich to SecSt, Feb. 21, 1913, USDS, 812.00/6303.

<sup>25</sup>Bowman to SecSt, Feb. 21, 1913, USDS, 812.00/6315.

<sup>26</sup>Simpich to SecSt, Feb. 27, 1913, USDS, 812.00/6406. Fronteras was the junction point where telegraphic lines from mining offices in Douglas to those in Nacozari crossed the lines from Nogales and Hermosillo running eastward to Chihuahua. American mining companies were well informed of the events in Mexico, and news was available from a tap when there was no other source.

<sup>27</sup>Bowman to SecSt, Feb. 27, 1913, USDS, 812.00/6410.

<sup>28</sup>H. L. Stimson to War Dept., Feb. 28, 1913, USDS, 812.00/6414.

Cananea still had its federal garrison, though Diéguez, knowing he had the support of the mine workers, acted as if the troops did not exist. On February 28, he openly began passing out arms to sympathizers to use in an attack on the barracks, and some four hundred partisans congregated in the suburbs that evening.<sup>29</sup> The next evening he handed out more rifles. In the face of such blatant opposition the federal troops chose to entrench on a hill outside the town. Diéguez closed the saloons and kept the town under control.<sup>30</sup> General Ojeda promised to send five hundred troops on February 28; when the one hundred sixty-two that he did send arrived to reinforce the garrison on March 3, the maderistas, now numbering five hundred and eighty, had retired to the Ajos.<sup>31</sup>

Ures had greeted the news of the cuartelazo with indignation and, with news of the arrest of the President and Vice-President, volunteers began presenting themselves to the prefect. With news of their deaths, a contingent was organized to guard the town, and Ures became a staging center for groups moving toward Hermosillo from the east. Huépac and Baviácora in the Sonora River Valley both raised two hundred men to defend the state. From Sahuaripa, Colonel Juan Antonio García, the prefect, and one hundred cavalry had

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<sup>29</sup>Simpich to SecSt, Feb. 28, 1913, USDS, 812.00/6436.

<sup>30</sup>Simpich to SecSt, Mar. 1, 1913, USDS, 812.00/6458.

<sup>31</sup>Simpich to SecSt, Mar. 4, 1913, USDS, 812.00/6494.

ridden to Hermosillo to put themselves at Maytorena's orders, the first group to arrive.<sup>32</sup>

With all the rebellious gestures being made throughout the state, it appeared that Sonora had opted to oppose Huerta, but as yet the Interim Governor had taken no stand. Everyone knew his position, but he had yet to make it official, possibly as a play for time, the same ploy that Carranza was using. He, too, had military and financial problems which had to be solved before the state could embark on a rebellious course.

The 1200 state troops, or irregulars, gathered at Hermosillo at the end of February were being paid by the central government, but the funds would be withdrawn if recognition were not extended to Huerta. Without pay they would be more of a menace than protection, because there was no commissary in the town, and the men had to use their wages to eat. Consul Louis Hostetter asserted on March 1 that recognition was still possible. He informed the Secretary of State that Maytorena would have recognized Huerta had the assassinations not occurred, and that he was working with the new Governor to resolve the question. Pesqueira and the legislature promised to work for recognition if Hostetter could prove that a majority of the states had recognized the provisional government. The state also wanted guarantees of

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<sup>32</sup>Rivera, La Revolución, 291-293.

non-interference in state matters, no replacement of elected officials, and pay for the state troops. The consul had attempted to contact the American Embassy in Mexico City, which was spreading the word of recognition, but had received no answer.<sup>33</sup>

One of the Nogales consuls, Thomas D. Bowman, reported the state's position to Washington on March 5. He learned from the secret report of a Huerta agent that in a meeting held in Hermosillo on March 4, the Governor, Secretary of State Padilla, and representatives from the legislature and commercial clubs of Hermosillo and Guaymas, decided that if 1) the sovereignty of Sonora were respected, 2) no federal troops were sent to Sonora, 3) federal troops in the state were withdrawn, and 4) the federal government would pay the state troops, which would continue under the control of the Governor, the state would discuss recognition later.<sup>34</sup>

All delaying tactics ended the next day: on March 5 the legislature expedited Decree 120 which declared that the free and sovereign state of Sonora did not recognize Victoriano Huerta as president, and encouraged the Governor to make effective use of the faculties conceded him by the state's political constitution.<sup>35</sup> In the manifesto announcing

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<sup>33</sup>Hostetter to SecSt, Mar. 1, 1913, USDS, 812.00/6521.

<sup>34</sup>Bowman to SecSt, Mar. 5, 1913, USDS, 812.00/6612;  
Southernland to SecNavy, Mar. 13, 1913, USDS, 812.00/6974.

<sup>35</sup>AGES, 3049.



the decree, which was not published until March 7, Governor Pesqueira mentioned that citizen's groups in Fronteras, Huépac, Cananea, La Colorada and Moctezuma had already protested against Huerta.<sup>36</sup>

Militarily, Pesqueira had to reckon with a substantial number of federal troops, generally well armed, whose loyalty to either side was questionable.<sup>37</sup> General Sanjinés had been replaced as federal commander in the north by General Miguel Gil, who was relieved by General Pedro Ojeda. Ojeda's command included men at Naco, Agua Prieta, Cananea and Nogales. The Nogales contingent was commanded by Colonel Emilio Kosterlitsky, and was probably the best trained and armed force on the border.

The Yaqui Division, headquartered at Tórin on the Yaqui River, was headed by General Miguel Gil, and included Mayo and Yaqui volunteers with forces scattered from Guaymas to Cócorit. As auxiliaries in Guaymas there were two federal gunboats.<sup>38</sup> Also, in the south one important town had not joined the opposition to Huerta, Álamos. The prefect of the

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<sup>36</sup>AGES, 2904.

<sup>37</sup>The number of troops on neither side can be accurately ascertained because of the tendency of each side to overstate the number of their opponents. For instance, Obregón, Ocho mil kilómetros, 35, says that Kosterlitsky had 400 men, but 280 men surrendered to the Americans; this is after Kosterlitsky was joined by men of his old command who deserted to him. By his own account Obregón seldom had superior forces. No number should be taken at face value.

<sup>38</sup>Southerland to SecNavy, Mar. 10, 1913, 812.00/6672.

Álamos district, Adrián Marcor, was a friend of the slain president and had welcomed him to Álamos only three years before; now, because of a conflict between himself and Benjamín Hill, Marcor led the leading citizens in opposing the state's rebellion. To the new revolutionaries, this was tantamount to treason.<sup>39</sup>

Pesqueira moved swiftly after the Decree was signed to meet any federal threat. Major Salvador Alvarado was promoted to the rank of colonel and named chief of operations in the central part of the state; Pesqueira named Colonels Benjamín Hill and Juan Cabral to the same posts in the south and the north, respectively. Colonel Álvaro Obregón had already been named chief of the War Section, but that bureaucratic position did not appeal to him, so he obtained permission to campaign.<sup>40</sup>

As soon as the legislature signed the decree, Pesqueira took charge of the railroad and telegraph lines and commandeered all rolling stock. The trains were used by squads of men sent by Obregón to burn bridges north of Guaymas to prevent a rapid advance on Hermosillo by federal troops in the port. Another train went north to burn bridges between Magdalena and Nogales. All telegraph lines, except one to the north, were cut, but a censor tapped that line in

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<sup>39</sup>Obregón, Ocho mil kilómetros, 35.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., 33.

Magdalena and stopped all word of developments in Hermosillo from reaching the borders.<sup>41</sup> By day's end the capital was sealed off from the rest of the state.

In fact, so thorough was the censorship that Consul Bowman, in Nogales, complained on March 11 that he had not learned what the state legislature did on March 5, but he knew that it must have been adverse because all of the trains between Guaymas and Nogales were seized and held by the state government on that day. As a result of the Governor's actions the Southern Pacific Railroad, parent company of the Ferrocarril Sud-Pacífico de México, recalled all the other rolling stock to the United States side of the boundary. Travelers arriving by wagon or horseback brought the only news from the capital.<sup>42</sup>

The Governor took over the railroad for financial as well as strategic reasons. He hoped that control of the railway would bring money into the treasury, but he quickly decided that it was more of a liability than an asset. He replaced the American crewmen with Mexicans to assure their loyalty while troops were being shuttled. At the end of March he indicated he would return it to Southern Pacific control as soon as was feasible; the state could not afford

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<sup>41</sup>Memo, State Dept., Div. Latin American Affairs, Mar. 7, 1913, USDS, 812.00/6633; Bowman to SecSt, Mar. 7 & 11, 1913, USDS, 812.00/6544 & 6730.

<sup>42</sup>Bowman to SecSt, Mar. 11, 1913 USDS, 812.00/6730.

to run it.<sup>43</sup> The parent company did not want it back as long as they would have to carry state troops, which would incur the displeasure of the federal government, whereas, if the state continued to operate it they would not be held responsible.<sup>44</sup>

The Governor had to contend with an immediate financial crisis. Maytorena had demanded, before he left Hermosillo, the sum of 12,000 pesos, which was six months of salary for himself and those of his staff who accompanied him.<sup>45</sup> The payment drained a treasury which had, effectively, no income. The Huerta government still had control of the customs houses on the border and the port of Guaymas, and at the first hint of trouble had transferred customs funds to United States banks. All of the army paymasters had been grouped in Guaymas together with federal army funds and all of the income from the stamp tax and postage. Moreover, some of the banks, realizing what was coming, transferred their funds to the United States.<sup>46</sup>

To meet financial needs Pesqueira levied loans totaling 600,000 pesos on the banks and wealthy men of Hermosillo, but

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<sup>43</sup>Cowles to SecNavy, April 1, 1913, USDS, 812.00/7177.

<sup>44</sup>Simpich to SecSt, Mar. 28, 1913, USDS, 812.00/6980. AGES, 2959 contains exchange between Pesqueira and H. R. Temple, SPRR Agent regarding takeover and return. March, 1913.

<sup>45</sup>Why the Governor in exile should be entitled to a salary while not on official business is unexplained.

<sup>46</sup>Rivera, La Revolución, 296; Obregón, Ocho mil kilómetros, 31.

Max Muller, president of the Bank of Sonora and also German consular agent, succeeded in obtaining a reduction to a more realistic 50,000 pesos and got the interest on the loans guaranteed by the state legislature. The prefect of Hermosillo frightened the Chamber of Commerce with threats of force if the loans were not paid. Muller was arrested for alleged political activity against the state on the basis of a compromising letter, but was released after he paid a 20,000 peso "loan" to the state treasury.<sup>47</sup> Obviously, the men could not refuse to make a loan. Pesqueira also appointed bank examiners, but the nationally chartered banks chose to close their doors rather than admit them. This of course created more hardship, for without the banks no business could be conducted and labor could not be paid.<sup>48</sup> By the end of March, the closing of the banks and normal communications began to tell; reports reaching the northern border spoke of bread riots in the capital.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>47</sup>L. W. Mix, who witnessed the arrival of Max Muller in Nogales, Sonora, where he paid the 20,000 pesos, wrote that Roberto Pesqueira received the money, then caught the train to Tucson, perhaps to buy arms, or to split with Maytorena. Mix to Epes Randolph, March 25, 1913, USDS, 812.00/7014. Randolph, the manager for the SPRR, forwarded the letter to Senator Mark Smith, who forwarded it to the Secretary of State. The amounts stated for the forced loans are of dubious accuracy and vary from observer to observer.

<sup>48</sup>Southerland to SecNavy, Mar. 8, 1913, USDS, 812.00/6659; Bowman to SecSt, Mar. 14, 16, 23 & 28, 1913, USDS, 812.00/6695, 6706, 6835 & 6980; Hostetter to SecSt, Mar. 7, 15, 17 & 26, 1913, USDS, 812.00/6726, 6820, 6855 & 6981.

<sup>49</sup>Bowman to SecSt, Mar. 26 & 28, USDS, 812.00/6895 & 6980.

State finances still needed bolstering, so on March 18 Pesqueira contacted the president of the Chamber of Commerce in Guaymas, a town full of federal troops, and asked him to negotiate an 80,000 peso loan from the bankers and capitalists there. The Chamber of Commerce refused to cooperate because it could do nothing of a political nature, and the loan would place the merchants in the class of rebels.<sup>50</sup> American owned corporations in the state, especially the mines, were asked to contribute in return for state promissary notes, but none did so voluntarily.<sup>51</sup> The presence of the troops in mining towns after they were seized in March and April, coupled with the closure of the railroads, caused fuel shortages in the Cananea foundaries and subsequent closures, lay-offs and threats of famine.<sup>52</sup>

Pesqueira recommended to all army commanders that they find some method of obtaining arms, horses and provisions which would not cause alarm among the citizens with its abuses, and told them to punish those who acted otherwise.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>50</sup>Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet to SecNavy, Mar. 24, 1913, USDS, 812.00/7174.

<sup>51</sup>Simpich to SecSt., Mar. 31, 1913, USDS, 812.00/7020.

<sup>52</sup>Simpich to SecSt., Apr. 3 & 4, 1913, USDS, 812.00/7004 & 7075. The fuel situation began to ease at the end of April, and the mines reopened on May 10. Simpich to SecSt., Apr. 25, 1913, USDS, 812.00/7269; Report for the week ending May 10, 1913, of general conditions along the Mexican border, based on reports for the same period from the local military commanding officers, (hereinafter referred to as Border Report) USDS, 812.00/7606.

<sup>53</sup>AGES, 2904.

Carranza later reiterated the order, but that did not prevent consistent evasion at the expense of the ordinary citizen. In Sonora, cattle were easily confiscated or stolen, since in most cases they roamed free on the range. Pesqueira approached the ranchers in the north with the proposal of buying cattle with state bonds. The state would then market the cattle in the United States, without paying the export tax, and use the funds to buy war supplies.<sup>54</sup> As in the case of the bankers, the cattlemen actually had no alternative; the state ordered the roundup of all steers.<sup>55</sup> When the steer population was depleted the state imposed an eight dollar head tax on cows to prevent their export.<sup>56</sup> The sale of the cows continued, however, with the cattle growers seeking to evade confiscation, to such a degree that in September, the Governor was forced to tell the prefects in all districts to stop the practice of cows being sold before their calves were six months old to prevent the calves from starving.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>54</sup>Pesqueira to prefects, Apr. 20, 1913, AGES, 2959. The law making payment with bonds legal was Number 117 of Feb. 2, 1913. AGES, 3020 & 2902 contain bills sent to the state for provisions & evidence that some were paid with state bonds.

<sup>55</sup>Simpich to SecSt, April 14, 1913, USDS, 812.00/7194. Complaints about the taking of cattle without any form of payment may be found in AGES, 2913.

<sup>56</sup>R. P. Del Valle to Ben G. Davis, June 12, 1913, USDS, 812.00/23643.

<sup>57</sup>Maytorena to prefects, Sept. 29, 1913, AGES, 2959, guerra. Maytorena had resumed the governorship on August 4.

There were rumors that the Governor wanted to begin issuing paper money by establishing a bank of emission, with the bills guaranteed by the state treasury. His advisers opposed the move, preferring that the issuance and guarantee of such money be left to Carranza, whom they had recognized as the chief of the Constitutionalist movement. In that way the concession for the issuance of money by banks could be suppressed.<sup>58</sup> His advisors prevailed; Carranza authorized the first issuance of paper money on April 26, 1913, but the decree did not prohibit state emission.<sup>59</sup>

In an attempt to ease the financial needs of the state Pesqueira carried out small economies. The salaries of state officials were cut in half<sup>60</sup> and he asked the public officials to suspend the use of carriages at public expense; in turn he asked the transportation company in Hermosillo to issue passes to the Justices and Secretaries for free use of its street cars. The government also economized by the simple expedient of not paying its bills.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>58</sup>Navarro to Carranza, Apr. 5, 1913, as printed in Fabela, Documentos históricos, I, 14.

<sup>59</sup>Decree of April 26, 1913, as printed in Fabela, Documentos históricos, IV, 75-76.

<sup>60</sup>Simpich to SecSt, Apr. 14, 1913, USDS, 812.00/7194.

<sup>61</sup>Pesqueira to Gerente de la Compañía de Transvías, Apr. 7 & 14, AGES, 2903. Also in 2903 and 2902 complaints from the prefects from Ures and Nogales about the non-payment of rents and utilities may be found; presumably the other prefects had the same complaints. Non-payment of salaries found in 2903 & 2911.



Pesqueira also created an onerous office which opened the way for a multitude of officially sanctioned confiscations, the Administration of Absentee Properties.<sup>62</sup> This office was empowered to seize the property of anyone considered to be an enemy of the Constitutionalist movement for the use of that movement.

With communications to the north cut and the railway under his control, Obregón entrained the forces gathered in Hermosillo on March 6 for Magdalena. There they remained four days repairing the railroad bridges they had previously burned, then moved to Los Alizos Canyon, the southern approach to Nogales. From there they were forced to march because the badly damaged roadbed would not permit quick repairs. Speed was important; Obregón feared that Ojeda would send reinforcements from Agua Prieta.<sup>63</sup> The soldiers marched toward Nogales through intense cold, and began the assault before daylight on March 13. Kosterlitsky successfully defended the town until sundown, and then fighting ceased. At eight o'clock Nogales was in Obregón's hands and all of the federal

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<sup>62</sup>José María Maytorena, Algunas verdades sobre el General Obregón (Los Angeles, 1919) 38.

<sup>63</sup>Kosterlitsky was doubtlessly aware of his proximity, since on March 11 Consul Simpich visited both Kosterlitsky and Obregón, who was then encamped eighteen miles away, to warn them against incurring damage in Nogales, Arizona. Simpich to SecSt, Mar. 11, 1913, USDS, 812.00/6638. Obregón does not mention Simpich's visit, but states that his strategy was so planned. Obregón, Ocho mil kilómetros, 37.

soldiers had crossed the border to surrender to the Americans.<sup>64</sup>

Obregón had remained in Magdalena for four days, and during that time General Ojeda certainly knew where he was and why he was there. On March 8, Ojeda wired Nogales that he was coming with three thousand men to reenforce the garrison.<sup>65</sup> On March 10, he announced he would leave the next day; by then, it was too late. As Obregón advanced on Nogales on March 13 Ojeda's entire garrison evacuated Agua Prieta for Naco.<sup>66</sup> Of Ojeda's performance, Obregón said

I have always believed that the taking of Nogales was due to the torpor of the enemy and not to our ability... the enemy, surely, gave no importance to my advance, did not judge it necessary to reenforce the town....<sup>67</sup>

When Ojeda deserted Agua Prieta, he left behind a boxcar containing one hundred and nine Mauser rifles in bad condition, fifty boxes of cartridges, and much cold weather equipment which was of great use to the state troops. Ojeda did not know that the car was left behind because of a scheme hatched

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<sup>64</sup>Bowman to SecSt, Mar. 10 & 13, 1913, USDS, 812.00/6610, 6654, 6676, 6677 & 6678; Simpich to SecSt, Mar. 13, 1913, USDS, 812.00/6675.

<sup>65</sup>Simpich to SecSt, Mar. 9, 1913, USDS, 812.00/6582; Bowman to SecSt, Mar. 9, 1913, USDS, 812.00/6591. Simpich added, "In my opinion General Ojeda's available force does not exceed nine hundred."

<sup>66</sup>Dye to SecSt, Mar. 12, 1913, USDS, 812.00/6650; SecWar to SecSt, Mar. 13, 1913, USDS, 812.00/6656; McReynolds to SecSt, Mar. 13, 1913, USDS, 812.00/6657.

<sup>67</sup>Obregón, Ocho mil Kilómetros, 39.

by De la Huerta and Roberto V. Pesqueira. Pesqueira had come to Douglas to attend to private business, and De la Huerta was there to try to join Calles.<sup>68</sup> De la Huerta sought out a railroad worker who had helped Calles leave Agua Prieta; that worker told them that Ojeda was leaving and that he supposedly had two boxcars of munitions which would enter the United States to be taken to Naco. De la Huerta convinced him to change the combination of cars so that those loaded with the munitions would remain in Agua Prieta, and the ruse worked. Actually, there was only one car, and the rifles needed repairs, but they were reconditioned and served, as did the other material.<sup>69</sup> Thus De la Huerta was present in Agua Prieta when the town was "taken," and he formed a small garrison. He telegraphed Calles in Fronteras, where he had assembled some three hundred men, to notify him that he held

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<sup>68</sup>Roberto V. Pesqueira was the administrator of the Pesqueira family estate, which had long had offices in Douglas, and he used the offices to handle financial matters for the revolutionaries. An agent for the U.S. Bureau of Investigation reported Calles, on whom there was an arrest warrant in Sonora, was hiding at the home of Pesqueira's private secretary on March 8. Pesqueira arrived in Douglas on the same night, and held a meeting. Agents' reports, Mar. 8, 1913, USDS, 812.00/6731. De la Huerta mentions that Calles crossed the line and returned with recruits. Guzmán Esparza, *Memorias*, 59. While in Douglas, Pesqueira sent a telegram to President Wilson protesting the recognition of the Huerta government, arguing that the resignation was forged and that Congress had been coerced into accepting it. Pesqueira to President, Mar. 7, 1913, USDS, 812.00/6619.

<sup>69</sup>WarDept to SecSt, Mar. 14, 1913, USDS, 812.00/6688. Consul confirms taking of boxcar and contents.

the town.<sup>70</sup> Calles arrived early the next morning to take command.<sup>71</sup>

Obregón left Nogales on March 19 to march on Naco and Cananea. His primary destination was Naco, and he had Cabral, whom he had designated as commander in Nogales, write to General Ojeda proposing that he move out of the town to avoid an international incident. Ojeda refused to leave. Obregón sent a force of two hundred men as a challenge, but still Ojeda would not venture out of the town. Leaving this force in charge of Bracamonte, Obregón began to march his men into position. Their route took them through Estación del Río (or Del Río), which had been headquarters for Diéguez since he had quit Cananea. While his troops rested, Obregón sent a note to Colonel Moreno, federal commander at Cananea, demanding his surrender and giving him eighteen hours to reply. Moreno replied that he had orders to fight, and Obregón began his attack on Cananea on March 24.

Early in the afternoon of the next day, Colonel Salvador Alvarado, whose forces had joined Obregón in Nogales, notified Obregón that he had signed a twenty-four hour armistice with

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<sup>70</sup>Guzmán Esparza, Memorias, 57-59.

<sup>71</sup>WarDept to SecSt, Mar. 14, 1913, USDS, 812.00/6688. Alexander V. Dye, former consul now working for Phelps-Dodge in Douglas, reported that Ojeda had gone toward Cananea when he left Agua Prieta. Dye to SecSt, Mar. 12, 1913, USDS, 812.00/6650. His assumption was probably based on the news that Diéguez and a party of five hundred men were camped in the suburbs of Cananea, although there had been no fighting as yet. Simpich to SecSt, Mar. 13, 1913, USDS, 812.00/6668.

Moreno, but when Obregón communicated this to Hermosillo the Governor told him that he, alone, was authorized to sign a cease-fire. Obregón was reluctant to renew the combat immediately because the families in Cananea, who had fled to the hills at the outbreak of the fighting, had returned to their homes and would be endangered. Moreno rejected another petition to surrender on March 26, and firing resumed at two o'clock.

Obregón went to the railroad station to receive information on Ojeda's movements, and found that the federal general had at last ventured out of Naco. Obregón immediately began mobilizing part of the troops engaged at Cananea to meet Ojeda, planning to leave Diéguez to keep Moreno engaged. However, that evening Moreno surrendered, after thirty-six hours without food or water.<sup>72</sup>

Before Obregón had left Nogales for Cananea and Naco, he received a telephone message from Calles in which the latter declared his determination to attack Naco. Obregón doubted

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<sup>72</sup>Obregón, *Ocho mil kilómetros*, 41-45. Consular reports are somewhat at variance with Obregón's description of the battle. They report the commencement of the fighting on March 24, but the truce is reported as beginning that day also. Simpich to SecSt, Mar. 24, 1913, USDS, 812.00/6852 and 6859. An unsuccessful assault on the fortress held by the federal forces is dated by Obregón as the night of March 24; the consul does not mention it until March 26. Obregón does not mention that he had to suppress looting, reportedly by executions. Simpich to SecSt, Mar. 26, 1913, USDS, 812.00/6887. Nor does he say anything about the thirty-six hours without supplies--he says they restocked during the truce. Simpich to SecSt, Mar. 26, 1913, USDS, 812.00/6894.

the wisdom of such an attack, and contacted the Douglas offices of Pesqueira to order Calles to delay any attack. The message was entrusted to De la Huerta for delivery, but did not reach Calles in time to avert "a serious calamity."<sup>73</sup> Obregón did not describe the incident in his book; De la Huerta did, although he classified it only as a "failure." It was a failure; an example of the results of the haphazard planning and lack of training and experience of the revolutionary leaders; a failure with comic opera overtones.

De la Huerta mentions no message from Obregón; instead he says that he warned Calles against the attempt, since Ojeda had double the number of men available to them. He insisted that Calles wait until Bracamonte could join them. That General arrived the next day and the united forces marched to Naco. Ojeda was prepared to fight a defensive battle and Calles realized that he lacked picks and shovels to dig fox-holes and trenches. He knew that De la Huerta had some money given him by Pesqueira, but he did not know how little he had, and Calles suggested that De la Huerta go to buy the necessary tools. De la Huerta traveled hurriedly by auto to Douglas, an hour's drive, and purchased a total of eighteen picks and shovels. He had just begun to unload them after his return, when Ojeda left the security of Naco

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<sup>73</sup>Obregón, Ocho mil kilómetros, 40.

and began firing on them.<sup>74</sup>

The scene became chaotic as everyone fled, Calles on a bareback horse, followed by Bracamonte, "in a stampede such as I had never seen nor will see again in my life."<sup>75</sup> De la Huerta wanted to leave also, but the car in which he arrived had to be cranked by hand to start it. His American driver tried desperately to turn the motor over while Ojeda's cavalry advanced on them. When all appeared lost, the motor started, and away they went, over rocks that threatened the tires and with bullets smacking into the car. Once on the road again, they overtook the panic-stricken horde who all preferred the car to their horses; it was then necessary to defend the car from their attempts to board it, but they did take four wounded men aboard.

An American doctor arrived to attend the wounded when they reached Agua Prieta, leaving his car near the police station. When the doctor returned to it, he found Calles and Bracamonte sleeping beneath it, not exactly a dignified location for the chiefs. De la Huerta woke them with some difficulty, and found them a place to sleep in the police station, then went to face the soldiers and townspeople who were convinced of their cowardice. He explained that the men

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<sup>74</sup>On March 25, Simpich telegraphed that Ojeda had left town about noon, but had reappeared one and one half hours later on the west side of town, where his troops rode along the border firing. He thought it was a trap to lure the rebels from the American side. Simpich to SecSt, Mar. 25, 1913, USDS, 812.00/6885.

<sup>75</sup>Guzmán Esparza, Memorias, 60.

were exhausted and excused Calles' actions on the basis that he was not a military man; but when Calles and Bracamonte did not soon put in an appearance, the public decided they had fled across the border. De la Huerta telephoned Pesqueira in Douglas, and although it was now midnight, he in turn called a bank manager friend to obtain money to take to De la Huerta. Some of the money he divided among the protestors, and with part he sent for coffee which was also distributed. For the rest of the night he went from group to group soothing the angry mob, and when he woke the two chiefs the next morning he advised them to make their apologies. The crowd gradually calmed and the arrival from Cananea of Salvador Alvarado, who was greatly esteemed, ended all clamor.<sup>76</sup> The ignominious episode was Calles' baptism under fire.

Ojeda marched his troops out of Naco March 26, the day following Calles' failure, ostensibly to take them to Cananea; Obregón and his forces moved out of Cananea the next day to meet them, but were stopped by burned railroad bridges, destroyed as Ojeda retreated back to the safety of Naco.<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>76</sup>Ibid., 59-63. De la Huerta notes that shortly thereafter, Calles was incorporated into the revolutionary movement and he personally had the pleasure of giving him his commission as a lieutenant colonel. (By incorporation he means that Calles' forces are incorporated into the recognized forces led by Obregón in a formal manner; heretofore they had been cooperative but independent.)

<sup>77</sup>The following account of the battle for Naco is taken from Obregón, *Ocho mil kilómetros*, 47-54. See also Simpich to SecSt, April 5-8, 1913, USDS, 812.00/7016, 7037, 7046, 7050 & 7051.



Seeing the impossibility of surprising Ojeda, Obregón withdrew his troops to Cananea to give them a needed rest. They remained there until March 31, leaving Calles and Bracamonte as a rear-guard. When they once more moved north, they were joined by Calles and Alvarado, and Obregón decided to deceive Ojeda to lure him out from Naco again. The column was hidden where Ojeda thought only Bracamonte and Calles were encamped, and there Obregón separated from it and went with the empty trains to Nogales. In Nogales he announced that he had been called south to campaign, but only the trains went south. He remained in Nogales to await a move by Ojeda.

Ojeda still did not venture out, so Obregón returned to plan an attack. Naco, he knew, was well defended, with trenches running through the town to protect all movement, and with open country surrounding it. He decided that the delivery of a bomb built into a railroad car, utilizing the slope of the tracks into Naco, would panic the federal troops if the explosion occurred in front of the barracks at night, and that his assault must take place at night. Obregón retired to Cananea to build the infernal machine, which was not finished until April 7. His "Emissary of Peace," as he named it, was moved to the outskirts of Naco, and the assault was scheduled to begin when it exploded. Obregón warned the American commander in Naco, Arizona to expect an attack that night. But several days later the "Emissary" was still intact and there had been no encounter, because the railroad incline into Naco was too slight. He had to attack without it.

After conferring with the chiefs, who intimated that there was a threat of rebellion in the ranks, Obregón proposed an all-out attack. The battle was bloody, but Obregón was successful, and the constitutionalists occupied Naco on April 13. All of the state south to Ortíz was now in their hands, and only in Naco, Nogales and Cananea had there been any resistance.

Colonel Benjamín G. Hill had been given the command in the south, and he left Hermosillo on March 13 to commence operations, following the route through La Colorada toward San Javier. He defeated federal troops in a skirmish at La Dura<sup>78</sup> on March 15 and in a battle on March 18-19. He and his troops arrived in Navojoa at the end of March,<sup>79</sup> to join Fermín Carpio and José J. Obregón.

Carpio, who was a close friend of Álvaro Obregón, and José J. Obregón, his brother, were commanders in the Mayo River area, based in Navojoa. They had been recruiting among the Mayo Indians,<sup>80</sup> and Carpio reported to Pesqueira that he

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<sup>78</sup>U. S. consuls received little information on the campaign in the south, and Obregón says very little about it in his book, except to mention the victories. On March 17, the USS Colorado, in Guaymas, reported that the rebels had defeated the federal troops in a small skirmish on March 15. USDS, 812.00/6781. La Dura faces La Concentración across the Yaqui River. Both Rivera (La Revolución, 326-327) and Obregón (Ocho mil kilómetros, 45) mention a battle at La Concentración on March 18-19, possibly the same one mentioned by Pesqueira (Bowman to SecSt, Mar. 23 & 28, 1913, USDS, 812.00/6835 & 6980).

<sup>79</sup>USS Colorado to SecNavy, Mar. 29, 1913, 812.00/6967.

<sup>80</sup>Commander in Chief, US Pacific Fleet, to SecNavy, Mar. 24, 1913, USDS, 812.00/7174.

had two hundred men with rifles, 400 with bows and arrows and three hundred unarmed.<sup>81</sup> Their primary assault on Álamos in mid-March had failed.<sup>82</sup>

The combined forces marched to Minas Nuevas, where Hill established his headquarters. His spies informed him that Álamos was well fortified with many field guns and mine fields outside the town. Deciding that a general attack was impractical, he initiated a series of night feints which caused the defenders to waste precious ammunition. After eleven of these he was convinced that the town could not withstand an assault. The battle lasted through April 16 until the afternoon of April 17, when the town raised a white flag. Those surrendering included some of the town's leading citizens, who were forced to pay large fines to re-equip Hill's troops.<sup>83</sup>

Obregón ordered Hill to clear the federal troops from Tórin, and sent a part of his irregulars to cooperate with the rebels in Sinaloa and another group to Chinipas, Chihuahua.<sup>84</sup> Obregón sent Hill replacements, and while the latter set out for Tórin, Obregón prepared to face the federal forces massed at Guaymas.

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<sup>81</sup>Commander in Chief, US Pacific Fleet, to SecNavy, Apr. 1, 1913, USDS, 812.00/7177.

<sup>82</sup>Commander in Chief, US Pacific Fleet, to SecNavy, Mar. 17, 1913, USDS, 812.00/6781.

<sup>83</sup>Obregón, Ocho mil kilómetros, 55-56.

<sup>84</sup>Details of the subsequent military action are largely derived from Obregón (Ocho mil kilómetros, 57-74).

Most of Obregón's army had returned to Hermosillo after the capture of Naco, leaving the border guarded by Alvarado and Calles. Federal soldiers had left Empalme for Guaymas on April 15, and state troops, who had been encamped near the important rail center, occupied it the same day.<sup>85</sup>

Obregón had moved the main body of his forces to a camp at Batamotal, seven miles north of Guaymas. On May 1, two federal gunboats and a merchant ship arrived in the port with reenforcements for the garrison and giving the federals the capability of bombarding Empalme, located about five miles from Guaymas. Only women and children were in residence in the town; all the native men had fled when the federal troops had taken over. The expected bombardment began May 2, and Obregón's men had to round up the panic stricken families and put them on trains for Hermosillo. The federal forces advanced into Empalme under cover of the gunboats' fire, and Obregón began a strategic withdrawal to lure them away from their covering fire and their supply depots.

Obregón retreated to Ortíz on April 4, with the enemy under General Miguel Gil and Luis Medina Barron at his heels

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<sup>85</sup> Bowman to SecSt, Apr. 15, 1913, 812.00/7146. The headquarters and shops of the Ferrocarril Sud-Pacífico were at Empalme, as were the freight yards, and were the principal reasons for the town's existence.

near Santa Rosa.<sup>86</sup> That evening, he met with his field commanders and Governor Pesqueira, who approved his plans. But the Governor also told him that the retreat had to end, because the population of Hermosillo was alarmed.<sup>87</sup> Obregón tried to set up an ambush, but the cautious federal generals refused to advance and his trap never sprang. Their inactivity forced him to take the offensive. His attack began at five o'clock in the morning of May 9 and continued through the morning of May 11, when the federal troops began to retreat. Sporadic skirmishing occurred until that evening when the federal soldiers reached the safety of Guaymas. Obregón could not follow them because of a shortage of cartridges; a new shipment did not arrive from Hermosillo until the next morning, too late to be of use.<sup>88</sup>

The battle of Santa Rosa was the bloodiest battle yet fought by Obregón, and it demonstrated his ability as a strategist. The federals had abandoned numerous artillery pieces

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<sup>86</sup>The federal commanders in all of the engagements in Sonora were not new to the state. Ojeda, Kosterlitsky, Medina Barron, and Miguel Gil had been army regulars under Díaz (Kosterlitsky had also held a commission in the rurales, which was not uncommon), who, after their defeat by the maderistas returned to federal service and were once again battling the maderistas.

<sup>87</sup>Obregón, Ocho mil kilómetros, XLII.

<sup>88</sup>Simpich to SecSt, May 12 & 13, 1913, USDS, 812.00/7461 & 7489. A copy of the official report sent to the governor is found in 812.00/7800.

in their flight; these the state could put to good use. Losses by the federal forces were high; Obregón's official report to the Governor gave the number as four hundred and sixty-four, while the state lost but forty-two.<sup>89</sup> As a result of his showing, Obregón was promoted to brigadier general, and Alvarado to colonel. A new commander arrived to direct federal efforts, General Pedro Ojeda, directly from his smashing defeat in Nogales. His early release by his American jailers stirred a storm of diplomatic protests.

Hill was still campaigning in the south, although there had been no major encounters and the federals remained in Torín. Obregón recalled him after the battle at Santa Rosa, leaving only small garrisons to guard the territory he had seized. However, within a few days after his arrival, Ojeda called in the Yaqui River Division troops, and Guaymas became the only town in the state left in federal hands.<sup>90</sup>

Obregón's troops remained strung out along the railroad from Santa Rosa to Ortíz. Ojeda, after ample preparations, marched out of Guaymas toward Hermosillo, advancing so methodically and cautiously that it took him two weeks to cover the five miles from Empalme to Ortíz, which he reached on May 29.

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<sup>89</sup>Cumberland (The Constitutionalist Years, 38) used the federal archives and notes that their accounts "are almost unbelievably at variance with one another," but the federal commanders did acknowledge that their losses were high.

<sup>90</sup>Obregón, Ocho mil kilómetros, XLVI; Rivera, La Revolución, 339.

The first federal contact was with Diéguez at Batamotal; Diéguez withdrew and Ojeda followed until he reached Ortíz. Until June 15 there were minor encounters as Obregón studied the land and laid his plans; in a meeting with his chiefs that day, Obregón announced that they would blockade the federals in Ortíz, cutting off their supplies, which included water, and their line of retreat. His plan was effected, and the skirmishes became more numerous. Then on June 25, Ojeda moved out of Ortíz, south across the valley to the hacienda of Santa María, seeking water. Santa María was defended by Hill's command, which fought off all attacks until one o'clock in the morning of June 26. Then firing stopped, and the tattered remnants of Ojeda's forces fled back to Guaymas. Again, Obregón gave no pursuit, because his men were tired. Instead, on June 28, he laid siege to Guaymas, a siege that lasted until the fall of Huerta.<sup>91</sup>

The battle at Santa María was even more costly to the federals than Santa Rosa had been. General Ojeda said he lost six hundred men out of the twenty-five hundred engaged;<sup>92</sup> Obregón reported that his men had burned three hundred dead

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<sup>91</sup>In his book, Obregón (*Ocho mil kilómetros*, 73) concedes he erred in not pursuing, given the panicky state in Guaymas, and the hunger, thirst and exhaustion of the fleeing troops. He also states that he subsequently received an offer from General Ojeda to join the federals, which he rejected.

<sup>92</sup>Cumberland, *The Constitutionalist Years*, 39.

and buried eighty more. The Yaqui chief Sibalaume was entrusted with hunting fugitives who escaped to the hills, and caught eighty in addition to the six hundred and fifty captured by other commands. Among these were many women and children, who were released, and thirteen officers, who were executed on the spot.

The governors in the north had cut their states adrift from the federal government without any plan or pledge of unity which usually preceded such action. It was to give the developing rebellion the gloss of legality that the Plan of Guadalupe was proclaimed on March 26, but Carranza, who was named as First Chief in the Plan, did not think it adequate and agreed with a friend's suggestion that a formal union be established.<sup>93</sup>

Carranza's secret agents arrived in Sonora in early April to confer with state representatives about a coalition,<sup>94</sup> and

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<sup>93</sup>Cumberland (*Ibid.*, 70-71) accepts Carranza as the author of the Plan of Guadalupe, but De la Huerta says no, that it was authored by a group of young friends of Carranza, against his wishes. Carranza wanted a representative convention to name him as chief of the constitutional movement, so called because constitutionally elected officials led the opposition to an unconstitutional usurpation. The armies were denoted as *constitucionalista* prior to the Plan. Alberto Calzadiaz Barrera, *El Fin de la División del Norte*, (México, D. F., 1965), 395-399. Barrera says that he personally wrote out the Plan in front of Carranza along lines which they had previously discussed.

<sup>94</sup>Bowman to SecSt, Apr. 2, 1913, USDS, 812.00/6999; Dr. Samuel Navarro to Carranza, Apr. 1, 1913, as printed in Fabela, *Documentos históricos*, I, 12.



a junta of delegates from Sonora, Coahuila, and Chihuahua, meeting in Agua Prieta on April 7, agreed to impress on the civil and military officials of their states the need for a new meeting to establish legality.<sup>95</sup> The state legislature unanimously chose Adolfo de la Huerta as it accredited representative to the new convention; in addition, he was to represent the major military men in the state. De la Huerta asked Roberto V. Pesqueira to accompany him to the meeting, but Pesqueira protested that he had no accreditation. The Deputy arranged for him to be the Governor's personal representative.<sup>96</sup>

The men proceeded to El Paso to meet Alfredo Breceda on April 5 to discuss a future meeting which would recognize the Plan of Guadalupe. During the discussions De la Huerta suggested that Breceda should speak directly to the Governor to acquaint himself with his views.<sup>97</sup> He agreed, and they travelled back to Sonora. En route, the two men filled him in on the political conditions in Sonora;<sup>98</sup> the alienation of the

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<sup>95</sup>Convention of Monclova, Art. I, AGES, 3090. Roberto V. Pesqueira represented Sonora in that meeting.

<sup>96</sup>Guzmán Esparza, Memorias, 63-64.

<sup>97</sup>De la Huerta (Ibid., 64-65) said they returned for Breceda to certify the credentials; Roque González Garza, in a letter to Carranza, said that they returned to procure an arrangement with the Governor and members of the legislature. Fabela, Documentos históricos, 15-16.

<sup>98</sup>Breceda, México Revolucionario, I, 407.

military chiefs because they were subject to a civilian, the hatred of Pesqueira for Maytorena and vice versa, and the jealousy among the military as they vied for leadership. All of these internal dissensions could be used, Breceda realized, to Carranza's advantage in gaining support for the Plan of Guadalupe.<sup>99</sup>

After conducting interviews with the Interim Governor and Maytorena, they went back to El Paso and thence to Monclova, arriving on April 14. Carranza met them at the train station and invited them to supper at his headquarters; later that evening he and De la Huerta talked for several hours about Carranza's plans for reforms.<sup>100</sup>

The convention at Monclova recognized the Plan of Guadalupe, which named Venustiano Carranza as the First Chief of what was designated as the "Constitucionalista Army," and charged him with convoking elections when peace was achieved.<sup>101</sup> The Plan contained no mention of reforms; its sole aim was the overthrow of Huerta. The convention also agreed to send Roberto V. Pesqueira to Washington as the confidential agent

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<sup>99</sup>Ibid., 420-421.

<sup>100</sup>De la Huerta mentions Carranza's desire to establish municipal independence, a new tax law, a divorce law, nationalization of the subsoil, and his opposition to the formation of labor unions. De la Huerta notes that others later took credit as originators of some of these ideas. Guzmán Esparza, Memorias, 66.

<sup>101</sup>The Convention of Monclova and the Plan of Guadalupe may be found in AGES, 2904; also reprinted in Fabela, Documentos históricos and Breceda, México Revolucionario.

of Carranza, to seek recognition of a belligerency status for the constitucionalistas.<sup>102</sup> The Sonoran legislature was not in session when De la Huerta returned, and it did not ratify the Convention of Monclova until August 20.<sup>103</sup>

Maytorena's leave of absence was not due to expire until August, but a campaign against his return began when he visited Hermosillo in April, and set off speculation and shows of pettiness in the clique surrounding Pesqueira. Maytorena had come simply to offer his services as a private citizen, which were refused, probably because of the military, who thought he was ready to resume the governorship. He was accused of again shirking his duty when he left, after being rebuffed, yet Pesqueira had to reassure the officers several times that Maytorena was not now thinking of returning as governor.<sup>104</sup>

The open animosity between the Maytorena and Pesqueira factions was widely known and discussed among politicians in Sonora as early as April, as Breceda's conversations with Pesqueira and De la Huerta had shown, and was a topic of conversation among the young revolutionary intellectuals who

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<sup>102</sup>José Vasconcelos snidely remarked that Rafael Zubarán Capmany was the only man sent to Washington whom Carranza trusted; the others were those he wished to be rid of. José Vasconcelos, La Tormenta (México, D.F., 1937), 94.

<sup>103</sup>Law 130, Aug. 20, 1913, AGES, 2904 manifestos.

<sup>104</sup>Letter from Maytorena to Pesqueira, Apr. 22, 1913; Telegrams exchanged by Pesqueira, Plank, Bórquez, and Calles, Apr. 22-26, 1913, AGES 2901.

began arriving in Sonora in early May.<sup>105</sup> A signed flyer published in El Paso del Norte revealed Maytorena's opponents to the public, if they had not known them before, and among the signatures was the name of Plutarco Elías Calles. Maytorena responded in kind, accusing his accusers of being johnny-come-latelys to the revolution, which caused Calles to protest to Pesqueira that they were constitucionalistas even before the state legislature had acted.<sup>106</sup>

From Arizona, Maytorena worked for the constitucionalista cause, carrying on a voluminous correspondence with Carranza to keep him informed of the events in Sonora.<sup>107</sup> His activities may have been undertaken with the purpose of gaining the support of Carranza for his taking over as governor again, and he appeared to have that support. Carranza sent Alfredo

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<sup>105</sup>Miguel Alessio Robles, Mi Generación y mi época (México, D.F., 1949), 76.

<sup>106</sup>Calles, etc. to Pesqueira, May 14, 1913, AGES, 2901.

<sup>107</sup>Fabela (Documentos históricos, I, 9) refers to previous communications. On March 28 Maytorena explained to Carranza why he left Sonora. The pressures, he said, made his stomach complaint flare up, and he was exhausted. He also mentioned that the central government owed Sonora 200,000 pesos from the war against the orozquistas. The plot against his return is also discussed; a group of ambitious men had formed a plot in his absence to prevent his return; toward this end they promulgated calumnies. Maytorena denied wanting to return before his leave terminated because that would cause more dissension among those jealously guarding their careers. Maytorena to Carranza, May 11, 1913, as reprinted in Fabela, Documentos históricos, I, 33-38.

Breceda to Hermosillo with a commission naming Pesqueira as a brigadier general, and Breceda stayed several days to discuss the problem of Maytorena's resumption of the governorship.<sup>108</sup> The letter was written on May 18; four days later Calles telegraphed Pesqueira to tell him that Carranza had ordered the latter to assume the title of Chief of Arms and yield the governorship to Maytorena. Calles warned Pesqueira that such a move would have grave consequences.<sup>109</sup> But Pesqueira assured him the same day that the orders were not final, and they were never carried out.

The anti-Maytorena faction publicly declared that their aversion to the restoration of Maytorena was based on his cowardly and immoral flight and his demand for the last 12,000 pesos in the treasury.<sup>110</sup> However, José Vasconcelos, one of the intellectuals who had come to Sonora to associate themselves with the revolution, thought that moral principals had little to do with the antipathy toward Maytorena.

In July, when Vasconcelos joined the revolutionaries in the Douglas-Naco area, he noted that they spoke little of

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<sup>108</sup>Fabela, Documentos históricos, I, 48-49; Breceda, México Revolucionario, I, 474-475.

<sup>109</sup>Telegrams, Calles-Pesqueira, May 22, 1913, AGES, 2901.

<sup>110</sup>Obregón, Ocho mil kilómetros, 80.

their revulsion for Huerta; all of their venom was directed against Maytorena.<sup>111</sup> The aversion, moreover, had nothing to do with the morality of deserting the state in its moment of crisis, but rose from Maytorena's refusal to appropriate property indiscriminately for their enrichment. Especially did they resent that he had not confiscated the business of Luis A. Martínez, a Guaymas lawyer and ship-builder who had built Mexico's first merchant fleet, on the claim that he was científico. Socialism was not their goal, only the acquisition of property from all who opposed them, including Maytorena. The small group agreed that they were the revolutionaries, not Madero nor Maytorena, and after they overthrew Maytorena they would confiscate the properties of all científicos, who to them meant all who had anything. The men espoused a variety of a creed originated by Manuel Bauche Alcalde of Mexico City, who wrote an article praising the "Men of the North," supposedly based on ideas furnished by Pesqueira. The substance of the creed was that central and southern Mexico had been degraded by the infusion of Indian blood, and the salvation of the country lay in the hands of

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<sup>111</sup> Vasconcelos stayed at Pesqueira's home in Douglas at night and usually spent the day in Naco talking with Pesqueira, Calles, and Francisco Elías, who was Calles' cousin. Of Roberto, Vasconcelos said he was the thinker of the group and his opinions were respected, except in the management of local affairs in which he was not consulted. Vasconcelos, La Tormenta, 73-74.

men from the northern frontier, the carriers of civilization.<sup>112</sup>

But Maytorena had luck running for him in the form of a developing schism between Obregón and the Interim-Governor. It possibly began out of petty jealousies which would arise between the civilian leader and the military leader when the military man was subordinate to the civilian. Possibly, it originated when Pesqueira commissioned Obregón to go to Chihuahua to fight with Villa after the battle of Santa Maria, and he refused to go.<sup>113</sup> Whatever the origins, Obregón's animus deepened because of an incident during the battle for Naco.

According to Obregón's official report sent to the Governor, Colonel Bracamonte and a group of armed men,

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<sup>112</sup>Vasconcelos (*La Tormenta*, 76-77), in his own form of snobbery, sneered at the pretensions of the northern men and their lack of sophistication. He said that Pesqueira would have been horrified if he had realized that he was advocating the destruction of the Latin culture and its replacement by North American primitivism. He also noted that Pesqueira was the product of the small village aristocracy and of pure Spanish blood, and to him a private bath, ice water in place of wine, elevators and telephones were civilization. Miguel Alessio Robles had once remarked that "What Roberto likes is to be paged," and a few months later Alessio Robles paid a page in an El Paso hotel to run through the lobbies crying "Mister Pesqueira....Mister Pesqueira." To Pesqueira, being paged a lot was a sign of importance.

<sup>113</sup>José María Maytorena, *Algunas verdades sobre el General Álvaro Obregón* (Los Angeles, 1919), 44; Alessio Robles, *Senderos* (México, D.F., 1930), 41.

dissatisfied with the battle plan, had come to his quarters to execute him on the charge of treason. Obregón had dissuaded them, but the action rankled. He was sure that Pesqueira would call for a court martial when he read the report. But days passed and nothing was said until Obregón told the Governor he should act to prevent a recurrence. Still Pesqueira did nothing, and Obregón angrily resigned his command and rank and told Pesqueira to announce his resignation to the troops. Pesqueira refused to accept the resignation, but agreed to communicate Obregón's desire. Alfredo Breceda arrived on the scene, called by Obregón, and together they met Pesqueira. After the meeting, Obregón did not speak again of his resignation nor did Breceda; they would mention only that they discussed Maytorena's return.<sup>114</sup>

Also present in Nogales for the meeting on July 28 besides Obregón, Breceda, and Pesqueira, were Roberto V. Pesqueira, Calles, Ignacio Bonillas, Hill, Manuel M. Diéguez and Maytorena. Breceda presided over the session impartially as a representative of Carranza; he had come with no instructions from the First Chief, who wanted the Sonorans to settle the problem among themselves.<sup>115</sup> Neither would Pesqueira take sides, fearing reprisals. The assemblage questioned why Maytorena wanted to return to office; he would reply only that

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<sup>114</sup>Rivera, La Revolución, 346-347.

<sup>115</sup>Carranza's position cannot be determined; Maytorena visited him in early July in Candela, Coahuila. Luther P. Ellsworth to SecSt, July 10 & 11, 1913, 812.00/8001 & 8039.



he was the constitutional governor. Obregón announced that he would not oppose Maytorena's return as long as he held the office constitutionally. With his statement, the issue was resolved to support Maytorena, and the meeting dissolved.<sup>116</sup> But when Maytorena reached Hermosillo, Pesqueira raised further obstacles, and Obregón made a flying trip to soothe the volatile tempers.

The official notification that Pesqueira had yielded power was telegraphed to the municipal presidents, prefects and military chiefs on August 4, and the usual congratulatory responses recognizing his authority began flowing in, but conspicuous by their absence were telegrams from Calles, Salvador Alvarado and Obregón. Calles, Alvarado and Diéguez also received telegrams that same day telling them that

The meeting called by General Pesqueira for tomorrow will not be held. Your reasons have caused censure for your conduct, but you will continue in your respective posts.<sup>117</sup>

Maytorena was not being magnanimous; he did not need more trouble from rebellious chiefs. There is no doubt that they

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<sup>116</sup>Obregón, Ocho mil kilómetros, 80. The other leaders must not have been aware of Obregón's stance before the meeting or it would not have been necessary.

<sup>117</sup>Contained in AGES, 2901. Announcement of resumption, telegrams of recognition from municipal presidents, and telegram from Pesqueira, saying he has to leave on an urgent mission; telegram from Maytorena to Alvarado, Diéguez and Calles, Aug. 4, 1913.

were still opposed to his return, as were at least some members of the legislature. Obregón and Breceda had remained in Nogales after the meeting of July 28; on August 11, another group met and again Obregón played the role of peacemaker. Calles, Pesqueira, Bonillas, Hill, Obregón, Breceda and the deputies met in Nogales, and Obregón informed Maytorena the next day that all had been satisfactorily arranged and that the deputies showed themselves willing to help the cause. Breceda also reported to Maytorena that the deputies agreed with all proposed by General Obregón, and would "cooperate with you and the military chiefs."<sup>118</sup> The legislature recognized the change on August 18.<sup>119</sup>

Stories of the division between Maytorena and the military men circulated in the state, causing unrest.<sup>120</sup> Obregón appointed General Pesqueira as chief of the forces with the responsibility for conducting the siege at Guaymas,<sup>121</sup> while Obregón, himself, prepared to carry the military campaign out of the state.

Sonora was relatively peaceful when Maytorena resumed

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<sup>118</sup>Telegrams exchanged between Maytorena, Obregón and Breceda, Aug. 12, 1913, AGES, 2899.

<sup>119</sup>Recognition of Congress, signed by Adolfo de la Huerta, Aug. 18, 1913, AGES, 2901.

<sup>120</sup>Joaquín Corella to Maytorena and reply, Aug. 12, 1913, AGES, 2899.

<sup>121</sup>Maytorena to Luis Aguirre Benevides, Aug. 7, 1913, AGES, 2901.

office. Elections for deputies and municipal officials had been scheduled for the last Sunday in April, but Circular 96 issued on April 16 rescheduled them for August 10. Pesqueira excused his action on the basis of the current political movement which, he said, would prevent men in arms from voting in their home districts.<sup>122</sup> On August 4, the men had not yet returned to their home districts, and Maytorena had received petitions for delay, so the elections were cancelled for August and not reset.<sup>123</sup> The suppression left him open to charges that he had done so in order to name the municipal presidents and assign deputies to represent the districts.<sup>124</sup>

The acquisition of munitions was of major importance, although it presented little difficulty as long as there was money, in spite of President Woodrow Wilson's decision not to ship arms to rebel factions. In July, the American military surmised that the constitucionalistas were short of funds because of the lull in the fighting and the flow of arms across the border.<sup>125</sup> Appeals for the lifting of the embargo,

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<sup>122</sup>Call for elections, Jan. 31, 1913; Circular 96, Apr. 16, 1913, AGES, 2901.

<sup>123</sup>Cancellation notice, Aug. 4, 1913, AGES, 2901.

<sup>124</sup>Fabela, Documentos históricos, I, 151; Galaz, Desde el Cerro, II, 133.

<sup>125</sup>General Tasker H. Bliss to SecWar, July 19, 1913, 812.00/8212.

which raised the cost of arms since they were illicit, were issued by Pesqueira, Obregón and Maytorena.<sup>126</sup> Francisco Elías, the "border representative of the state of Sonora," Calles and the state's commercial agent wrote to ask Wilson to explain why the constitucionalistas should not be able to buy arms openly when the huertistas could.<sup>127</sup> It is doubtful whether this question had any influence on the President, but four days later he extended the embargo to all Mexican factions.<sup>128</sup>

United States border authorities made sincere efforts to stop the arms smuggling, but to little avail, since the border conditions, both physically and popularly, favored the constitucionalistas. The authorities knew the arms and ammunition appearing on the other side of the border came from the mercantile and hardware establishments on the American side, but they had no clue as to how or where they crossed.<sup>129</sup>

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<sup>126</sup>I. L. Pesqueira and A. Obregón to White House, July 26, 1913, 812.00/8194; Maytorena to Bryan and Wilson, Aug. 20 & Sept. 8, 1913, 812.00/8479 & 8767.

<sup>127</sup>Calles, F. S. Elías, J. N. González to W. Wilson, Aug. 23, 1913, 812.00/8583.

<sup>128</sup>Wilson's speech to joint session of Congress, Aug. 27, 1913, 812.00/8614a.

<sup>129</sup>Numerous reports on smuggling are to be found in consular reports; for example: Agent, Bureau of Investigation, Aug. 19 & Sept. 20, 1913, 812.00/8500 & 9044; Simpich to SecSt, Aug. 25, 1913, 812.00/8550; Dept. of Justice to SecSt, Aug. 29, 1913, 812.00/8626, etc.

The stores frequently received excessive shipments which obviated their sale for hunting.<sup>130</sup> The arrival in Douglas of 52,000 rounds from September 10 to September 12 led authorities to conclude that there had to be ways of evading surveillance that they had not thought of.<sup>131</sup> Constitucionalistas were paying a bonus of ten dollars per thousand for ammunition delivered across the line.<sup>132</sup>

Arresting dealers because of excessive stock was seldom successful; they could only charge them with intent to violate the neutrality laws,<sup>133</sup> a charge hard to prove. The Douglas Hardware Store estimated that in five months they had sold 400,000 rounds of ammunition, an eighty percent increase over their usual sales, but all sales were made openly, and they furnished a list of their customers. The investigating agent had to admit that there was no evidence of a violation of the law.<sup>134</sup>

A few cases were brought before the federal grand jury in hopes that prosecution would have a salutary effect;<sup>135</sup>

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<sup>130</sup>SecWar to SecSt, Sept. 26, 1913, 812.00/9004.

<sup>131</sup>Border Report, Sept. 13, 1913, 812.00/9041.

<sup>132</sup>Border Report, Sept. 6, 1913, 812.00/8894.

<sup>133</sup>Border Report, Sept. 20, 1913, 812.00/9044.

<sup>134</sup>Agent, Bureau of Investigation, Sept. 20, 1913, 812.00/9114.

<sup>135</sup>Border Report, Sept. 27, 1913, 812.00/9154.

apparently it did for the army reported in mid-October that there was no recent evidence of arms shipments.<sup>136</sup> The effect was felt in Mexico, for in mid-November Obregón spoke of the difficulty of obtaining cartridges because of strict American vigilance.<sup>137</sup>

Maytorena had no choice but to continue the financial practices of Pesqueira, but he did make changes in two decrees issued immediately after his return. Decree 10 reorganized the Administration of Absentee Properties and redesignated it as "Forced War Subsidies." The decree established a board, to be named by the Governor, which had the arbitrary power to decide what persons or corporate persons were enemies of the revolution, or who had contributed directly or indirectly to the origins of the present war. The decree imposed unlimited loans which had to be made on pain of confiscation of property, and provided for the naming of a receiver for the property. Decree 9 was designed to enforce Decree 10 by prohibiting Mexicans from selling, willing or pawning real estate to foreigners.<sup>138</sup> The land sales were forbidden to prevent "enemies" from making fictitious sales to foreigners who would

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<sup>136</sup>Border Reports, Oct. 18 & Dec. 13, 812.00/9492 & 10360.

<sup>137</sup>Obregón, Ocho mil kilómetros, 100.

<sup>138</sup>A. S. Fall to J. B. Moore, Sept. 27, 1913, 812.00/8716.

hold the property and enable the "enemy" to avoid the paying of a forced loan.<sup>139</sup>

Sonora's largest cash crop was garbanzos (chick peas) which were harvested in July and August for sale to brokers from the United States for resale in Europe, particularly Spain. The constitucionalistas quickly utilized Decree 10 to confiscate the crops of growers considered to be federal sympathizers, but then had to face the problem of transporting them. The crops had to be moved rapidly to avoid infestation by weevils and moulds;<sup>140</sup> unfortunately Empalme, the rail center through which all railroad traffic flowed, was occupied during the 1913 harvest season by federal troops and was within range of federal gunboats. The garbanzos could be brought to Cruz de Piedra, off-loaded onto wagons for transshipment past Empalme, where they could be reloaded onto trains for the north. Many of the American growers preferred shipping them through Guaymas, however, for heavy shipments through that port were reported.<sup>141</sup> To insure control of the shipments, federal forces advanced to Batamotal at the end of August.<sup>142</sup>

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<sup>139</sup>Hostetter to SecSt, Sept. 14, 1913, 812.00/8940.

<sup>140</sup>Operation of Vessels of United States Pacific Fleet on the West Coast of Mexico from Aug. 6, 1913 to Oct. 1, 1913 (hereinafter cited as USPF ops), 812.00/9283.

<sup>141</sup>Cowles to SecNavy, Oct. 21, 1913, 812.00/9333.

<sup>142</sup>USS Pittsburgh to SecNavy, Aug. 25, 1913, 812.00/8760.

It was, in fact, simpler to ship through Guaymas. To ship through Nogales, permission of the Governor first had to be secured. For this the broker had to supply the name of the grower and the destination of the shipment; if the Governor could determine that neither the buyer or seller were enemies of the cause, the permit was granted with payment of an export tax of one peso per sack.<sup>143</sup> Obregón took time from his military duties to discuss the sale of garbanzos from Huatabampo with Maytorena, and the Governor saw to it that hard-to-come-by railroad cars were available for their shipment.<sup>144</sup>

In late June, Carranza decided to make a roundabout trip through the Sierra Madre Occidental in order to intercede personally in Sonora's troubled politics, and also because his headquarters at Monclova was in danger from the huertistas. To prepare the way, he sent Alfredo Breceda to learn as much as possible of what was happening, and to tell the chiefs that he would arrive within two months.<sup>145</sup> Breceda was also to

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<sup>143</sup>The export tax is paid in addition to the local taxes and the state sales tax.

<sup>144</sup>AGES 2959.

<sup>145</sup>Breceda, México Revolucionario, I, 473-475. For an account of Carranza's odyssey see Cumberland, Constitutionalist Years, 81-82.



inform them of the creation of seven armies to operate in various areas.<sup>146</sup> On September 14, Carranza reached El Fuerte, Sinaloa, to a welcome from Felipe Riveros, the governor of Sinaloa, Breceda, Obregón and De la Huerta.<sup>147</sup> From El Fuerte the trip could be made by train to Cruz de Piedra, with a detour around Empalme to the hacienda at Santa Maria where Maytorena was waiting to greet Carranza.

His reception in the state was warm; crowds turned out at the stations and hamlets along the railroad, and a grand celebration greeted his arrival. After an evening of festivities he disclosed the naming of Obregón as Chief of the Army of the Northwest. The next day at an assembly of the notable personages in the capital he averred that reforms beneficial to the people and a new constitution were his goals.<sup>148</sup>

Carranza made an inspection tour through the north early in October, visiting Nogales and Cananea, where he was greeted effusively.<sup>149</sup> On his return to Hermosillo, he announced that the hour had come to form a government; by a

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<sup>146</sup>Carranza's letter to Pesqueira is printed in Breceda, México Revolucionario, I, 475.

<sup>147</sup>Obregón mentioned no one else who met the First Chief, although Carranza had notified the Governors of Sinaloa and Sonora of his arrival.

<sup>148</sup>Rivera, La Revolución, 360-361. Rivera, who was present himself, lists some of the guests; the roll included almost anyone who became anybody in the next twenty years.

<sup>149</sup>Border Report, Oct. 18, 1913, 812.00/9492; Bowman to SecSt, Oct. 17, 1913, 812.00/9251; Simpich to SecSt, Oct. 18, 1913, 812.00/9188.

decree issued October 17, he established a central government with eight departments. To head the Secretariat of Government he named Rafael Zubarán Capmany, with Adolfo de la Huerta as First Official; as Sub-Secretary of War and Navy, General Felipe Angeles, ex-head of the National Military College, who had supported Madero at the time of the cuartelazo; in the dual role of Treasurer and Foreign Minister, Francisco Escudero; and as First Official of Development and Communications, Ignacio Bonillas. General Ignacio L. Pesqueira was named President of the Supreme Military Tribunal. The other cabinet posts went unfilled.<sup>150</sup>

The appointment of Felipe Angeles opened another can of worms. Carranza had recalled General Angeles from exile in Paris and offered him the position of Secretary of War and Navy. Obregón was in Sinaloa with the army when the news of Angeles' naming reached him. He, Diéguez and Hill telegraphed Carranza to protest the appointment,<sup>151</sup> and with the First Chief's permission, Obregón returned to Hermosillo to protest in person. He warned Carranza that all of the military chiefs had no wish to serve under a long time member of the army they were fighting, and then insisted that his egotism had not caused the protest. When questioned why he opposed Angeles,

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<sup>150</sup>Breceda, México Revolucionario, II, 205-210.

<sup>151</sup>Alessio Robles, Mi generación, 95.

the General answered that he "economized" the truth and that each word was carefully thought out before spoken. Obregón thus believed that Angeles was trying not to reveal himself and therefore must have something to hide. Carranza assured Obregón that Angeles' role would be limited and all orders would emanate from his office. Carranza kept his word and relegated Angeles to the role of clerk, although his title was Sub-Secretary.<sup>152</sup>

While the First Chief organized his government, the internal political situation in Sonora continued to deteriorate. Although his visit had been proposed with the end of soothing the factions, his presence increased, rather than alleviated, the tensions. There is some evidence to indicate that he

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<sup>152</sup>Obregón, *Ocho mil kilómetros*, 84-85. Carranza and a large party went to Culiacán in January, 1914. While there, Alessio Robles and Angeles walked one evening by the river, and Angeles began discussing his unhappiness with his situation. He said that Carranza had offered him the Secretariat, then named him sub-Secretary, but in actuality he was not even a clerk. Carranza signed all communications with the military himself. He had, he continued, asked for a field command. Alessio Robles, believing that Angeles knew of the telegram, stated that that must be the reason for the change. To his chagrin, Angeles did not know, and Alessio Robles hastily tried to change the subject.

After supper that night, he told Carranza what had happened and the First Chief told him that after receiving it, he had called Obregón to Hermosillo and reprimanded him firmly. "But," he said, "you have no idea with what ability he defended him self." Alessio Robles, *Mi generación*, 96. Carranza apparently was "economizing" the truth to him. Since Alessio Robles remained a loyal friend to both Obregón and Carranza throughout his life, his accounts are credible; he was sometimes critical, but his accounts are notable for their moderation.

encouraged the conflict; at best, his advocates could call him a spectator.

On Carranza's widely publicized visit to Cananea in October, the welcoming speech was given by Miguel Alessio Robles, the newly appointed Second Judge of the District Court in Cananea. His welcome was followed by a speech given by Cesareo G. Soriano, known to be an ardent Calles proponent, in which Soriano charged Maytorena with numerous crimes, broadcasting to the world the serious rift which persisted in constitucionalista ranks. Carranza said no word of reproval, although he did imply his disapproval before the press. That was not enough.<sup>153</sup> Neither had the apparently friendly relations between Obregón and Maytorena lasted.

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<sup>153</sup>Miguel Alessio Robles was not a Sonoran; he was a young lawyer from Saltillo who had arrived in May, and a supporter of Carranza. He criticized Carranza for not making a public disavowal of the speech, although he did so in private. Alessio Robles, *Mi generación*, 81. Alessio Robles' career as a judge in Cananea did not last long. Several residents filed accusations against the president of Cananea for permitting Chinese gambling houses to operate with benefit to his purse, not the city treasury, and of selling the hides of animals killed by the state for the families of soldiers. Alessio Robles decided the president was guilty on September 18, 1913. The judge was subjected to a visita on December 25-29, 1913; the visitador announced that he had found irregularities "which reveal an absolute lack of judicial knowledge." Complaint against the president is found in AGES, 2897; report of the Visitador general de Justicia, AGES, 2947. The decision against the president could have been political since he was undoubtedly a maytorenista while Alessio Robles was a Carranza man, just as the visitador was undoubtedly a maytorenista. Alessio Robles left the state in January, 1914, and was later named to the Supreme Court of Mexico.

Obregón had gone to meet Carranza at El Fuerte with an escort under the command of Colonel Hill to avert a possible attack by Ojeda's men from Topolobampo, Sinaloa. Maytorena denied sending him, and assumed that Obregón had gone to make political hay,<sup>154</sup> probably rightly so, for Hill was perfectly capable of going alone and the slow trip to Santa María gave Obregón and Carranza ample time to become acquainted. Moreover, Obregón had been in communication with Breceda and surely knew of the military posts which would be created. Obregón answered Maytorena's accusations by saying that the Governor was jealous because he wanted to be named head of the army.<sup>155</sup>

Salvador Alvarado joined the attack on Maytorena in a letter to Carranza in November. He accused Maytorena of refusing to accept the responsibility of leadership in 1911, and of then controlling the elections after the fighting was over. He brought up the Maytorena conflict with Congress over the Mexico City account, and stated that Maytorena used soldiers to protect his ranch from the Yaquis while denying protection to his neighbors. He mentioned the suppression of the elections, but told Carranza that, in his opinion, the state was in no danger and all the troops could be sent out.<sup>156</sup>

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<sup>154</sup>Maytorena, Algunas verdades, 44.

<sup>155</sup>Ibid., 44.

<sup>156</sup>Alvarado to Carranza, Nov. 16, 1913, as reprinted in Fabela, Documentos históricos, I, 149-151.

Carranza continued to observe the conflict, but refrained from expressing any opinions, although on occasion he had to constrain the parties involved. At Christmas he dined with Maytorena and his friends. The dinner was convivial, but shortly afterward Maytorena began speaking of the lack of military merit of Obregón and Alvarado, from whom he was now estranged. Carranza said nothing, until Maytorena loudly stated that if the First Chief would permit it, he would have the worthless military men dumped across the border. Carranza demurred, saying the two men had given good service and were worthy of respect.<sup>157</sup>

When Carranza arrived in Sonora, the Sonoran army had not been engaged since the battle at Santa María, except for an abortive expedition sent by Obregón in August to bring Baja California under constitucionalista control.<sup>158</sup> With

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<sup>157</sup> Miguel Alessio Robles, *Senderos* (México, D.F., 1930), 43-44. The plots and counter-plots led to efforts to force Maytorena to resign, but he refused. Maytorena finally asked Carranza how to avoid the continual pressure, and Angeles, who was present, suggested naming Obregón as Secretary of War so that he would leave Sonora when Carranza left. The First Chief responded by saying that Angeles was a patriot, but he never acted on the suggestion. Frederico Cervantes M., Francisco Villa y la Revolución (México, D.F., 1960), 193-195.

<sup>158</sup> This small force of thirty-six men attempted to cross the desert northwest to the Colorado River, two hundred and fifty miles of waterless and shadeless wastelands, where the world record temperature for heat was set, in August. Two of the six officers returned; of the troops Obregón says only that almost all died. Obregón, Ocho mil kilómetros, 81.

the structuring of the government, the state troops became a part of the Army of the Northwest, which also encompassed troops from Coahuila, Durango, Sinaloa and the Territory of Baja California. Obregón, who had been subject to Maytorena, now owed allegiance only to Carranza, and he quickly prepared his forces to move south after Carranza's arrival. Benjamín Hill had remained in Sinaloa after going with Obregón to meet Carranza, and had operated with the constitucionalistas there to take Los Mochis. Using that town as a base, they advanced on Culiacán, which fell on November 13 after a five-day battle.<sup>159</sup> The federal forces fell back to Mazatlán, which was put under seige.

Carranza and a large party, including Maytorena and Felipe Angeles, paid a visit to Culiacán in January, 1914, and the coldness between Carranza and Maytorena was noted by all those present. When they returned to Hermosillo, Carranza began preparations to leave for Chihuahua where Ciudad Juárez had been captured by General Villa. Again, Carranza chose not to travel to Ciudad Juárez through the United States, but insisted on taking the northern route from Nogales through Pulpito Canyon.<sup>160</sup>

Obregón joined the First Chief in Hermosillo at the end

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<sup>159</sup>Obregón, Ocho mil kilómetros, 86-96.

<sup>160</sup>Most of his cortege preferred to take the easy way by train and wait for him in Ciudad Juárez, including De la Huerta. Alessio Robles, Mi generación, 99.

of February to accompany him to Nogales; there Carranza gave him broad powers in recruiting, provisioning and granting promotions in his army, and also charged him with garrisoning each state in his theater of operations. Obregón, before saying goodbye, warned Carranza that General Angeles, who was accompanying him on the difficult trip, would be a traitor.<sup>161</sup>

Carranza's party left Nogales on March 8; four days later at a small ranch where they were camped messages arrived from General Villa soliciting permission for General Angeles to command the artillery in the attack he was planning on Torreón. So discontented was Angeles with his cabinet post that he enthusiastically sought and received permission, and left the next morning in the car that had brought the messages. After reflections, Carranza countermanded the orders, but Angeles was gone.<sup>162</sup>

Obregón remained in Nogales until March 14, then returned to the state capital; the next day he commissioned General Alvarado to command the troops besieging Guaymas and designated Colonel Calles as the military commandant of Hermosillo and chief of the fixed forces in the state.<sup>163</sup> With those appointments, the fuse was lit.

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<sup>161</sup>Obregón, Ocho mil kilómetros, 102-104; Fabela mentions the warning in Documentos históricos, I, 409.

<sup>162</sup>Alessio Robles, Mi generación, 99-101. Fabela gives a detailed description of the crossing in Documentos históricos, I, 409-411.

<sup>163</sup>Obregón, Ocho mil kilómetros, 104-105.



CHAPTER IV  
MAYTORENA AND VILLA: 1915-1915

With Calles raised to a position of statewide power, and with Carranza out of the state, the political sniping indulged in by both sides quickly degenerated into political reprisals. The callistas described all maytorenistas as huertistas. Maytorenista officials were arrested one by one until few were left; the prefect of Cananea was jailed on trumped up charges on June 1 and an order was issued for the arrest of the municipal president. The president had not been arrested for a very good reason; he had the support of the laborers who were staunch maytorenistas because the Governor opposed the military, which sided with the companies in order to keep the mines working to obtain the customs income.<sup>1</sup> Maytorena complained to Carranza of Calles' hostility and demanded that Carranza tell him his views and his position. Carranza replied that he would support Maytorena as governor, and sent a confidential agent to study what was happening. The agent reported that, among other things, Calles had ordered Maytorena's military escort out of the capital; Carranza ordered Calles to recall the escort, and put it under

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<sup>1</sup>Border Report, June 13, 1914, USDS, 812.00/12324.

Maytorena's orders.<sup>2</sup>

The very public conflict was conducted by means of newspapers representing, and supported by, the opposing factions. The callista newspapers La Libertad and El Independiente utilized a demolishing irony and ridicule against Maytorena and his friends, forcing them into the defensive role of victims. The callistas dubbed the official state paper, La Voz de Sonora, which was financed by state funds and supported Maytorena, as La Voz de Tambora (The Voice of the Bass Drum). The maytorenistas nicknamed their opposition La Fracción Chiquita (the little fraction) to connote its small numbers and the contempt they felt for it. In retaliation the callistas labeled them La Grandota, ("the large one"--a slang term) a cruel cut at a wife who was noted for her "opulent humanity."<sup>3</sup>

Even the American consul in Hermosillo, whose personal estimate of Maytorena was very low, thought that the newspapers had abused him shamefully; that, he said, was the basis for the trouble. "They published his shortcomings in very insulting language, and while the charges were all true and proven the language was unnecessary."<sup>4</sup> The charges

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<sup>2</sup>Cumberland, The Constitutionalist Years, 132.

<sup>3</sup>Rivera, La Revolución, 132.

<sup>4</sup>Hostetter to SecSt, June 7, 1914, USDS, 812.00/12233. Hostetter remarked that "The greatest trouble is, that he is such an ignorant incompetent, that it's hard to make him realize his true position."

evolved from the systematic looting by Maytorena's associates, all "bad characters," of nearly one million pesos from state coffers since the Governor's return in August. The military authorities had numerous letters showing the transactions and published them, together with a great deal of abuse.<sup>5</sup>

The power lay with Calles, whom the residents of Hermosillo, fearful but impressed, referred to as "the night watchman" because of his forbidding omnipresence.<sup>6</sup> In the spring of 1914, the Plaza Zaragoza, the central plaza in Hermosillo, was bedecked with poppies and scented with violets. The state band with its forty splendidly uniformed members played a concert on its wrought-iron Victorian bandstand each Thursday night and Sunday morning under the baton of Rodolfo Campodonico. In February of 1914 the conductor, who also had fame as a composer, had introduced his March, "Viva Maytorena" to the citizens of the state capital.

One Thursday evening in May the plaza was full of promenaders of all social classes; the women walking one way and the men walking the other. Slowly down the street

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<sup>5</sup>Hostetter to SecSt, June 13, 1914, USDS, 812.00/12320.

<sup>6</sup>The following account is taken from Fernando A. Galaz, Desde el cerro de la Campana (Hermosillo, 1960), I, 57-59. The scene described by Galaz, who was a resident of Hermosillo, apparently took place on May 28. Rivera (La Revolución, 389) prints a telegram from Calles to Carranza dated May 29, in which he says that the maytorenistas provoked trouble during a serenade and some shots were fired, without any consequences.

came an elegant carriage pulled by beautiful horses, and in it, Colonel Calles and other military men; behind him came a squad of cavalry as if on guard. As they grew near, several men went to the conductor and asked him to play his march. Campodonico knew Calles was there and did not want to cause a scene, so he refused. Then one of the men called to the crowd for support, and asked if he were afraid of the callistas. Rebuked, he picked up his cornet and began to play, but an officer and two soldiers with drawn guns approached the bandstand and ordered him to stop. Campodonico turned around to face the watching crowd, continuing to play until the crowd's jeers drove the soldiers away.<sup>7</sup>

As a consequence of the railery in the plaza, Calles began a campaign to deprive Maytorena of military protection. Calles ordered Maytorena's bodyguard to remain in quarters, and to prevent any recurrence, he declared a state of siege putting into effect the law of January 25.<sup>8</sup> He insisted

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<sup>7</sup>Calles to Carranza, May 29, 1914. Rivera, *La Revolución*, 389. Rivera publishes a series of telegrams (389-401) from Calles or Salvador Alvarado to Carranza telling him of the events in Sonora. Rivera says that these telegrams were obtained from the "Archivo del Gobierno del Estado de Sonora," presumably the "Archivo General del Estado de Sonora." The telegrams were not located in the archive in August, 1974; possibly they were a part of a file entitled "Conflicto entre Maytorena y Carranza," which could not be found. However, the contents of this file were not listed so this cannot be stated with certainty.

<sup>8</sup>The Law of January 25, 1862, which established the death penalty for persons in rebellion against constituted authority and established political institutions. All prisoners taken in battle could be executed without trial. Carranza re-issued the law May 14, 1913.

that the harsh measures were absolutely necessary since "enemy efforts have taken on alarming proportions."

Carranza requested other data on the incident and Maytorena's attitude toward it, but Calles did not recount what had happened. He replied that Maytorena had a guard of fifty men who answered only to the Governor; and that they should be withdrawn since they were being augmented constantly.<sup>9</sup> To prove further that Maytorena was plotting subversion, Calles notified Carranza on June 4 that the Governor's guard had been increased to one hundred and fifty men, who were quartered in the Government Palace. Calles urged Carranza again to order Maytorena to put his guard under Calles' control; if the Governor refused he would clearly be in rebellion. As additional evidence Calles transcribed a telegram from the military commander at Ures in which he described a revel<sup>10</sup> attended by the president and prefect and a few others. In his presence the prefect cried "Viva Maytorena" and was answered by the others. Later the prefect asked him if he would join a movement against the carrancistas.<sup>11</sup>

While Calles bombarded Carranza with accusations against Maytorena, General Salvador Alvarado, who had so scathingly

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<sup>9</sup>Calles to Carranza, June 3, 1914, as printed in Rivera, La Revolución, 389.

<sup>10</sup>The commander used the word parranda which translates as a "spree" or "revel," with connotations of rowdiness and excessive indulgence in alcohol.

<sup>11</sup>Calles to Carranza, June 4, 1914. Rivera, La Revolución, 390.

denounced Maytorena's performance as a governor the previous November, wired the First Chief some accusations of his own on June 3.

Today the chiefs of my command came to me, telling me that I should intervene directly in the local question, that each day a more difficult situation appears, through the divisions caused by the attitude of Colonel Elías Calles. One group of people have been causing discontent. These supposed divisions naturally have to be applauded by the enemy; and the bad elements of our cause create an atmosphere of intrigues and plots, using to their advantage that the Yaquis are killing the citizens daily, that we have enemies at the front, that the Yaquis are going to commit atrocities upon entering the towns, that last night they were playing music in the plaza of Hermosillo, that because they played "Viva Maytorena" Plank ordered the conductor to the barracks, that Major Plank insulted the people and shot his pistol at them. Colonel Calles asked Maytorena for his guard and he manifested he would turn it over only on your orders. They say that if the Governor is guilty he should be tried or another named...but that they do not want the division to deepen through entangled irresponsible acts; they tell me that they want you to name a representative to come to investigate, in order to settle this difficulty in the most advantageous way.<sup>12</sup>

Perhaps it was the tempering effect of the Alvarado telegram which caused Carranza to insist that Calles do everything possible to conciliate Maytorena so that he would have no further reason for rebellion. Calles assured him that he would and reminded the First Chief that he (Calles)

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<sup>12</sup>Ibid., 392. Alvarado to Carranza, June 3, 1914. Rivera believed that Alvarado wrote because he hated Calles, Carranza, Obregón and Bonillas and all those who followed "the straight line of the Revolution," and that he was awaiting a chance to lead a rebellion.

was acting not for himself but for the "cause."<sup>13</sup>

He sent the French consul to the Governor to tell him that, by orders of Carranza, he offered him full guarantees and security; and that to calm the populace he should remove the guard from the Government Palace.<sup>14</sup> Maytorena, who had moved into the Government Palace himself, refused. Before taking any action he wanted to consult Carranza and General Villa.<sup>15</sup>

Obregón, leading his victorious army through Jalisco, was well informed on the political situation in Sonora, but had refrained from interfering. He, too, apparently saw Calles as the source of unrest in the state, and on June 6 ordered him to turn over his command to Colonel Antonio A. Guerrero, who had replaced him in Nogales, and to join him in Jalisco. Such an arrangement would not be satisfactory to the maytorenistas<sup>16</sup> who knew Guerrero as a callista. Calles never left the state because Carranza countermanded Obregón's order.<sup>17</sup>

Maytorenistas arrested the editor of the callista

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<sup>13</sup>Calles to Carranza, June 6, 1914. Ibid., 391-392.

<sup>14</sup>Hostetter to SecSt, June 7, 1914, USDS, 812.00/12233.

<sup>15</sup>Calles to Carranza, June 6, 1914. Rivera, La Revolución, 392.

<sup>16</sup>Calles to Carranza, June 7, 1914. Ibid., 394. Obregón did not mention this order.

<sup>17</sup>Federico Cervantes M., Francisco Villa y la Revolución. (México, D.F., 1960) 195; Obregón to Carranza, July 9, 1914 in Rivera, La Revolución, 400.

Newspaper La Libertad on June 7 and took him to the Palace; a menacing crowd of maytorenistas was calmed and the editor went home, but a resurgence of demonstrations caused him to request that he be taken to the prison. Maytorena acceded, but when the editor arrived at the prison with his escort, the prison guards fired, killing two and wounding three. For that reason the Governor begged Alvarado to send him two hundred men from the Yaqui troops of Colonel Urbalejo or Acosta so the people would know he did not lack support. Alvarado answered that he could not send troops nor mix in the matter without orders from Carranza; in his report to Carranza he reminded him that Guerrero was not acceptable, since "the people see in that chief a second Calles."<sup>18</sup>

Hermosillo seemed to be teetering on the brink of open warfare with ten lives lost in the first two weeks of June.<sup>19</sup> Carranza ordered General Alvarado to Hermosillo, to relieve Guerrero and to disarm Maytorena's guard; Alvarado gave Maytorena two hours in which to submit or face the consequences, and Maytorena yielded his guard. Alvarado warned that the next incident would lead to martial law.<sup>20</sup> Calles and his troops were ordered to Nogales, ostensibly to get new uniforms. Ignacio Bonillas, acting as Carranza's agent, arrived in Nogales on June 13 to confer with the callista

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<sup>18</sup>Alvarado to Carranza, June 8, 1914 in Rivera, La Revolución, 396.

<sup>19</sup>Hostetter to SecSt, June 13, 1914, USDS, 812.00/12320.

<sup>20</sup>Hostetter to SecSt, June 13, 1914, USDS, 812.00/12248; Border Report, June 20, 1914, USDS, 812.00/12391.



elements.<sup>21</sup>

When the Calles-Maytorena feud advanced beyond the name-calling stage in early June, Maytorena had turned for succor to his friend, now commanding general of the Division of the North, Francisco "Pancho" Villa, who was himself encountering difficulties with Carranza. Mutual suspicions, justified on both sides, and jealousies opened the breach,<sup>22</sup> thus Maytorena found sympathy, if little actual help, from Villa, who was shortly involved in a fight for survival. Maytorena had been pleading with Villa, then in Torreón, for some kind of aid against Calles. Villa contacted Calles to chide him for his hostile acts against the constitutionally elected governor, and urged Calles to try to end the disagreement. Calles insisted that he was a traitor and must be exiled. His own attitude, Calles said, was correct and patriotic and he would not stop trying to remove him. Villa then warned Calles that he would not consent to hostilities against Maytorena. When Calles left Hermosillo the following day Villa did not know whether his threats had effected the move; he did know that Calles continued his telegraphic

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<sup>21</sup>Border Report, June 13, 1914, USDS, 812.00/12324. Calles, Bonillas and Alvarado discussed the crisis and thought they could resolve it. Bonillas carried the resulting memo back with him; Alvarado does not mention what it contained. Alvarado to Carranza, June 15, 1914, as printed in Rivera, 397.

<sup>22</sup>For a brief account of the beginning of the Carranza-Villa conflict, see Cumberland, The Constitutionalist Years, 133-138.

intriguing.<sup>23</sup>

Calles protested to Carranza that the disarming of Maytorena's guard was a farce, the result of lying promises of cooperation made to Alvarado by Acosta and Urbalejo. He was absolutely sure, he told the First Chief, that the Governor was in league with Villa; moreover he doubted the loyalty of all the troops from the south in Alvarado's command (the Yaquis).<sup>24</sup>

Well he might doubt their loyalty; Alvarado himself had cautioned Carranza that due to subversion he was sure they would not obey him in a conflict with Maytorena. Alvarado thought it best that the Calles troops remain in the state to form the nucleus of a new force, as they were the only ones that could be counted on.<sup>25</sup> Two days later Alvarado wired that Urbalejo and Acosta had offered their support to Maytorena.<sup>26</sup> On June 19 the troops commanded by Urbalejo and Acosta were drawn up in Zaragoza Plaza across from the Municipal Palace when Maytorena and

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<sup>23</sup>Martín Luis Guzmán, *Memoirs of Pancho Villo*, trans. by Virginia H. Taylor (Austin, Texas, 1966), 249-250; Luis Aguirre Benavides, *De Francisco I. Madero a Francisco Villa; memorias de un revolucionario* (México, D.F., 1966), 136-137. Luis Aguirre Benavides was Villa's secretary and conducted the interview. Villa, according to Aguirre, considered Maytorena a "good" revolutionary and his friend because he had aided him to return to Mexico, and because they were maderistas. Villistas, in general, believed Carranza was encouraging the conflict because he had not stopped it.

<sup>24</sup>Calles to Carranza, June (13), 1914, Rivera, *La Revolución*, 396-397.

<sup>25</sup>Alvarado to Carranza, June 15, 1914, *Ibid.*, 397.

<sup>26</sup>Alvarado to Carranza, June 17, 1914, *Ibid.*, 397.

Jesús Ramos, the prefect for the Hermosillo district, appeared on the balcony of the Palace. Ramos stepped forward and began to harangue the troops against Calles, whom he called Carranza's representative, and called for all carrancistas to be expelled from the state. Maytorena, he declared, was the only leader who still worked in the spirit of Madero, and he promised them money and the immediate division of lands on the Yaqui River.<sup>27</sup>

The presence of Alvarado in Hermosillo solved nothing though conditions stabilized. Although Alvarado and Maytorena were on friendly terms the Governor did not believe him trustworthy.<sup>28</sup> The General continued to press Carranza in behalf of his officers who asked that Calles be removed from the state, that Maytorena be allowed to complete his term, and that state forces be unified under a single command. The officers protested their fealty, but wanted to avoid difficulties in Sonora. They guaranteed that if Carranza acceded to their petition the state would remain at peace. Calles was charged with refusing the aid of his troops at Guaymas on two occasions, which had produced an aversion for him among the southern officers.

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<sup>27</sup>Testimony of Antonio A. Guerrero, Victor Huerta, Ramón Gil Samaniego, AGES, 3090, Sección de Guerra, procesados. The charge presented to the judge, itself a harangue, states that the Indians were then invited into the Palace to get drunk, and they rampaged through the city committing outrages, fighting callistas, with the incident culminating in the arrest of Alvarado. The charge is, mildly stated, exaggerated, or else it was a long drunk, for Alvarado was not arrested until seven weeks later.

<sup>28</sup>Hostetter to SecSt, July 6, 1914, USDS, 812.00/12422.

Alvarado favored the officers' proposals himself; he thought the army should support public opinion, which contravened Calles' machinations. He stated flatly that Calles was at the root of the unrest.<sup>29</sup>

Calles, not knowing of Alvarado's telegram, told Carranza that he lacked confidence in the General because of his recent conduct. He accused Alvarado of trying to gain control of his forces through the pretense of an attack on Guaymas. Calles also knew, by way of condemnation, that Alvarado had had several conferences with Maytorena.<sup>30</sup>

Carranza apparently respected the expressed wishes of Alvarado's forces, and ordered Obregón to transfer Calles, to which Obregón answered on July 9:

In answer to your message relative to the request that Colonel Elías Calles leave Sonora; I manifest to you that some time ago I believed it desirable to utilize his services in campaign, and in that sense gave timely orders, which were counteracted by your Headquarters.<sup>31</sup>

Conditions in Hermosillo appeared to be stalemated, but the political feud began making itself felt elsewhere in the state. The miners at Cananea began a strike on July 2. Although they did not strike as a protest, the walkout took on political overtones because the troops in the north which would be used to protect company property were under Calles' command, and the miners favored

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<sup>29</sup>Alvarado to Carranza, June 29, 1914, Ibid., 398.

<sup>30</sup>Calles to Carranza, July 1, 1914, Ibid., 399-400.

<sup>31</sup>Obregón to Carranza, July 9, 1914, Ibid., 400.

Maytorena.<sup>32</sup> When Calles learned of the strike he telegraphed the prefect to tell him to get the workers back in the mines. The prefect believed that the miners had the right to strike and would not obey. Calles went to Cananea to assert his authority, and the prefect convoked the strikers to meet Calles' train at the station and protest when he arrived. Calles ordered his troops to descend and disperse the demonstrators, and when some of the leaders attempted to speak, Calles had the troops open fire; several strikers were killed and wounded. Calles then ordered the apprehension of the leaders and the prefect, but they had fled to the United States. The panic-stricken workers went back to the mines, but the women encouraged them to continue their strike; Calles had forty of the women arrested and jailed.<sup>33</sup>

The workers set fires in two shafts at the 4C's on July 24, which were brought under control on the next day, and La Voz de Sonora incited them to do their worst and demand their rights.<sup>34</sup> The Cananea mines closed on August 15, leaving 3800 unemployed, mostly Mexicans;<sup>35</sup> the Nacozari mine owned by the Copper Queen Company discharged twenty-five percent of its employees in the first

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<sup>32</sup>Bowman to SecSt, July 2, 1914, USDS, 812.00/12394.

<sup>33</sup>Ignacio Muñoz, Verdad y mito de la Revolución mexicana relatada por un protagonista (México, D.F., 1960), II, 55-56.

<sup>34</sup>Hostetter to SecSt, July 26, 1914, USDS, 812.00/12720.

<sup>35</sup>Border Report, July 15, 1914, USDS, 812.00/12972.

week in August due to a weak copper market.<sup>36</sup>

After the battle for Zacatecas a rupture between Villa and Carranza appeared inevitable. Threatened with the loss of the services of the Division of the North, the First Chief consented to send a commission which met with Villa's representatives to discuss the fate of the Division and points of disagreement between the villistas and the constitucionalistas.<sup>37</sup> In the afternoon session of July 6 the delegate from the Division proposed that Carranza should resolve the conflict in Sonora without violating the sovereignty of the state and with respect for the person of the constitutional governor. After a discussion, those present unanimously approved that statement, and added an appeal to Maytorena to act in behalf of the state and resign, if he believes that in such a manner he can put an end to the internal conflict, proposing a impartial person of prestige, affiliated with the constitucionalista cause, to take charge of the government of Sonora and give guarantees to the people whose sacred interests are in danger.<sup>38</sup>

Although numerous accords were signed on July 8, the meetings had no practical result.

In the meanwhile events occurring on the national level brought the constitucionalistas close to their goals and

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<sup>36</sup>Border Report, July 8, 1914, USDS, 812.00/12887. The unemployed from the mines furnished a source of manpower for the contending factions.

<sup>37</sup>Aguirre Benavides, Memorias de un revolucionario, 151-156, gives a complete account of the meetings, at which he was present.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., 155.

should have presaged peace. In late June deserters from Guaymas brought word that the federal troops there were preparing to evacuate.<sup>39</sup> Reports of the evacuation in progress and Obregón's victory at Guadalajara were celebrated in Saltillo by the ringing of church bells on July 10; on July 15 Huerta resigned and turned the government over to Francisco Carbajal. Early in July, the federal forces were making feverish preparations to leave Guaymas. Alvarado sent a demand that they evacuate or surrender before July 5, but received no answer. He then mounted an assault on the advance posts which were driven into the city, but enforcements repulsed the constitutionistas. The federal commander agreed to talk with Alvarado to arrange an orderly evacuation, and their representatives met aboard the U. S. S. Raleigh. Some of Alvarado's officers objected to a peaceful withdrawal because they wanted to sack the town.<sup>40</sup> Evacuation of Guaymas was completed on July 16<sup>41</sup> and Alvarado and Maytorena entered to establish a new government. Maytorena made every effort to win over Alvarado's Yaquis, utilizing letters sent to the encampments<sup>42</sup> and payments.<sup>43</sup> While Guaymas was invested he told

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<sup>39</sup>Hostetter to SecSt, June 26, 1914, USDS, 812.00/12360.

<sup>40</sup>T. P. Magruder to SecNavy, July 8 & 15, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13672.

<sup>41</sup>Hostetter to SecSt, July 17, 1914, USDS, 812.00/12528.

<sup>42</sup>Testimony of Antonio A. Guerrero, et al, AGES, 3090.

<sup>43</sup>Hostetter to SecSt, Aug. 3, 1914, USDS, 812.00/12734.

them that Alvarado wanted them to waste their ammunition so they could fall prey to Calles, and they fell back. He encouraged the Yaquis who entered Guaymas with him to take what they wanted from Guaymas stores: Alvarado made them return the property.<sup>44</sup> The railroad, closed since March 5, 1913, once again allowed passage from Nogales to the southern borders of the state, and the telegraph and post office could communicate with the rest of the state.<sup>45</sup> Alvarado reorganized the federal officials and named a new customs collector.

With the withdrawal of the federal troops from Guaymas, the large carrancista army in Sonora could not be justified. Moreover, Obregón was aware of the dubious loyalty of the large Yaqui contingent and the explosive situation that existed. To forestall a revolt in Alvarado's ranks which would aid Maytorena, he ordered Alvarado to move two or three thousand of his troops to the south, together with all reserves of cartridges and all artillery.<sup>46</sup> Obregón said he needed the troops to reinforce the constitucionalistas then attacking Mazatlán.<sup>47</sup>

Alvarado did not carry out Obregón's orders; he was imprisoned in Hermosillo on August 9, on Maytorena's orders, together with several officers of his command. The same day,

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<sup>44</sup>Hostetter to SecSt, Aug. 3, 1914, USDS, 812.00/12793.

<sup>45</sup>USS Raleigh to SecNavy, July 19, 1914, USDS, 812.00/12575.

<sup>46</sup>Obregón, Ocho mil kilómetros, 149.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., 154.



in various parts of the state, civil officials and civilians sympathetic to Calles were also apprehended, and in Hermosillo the governor recruited two thousand federal prisoners-of-war from the prison into his ranks, including many officers. Employees in the federal offices were replaced with his own people.<sup>48</sup> Maytorena had been warning Carranza that if Calles were not removed from Sonora he would drive him out, and Carranza promised that Calles would be sent to Chihuahua.<sup>49</sup> Carranza, with his escort, joined Obregón on August 11 for the advance on Mexico City; they decided to remove any pretext that Maytorena had for rebellion by removing the professed source of irritation, Calles. Obregón decided that General Benjamín Hill was the man to replace him because of the long-standing friendship between Hill and the Governor. An order of the day, issued August 12, ordered Hill to Sonora as the military commander of the state, with Calles subordinate to him.<sup>50</sup>

The troops which had been investing Guaymas were moved back to Cruz de Piedra and Maytorena Station on July 22 and 23, leaving only a small garrison in the port.<sup>51</sup> After Alvarado's arrest they were moved to Hermosillo,<sup>52</sup> then, on

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<sup>48</sup>Ibid., 157-158.

<sup>49</sup>Border Report, Aug. 8, 1914, USDS, 812.00/12887.

<sup>50</sup>Obregón, Ocho mil kilómetros, 157.

<sup>51</sup>T. P. Magruder to SecNavy, Aug. 7, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13151.

<sup>52</sup>T. P. Magruder to SecNavy, July 8, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13672.

August 13, were mobilized for a move to Nogales.<sup>53</sup> To intercept Maytorena, Calles had to pull his men out of Cananea, leaving the mining town in the control of the labor elements,<sup>54</sup> to utilize them at Santa Ana.<sup>55</sup> Four hundred maytorenistas arrived in Cananea August 18 and were joined by the prefect with two hundred men who had deserted Calles. After a clash at Santa Ana the callistas fell back to Casita,<sup>56</sup> there Calles received orders from Obregón to discontinue any opposition,<sup>57</sup> and on the evening of August 18 he began withdrawing and recalling all of his soldiers along the border to Nogales.<sup>58</sup> The next day he concentrated them in Naco.<sup>59</sup> Maytorena occupied Nogales without resistance on August 23, while Calles moved a force back to Cananea. The maytorenistas in the mining community left for the mountains.<sup>60</sup>

General Hill arrived in Naco on August 24 after traveling from Eagle Pass, Texas by special permission of the United

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<sup>53</sup>Hostetter to SecSt, Aug. 14, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13102; Simpich to SecSt, Aug. 14, 1914, USDS, 812.00/12864.

<sup>54</sup>Simpich to SecSt, Aug. 10, 1914, USDS, 812.00/12803.

<sup>55</sup>Simpich to SecSt, Aug. 12, 1914, USDS, 812.00/12836.

<sup>56</sup>Simpich to SecSt, Aug. 16, 1914, USDS, 812.00/12875.

<sup>57</sup>Simpich to SecSt, Aug. 18, 1914, USDS, 812.00/12913.

<sup>58</sup>Bowman to SecSt, Aug. 18, 1914, USDS, 812.00/12921.

<sup>59</sup>Simpich to SecSt, Aug. 19, 1914, USDS, 812.00/12937; Bowman to SecSt, Aug. 19, 1914, USDS, 812.00/12958.

<sup>60</sup>Simpich to SecSt, Aug. 23, 1914, USDS, 812.00/12968; also USDS, 812.00/12997, 13071, 12996.

States Department of State. He spent his first day trying to communicate with Calles and Maytorena. Calles he found at Del Río, on the Nacozari Railroad, but Maytorena refused to see him, using illness as an excuse.<sup>61</sup>

While Hill was enroute to Sonora other attempts were being made to restore tranquility in the state. Before Carranza's triumphal entry into Mexico City, he and Obregón had discussed the possibility of Obregón's going to Chihuahua to confer with Villa. As soon as the Army of the Northwest had occupied Mexico City, Obregón sought permission from Carranza, who had not yet made his triumphal entry, to go to Chihuahua to discuss with Villa his estrangement from Carranza and the trouble in Sonora. Carranza did not think it worthwhile; Villa, he said, would rebel soon, no matter what influence was brought to bear. Obregón, who knew Villa only through correspondence, persisted, arguing that he could possibly sway Villa because of their good past relationship. He also believed he could persuade the General to accompany him to Sonora to settle the difficulties between Maytorena and Calles.<sup>62</sup>

Carranza maintained his objections but finally agreed that Obregón could go. The First Chief sent a telegram to Villa in which he stated Obregón's mission, and entreated him to go with the General to Sonora to investigate and

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<sup>61</sup>Border Report, Aug. 29, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13127.

<sup>62</sup>Obregón, Ocho mil kilómetros, 225.

determine the reasons for the quarrel. Carranza did not know, he insisted, if Maytorena's fight was with Calles and Alvarado, or if he was opposing Carranza's authority.<sup>63</sup>

Obregón left Mexico City on the night of August 21 by special train, accompanied only by his staff and a fifteen-man escort.<sup>64</sup> Villa met him at the station and escorted him to his private home where Villa displayed great interest in what had been happening in Mexico City. Villa told Obregón that he would not be a traitor, but then declared "The destinies of the country are in your hands and my hands; the two united, we will dominate the country in less than a minute, and as I am an obscure man, you will be president."

Villa's statement put Obregón in a different situation; he responded briefly that the fighting had ended and the next president would be the choice of the people. Obregón attempted to listen and keep quiet to avoid arousing any suspicion in Villa. From Villa's conversation he decided that he was badly misled, and that it would be difficult to counteract the counsel of those around him. But in Villa's

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<sup>63</sup>Telegraph reproduced in Cervantes, Francisco Villa, 226 and in Luis Guzmán, Memoirs, 288. Interestingly, these biographers of Villa's say that Carranza made the initial move. L. J. Canova reported to the Secretary of State (USDS, 812.00/12960) that Villa had telegraphed Carranza asking for Obregón to come on August 20.

<sup>64</sup>Obregón's mission to Sonora is found in a variety of sources: Obregón, Ocho mil kilómetros, 168-179; Aguirre Benavides, Memorias de un revolucionario, 165-167. Cumberland, The Constitutionalist Years, 153-157, Luis Guzmán, Memoirs, 289-302 and Cervantes, Francisco Villa, 225-238 all rely on Obregón. This account is based on Obregón unless otherwise noted.

occasional moments of withdrawal from them, he demonstrated a spirit of conciliation and a distaste for the politicians surrounding him.

When they spoke of Sonora, Obregón maintained that Maytorena was in the wrong. The Governor, he insisted, had lost the respect of the people by leaving; and their disrespect for him was transmuted into disrespect for Maytorena's authority. This in turn led to disagreements which conspirators used to their advantage to promote discord. Villa contended that Calles was conspiring against Maytorena, and Obregón countered that he had asked for the recall of Calles. But even if Calles stayed, he added, Maytorena was wrong in assuming that his enemies could count on help from the First Chief. When Villa insisted that Carranza was aiding Calles, Obregón assured him that it was because he had to protect himself from the spurious actions of Maytorena.

While they were awaiting permission from the Department of State to travel to Sonora through United States territory with an escort of Villa's armed dorados, Obregón received a telegram saying that Maytorena's soldiers had entered Nogales wearing hat bands reading "Viva Villa." Since Villa denied he was encouraging Maytorena, he could comment only that they must have worn them out of enthusiasm for the cause.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>65</sup>Cervantes, Francisco Villa, 227.

Obregón and Villa paid their respects to General John Pershing in El Paso on August 26,<sup>66</sup> and the next day caught the train for Nogales where they arrived late the same night.<sup>67</sup> Obregón agreed that Villa should go alone first to talk to Maytorena, after Villa convinced him that, since the maytorenistas held Obregón responsible for Calles, there might be demonstrations against him. After conferring with Villa Maytorena reluctantly agreed to talk with Obregón; he doubted that Obregón had really come to make peace. Villa, Obregón, Maytorena, Colonels Urbalejo and Acosta (present at Obregón's request) and Luis Aguirre Benavides, Villa's secretary, met in Maytorena's home in Nogales.<sup>68</sup>

In the talks on August 29, Maytorena made clear his anger at Calles and his colleagues, and specified the charges;<sup>69</sup> but those against Obregón and Carranza were

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<sup>66</sup>z. L. Cobb to SecSt, Aug. 26, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13010.

<sup>67</sup>Obregón said that they arrived the night of Aug. 28, but the Border Report, Aug. 29 (USDS, 812.00/13127) said they had been there since Aug. 27.

<sup>68</sup>Luis Guzmán, Memoirs, 293-294. Serrano was Obregón's secretary; he had been Maytorena's secretary until shortly after the Governor had taken his leave of absence in 1913. He had returned with De la Huerta after his visit to Maytorena and Villa.

<sup>69</sup>Cervantes, Francisco Villa, 228.

more suspected than factual.<sup>70</sup> He told Obregón that General Alvarado had been jailed because neither he nor his staff respected the authority of his government or recognized the sovereignty of the State.<sup>71</sup> Obregón accepted his reasons, and said he wanted to name a new military commander for the state: Urbalejo or Acosta, whichever Maytorena approved, or even Maytorena himself. Maytorena wanted to know what the conditions for the appointment would be; Obregón declared that recognition of him as his chief was the prerequisite.<sup>72</sup> On the evening of August 20 those present signed an accord which provided that 1) Urbalejo and Acosta would accept Obregón as their commander; 2) that Maytorena was the new commander of the troops in the state; 3) that the forces

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<sup>70</sup>Aguirre Benavides, *Memorias de un revolucionario*, 166. Aguirre, who was present, did not choose to disclose anything specific about the meeting, just that the charges had no foundation. His account of the meeting is very brief. Obregón (*Ocho mil kilómetros*, 170-171), on the other hand, reported the questions he supposedly asked Maytorena, but if his account is revelatory of the entire meeting, there was no apparent basis on which to hope for an agreement. Strangely, Obregón stated that Maytorena refused to answer any questions which might have answers derogatory to the General, the opposite of what might be expected.

<sup>71</sup>Cervantes, *Francisco Villa*, 228.

<sup>72</sup>*Ibid.* Obregón (*Ocho mil kilómetros*, 171-172), had a slightly different version of this offer that casts Maytorena in a less favorable light. He offered, he said, the job to Maytorena on the condition of recognition, but Maytorena hesitated until Villa told him that if everything were not settled, it would be because the Governor did not want it settled. Maytorena was forced to accept. According to Luis Guzmán (*Memoirs*, 295-296) Obregón's questions were not raised until after the agreement was reached and Maytorena would not answer in order to avoid more trouble.

then under the command of Calles, wherever found, were to be under Maytorena's command; and 4) that the employees of the federal offices within the state were to be named by Maytorena and Obregón, with the approval of Carranza.

Obregón wired Carranza:

I am honored to communicate to you that today a treaty was signed solving the Sonoran conflicts. I have named as commandant of the forces in Sonora, Governor Maytorena, for having proved that his complaints are justified, that, in fact, attempts against the state sovereignty and against all principal authority were committed. I also ordered the continued detention of General Alvarado and his staff. I believe it indispensable to establish my general headquarters in Sonora, to which Maytorena will be subordinate in the future. I will come there, of course, in order to arrange pending matters and to be able to return quickly.<sup>73</sup>

His message to Carranza did not express any misgivings about the agreement.<sup>74</sup> That same night a broadside appeared on the streets of the town of Nogales. The text accused Obregón of sending honorable constitucionalistas into exile, of attempting to violate the sovereignty of the state, and other equally unspecified crimes.<sup>75</sup> Obregón, full of indignation, promptly removed Maytorena from the military command. He told Villa that the Governor was responsible

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<sup>73</sup>Cervantes, Francisco Villa, 229.

<sup>74</sup>Obregón (Ocho mil kilómetros, 172-173) said that he never for a minute supposed that the problem was solved, but by naming Maytorena commander, he could prove to Villa that Maytorena had no valid reason for revolt when he refused to obey orders in the future.

<sup>75</sup>Reproduced in Ibid., 173-174. A short translation is found in Luis Guzmán (Memoirs, 298).



for the publication and that they could not accomplish their mission because of his interference. Without waiting to ask Maytorena for an explanation, Obregón drew up another agreement. Villa did not think Maytorena was behind the publication, but he did concede that the Governor had no control over his territory, so he agreed to join Obregon in the new pact.<sup>76</sup>

The new agreement proclaimed their belief that "noxious and antipatriotic elements" were obstacles to peace; that to prevent further fighting they had resolved: to leave Maytorena's forces under his command; that Calles' command would be placed under Hill; and that if either of the commanders violated the previous clause he would be attacked by the combined forces of the Armies of the Northwest and North, until he submitted.<sup>77</sup> Only Obregón and Villa signed the new document.

When Villa later explained to the Governor why the first agreement had been voided, because of the threats made against Obregón, Maytorena insisted that he had nothing to do with the publication; he insisted that Obregón, himself, had authored the publication in an effort to create more trouble. They both realized what the consequences might be if they refused to support Obregón while he was

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<sup>76</sup>Luis Guzmán, *Memoirs*, 298.

<sup>77</sup>Obregón, *Ocho mil kilómetros*, 174-175. None of the accounts make clear whether Maytorena was told before or after the new pact was an accomplished fact; Obregón said the decision was his and Villa's.

in Nogales; thus Maytorena agreed to maintain the status quo if he were not attacked.<sup>78</sup>

On the trip back to Chihuahua, Villa and Obregón returned again and again to the subject of the settlement in Sonora. Obregón was certain that the peace could not be maintained as long as Maytorena continued as governor; Villa defended the Governor, but agreed that his partisans would never accept the conditions of the settlement. He finally consented to the replacement of Maytorena if Obregón could name a man acceptable to the Governor. Obregón thought that General Juan G. Cabral would be suitable.

Once again the two men signed an agreement relative to Sonora. Under its articles Maytorena was to leave the governorship and be replaced by General Cabral, who would also function as military commander. The troops under the command of Calles would be removed, to a location where they were most needed, until the military commander of Sonora judged the time opportune for their return. All the volunteers fighting against Maytorena would be released. Cabral was to guarantee Maytorena's personal and property

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<sup>78</sup>Luis Guzmán, Memoirs, 298. Before leaving Nogales, Villa was invited to Agua Prieta, where he attended a banquet at the home of Francisco Elías. The guests included numerous maderista revolutionaries: Roberto V. Pesqueira, Pedro Bracamonte and his brother, and General Anacleto J. Girón, who all painted Obregón as a man capable of treachery. Villa was impressed by their animus, which undermined any good impression he might have had. So virulent was their feeling that Girón, on his deathbed several weeks later, wired Villa that Obregón, who was then again in Chihuahua, should not leave Chihuahua alive. Aguirre Benavides, Memorias de un revolucionario, 166-167.

rights, and was to restore the state to peace in order to convoke municipal elections.<sup>79</sup>

The accord was signed on September 3 in Chihuahua. The United States Department of State had avidly followed the development of the quest for peace in Sonora, because of large American investments there. The announcement of the newest pact apparently was not immediately made public; the Department sent a telegram to George C. Carothers, consul at Ciudad Juárez working as a special agent to Villa, to protest to Villa and Obregón the continuing Yaqui depredations in Sonora, and to suggest to them the possibility of replacing Maytorena with someone who could maintain order.<sup>80</sup> The Department congratulated the two Generals for reaching a solution in Sonora.<sup>81</sup>

On the same day on which they signed the new agreement for Sonora, Obregón and Villa signed a series of proposals to Carranza, in the form of a memorandum, for the process of restoring the nation to a constitutional government. It also proposed the suppression of the vice-presidency, a change in the length of term of the presidency, and the ineligibility of officers of the new army to serve in high elective positions, unless they had left the service

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<sup>79</sup>Obregón, Ocho mil kilómetros, 176.

<sup>80</sup>George Carothers to SecSt, Sept. 4, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13103.

<sup>81</sup>z. L. Cobb to SecSt, Sept. 5, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13128.

six months prior to becoming a candidate. Article I demanded that Carranza take the title of Interim President, which would disqualify him from the elections under the precept of "no re-election."<sup>82</sup>

A delegation from the Division of the North accompanied Obregón back to Mexico City to present the memorandum to the First Chief. Obregón reported to Carranza on his commission to Sonora, but nothing the General could say, not even the signed agreement removing Maytorena, could convince Carranza of Villa's good faith. He did agree to receive the delegation and to the replacement of Maytorena with Cabral.<sup>83</sup>

After studying the memorandum for four days Carranza stated that he would accept Article I, and suggested some changes in other articles. But most were of such outstanding importance, he said, that they should be acted on by a junta representative of the country; to discuss these and other topics of interest to the nation, he had convoked a junta to meet on October 1.<sup>84</sup>

No time limits were set in any of the agreements, and Obregón had hardly arrived in Mexico City when Villa began pressing him to send Cabral to Sonora.<sup>85</sup> Obregón assured

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<sup>82</sup>The proposals are printed in Obregón, Ocho mil kilómetros, 178; the entire document with a very long preamble, is reproduced in Cervantes, Francisco Villa, 232-236.

<sup>83</sup>Obregón, Ocho mil kilómetros, 179-180.

<sup>84</sup>Ibid., 186-187.

<sup>85</sup>The following telegraphic exchange is reproduced in Ibid., 183-186 and Cervantes, Francisco Villa, 246-248.

him that as soon as Cabral could arrange matters in Mexico City, he would leave. On September 8, Villa wired that he had given Hill orders several times to retire to Casas Grandes. Speed was essential in evading more trouble.<sup>86</sup>

Despite his awareness that Villa had broken the terms in ordering Hill to leave, Obregón chose not to remind him of that fact, but still did not send Cabral. He soothingly suggested that the troops not be moved until Cabral had arrived in Sonora. Obregón promised that he would accompany Cabral north in two or three days to Chihuahua, where he would remain while Cabral continued to Sonora.

On September 10, Villa again urged Obregón:

It is absolutely necessary and urgent that you order Hill's forces to Casas Grandes or any other place in this state, since his remaining in Sonora is causing difficulties.<sup>87</sup>

Obregón responded:

I will make those commanders responsible for any difficulties created by them; but it is unnecessary to move them before General Cabral takes possession of the post.<sup>88</sup>

If Obregón and Carranza sincerely sought a solution in Sonora, the delays were making their chances increasingly slim. The conferences in Sonora had granted the populace

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<sup>86</sup>Simpich to SecSt, Sept. 9, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13137. Hill did not reply.

<sup>87</sup>Cervantes, Francisco Villa, 248.

<sup>88</sup>Ibid.

a respite from tension, and the general impression was that Villa was not supporting Maytorena. Calles, who had not attended the conferences, and his family, left with Villa and Obregón for Chihuahua,<sup>89</sup> leaving Hill in command of his troops. Hill moved the largest part of his contingent, approximately 1,600 men, to Santa Cruz on the railroad between Nogales and Cananea.<sup>90</sup> On September 10, General Hill's advance force attacked a reconnaissance force from Nogales. Maytorena professed to be stunned by the occurrence; Hill's advance violated the agreements and would force a fight if he advanced further; Hill, in turn laid the blame on Maytorena.<sup>91</sup>

With the two forces poised to fall on each other at the slightest pretext, Obregón decided that the gravity of the situation merited a return to Chihuahua;<sup>92</sup> in addition he wanted to discuss the coming convention, because of intimations that Villa would not send representatives. On the trip from Mexico City to Chihuahua, Obregón had received a telegram from Roberto V. Pesqueira warning him that he

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<sup>89</sup>Border Report, Sept. 5, 1914, 812.00/13182. Obregón did not mention Calles being on the trip. Calles went on to Mexico City, but the reason for the trip is unknown, unless it was simply to remove an irritant.

<sup>90</sup>Simpich to SecSt, Sept. 9, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13137.

<sup>91</sup>Border Report, Sept. 12, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13235; C. L. Montague to Simpich, Sept. 12, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13226.

<sup>92</sup>The following account of Obregón's second visit to Villa is derived chiefly from Obregón, Ocho mil kilómetros, 199-206.

would probably be killed in Chihuahua.<sup>93</sup> Possibly because of Pesqueira's warning, and probably because of the explosive conditions he encountered at Villa's headquarters, Obregón took the precaution of sending Major Julio Madero, a member of his staff, to Douglas early on September 1 to secretly inform Hill of the situation and to order him not to execute any commands which he might send while in Chihuahua. Obregón also sent 20,000 pesos to deposit with Francisco S. Elías, which were to be distributed among the families of his staff should they all be killed in Chihuahua.<sup>94</sup>

On his arrival on September 16, he immediately noted a change in Villa's attitude, and that Villa was making no attempt to hide his bellicose preparations. Obregón believed, he said later, that was was inevitable and that all he could hope to do was appeal to the better, discontented elements which surrounded Villa, and try to attract them away from him. To achieve this, Obregón and his staff talked confidentially to any of Villa's staff who had evidenced any discontent, but with no success. Obregón attributed their lack of success to Villa's officers' fears of arousing Villa's suspicions against them.

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<sup>93</sup>It is difficult to determine just which side Pesqueira supported in this quarrel; on the one hand, Aguirre said he spread malicious stories against Obregón, and here he was trying to save his life. Pesqueira's warning may have been related to Giron's adjuring Villa not to let Obregón leave Chihuahua alive, as previously mentioned. See footnote 78.

<sup>94</sup>Obregón, Ocho mil kilómetros, 205. Obregón does not mention his motivation.

Obregón and his staff dined with Raul Madero on September 17. Their after-dinner conversation was interrupted by the arrival of Villa's chauffeur who reported that Villa wanted to see Obregón. According to Obregón's account of what occurred, Villa accused him of being a traitor and stated he would have him shot immediately.<sup>95</sup> Aguirre Benevides, on his own initiative, called Raul Madero, whom Villa was very fond of, to the scene and Villa became calmer; but before Madero arrived he had a secretary call for twenty dorados to form a firing squad. Villa also sent a telegram to Hill, in Obregón's name, ordering him to leave Sonora for Casas Grandes, not knowing of Julio Madero's mission.

While Obregón and his staff paced the floor the firing squad outside awaited its orders from Villa. Villa continued to insist he would have him shot; then suddenly Villa left the room. An hour went by, then Villa sent the firing squad away. He re-entered the room where Obregón and his staff waited, and asked Obregón to sit beside him. Then emotionally, he declared that he did not kill defenseless men nor his guests. Amid the silence that followed, supper was announced, and Villa invited him to eat, saying the

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<sup>95</sup>Obregón (Ibid., 202) never explained what had caused Villa to erupt, but he told George Carothers the following morning that Villa had become infuriated during an argument when a telegram arrived saying Hill's men had burned a bridge near Nogales. Carothers to SecSt, Sept. 19, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13237. Aguirre (Memorias de un revolucionario, 168) gave no specific reason for the fury, mentioning only that Villa received several telegrams from Maytorena complaining of harrassment by Hill's men.



incident was ended. Obregón commented "I confess that I didn't share Villa's opinion that it was all over, as the same thing hadn't happened in me, because my fear had not even begun to diminish."

After supper with Villa and his wife, Obregón and his staff attended a dance which they had planned earlier as a gesture thanking the Division of the North for its hospitality.<sup>96</sup> The entire town knew of the firing squad called by Villa, but when questioned as to what had caused Villa to change his mind, Obregón jokingly answered, "The truth is, I don't know. I was occupied in thinking how to secure myself a safe-conduct to the Don Venustiano of the heavens."<sup>97</sup>

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<sup>96</sup>G. C. Carothers to SecSt, Sept. 19, 1914, 812.00/13237. Carothers said Villa attended the dance, Obregón said he did not.

<sup>97</sup>Cervantes, Francisco Villa, 255, quoting Captain Carlos T. Robinson, a member of Villa's staff. Cervantes (254-256) reproduces a passage from a book written by Señora Luz Corral de Villa, Villa's only legitimate wife, which explained in part why Villa changed his mind. Señora Corral related that she had had mirrors installed so that she could note in her bedroom what was happening in the living room. One morning (her times differ from Obregón's) she could tell that her husband and Obregón were arguing heatedly. They strode up and down, and she could see Villa was very angry. Then she learned that the house was surrounded by dorados. The meal was announced, and Obregón and his people joined them, with the Villas at the head of the table, and Obregón, joking as if nothing had happened, next to Villa.

After the meal she followed her husband. Several persons were standing in the hall, among them General Angeles, who said to her, "Señora, General Villa is going to shoot General Obregón, and nobody wants it to happen; see what you can do for him." She understood the difficulty facing her, but approached Villa, and asked why the house was surrounded and the band, which was scheduled to play, was gone. Villa replied that he had had enough of Obregón's dirty tricks in Sonora, and was going to have him shot. She reminded him that if he had Obregón shot, the foreign press would say "Francisco Villa ordered his friend, companion, and guest, shot, and you know hospitality is everywhere sacred." Villa did not answer, but after a short rest, he sent the guards away and ordered Obregón's train prepared for departure.

General Juan Cabral had left Mexico City on September 12, and his arrival in Sonora went virtually unnoticed in diplomatic circles because Obregón and Villa were meeting again. Cabral met with Maytorena, who refused to yield the governorship on the grounds that he had been put in office by the people, and only they could remove him.<sup>98</sup> When Villa's telegram ordering Hill to move to Chihuahua arrived, Cabral assured a doubting Carothers in El Paso that the orders were authentic.<sup>99</sup> He had no doubt about their authenticity, because his orders, under the third agreement, included the removal of Calles' former command from the state.<sup>100</sup> Hill consulted Carranza about Obregón's orders and the First Chief approved his refusing to obey them. He also instructed Hill to use all necessary means to force Maytorena to submit, and to tell Cabral to return to Mexico City immediately.<sup>101</sup>

Several eyewitnesses to the scene between Villa and Obregón had gone to El Paso the following day and reported that Villa was holding Obregón as a hostage for events in

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<sup>98</sup>Alfonso Taracena, La Verdadera Revolución Mexicana; tercera etapa (1914-1915) (México, D.F., 1960), 26.

<sup>99</sup>G. C. Carothers to SecSt, Sept. 19, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13228.

<sup>100</sup>Cabral so informed the consular agent in Cananea. Simpich to SecSt, Sept. 20, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13131. Cabral apparently had not been informed of Obregón's message to Hill.

<sup>101</sup>Simpich to SecSt, Sept. 22, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13249.

Sonora;<sup>102</sup> the same announcement was made in Mexico City.<sup>103</sup> The statements were not true, except for those anguished hours on September 17. Obregón remained to try to persuade Villa to send representatives to the junta convoked by Carranza.<sup>104</sup> Consul Carothers also urged Villa to attend, and Villa told his agent that the Northern Division would be present at the convention, provided elections would be convoked immediately and that the convention was short.<sup>105</sup> It was not until September 21, however, that Villa and his generals reached a decision: Villa would remain in Chihuahua while all his generals went to Mexico City, with Generals Eugenio Aguirre Benavides and José Isabel Robles accompanying Obregón when he returned that night.<sup>106</sup>

Obregón's return trip to Mexico City developed the drama and suspense of a modern cops-and-robbers chase. When his train stopped at a small station a telegram reached the villista Generals, telling them to return with Obregón. Aguirre and Robles offered to do as Obregón wished, either to return or to go on. All three men were certain of the

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<sup>102</sup>Aguirre Benavides, Memorias de un revolucionario, 168.

<sup>103</sup>Silliman to SecSt, Sept. 21, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13243.

<sup>104</sup>Villa had demurred, believing that Carranza would not permit an honest convention. The First Chief had invited the governors and generals, who all owed allegiance to him, instead of the field generals; Villa considered it a ruse to delay calling elections. Carothers to SecSt, Sept. 19, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13227.

<sup>105</sup>Carothers to SecSt, Sept. 19, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13227.

<sup>106</sup>Carothers to SecSt, Sept. 22, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13247.

fate which awaited Obregón if he returned, but he understood their delicate position and chose to turn back. He begged only that if he were executed, they would see that it be done without humiliation. The villistas so promised, and also pledged that if Obregón were killed, they would be the first to rebel against Villa.<sup>107</sup>

The train arrived in Chihuahua early in the morning of September 23; at Villa's home Obregón found the General furious, not with him but with Carranza. Villa's anger was caused by two telegrams sent by Carranza the day before to the commanders at Zacatecas and Monterrey ordering them to destroy the railroad that joined the two towns to Torreón, and to battle Villa's forces if they advanced. The telegram had been forwarded to Villa by the telegraphers. When Villa had asked Carranza for an explanation, the First Chief replied that he had no explanation to give him; that in place of asking him for an explanation, Villa should explain his actions toward Obregón.<sup>108</sup> Villa showed Obregón Carranza's reply, which excoriated him for holding him prisoner, and

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<sup>107</sup>Obregón, Ocho mil kilómetros, 206-207.

<sup>108</sup>Cervantes, Francisco Villa, 258. General Pánfilo Natera, who had orders to remove track between Tórréon and Zacatecas, also questioned Carranza on September 22 about his reasons for considering Villa's forces as enemies. In reply, Carranza listed the charges against Villa, including that of fomenting Maytorena's rebellion in Sonora and threatening to send troops if the loyal troops attacked the Governor. Natera pointed out that the next train on the tracks would be the one carrying the delegation to the convention, and Carranza permitted it to pass. The exchange of telegrams is reproduced in Cervantes, 259-260.

then showed him the message which he had sent to Carranza withdrawing his recognition. It stated simply:

In answer to your message, I state that General Obregón and other Generals from this Division left last night for that Capital, with the object of discussing important points relative to the general situation of the Republic; but in view of your proceedings...I have ordered that they suspend his trip and detain him in Torreón. In consequence I notify you that this Division will not attend the Convention which you have convoked, and immediately declares your non-recognition as First Chief.<sup>109</sup>

That day, death was very close to Obregón as Villa's men tried to influence him for or against the execution. Villa ordered Robles and Aguirre Benevides to leave for Mexico City again, but they refused to go until they received assurances that Obregón would not be killed. Villa acceded to their demand, and they departed; Obregón was permitted to leave later that evening. An hour after he left, Villa ordered his cohort, Rodolfo Fierro, and an escort to follow by special train to kill Obregón, but the impossible happened: Fierro told Villa that Obregón ought not be killed. Villa still was not dissuaded from his efforts, and the next morning telegraphed another General to kill Obregón and his staff when they arrived at Torreón. Luis Aguirre Benevides learned of Villa's last

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<sup>109</sup>Cervantes, Francisco Villa, 260-261 reproduces the telegram as does Obregón, Ocho mil kilómetros, 208. Obregón does not mention the reasons for Villa's anger. Cervantes (261-265) also reproduces Villa's long public manifesto listing his charges against Carranza.

orders and pleaded with him to retract them; Villa finally agreed and countermanded the order. Later they learned Obregón had gone through Torreón before either of Villa's orders had been received.<sup>110</sup>

Obregón returned to Zacatecas to persuade the generals of the Northern Division to attend the convention, and also with a non-publicized motive; from his discussions with villista officers, Obregón was certain he could persuade some of them to desert Villa. The city began to fill with Villa's troops while Obregón was there, and he withdrew to Aguascalientes, leaving the other commissioners to complete the parleys. The villista generals were afraid to attend the convention in Mexico City, so the commission agreed to move it to Aguascalientes, between the Carranza-Villa territories, on October 10, where it would be attended by all constitucionalista generals who could come. The accord signed by the two factions also called for the suspension of hostilities and troop movements.<sup>111</sup>

Cabral's mission to Sonora had proven fruitless. Villa had dispatched troops toward Sonora during his fury at Obregón,<sup>112</sup> but they were recalled when he announced his

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<sup>110</sup>Aguirre Benavides, Memorias de un revolucionario, 170-171. Aguirre had informed Obregón before he left that he and his brother, General Eugenio Aguirre Benavides, would desert Villa as soon as their families were safely out of Chihuahua. Obregón, Ocho mil kilómetros, 208-209. Obregón's version (210-214) of what had happened is much more complex.

<sup>111</sup>Obregón, Ocho mil kilómetros, 216-217.

<sup>112</sup>Canova to SecSt, Sept. 23, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13272.

break with Carranza.<sup>113</sup> The two armies in Sonora clashed at Santa Cruz on September 25<sup>114</sup> and Hill pulled his troops back from Cananea a few days later to entrench near Naco.<sup>115</sup> Cabral returned to Mexico City.<sup>116</sup>

The civilian population of Naco, Sonora, crossed the border to Naco, Arizona, as the skirmishing began on October 1.<sup>117</sup> Hill's men were protected by a semi-circular trench about eight hundred yards from the border, and Maytorena's men occupied the hills around that. Maytorena asked Hill to surrender on October 2; when he refused, sporadic long-distance firing, generally light and badly aimed, continued, although no serious effort to advance was made. Both troops were well supplied with ammunition.<sup>118</sup> Finally, the Governor's

<sup>113</sup> Bliss to Agwar, Sept. 25, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13346.

<sup>114</sup> Simpich to SecSt, Sept. 25, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13288.

<sup>115</sup> Simpich to SecSt, Sept. 28, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13318. The whereabouts of Calles during this period is something of a mystery. He left with Villa and Obregón and went on with Obregón to Mexico City, where he attended a dinner with Carranza at the Military Casino on September 13, just prior to Obregón's second trip to Chihuahua. Taracena, Tercera etapa, 23. When he returned to Naco is unknown; on September 28 he took money out to Hill's troops. Simpich to SecSt, Sept. 28, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13318.

<sup>116</sup> Border Report, Sept. 26, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13400.

<sup>117</sup> Simpich to SecSt, Oct. 1, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13352.

<sup>118</sup> On the night of October 3, Hill's men spent the night in the trenches after Hill heard that Maytorena's men were only three hundred yards away; Maytorena's men had returned to their camp at ten o'clock. Border Reports, Oct. 10 & 3, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13545 & 13462.

troops<sup>119</sup> launched a heavy assault at midnight of October 10 and 11, which broke Hill's lines and could have succeeded had it been pushed.<sup>120</sup>

Maytorena had ignored the call for the cessation of hostilities issued by the generals in Zacatecas, and the Convention meeting at Aguascalientes decided to order an end to the fighting and the release of political prisoners.<sup>121</sup> Hill notified the Convention he was unable to release his political prisoners because they were wanted by the civil courts on other charges.<sup>122</sup> Maytorena's agent received the telegraphed order on October 16, but had not delivered it to the Governor<sup>123</sup> before the latter began another fierce assault on Naco.<sup>124</sup> The assault was repelled and fighting continued.

The Convention sent General Ramón V. Sosa to investigate the disobedience on the northern border<sup>125</sup> and ordered Maytorena to stop fighting again.<sup>126</sup> Sosa arrived in Naco

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<sup>119</sup>Maytorena's troops were referred to as Yaquis, but only about eight hundred of his men were Indians. Border Report, Oct. 1, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13462.

<sup>120</sup>Border Report, Oct. 17, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13586.

<sup>121</sup>Cobb to SecSt, Oct. 16, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13521.

<sup>122</sup>Cobb to SecSt, Oct. 19, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13549.

<sup>123</sup>Bliss to Agwar, Oct. 17, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13533.

<sup>124</sup>Bliss to Agwar, Oct. 17, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13544. The assault began at 12:08 a.m. of October 17; General Tasker Bliss reported the message had not been delivered twenty-seven hours later. Bliss to Agwar, Oct. 17, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13533.

<sup>125</sup>Cobb to SecSt, Oct. 21, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13548.

<sup>126</sup>Cobb to SecSt, Oct. 19, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13549.



on October 21 and was given facilities to visit the combatants. He met first with Maytorena and obtained a promise to withdraw a few miles; then he prepared to talk to Hill to arrange a cease-fire, assuming the Convention would resolve the issues in Sonora, since Carranza supposedly was adhering to the Convention.<sup>127</sup> But even as Sosa sought a truce, Carranza was denouncing the Convention and demanding obedience from the governors and generals;<sup>127</sup> nonetheless, there was a cease-fire effective on October 23. Maytorena began a reluctant evacuation to await resolution by the Convention.<sup>129</sup>

In Hermosillo, General Alvarado and his staff were released from prison, taken to Nogales and deported<sup>130</sup> as part of the cease-fire agreement. Hill took advantage of the truce and began exploding his mines around Naco in preparation for leaving. It was generally agreed that he would fall back to Agua Prieta,<sup>131</sup> where a small force of Yaquis had been annoying the three-hundred-man garrison for several weeks.<sup>132</sup> Maytorena had received reinforcements just as the truce was arranged,<sup>133</sup> and the first week in November

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<sup>127</sup>Bliss to Agwar, Oct. 22, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13575.

<sup>128</sup>Cobb to SecSt, Oct. 23, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13580.

<sup>129</sup>Bliss to Agwar, Oct. 23, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13588.

<sup>130</sup>Border Report, Oct. 24, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13653.

<sup>131</sup>Bliss to Agwar, Oct. 27, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13612.

<sup>132</sup>Border Report, Oct. 17, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13586.

<sup>133</sup>Border Report, Oct. 24, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13653.

he began moving his troops back south of Naco.<sup>134</sup> On November 8 he notified the commander in Naco, Arizona, that he was reoccupying his old positions and that he would try to keep projectiles from crossing the border,<sup>135</sup> but the attack did not begin until November 12. Disultory firing continued through November 17, and the following day a massive attack was launched, with no advantage gained.<sup>136</sup> The siege continued until December 19, when Maytorena, under pressure from the United States because of deaths in Naco, Arizona, and from the President of the Convention government, agreed to withdraw once again.<sup>137</sup>

The United States Department of State had been bringing pressure to bear on the Convention's president, General Eulalio Gutiérrez, now installed as president of the Republic in Mexico City, as well as on Carranza, who had fled with his government to Veracruz, in an effort to end the hostilities in Naco that threatened American lives. Gutiérrez contacted Maytorena to ask him to prevent bullets from entering the United States or to suspend his attacks on Naco, but Maytorena did not respond. Carranza, in his reply of December 12, blamed Maytorena for any American lives lost

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<sup>134</sup>Simpich to SecSt, Nov. 5, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13691.

<sup>135</sup>J. M. Maytorena to Colonel Hatfield, Nov. 8, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13811.

<sup>136</sup>Border Report, Nov. 21, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13953.

<sup>137</sup>Silliman to SecSt, Dec. 19, 1914, USDS, 812.00/14050; Carothers to SecSt, Dec. 19, 1914, USDS, 812.00/14044.

since the border was behind Hill's forces, and also declared that efforts made by the United States which involved the use of force would be considered as hostile acts.<sup>138</sup>

Having failed to achieve the desired result Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan sent George C. Carothers to talk with Maytorena. Maytorena and Carothers conferred at Maytorena's camp, near Naco, on December 18. Carothers reported that Maytorena was anxious to avoid a clash and willing to withdraw, but protested against Hill enjoying the advantage of a port through which he could receive supplies and reinforcements. If the port were closed, Hill would be forced to fight or surrender. Carothers advised such a move, and General Tasker H. Bliss, the commander of the United States Army's Southern Department, who was in Naco, Arizona, concurred. After their meeting Maytorena gave the command for his forces to stop firing on Hill's positions.<sup>139</sup>

Maytorena's withdrawal failed to stop the fighting, as his troops reportedly disobeyed his orders and attacked on their own, at Naco as well as in the outlying districts.<sup>140</sup> Knowing that the truce was being violated continually, the State Department summoned help from the United States Army. General Hugh Scott, a friend and admirer of Villa's and,

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<sup>138</sup>Robert E. Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 1914-1915: The Convention of Aguascalientes (Bloomington, 1960), 159-160.

<sup>139</sup>Carothers to SecSt, Dec. 19, 1914, USDS, 812.00/14044.

<sup>140</sup>Simpich to SecSt, Dec. 21, 1914, USDS, 812.00/14078.

until November, commander of the Southern Department, was sent to Naco to arrange a peace. Scott arrived on December 20 and asked Maytorena, Hill, and Roberto V. Pesqueira, representing Carranza, to meet with him in Naco, Arizona. Together with General Bliss, Scott drew up a proposed cease-fire agreement for Hill and Maytorena which would be secret until both signed. Pesqueira, Hill, and Calles, who was also present, signed on December 23, but Maytorena pleaded illness and asked for a postponement of the conference. The unusually wet December weather also slowed his arrival, but when he did arrive, he stated he had no power to sign. He would sign, however, if he received orders from Villa to do so. Scott reported his problem to Bryan, and Bryan asked the Brazilian minister in Mexico City to urge Villa and Gutierrez to instruct Maytorena to sign.<sup>141</sup>

The agreement awaiting Maytorena's signature had five principal points.

1. Hill was to evacuate Naco, Sonora.
2. Both sides promised not to occupy Naco in any form.
3. Naco was to be neutral and closed to traffic and commerce until a constitutional government was recognized by the United States.
4. The occupation of the present forces in Agua Prieta and Nogales was to be respected--that is, they would not be attacked--to prevent damages to United States territory and to avoid international complications.

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<sup>141</sup>Bryan to Cardoso de Oliveira, Dec. 26, 1914, USDS, 812.00/14086a.

5. Maytorena's troops were to retire to Cananea or Nogales and not molest Hill's troops as they evacuated Naco and moved to Agua Prieta, and vice versa.<sup>142</sup>

Scott had sent to Mexico City to obtain Villa's consent to the pact. In Villa's replies of December 31, he recognized United States rights to defend the lives and interests of the people of Naco, Arizona, but he opposed any agreement which would prolong the situation in Sonora. He preferred to use arms and had mobilized 8,000 men under General Juan G. Cabral, who had elected to support the Convention, to proceed to Naco. Scott promptly notified Villa that an attack was not permissible. The Department of State requested the British Minister in Mexico City to bring Villa's intentions to the attention of President Gutiérrez.<sup>143</sup>

Maytorena still had not signed the agreement on January 1, and Hill could not move his troops peacefully while the Governor's troops sat outside Naco. Scott was fuming because more bullets had entered Naco, Arizona, and because the Yaquis had chased Hill's men into American territory and then fired on American troops. Scott said that if he did not receive an answer on January 1, he would tell the United States government that the Governor did not

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<sup>142</sup>Ibid.; Breckenridge to SecSt, Dec. 26, 1914, USDS, 812.00/14100.

<sup>143</sup>SecSt, Acting, to Cardoso de Oliveira, Jan. 2, 1915, USDS, 812.00/14143a; Scott to SecWar, Jan. 1, 1915, USDS, 812.00/14164.

want an agreement. Gutiérrez ordered Maytorena not to attack and to withdraw from the border on January 4, but got no response from the Governor.<sup>144</sup> Scott's disgust did not prevent his acting on a suggestion by President Wilson that he arrange an interview with Villa.<sup>145</sup> Villa came to El Paso to meet Scott on January 8, and agreed to order Maytorena to sign the agreement that Gutiérrez had approved.<sup>146</sup>

On January 10, General Hill arrived in Douglas, went to Agua Prieta, then returned to Douglas where he caught an east-bound train that evening.<sup>147</sup> For eleven days there were no reports of his whereabouts, until the United States consul at Veracruz reported his arrival there on January 21.<sup>148</sup> Carranza had secretly ordered Hill to join Obregón's army; news of his reassignment was not announced until he was safely in Veracruz in order to prevent assassination attempts by villistas as he traveled near territory held by them. His recall left Calles once more in command of the constitucionalista forces on the border. Scott returned to Naco, and on January 11, Calles and Maytorena signed the agreement, with Calles'

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<sup>144</sup>Scott to SecWar, Jan. 1, 1915, USDS, 812.00/14164.

<sup>145</sup>SecSt to SecWar, Jan. 7, 1915, USDS, 812.00/14185a.

<sup>146</sup>Carothers to SecSt, Jan. 8 & 9, 1915, USDS, 812.00/14190 & 14176.

<sup>147</sup>Border Report, Jan. 16, 1915, USDS, 812.00/14278.

<sup>148</sup>Canada to SecSt, Jan. 21, 1915, USDS, 812.00/14258.

name replacing that of Hill in the terms.<sup>149</sup>

The troops Villa had told Scott he would send began to leave Casas Grandes on January 18 to make the difficult trek into Sonora,<sup>150</sup> but General Cabral, who was to assume the command of all Convention and allied forces in Sonora, arrived in Nogales on January 15 to confer with Maytorena.<sup>151</sup> Maytorena did not accept Villa's proposal for Cabral to take command of his troops, and Cabral went to Cananea on January 21 to seek enlistments.<sup>152</sup> There his inducements for recruits

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<sup>149</sup>USDS, 812.00/14162 contains a copy of the agreement, which is also reproduced in Obregón, Ocho mil kilómetros, 266-267. Obregón does not mention the American role in the negotiations. A sixth article stated that Maytorena's troops at Agua Prieta would retire to Fronteras, leaving the route from the west clear, until Calles' troops had arrived in Agua Prieta. Quirk (The Mexican Revolution, 163-164) reports an interesting scheme to buy off the soldiers in Agua Prieta, using money loaned by a Tucson bank. Although the Department of State would not support the nefarious plan, reports on the desertions from the Agua Prieta garrison because of lack of pay--the men were supposed to be paid daily--suggest that it might have succeeded. More men would have left if there had been any work available. Border Reports, Jan. 2, 16, 23, 1915, USDS, 812.00/14197, 14278 & 14319.

<sup>150</sup>The first of Cabral's troops reached Colonia Morelos and Colonia Oaxaca on January 24 under the command of General Sosa. Seven to eight hundred women and children accompanied the army on its march; eleven persons and hundreds of horses froze to death in the mountain crossing. Supplies were unavailable in the areas through which they passed. In western Chihuahua food was so scarce that the women and children slipped in at night, after the horses had their nightly corn ration, to grab the corn from the ground, so a constant guard had to be maintained over the horses. Border Report, Feb. 27, 1915, USDS, 812.00/14562; Simpich to SecSt, Mar. 8, 1915, USDS, 812.00/14579. Quirk, (The Mexican Revolution, 165) said the troops were recalled by Villa from Casas Grandes and never went west.

<sup>151</sup>Simpich to SecSt, Jan. 15, 1915, USDS, 812.00/14213.

<sup>152</sup>Simpich to SecSt, Jan. 20, 1915, USDS, 812.00/14246.

aroused the jealousy and suspicions of the now Generals Acosta and Urbalejo and of the Cananea prefect, who planned to arrest him.

Cabral and his officers fled on horseback for Douglas on February 4.<sup>153</sup> He crossed the border to attend a meeting with Maytorena and his generals in Nogales on February 19,<sup>154</sup> but Maytorena did not utilize his services, which caused much dissatisfaction among his former troops,<sup>155</sup> and four hundred of Cabral's command deserted to join Calles.<sup>156</sup> Cabral returned to the United States, declaring his determination to remain neutral.<sup>157</sup>

The Naco truce was quickly broken by Maytorena. On February 1 he appointed a customs collector for the town, and reopened the port. There were no soldiers occupying the town, only civil authorities.<sup>158</sup> There were immediate complaints to the State Department by the carrancista representative, but the United States made no move to remove them.<sup>159</sup> It quickly became evident that a small force of

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<sup>153</sup>Border Report, Feb. 6, 1915, USDS, 812.00/14396; Montague to Simpich, Feb. 4, 1915, USDS, 812.00/14398, enclosure.

<sup>154</sup>Border Report, Feb. 20, 1915, USDS, 812.00/14470.

<sup>155</sup>Border Report, Feb. 27, 1915, USDS, 812.00/14526.

<sup>156</sup>Obregón, Ocho mil kilómetros, 297; Border Report, Jan. 30, 1915, USDS, 812.00/14366.

<sup>157</sup>Obregón, Ocho mil kilómetros, 297.

<sup>158</sup>Simpich to SecSt, Feb. 1, 1915, USDS, 812.00/14324.

<sup>159</sup>E. Arredondo to SecSt, Feb. 1 & 5, 1915, USDS, 812.00/14331 & 14351.



plain-clothes troops was occupying Naco; the customs collector had fifty-two aides, a number out of all proportion to the business done in the port.<sup>160</sup>

It had been understood that the truce applied to all Sonoran towns on the international boundary which had neighbors immediately across the boundary in the United States, but in no way did it affect the campaign away from the border. The border towns did remain quiet for several months, but the military campaign in the rest of the northeastern sector took on all the aspects of a game of musical chairs. There were numerous forays by constitucionalista troops from the protection of Agua Prieta; at times they gained a town, but usually they retreated from the same town in a few days. Cananea, especially, suffered from the entrances and exits of the maytorenistas and the constitucionalistas, with few casualties on either side.

Until the last three months of 1915 all of the maneuvering, the relatively few skirmishes, the factional disputes, and desertions did not significantly alter conditions in the northeast. Calles did make a promising move in July; on the evening of July 17 he led secretly from Agua Prieta three thousand men who rapidly racked up a series of victories. On July 18, Calles defeated Acosta at Anaváachi

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<sup>160</sup>Border Report, Feb. 20, 1915, USDS, 812.00/14470.

Pass.<sup>161</sup> On July 19, after one hour's fighting, two hundred of his men defeated the forty customs guards and assorted other officials in Naco. On July 20, he entered Cananea unopposed, and Maytorena's forces fled in disorder back to Nogales.<sup>162</sup> Calles then moved his troops west along the Cananea-Nogales railroad to Santa Barbara, eighteen miles east of Nogales. The constitucionalistas unexpectedly attacked the Nogales outposts on August 4 in a brief battle,<sup>163</sup> and then began what appeared to be a seige of Nogales, except that the road to Hermosillo was not closed and Maytorena's troops in the south could be called in.<sup>164</sup>

Calles' troops sat along the railroad until September 18, when Maytorena's advance units began an assault.<sup>165</sup> After three days of fighting the constitucionalistas withdrew

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<sup>161</sup>An American eyewitness stated that Maytorena's defeats at the beginning of this offensive were due to a strike by his soldiers for their pay due and for payment in gold. They refused to fight, threw down their arms and ran from the battlefield, creating a rout, which did not end until they were fed, clothed and paid in Nogales. Border Report, Sept. 18, 1915, USDS, 812.00/16319.

<sup>162</sup>Border Report, July 24, 1915, USDS, 812.00/15632.

<sup>163</sup>Border Report, Aug. 7, 1915, USDS, 812.00/15812.

<sup>164</sup>Border Report, Aug. 14, 1915, USDS, 812.00/15908. Obregón did not mention this move of Calles' at all, so it is unknown whether it was made under his orders; nor did Calles ever state his reason. It did fulfill one of Obregón's aims: to get Maytorena to withdraw his troops from the Yaqui River Valley.

<sup>165</sup>Funston to Adj. Gen., Sept. 19, 1915, USDS, 812.00/16235.

from all positions with heavy casualties.<sup>166</sup>

As Calles retreated to Agua Prieta, drawing his garrisons, except Naco, in after him,<sup>167</sup> word arrived that Villa's army was entraining for Casas Grandes and a march to Sonora.<sup>168</sup> Calles announced in a call for volunteers to fight Villa on September 24, that he had withdrawn from attacking Nogales because of the villista advance, "notwithstanding the fact that he has had victories over the traitors at Cabullona, Aniváachi, Naco, Villaverde, Cananea, Paredes and El Altar."<sup>169</sup> His leaving for that reason was slightly premature.

After the battle near Nogales, the city officials of Cananea, who were Calles appointees, fled. One of Maytorena's commanders telephoned to ask for all callistas to leave town, but they refused. The maytorenistas, or bandits, as one report said, entered the town firing (although no one was hurt), found a liquor supply, and all got drunk. The callistas slipped out of Cananea on the morning of September 23,

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<sup>166</sup>Funston to Adj. Gen., Sept. 20, 1915, USDS, 812.00/16236; Simpich to SecSt, Sept. 20, 1915, USDS, 812.00/16282; also USDS, 812.00/16277 & 16278.

<sup>167</sup>Simpich to SecSt, Sept. 28, 1915, USDS, 812.00/16371.

<sup>168</sup>Cobb to SecSt, Sept. 27, 1915, 812.00/16314. By this time Villa had been decisively defeated at Celaya by Obregón and had retreated back through Chihuahua to Ciudad Juárez, thence southwestwardly to Casas Grandes, the closest railroad point to Púlpito Canyon.

<sup>169</sup>Copy of manifesto, AGES, 3046.

but then, at noon, a train arrived from Calles' camp with four hundred infantry, followed shortly by two hundred cavalry. They also entered shooting, but the maytorenistas left unhurt. The American consular agent, Charles L. Montague, asked the commander if they were going to garrison the town; the commander did not know, but told Montague that they had killed thirty of the enemy. Montague investigated the deaths, and found they were thirty citizens killed in cold blood, some with three or four soft-nosed bullets through the head to preclude recognition. Several were members of the police force who had been selected by the Chamber of Commerce and one of the local revolutionary societies in July, when Calles had occupied the town before; the men were selected with the idea that they would be apolitical and take no part in the Calles-Maytorena war. When the Calles officials left on September 22 they told the police to protect the town; an impossible task with their numbers. The commander told Montague they were killed because they had not done so.<sup>170</sup>

The depredations of the Yaquis in south and central

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<sup>170</sup>Montague noted that such conduct had caused him to lose all respect for Calles; other carrancistas were of the same caliber, he said, no better than the villistas, and "if they are given recognition and assistance in controlling Mexico, they will continue the practice of murdering those against whom they may have a grievance." Montague to Simpich, Sept. 24, 1915, USDS, 812.00/16375. This is not the first consular report on callista atrocities during the northeastern campaign. Reports of the murders of wounded and the executions of officers and prisoners usually accompanied callista victories, in accord with Carranza's dictates that the Juarez decree of January 25, 1862 be enforced.

Sonora, together with the extraordinary demands of war for manpower, foodstuffs and livestock, combined with another factor, the weather, in late 1914 to bring the state face to face with the spectre of famine. The winter of 1914-1915 was exceptionally bad. The extremely heavy rains which had delayed Maytorena's arrival at the Naco truce talks had blanketed Sonora, causing floods that destroyed valuable agricultural lands in the valleys and rail communications over the entire state. Consular agent Montague reported from Cananea in February, 1915 that they had had so much heavy rain and snow in the last two months that the wagon roads were almost impassable, and the open country was so soggy that the cowboys' horses bogged down in the mud.<sup>171</sup>

As a result of the weather and the war, by February of

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<sup>171</sup>Montague to Simpich, Feb. 3, 1915, USDS, 812.00/14398. In Hermosillo, the clouds began to cover the sky between nine and ten o'clock on the night of December 10, 1914; after ten o'clock, a soft rain began that lasted fifteen days without stopping. After three days of rain, water began to arrive from upriver; on the fifth day the wide shallow riverbed was covered, and on the sixth day the water filled the banks. By the tenth day the waters were carrying heavy trees, crosses and coffins from the cemeteries along its banks, and hundreds of acres of farm lands were eroded away. An iron bridge which joined Villa de Seris to Hermosillo acted as a dam as debris piled up against it, diverting the water around it to flood the towns. Three feet of water filled on church near the river, and dozens of adobe houses sagged into mud heaps. Together with the rain was a penetrating cold; a shortage of firewood led to the destruction for burning of wooden architectural features. The iron bridge finally gave; its destruction saved Hermosillo. The metal span swung downstream against the Hermosillo side, diverting the waters to the farm land across the river. On Christmas Eve, the city was beginning to feel panic, but the traditional Christmas posadas began. Before midnight, the rain ended and within minutes the stars had appeared. Galaz, Desde el cerro, I, 60-62.

1915 food shortages began to plague the state. With the mines closed, men were without work, capital fled, and no jobs were available.<sup>172</sup> Maytorena had issued paper money under his Executive Decree Thirteen of August 27, 1913<sup>173</sup> which was easily counterfeited and quickly lost value, as did the villista paper introduced after Villa's break with Carranza. Wages continued to be paid at face value, but prices were based on the gold value, so that a workman making two to three pesos, paper, per day, had to pay thirty-five pesos, paper, for a pair of shoes in Nogales in February 1915.<sup>174</sup> Food, naturally scarcer in the winter, also commanded high prices. Montague reported that the merchants in Cananea feared looting if the poor were not given relief soon. Meat was distributed but there was a need for the other staples: beans, corn, flour and lard. Consul Simpich reported in March that the food scarcity was serious in Nogales, although there was no starvation yet, but driving Maytorena out would not materially improve the state's ills. Funds were needed to rehabilitate farms, import merchandise, to settle debts and to reopen industry. The people needed food, clothing, farm equipment and animals, not manifestos, generals and arms. Sosa's hungry band which had crossed the mountains

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<sup>172</sup>Border Report, Oct. 30, 1915, USDS, 812.00/16752.

<sup>173</sup>Executive Decree 13 is mentioned in an announcement of a new issue of paper money made on March 10, 1915, AGES, 3024.

<sup>174</sup>Simpich to SecSt, Feb. 9, 1915, USDS, 812.00/14398.

from Chihuahua to join Maytorena had had plenty of paper money, but there was no food to buy. When Sosa arrived in Cananea, he distributed three thousand pesos among the poor in Cananea, but there was little food for sale.<sup>175</sup> Yaquis deserting Maytorena sought food in Cananea where none was to be found; the Indians reportedly were digging roots to survive. Only a few lean bulls were to be found on the ranges between Cananea and Naco.<sup>176</sup>

Nacozari also felt shortages with the stoppage of rail traffic, not only in fuels and dynamite for the mines but in imported flour and corn.<sup>177</sup> A Guaymas mob demanding food began a riot on March 19, which ended in looting. It began at three in the afternoon with women in a Guaymas suburb looting Chinese stores; they then marched into Guaymas, collecting more women along the way, and demanded food at the municipal city hall. The prefect suggested that they get it at the stores and made no effort to disperse the crowd, which grew as it moved up the main street. Near the market the crowd broke down the doors of a Chinese store; it was sacked and all furnishings destroyed. During the night seventeen Chinese stores were looted, although little food was taken. Much of the loot was recovered, but the soldiers who arrived to

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<sup>175</sup>Montague to Simpich, Feb. 3, 1915, USDS, 812.00/14398, enclosure.

<sup>176</sup>Simpich to SecSt, Mar. 8, 1915, USDS, 812.00/14579.

<sup>177</sup>Border Report, March 13, 1915, USDS, 812.00/14659.

police the town feared a mutiny if they did anything that might offend the looters. Quiet was restored on March 21, and the merchants donated food to the government to distribute in small amounts.<sup>178</sup>

In March and April, 1915, Consul Simpich traveled through the accessible parts of Sonora to report on the conditions in the state.<sup>179</sup> Hunger, he noted, was more prevalent in Cananea than elsewhere, due to the unique status of the town. The 4C's, the largest employer in town, had been shut down since the summer of 1914, and the employees who remained in the town had no work, no funds, and no place to go. Thousands of persons there had a bare existence; the men tried placer gold mining, hunted, hauled wood or joined the armies. The families suffered, the women more so than the men. The primary cause for the suffering was the closing of the mines; secondarily, the military commandeering and confiscation of supplies. Cananea, which imported all of its food and supplies for the mines, had been cut off from all supplies in autumn, 1914, and train service in the spring of 1915 was still irregular, due to troop moves and washouts. The formerly large reserves of foodstuffs had been depleted by the military, and the merchants were no longer replenishing their stocks. Corn,

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<sup>178</sup>Ops. Report, USPF, to SecNavy, May 1, 1915, USDS, 812.00/15055.

<sup>179</sup>The following account is derived from his report to the Secretary of State, Apr. 6, 1915, USDS, 812.00/14863.



beans, rice and flour were in extremely short supply.

The area south of Nogales and Cananea toward Ures was also affected by troop moves, and the rains came before the crop was harvested. For three months unprecedented rain and melting snow washed away farms in the Sonora River Valley until some farmers had no land left. When communication by rail was good, food could be imported from the south, but with conflicting factions holding Sinaloa, export to Sonora had been prohibited.

The workstock had been confiscated, and the horses used by the army, once released, were unfit for work. There were many starving people in the area, and relief in the form of food was desperately needed. Money was no good, because there was no food to be bought, and there were no local relief societies. Prices were much higher than three years earlier and the acreage planted was down from the Spring of 1915. The harvest of the previous autumn, where it was made, was normal or above average, but all the produce had been consumed in maintaining armies.

Hunger was evident south of Hermosillo, but there was no starvation. The crop shortages there were due to floods and to fear of the Indians who had devastated the area. Many farms were abandoned and the families moved into towns. Merchants in Guaymas estimated that only ten percent of the normal wheat crop had been harvested, twenty-five percent of the garbanzo crop, and ten to twenty percent of the corn crop, but this was due more to floods than to war. The

amount of acreage planted had been below normal to begin with, only an estimated fifty to sixty percent of the usual sown, and the floods had left little.

Western Sonora had no real famine, but there was hunger. Meat was still plentiful and wheat harvesting, which had begun south of Hermosillo, promised relief. Nevertheless, by May the situation had not eased in Hermosillo, because confiscatory demands by the government discouraged merchants from restocking the farmers from milling.<sup>180</sup> Five to six hundred residents rioted on May 20 for food; they broke into and looted the stores of everything moveable. The city did nothing until the military interceded, and Maytorena sent troops from Torres to restore peace.<sup>181</sup>

The government did feed many persons, but it was not a systematic process and was attended by much abuse. The harvests were ample enough to furnish food to the city, but the farmers refused to bring it in for fear of Indians.<sup>182</sup> At the end of May, one of Maytorena's staff arrived at Cumpas to oversee the harvesting and grinding of the new wheat. A portion of the flour went to Hermosillo and the remainder was distributed among various commands.<sup>183</sup> The wheat was taken without the farmers consent, as was milled

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<sup>180</sup>Hostetter to SecSt, May 14, 1915, USDS, 812.00/15038.

<sup>181</sup>Border Report, May 22, 1915, USDS, 812.00/15105.

<sup>182</sup>Hostetter to SecSt, Aug. 3, 1915, USDS, 812.00/15698.

<sup>183</sup>Border Report, May 29, 1915, USDS, 812.00/15158.

flour from the mills.<sup>184</sup> The poor in Sonora were still hungry even when food became more plentiful. Large amounts of food sent to Hermosillo did not help the poor who had no money and no work. Women and children, whose men were in the army or had deserted them, felt the pinch most.<sup>185</sup>

Shortages in Cananea were relieved with the reopening of the railroad and by June, 1915 the mines began reopening as it appeared that fuel would again be available.<sup>186</sup> But the supply proved to be temporary and mines in Nacozari closed July 15 for lack of fuel.<sup>187</sup>

Three hundred of Maytorena's troops in Guaymas threatened to mutiny on May 11 because their pay was not high enough (1½ pesos per day) to purchase food at the prevailing prices. They demanded an increase in pay and a reasonable price ceiling for food from the prefect, the military commandant, and the merchants. The city authorities obtained corn and frijoles and turned them over to several storekeepers for sale at low prices, whereas all other merchants had to sell merchandize not furnished by the government at the same fixed prices.<sup>188</sup>

At the end of one year of fighting between the

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<sup>184</sup>Hostetter to SecSt, July 17, 1915, USDS, 812.00/15542.

<sup>185</sup>Border Report, June 26, 1915, USDS, 812.00/15448.

<sup>186</sup>Border Reports, June 12 and June 19, 1915, USDS, 812.00/15278 & 15333.

<sup>187</sup>Border Report, July 24, 1915, USDS, 812.00/15632.

<sup>188</sup>USS Raleigh to Comm. in Chief, USPF, May 15, 1915, USDS, 812.00/15204.

maytorenistas and the contitucionalistas the state lacked food and money, military discipline was lax, many towns were without civil or military officials, most towns were at the mercy of thieves and outlaws, and the Yaquis raided with impunity.<sup>189</sup> By the end of September, the public had additional cause for alarm. With the harvests just over, food was already scarce.<sup>190</sup>

With attention focused on the northeastern border towns, the rest of the state drifted and suffered from lack of attention. The Yaquis took advantage of this in their continuing effort to displace settlers from their lands. The maytorenistas had actively sought the support of the Yaqui troops, and an Indian contingent remained in Hermosillo after the move to the north. The Yaqui presence opened Pandora's box for the residents, who lived in constant fear of their insurgency. Such incidents as the two-hour war dance which the Indians held in the plaza on August 14, the constant debauchery and assaults on citizens, and the stories of atrocities committed by Yaqui soldiers did nothing to ease the city's state of mind.<sup>191</sup> Tensions did ease in late september with the departure of most of the Indian garrison for the Yaquis' traditional pilgrimage to Magdalena for the Feast

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<sup>189</sup>Simpich to SecSt, Sept. 20, 1915, USDS, 812.00/16284.

<sup>190</sup>Border Report, Sept. 25, 1915, USDS, 812.00/16397.

<sup>191</sup>Hostetter to SecSt, Aug. 15 & 20, Oct. 5, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13099, 13142 & 13478.

of St. Francis.<sup>192</sup>

The menace of the "bronco" Yaqui haunted most of central and southern Sonora. Indian depredations had increased in January, 1914, as the state government became too pre-occupied with its own survival to exercise effective controls. In central Sonora the Indians had terrorized the mining areas along the Yaqui River, and travelers venturing through that territory were sometimes robbed and killed. The state furnished ineffective escorts, but did nothing to stop the Indians.<sup>193</sup> Military posts set up between La Dura and La Colorado failed to stop the raids in the area.<sup>194</sup>

All reports from the region south of Hermosillo carried new stories of Yaqui raids and murders after August, 1914.<sup>195</sup> The prefects, in many cases, feared doing anything which would arouse the Indians, who were allowed to raid with impunity.<sup>196</sup> Maytorena occasionally promised action, as he did in response to the British consul's complaint about raids near Guaymas; but Consul Simpich in Nogales, who was more familiar with Maytorena's predicament than the centrally

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<sup>192</sup>Hostetter to SecSt, Oct. 4, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13477.

<sup>193</sup>T. T. Ansberry to C. P. Reiniger, Aug. 10, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13032.

<sup>194</sup>Hostetter to SecSt, July 30, 1914, USDS, 812.00/12748.

<sup>195</sup>Hostetter to SecSt, Sept. 29, 1914 to Jan. 6, 1915, USDS, 812.00/13401 to 14242; also USDS, 812.00/14110 & 14116.

<sup>196</sup>Hostetter to SecSt, Aug. 15, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13032.

located consuls, realistically doubted that Maytorena could act against the bronco Indians, even if he were so disposed. As he pointed out, Maytorena had no influence over that group of Yaquis and could not risk a military campaign. He did suggest that George Carothers could inform Villa of the Yaqui troubles, pointing out to him that more troops were needed in the south.<sup>197</sup> The Department of State instructed Carothers, who informed Villa, but there was no response from the latter.<sup>198</sup>

Early in January, 1915 Obregón had ordered General Ramón F. Iturbe in Sinaloa to enter Sonora from the south to open a second front. Military and political conditions in Tepic prevented Iturbe from sending his full force. Only a portion, dubbed the "Sinaloan Expeditionary Column," under General Angle Flores, could be utilized to capture Navojoa; another small contingent began a campaign in the extreme south of Sonora against the Mayos, who, like the Yaquis, were committing depredations.<sup>199</sup> After a minor battle to the south of Navojoa, Flores occupied that town on January 24, with no resistance; an attack by maytorenista forces in the area on February 15 was beaten off.

The maytorenistas from the north, under General Sosa, were readied for transfer to the south in late February,

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<sup>197</sup>Simpich to SecSt, Dec. 30, 1914, USDS, 812.00/14109.

<sup>198</sup>SecSt to Simpich, Dec. 31, 1914, USDS, 812.00/14109.

<sup>199</sup>Obregón, Ocho mil kilómetros, 253-254.

but could not be moved until the flood-destroyed railroad bridges had been repaired.<sup>200</sup>

Sosa arrived in Guaymas on March 28 with thirty-two car-loads of soldiers, women, children and horses. General Urbalejo followed with his Yaqui troops and remained in Guaymas until April 6.<sup>201</sup> In mid-April, Sosa invested Navojoa, trying to isolate the town so that Maytorena might control the lucrative garbanzo crop from the Mayo River Valley.<sup>202</sup> Their lack of success in causing the surrender of Flores caused the withdrawal of the maytorenistas in mid-June, and Flores moved out of Navojoa to occupy Álamos, Huatabampo, and gradually, the whole of the south.<sup>203</sup>

Maytorena's command was divided by factional quarrels and jealousies, by disputes over the division of funds and the lack of funds, and fear of the Yaquis; all of which had eroded the Governor's authority, making it impossible for him to receive prompt response to his orders. Since early in 1915, he had feared assassination; at one time he lived for weeks in two darkened rooms of the Nogales customs house, with guards at the doors and windows at all hours.<sup>204</sup>

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<sup>200</sup>Border Report, Feb. 27, 1915, USDS, 812.00/14526.

<sup>201</sup>Simpich to SecSt, Apr. 6, 1915, USDS, 812.00/14863.

<sup>202</sup>Maytorena had reportedly sold the crop already for \$50,000.00 gold. Border Report, May 1, 1915, USDS, 812.00/15012.

<sup>203</sup>Obregon, Ocho mil kilómetros, 478-479.

<sup>204</sup>Simpich to SecSt, Mar. 8, 1915, USDS, 812.00/14579.

He had already moved his furniture and all government records to Nogales, Arizona.<sup>205</sup>

His troops were demoralized; there were numerous desertions and he expected more Yaquis to desert to join their marauding kinsmen.<sup>206</sup> His lack of money cut his arms supply, with all shipments from the United States being cancelled.<sup>207</sup> There was discontent and quarrels among his officers, and his appointment of Urbalejo as Commander in Chief of his army caused even more dissatisfaction.<sup>208</sup>

By June, after Villa was defeated at Trinidad, it had become obvious that his reign in Chihuahua was ending; and while Calles sat outside Nogales in July, Villa's General Angeles, in disguise, paid a visit to Maytorena.<sup>209</sup> Purportedly, Angeles had come to relieve Maytorena for a vacation, with the General assuming the Governor's civil and military duties. Maytorena, however, apparently insisted on serving out his term, which ended September 1.<sup>210</sup>

Maytorena had been preparing for the end of his term

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<sup>205</sup>Border Report, May 1, 1915, USDS, 812.00/15012.

<sup>206</sup>Border Reports, May 13 & 15, USDS, 812.00/14659 & 15074.

<sup>207</sup>Border Report, May 8, 1915, USDS, 812.00/15029.

<sup>208</sup>Border Report, Aug. 14 & 21, 1915, USDS, 812.00/15908 & 15985.

<sup>209</sup>Dept. of Justice to Lansing, July 23, 1915, USDS, 812.00/15534.

<sup>210</sup>Funston to Agwar, Aug. 3, 1914, USDS, 812.00/15665. Actually, the reason for his visit remained a mystery. Border Report, Aug. 7, 1915, USDS, 812.00/15812.



by shipping and selling his horses and cattle and purchasing a house and ranch in Arizona. His final personal property was readied to enter the United States, and the Governor told his friends that the responsibilities and burdens had been undermining his health.<sup>211</sup>

On August 14, three officers attempted to assassinate the Governor; all confessed, were courtmartialled and shot. As he neared the end of his legal term, Maytorena announced that Villa had asked him to remain as the civil governor after the expiration of his term, and on August 31 agreed to remain.<sup>212</sup> But on September 25, amid Calles' withdrawal, Maytorena sought and received permission from the Department of State to attend the Pan-American Congress in Washington,<sup>213</sup> and he entered the United States with his staff on September 30, leaving his friend, Carlos Randall, as the acting governor.<sup>214</sup> With his departure, Maytorena's participation in the politics of Sonora and the Mexican revolution effectively ended.

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<sup>211</sup>Border Report, Aug. 14, 1915, USDS, 812.00/15908.

<sup>212</sup>Border Report, Aug. 28, 1915, USDS, 812.00/16054; Simpich to SecSt, Sept. 4, 1915, USDS, 812.00/16068; Border Report, Sept. 4, 1915, USDS, 812.00/16175.

<sup>213</sup>Simpich to SecSt, Sept. 30, 1915, USDS, 812.00/16337.

<sup>214</sup>Maytorena was arrested as soon as he entered the United States, but the Secretary of War ordered his release the same day. He and his staff went on to the Conference. Telegraphic exchange, Funston to Marsh, Oct. 1, 1915, USDS, 812.00/16355. After his return from Washington, Maytorena remained in southern Arizona for a while, then moved on to Los Angeles. There he was questioned by immigration officials, and he was barred from permanent residence in the United

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States because of an adulterous liaison with two Mexican women who he swore were not his mistresses. But he remained in the United States until the expulsion of Calles in 1935, and in 1938 Sonora invited him to return. He returned to Hermosillo and then to Guaymas, where he sought the release of his property which had been intervened after his exile began. President Cárdenas gave him the title of General of Division with a pension. Maytorena died in Mexico City on January 18, 1948.

**CHAPTER V**  
**THE CONSTITUCIONALISTAS TAKE**  
**CONTROL: 1915-1917**

Pancho Villa was on his way to Sonora. He had retreated from Torreon to Chihuahua before Obregón's advancing forces, destroying the railroad behind him. From Chihuahua he sent his troops on to Ciudad Juárez, and from there southwestward to Casas Grandes, the nearest rail point to Sonora. On September 30 his approximately 13,000 troops started to move out of Casas Grandes, with some 7000 headed southwest to Sinaloa and 6000 northwest to Púlpito Canyon.<sup>1</sup> He had requested permission from the United States to send his hospital trains to Nogales, Arizona, through the United States, but the permission had been denied.<sup>2</sup> His men moved into the Sierras as winter began to be felt; on this march Villa's trusted lieutenant, Rodolfo

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<sup>1</sup>Cobb to SecSt, Sept. 30, 1915, USDS, 812.00/26334.

<sup>2</sup>Funston to Adj. Gen., answer, Sept. 29, 1915; SecSt to Funston, Sept. 30, 1915, USDS 812.00/16330.

Fierro, drowned while attempting to cross a lake on horse-back.<sup>3</sup> Villa confirmed that he intended to attack Agua Prieta before he left Casas Grandes on October 9.<sup>4</sup>

Maytorena had left his government destitute. Carlos Randall complained that the ex-Governor had left him with only three hundred and fifty dollars in the treasury and only two clerks. Moreover, he thought that Maytorena's desertion had wrecked his own effectiveness, and that he would not be able to control the army. He hinted that he himself might resign.<sup>5</sup>

During the month following Maytorena's leaving, the military situation was altered very little along the northern border, but the southern situation changed rapidly. Obregón began preparations for the taking of Sonora by planning a two-front campaign. General Diéguez was to move from Manzanillo by sea to take Guaymas; Calles was to take the offensive against the enemy around Nogales and destroy the railroad there, to prevent the detachment of troops from Nogales for the south. To provide sufficient and quick transport from the south to utilize the element of surprise, Obregón hired four American-owned ships and added

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<sup>3</sup>Fierro's death is described in Cervantes, Francisco Villa, 525-528.

<sup>4</sup>Carothers to SecSt, Oct. 9, 1915, USDS, 812.00/16441.

<sup>5</sup>Funston to Adj. Gen., Oct. 1, 1915, USDS, 812.00/16355.

them to his small fleet. Diéguez embarked from Mazatlán on October 9, and three days later landed his men at Cruz de Piedra, across the bay from Guaymas; he then advanced overland to Empalme, which was taken after a brief battle. Guaymas fell the same day. The constitucionalista troops in Navojoa had already taken much of the south, and no easily gained control of Tórin, Corral and Lencho, all points along the railroad.

Diéguez awaited reinforcements before beginning a march on Hermosillo, although Obregón doubted that he would encounter much resistance there, since the maytorenistas were concentrated in Nogales.<sup>6</sup> Diéguez took Torres on October 31, capturing large amounts of supplies. General Flores had already joined him; the state south of Hermosillo was now in constitucionalista hands.<sup>7</sup> On November 6 Diéguez entered Hermosillo without opposition; again the maytorenistas had fled precipitously, abandoning<sup>8</sup> their stockpiles of supplies.

Although Villa and Maytorena allegedly were brothers in combat, Maytorena's Sonoran partisans were not too happy at the prospect of Villa in Sonora. There was much personal fear of him, aside from the fear that he would strip the

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<sup>6</sup>Obregón, Ocho mil kilómetros, 452.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., 456.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., 457.

state.<sup>9</sup>

Randall, in Nogales, yielded most of his civil role to the military as the ring began to tighten around him.<sup>10</sup> He seemed determined to undermine Maytorena's standing with Villa; he arrested and jailed four of Maytorena's adherents on conspiracy charges; supposedly, while drunk they talked of Maytorena's intent to repudiate the villistas and join Carranza. Rumors persisted that Randall wanted out, but Urbalejo, who appeared to be in charge, was an unknown factor.<sup>11</sup>

Obregón went to Nogales for confidential talks with Generals Urbalejo and Acosta on November 12,<sup>12</sup> and Villa arrived the same evening and conferred with Randall.<sup>13</sup> Francisco Serrano, of Obregón's staff, also came to Nogales to confer with Randall's agents, possibly about an amnesty.<sup>14</sup> Randall tried using threats against the United States to get the United States to cancel permission for Obregón's troop to travel through the United States; if it were not cancelled, he said, he would not guarantee American lives in Sonora. Secretary of State Lansing replied that he

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<sup>9</sup>Border Report, Oct. 23, 1915, USDS, 812.00/16667

<sup>10</sup>Border Report, Oct. 9, 1915, USDS, 812.00/16526

<sup>11</sup>Border Report, Oct. 16, 1915, USDS, 812.00/16600.

<sup>12</sup>Simpich to SecSt, Nov. 12, 1915, USDS, 812.00/16772.

<sup>13</sup>Cochran to SecSt, Nov. 13, 1915, USDS, 812.00/16777.

<sup>14</sup>Simpich to SecSt, Nov. 7, 1915, USDS, 812.00/16731.

would hold Randall responsible for any American lives lost; Randall then stated that he had signed the telegram under coercion.<sup>15</sup>

On October 20, Obregón ordered the movement of General Hill's troops, through the United States from Piedras Negras to Agua Prieta, with the permission of the United States government. These joined Calles to await an expected attack from Villa.<sup>16</sup>

On October 21, Calles ordered the evacuation of Naco and the transfer of the forces there to Agua Prieta. Obregón wired Calles on October 22, from Gómez Palacio, Durango, that

I am informed that the forces of the outlaw Villa advance on Sonora. I have already sent sufficient forces to give a death blow to the traitors. I am not coming personally to battle them because to you belongs the legitimate right of writing the last military page of the Revolution, as a merited prize for the unequal struggle you have sustained with so much abnegation and at the cost of so many sacrifices.<sup>17</sup>

On October 29 Calles defeated an advance force of villistas at Cabullona; on October 30 the first reinforcements arrived from Chihuahua with the rest following the next day

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<sup>15</sup>Border Report, Oct. 30, 1915, USDS, 812.00/16752.

<sup>16</sup>Obregón, Ocho mil kilómetros, 450-451.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., 451.

under General Francisco R. Serrano. The villistas were congregating about Agua Prieta preparing for an attack, which began just after midnight of November 1 and lasted through November 2. Villa's forces began retreating on November 3, unpursued by Calles whose horses were safely in the United States. Villa's command, which had sustained heavy losses, including dead, wounded, and hundreds of desertions, fell back to Naco to regroup.<sup>18</sup>

Villa had believed that Agua Prieta would be easily taken. He did not know of Hill's arrival until after the attack began. The villistas had arrived in the area cold and tired from the long mountainous crossing, hungry because little food could be found in northeastern Sonora. In addition, water was in very short supply. When Villa realized that constitutionalista troops had arrived through the United States, he was furious; he had not known of Carranza's de facto recognition by the United States. Also, searchlights from the American side supposedly lit the battlefield, depriving Villa's men of protection.<sup>19</sup>

When Obregón learned that Calles had not destroyed Villa's army, which would certainly continue operations.

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid., 453-455.

<sup>19</sup> Cervantes, Francisco Villa, 531-532; Carothers to SecSt, Oct. 31, 1915, 812.00/16653; Funston to Adj. Gen., Oct. 28, 1915, 812.00/16642.



he decided it was necessary to take command personally of his forces in Agua Prieta and coordinate his moves with those of Diéguez.<sup>20</sup> He arrived in Agua Prieta on November 6, the same day Diéguez entered Hermosillo. Obregón ordered Diéguez to concentrate as many troops as possible in Hermosillo to prepare for an attack by Villa, who still controlled the railroad between Nogales and Hermosillo.<sup>21</sup>

Villa was desperate for food and clothing for his men. He and a part of his force retreated through Cananea, where he demanded \$25,000.00 from the American mine owners and threatened to confiscate all cattle from the Cananea Cattle Company ranges. He did receive money from the 4C's and some supplies, and sacked the 4C's warehouse after he had promised not to molest Cananea.<sup>22</sup> Once reprovisioned and rested, the army began its move toward Hermosillo.

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<sup>20</sup>Except where otherwise noted, the following campaign report is derived from Obregón, Ocho mil kilómetros, 457-470.

<sup>21</sup>The control over the railroad was more theoretical than real. Maytorenistas controlled all stations although these were constantly harrassed by Calles' guerilla groups. Galaz (Desde el cerro, 208-209) described trips made from Hermosillo to Nogales in 1915, which were often four to six days one way, to purchase foods scarce in Hermosillo. The train traveled with an escort of maytorenista soldiers, but their presence did not prevent repeated attacks along the route by callistas, who also burned the bridges. It was a trip of fear, he said, of seeing the results of the shootings by the callistas, who left the bodies of their victims hanging from the telegraph poles along the tracks.

<sup>22</sup>Carothers to SecSt, Nov. 5, 1915, USDS, 812.00/16717; Border Report, Nov. 6, 1915, USDS, 812.00/16803.

A general amnesty issued by Obregón on November 9, 1915, was to be effective until November 30.<sup>23</sup> Possibly as a result of the amnesty, Villa's demoralized army, far from home and insufficiently supplied, began deserting; 1500 were reported entering the United States from Naco. Others vanished into the mountains going east to Chihuahua.<sup>24</sup>

Naco had been re-occupied by General Urbalejo after Calles withdrew on October 21, but on November 1, he, too, withdrew to Nogales and then raced south with his Yaquis to block further advances by Diéguez.<sup>25</sup> Villa's straggling army fanned out over the area from Naco to Cananea, and a part of them occupied Naco at Villa's orders to act as a reserve and a rearguard. This proved to be a tactical error. Obregón saw his chance to prevent the force at Naco from rejoining Villa. He ordered General Francisco R. Serrano,<sup>26</sup> his Chief-of-Staff, to Torreón to move the troops from the Army of the Northwest, who were still there,

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<sup>23</sup>Amnesty issued by Obregón, Nov. 9, 1915 in AGES, 3090.

<sup>24</sup>Carothers to SecSt, Nov. 10, 1915, USDS, 812.00/16761 & 16762.

<sup>25</sup>Simpich to SecSt, Nov. 10, 1915, USDS, 812.00/16785; Border Report, Nov. 6, 1915, USDS, 812.00/16803.

<sup>26</sup>Serrano had been Maytorena's private secretary; he had left the Governor shortly after the latter fled to Tucson in 1913, and returned to Sonora with De la Huerta.

to Agua Prieta.

Calles' troops began harassing the villistas, who evacuated Naco, and the vanguard of the consticionalistas occupied Naco on November 15. One party of 1500 villista cavalry went south through the Sonora River Valley to join Villa near Hermosillo.<sup>27</sup> The villistas retreating from Naco expected Obregón to attack by way of the railroad; instead he destroyed the railroad, which also would have afforded the villistas an avenue of retreat, and forced them to regroup in Cananea under General José Rodríguez. The constitucionalistas advanced on Cananea on November 21, to find that the villistas had fled southward during the night. That same day Obregón received a telegram from Diéguez reporting the defeat of Urbalejo's

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<sup>27</sup> The retreating villistas took all the food they could find and stole the cattle. When they entered Arizpe, they discovered the provisions that one of the storekeepers had hidden above a false ceiling by poking the ceiling with their bayonets. They took all the supplies, and in the poorer section of the town furnished the corn to the women so that they might make the soldiers tortillas. Their women, who usually travelled with them, had been left behind in Chihuahua. In the entire town of Arizpe, there was only one man; the women grouped together in various houses for safety, and stood in the doorways to hand out the tortillas to the soldiers. The callistas who followed the villistas were no better; they took everything that was left and maliciously destroyed anything for which they had no use. Interviews with Elena Sotomayor de Pellat, María Jesús Fuentes and Ignacio L. Pesqueira, Oct. 5 & 6, 1974, Arizpe, Sonora.

soldiers at Alamitos, north of Hermosillo, on November 18.<sup>28</sup>

Obregón knew that the defeat at Alamitos had not resolved the military situation in central Sonora, and that Dieguez could expect an attack from Villa. Nogales was the only port available to Villa; its capture would cut off not only any reprovisioning attempts but also any retreat to the United States utilizing the railroad.<sup>29</sup>

Joined by additional soldiers from the forces in Torreón, the constitucionalistas began to advance on Nogales on November 25, Colonel Lázaro Cárdenas and his cavalry were the vanguard; they met the maytorenistas and after a short encounter, displaced them. At noon of the same day, Cárdenas telegraphed Calles to tell him that he had occupied Nogales. General Acosta and Randall crossed the border into Arizona and an estimated nine hundred villistas escaped to the south.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>28</sup>Communications to the south were still controlled by the villistas; the telegrams went via San Francisco, probably by wireless to United States ships in Guaymas, and thence to Hermosillo. Hostetter had to send his communications that way.

<sup>29</sup>General Funston described Obregón's situation as critical. Obregón had to take Nogales because he had a large army, whose whereabouts were unknown at his rear, the force from Cananea with approximately 6000 men. Funston to Adj. Gen., Nov. 2(5), 1915, USDS, 812.00/16855.

<sup>30</sup>Carothers to SecSt, Nov. 26, 1915, USDS, 812.00/16868. A United States report on the Nogales battle said Villa had ordered the evacuation of Nogales on November 25,

While Obregón began to mobilize his troops to move on Nogales, Villa attacked Hermosillo on November 20. After thirty hours of fighting, Diéguez took the offensive and the villistas fled in disorganization. They fell back to Alamitos, the site of the earlier defeat, and General Acosta went to Nogales, managing to evade Obregón's nearby troops.<sup>31</sup> Villa went east to La Colorado where his troops dispersed into smaller groups to make their separate ways back to Chihuahua. One group swung northeastward toward Batuc, where they arrived filthy and sick, and stayed long enough to share their dysentery and lice with the residents.<sup>32</sup>

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and Randall and Acosta had crossed the border. The remaining troops were looting the town on November 26 and Obregón's troops caught them before they had finished. Border Report, Dec. 4, 1915, USDS, 812.00/16951.

<sup>31</sup>From prisoners, General Diéguez learned that Villa had promised the Yaquis three days of sacking if Hermosillo were taken. Alarm spread through the town, and several members of the elite families in town approached General Angel Flores and got him to promise to fight until his last cartridge was gone. At two o'clock of that same afternoon three hundred Yaquis surrendered to Diéguez. On November 22, Diéguez ordered his staff to prepare to evacuate, since munitions were growing short, but Flores could not after his pledge. He told Diéguez what he had promised, and after a few minutes thought, Diéguez agreed that he could not do so since a military man's word was sacred. So instead of withdrawing he ordered a charge and the villistas were routed. Galaz, Desde el cerro, 65-66.

<sup>32</sup>Reminiscence of Amelia Gámez de Buelna, Aug., 1974, Hermosillo, Sonora.

In La Colorada the villistas sacked all the stores and murdered sixteen Chinese. At nearby San Pedro de la Cueva some of the men decided to defend the town and ambushed the villistas. The villistas collected other bands and with Villa's permission entered the town, where they captured as many men as they could find, a total of seventy-eight, lined them up against the church and shot them before the horrified eyes of their women. The villistas then turned on the defenseless women, and for three days raped and pillaged and burned.<sup>33</sup> Leaving this horror in its wake, the column under Villa's command went east to Sahuaripa, through Dolores Pass into Chihuahua.<sup>34</sup>

Numerous villista chiefs, including Urbalejo, allegedly surrendered rather than support the depredations of the departing villistas. The large force under General Rodríguez from Cananea still remained at large in the northern part of the state. Rodríguez had retreated across the mountains south of Cananea to Bacoachi, twenty-one miles north of Arizpe; Obregón expected that he would try to escape to Chihuahua by the route through Pulpito Canyon. Constitucionalista forces were sent to garrison

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<sup>33</sup>Alberto Calzadiaz Barrera, El Fin de la División del Norte (México, D. F., 1965), 146-148. Hostetter to SecSt, Dec. 27, 1915, USDS, 812.00/17053.

<sup>34</sup>Cobb to SecSt, Dec. 9, 1915, 812.00/16930.

the villages in the immediate vicinity of Bacoachi. Rodríguez sacked the mining camp of El Tigre, then advanced on Fronteras. Because of the known size of the villista force, Obregón called for reinforcements from the south under General Angel Flores; Rodríguez meanwhile took Fronteras, his soldiers sacking and raping, and killing Chinese. The forces of Flores and Calles encountered Rodríguez at San Joaquín on December 19 and routed his forces, which fled east in disorder.<sup>35</sup> Obregón sent Calles in pursuit; Calles, of course, caught very few because, "they don't stop to sleep, traveling day and night." Only seven were caught; all seven were executed.<sup>36</sup>

With the border secured Obregón turned his attention to the Yaquis who had recently initiated peace talks with Diéguez, and who were waiting to talk with Obregón. He went to Hermosillo to confer on the progress of the talks, and concurred with Diéguez that the Yaquis were demanding too much. The Indians were entitled to just reparations, but they desired absolute dominion over the traditional Yaqui region to the exclusion of all outsiders. Thus

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<sup>35</sup>Border Report, Dec. 18, 1915, USDS, 812.00/17030. The atrocities were not all on the side of the villistas. Flores reportedly executed all of his prisoners; Calles executed all captured officers.

<sup>36</sup>Obregón, Ocho mil kilómetros, 470.

Obregón did not believe that a satisfactory agreement could be made. Nonetheless, he went on to Guaymas to await the return of emissaries sent to the pueblo chiefs. On December 20 Obregón learned that the Yaquis had attacked a garrison on the railroad south of Guaymas, and he decided to abandon his conciliatory attitude. He gave orders to Diéguez to begin a vigorous campaign to make the rebels feel the strength of the government; the next day, after Obregón returned to Hermosillo, Carranza ordered him to Ciudad Juárez to handle the establishment of peace in that city.<sup>37</sup>

By mid-December there was no longer a villista army, only some roaming and hungry bandits, and the state could look forward to a return to civil government.<sup>38</sup>

Carranza had appointed Hill as interim military governor of the state, and he had taken over the command in 1914, but his sole effort at ruling was the issuance of Decree 2, on November 21, 1914, which declared the

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<sup>37</sup>Obregón, Ocho mil Kilómetros, 471-474.

<sup>38</sup>The last villista group in the state was that of Alberto García and his fifty men, who surrendered on January 21 in Moctezuma. Calles to Carranza, Jan. 22, 1916, AGES, 3071-2. The garrison and citizens of the town were alarmed about the amnesty to the villistas, especially when the chiefs began gathering there. A special commission sent by Calles tried to soothe the residents, and suggested that the government utilize the ex-villistas in the Yaqui campaign. Arturo Guzman Jiménez to Enrique Moreno, Feb. 6, 1916, AGES 3071-2.



abolishment of political prefectures in Sonora, with their functions passing to municipal presidents and police commissioners.<sup>39</sup> After Hill departed in January, Sonora apparently had no constitucionalista government until August 4, when Calles began functioning as governor and appointed Enrique Moreno as Secretary General of Government.<sup>40</sup>

One of Calles' first tasks was to restore civil government to the areas under the control of the constitucionalistas. Moreno told Calles that he must decide which town would serve as the seat for the Moctezuma district, the only district under their control in August, 1915. There was a conflict between Moctezuma and Cumpas and Moreno suggested he could solve the problem by naming Nacozari as district seat; Calles, however, chose Cumpas. The municipal presidents wanted to know about the circulation of villista and maytorenista paper money which had been

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<sup>39</sup>This decree is signed by Hill as Interim Military Governor of the state, the only mention found of the appointment. Carranza's decree banning the prefectures was issued December 25, 1914; both found in AGES, 3046. The decree had no circulation and it was necessary for Moreno to confirm it in September. President, Cananea, to Moreno; answer, Sept. 8, 1915, AGES, 3046.

<sup>40</sup>In none of the consular reports was the Calles appointment mentioned until December. Border Report, Dec. 18, 1915, USDS, 812.00/17030. There is no record of the actual appointment of Calles in the archives, only the notice that Enrique Moreno had been appointed as Secretary of Government. Circular 1, Aug. 4, 1915, AGES, 3050. A list of personnel in the same file shows that he was the only other functionary besides Calles until December 1.

outlawed by Carranza. The municipalities had taken it as payment for taxes; now they could not use it to pay expenses. They also needed inspectors at Agua Prieta and Naco to ascertain what portion of the constitucionalista money in circulation there was counterfeit and to certify the remainder, but only one inspector was available. The municipalities needed arms for their police forces because the state had taken the arms they had, and they had no money for new ones.<sup>41</sup>

The constitucionalistas controlled only the Moctezuma district in eastern Sonora, scattered mining camps in the Arizpe district, and Agua Prieta on August 4. Moreno carried out many of the duties of the governor since Calles was shut up in Agua Prieta.

Civil authority had deteriorated to the point of anarchy in much of the state during 1915 while Maytorena was preoccupied with war. In Baviácora the city authorities had abandoned their posts, leaving all town business in the hands of one man who functioned as the municipal treasurer and secretary of the town council. Troops were quartered in the town hall much of the time; moreover, the town income was insufficient to cover town expenses, so

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<sup>41</sup>Moreno to Calles and answer, Aug. 25 and Sept. 7, 1915, AGES, 3045-2.

the one official had received no salary.<sup>42</sup> Moreno made an inspection visit to the Moctezuma district early in September 1915. He reported that the town of Moctezuma had a president, but no town council. The people agreed that their president was an excellent official, but they wanted to choose a group from which the governor could select a council. Moreno suggested that Calles accede to their request. He did not think a military commander was necessary. Nacozari de García had functioning schools, fully equipped, which were provided by the Nacozari Mining Company, as well as a public library. The government-supported school, however, was in a state of neglect and Moreno gave orders to remedy that. There had been some cases of smallpox in the town; Moreno expropriated the houses of the stricken for destruction and opened a leper colony (lazareto) to isolate those infected. He also ordered four hundred doses of vaccine.<sup>43</sup>

In Pílares de Nacozari the schools provided by the Moctezuma Mining Company were declared to be adequate for the town's needs, but because of the town's importance as a labor center, Moreno thought a postmaster and stamp agent should be appointed. Cumpas, the new district headquarters, had a president who was thoroughly disliked, and Moreno

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<sup>42</sup>Ernesto Yáñez to Calles, Nov. 5, 1915, AGES, 3113.

<sup>43</sup>Interestingly, through this period, there is no idea presented for vaccination of the entire populace.

suggested that Calles let the people designate their own.<sup>44</sup>

His restricted area of authority did not prevent Calles from announcing an ambitious reform program. The Nogales (Arizona) Daily Herald published an interview with Calles on August 18, in which he pledged the prohibition of liquor and gambling, a sanitary overhaul of Nogales, Hermosillo, Guaymas and "other towns made into pig-styes by the Yaquis," the protection of foreign interests and settlers in the Yaqui River Valley, and the division of lands among soldiers. The interviewer commented:

To those who know Calles, it will be realized that these are not the usual idle boasts of Mexico military dictators. Governor Calles means what he says. He is a man who has so far accomplished all he has set out to accomplish.

A pamphlet entitled Land and Books for All! (Tierra y libros para todos!) for Mexican consumption, promised municipal independence, public instruction and the construction of schools and libraries in each town, judicial reforms, the establishment of an agricultural bank, new roads, prohibition of monopolies, hospitals and pensions, free elections, freedom of association, and freedom of the press.<sup>45</sup>

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Report of the Secretary of State to the Governor on some administrative matters arising from his visit to Nacozari de García y Pilares, Sept. 13, 1915, AGES, 3045-2.

45. Tierra y libros para todos! (Nacozari, ND), found in AGES, 3045-2.

Calles consulted Moreno before the pamphlet was printed. Moreno wrote to Calles that he supported freedom of the press, if the press respected private life, morality and public peace. He also told Calles that he should promise that the government would protect even a press which might indict it and propose its own remedies for local conditions.<sup>46</sup>

In August Calles began a barrage of circulars and decrees, some of which enforced decrees previously issued by Carranza, and others of which were his personal creations and in conflict with those of Carranza. Among these were the infamous Decree 1, which prohibited the sale and manufacture of all classes of alcoholic beverages; Decree 4 which enumerated legal games and abolished gambling; Decree 15, which called for a new census of real estate for taxation purposes; Decree 27, which called for the utilization of all arable land by the owner or by renters; Decree 32 calling for the confiscation of properties of all who belonged to or aided the reactionary elements in the state; and several decrees to better education, including the first school for orphans in the state.<sup>47</sup> There was no

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<sup>46</sup>Moreno to Calles, Sept. 13, 1915, AGES, 3045-2.

<sup>47</sup>Copies of all decrees may be found in AGES, 3068-1.

law excluding priests, but Calles ordered the expulsion of those who remained.<sup>48</sup>

The expulsion of the villistas should have meant the restoration of civil government, but on December 1 it was announced that Calles would continue as military governor.<sup>49</sup> Complaints about the misuse of power by his administration were not long in coming. Citizens complained about the corruption by graft, charged that persecution and revenge were rampant, and warned that the amnesty granted to the villistas was bait for the unwary. An Hermosillo banker expressed the feeling of his peers when he stated that "the villistas were bad, but this group is worse."<sup>50</sup>

By January 1916 Calles was involved in a conflict with Diéguez over the conduct of the military campaign against the Yaquis. Calles insisted on directing the campaign although Obregón had specifically assigned Diéguez to that task. Rumors circulated that Calles soon would be replaced by Francisco S. Elías, his first cousin and the consular and fiscal agent for the constitucionalistas in New York, that Calles had received orders from Carranza to join him in Querétaro, but that he ignored them.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Calles to Moreno, Mar. (21), 1916, AGES, 3129-2.

<sup>49</sup> Border Report, Dec. 4, 1915, USDS, 812.00/16951.

<sup>50</sup> Border Report, Dec. 18, 1915, USDS, 812.00/17030.

<sup>51</sup> Border Report, Jan. 15, 1916, USDS, 812.00/17152.

The speculation on Calles' replacement took a new turn later in January with the surprising and unofficial announcement that General Severiano Talamantes, son of the maderista martyr, would be the new governor and military commander in Sonora.<sup>52</sup> The truth about Talamantes' appointment remained uncertain; his arrival in Navojoa in April revived the question of whether he came to supersede Calles or to join the campaign against the Yaqui.<sup>53</sup>

Calles' personality seemed designed to create opposition and personal dislike. One American observer described him as stern, dictatorial, jealous, animated by a vindictive, narrow-minded, and vengeful spirit; his rule was declared to be arbitrary, bloody and extremely independent from the civil government. Many doubted that relations between Calles and Obregón were friendly, and it was believed that Obregón desired Calles' removal but did not have the leverage with Carranza to attain it. Yet Carranza had shown his annoyance with Calles for the

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Louis Hostetter, however, denied that there was any conflict between Calles and Diéguez. Border Report, Jan. 22, 1916, USDS, 812.00/17194. Diéguez left Sonora in January to confer with Carranza and Obregón; General Francisco R. Serrano, Obregón's chief of staff, replaced him as commander of the Indian campaign. Diéguez was named governor of Jalisco in March. Border Report, April 1, 1916, USDS, 812.00/17818.

<sup>52</sup>Special Border Report, Feb. 4, 1916, USDS, 812.00/17278.

<sup>53</sup>Border Report, Apr. 1, USDS, 812.00/17818.

latter's disregarding or disobeying decrees by the First Chief,<sup>54</sup> Carranza specifically ordered Calles to inform him weekly of the occurrences in the state and of its legislation.<sup>55</sup> Removal of several of Calles' friends from positions notorious for graft added grist for the rumor mill.<sup>56</sup>

Nor was Calles happy over the decrees issued by the First Chief which conflicted with the way he thought his state should be run, and he offered his resignation. Carranza asked him to retain office until elections were held.<sup>57</sup> The suppression of two of his decrees led Calles to decide to publish a newspaper to educate the public and lend support to his decrees.<sup>58</sup> In April, Carranza announced to all governors that any decree which they desired to issue must first receive his approval.<sup>59</sup>

There were also consistent rumors of an imminent break between Obregón and Carranza, fueled by remarks allegedly made privately by the general to friends in

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<sup>54</sup>Special Border Report, Feb. 4, 1916, USDS, 812.00/17278.

<sup>55</sup>Carranza to Calles, Jan. 12, 1916, AGES, 3071-2.

<sup>56</sup>Hdqts., 12th US Inf. to Comm. Gen., Southern Dept., Feb. 4, 1916, 812.00/17278.

<sup>57</sup>Border Report, Feb. 12, 1916, USDS, 812.00/17299.

<sup>58</sup>Border Report, Feb. 26, 1916, USDS, 812.00/17358.

<sup>59</sup>Circular, Apr. 6, 1916, AGES, 3064.



Nogales in December; remarks which impugned and ridiculed the personality, moral character, and mental capacity of the First Chief. The build-up for the Indian campaign was judged to be excessive, and was seen as preparations for a revolt, especially since there were no visible results of any military action.<sup>60</sup> Some of the rumors were put to rest in March when Obregón made a flying trip to Hermosillo to be married; Carranza had asked him to return as quickly as possible to accept the position of Secretary of War.<sup>61</sup>

Villa had not finished causing trouble for Mexico. In January, 1916 his men executed sixteen American mining engineers whom they took from a train at San Ysabel, Chihuahua. The United States government denounced the inability of the Carranza government to protect foreigners and its own citizens from the villista depredations, especially since the victims had been traveling with the personal assurance of Obregón and General Jacinto B. Treviño, commander in Chihuahua, that the route was safe.<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>60</sup>Hdqts. 12th US Inf. to Comm. Gen., Southern Dept., Feb. 4, 1916, USDS, 812.00/17278.

<sup>61</sup>Circular, Mar. 14, 1916, AGES, 3062.

<sup>62</sup>Cobb to SecSt, Jan. 15, 1916, 312.115C96/45, as printed in United States, Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: 1916 (Hereinafter cited as FR:1916) (Washington, 1925), 657-659. Numerous documents are also found in the 812.00 file.

Mexico responded by declaring Villa and his associates to be outlaws, subject to be shot on sight, but other action seemed depressingly slow. Carranza said that he had ordered pursuit, and averred that the outrage was committed to provoke international trouble.<sup>63</sup> Many Americans felt that Carranza was doing nothing, and the consul in El Paso confirmed that no man connected with the massacre had been caught at the end of January.<sup>64</sup> The Department of State did receive reports at the end of January that Carranza was going to order soldiers from Sonora to Chihuahua--that aroused the residents of the Yaqui River Valley who feared the campaign there would be affected.<sup>65</sup>

If Sonorans had feared that Villa might become a menace again, it was not expressed. The fastest reaction to the killings at San Ysabel was from Americans with interests in Sonora. Orders for supplies, machines, etc. all affecting the commercial recovery of the state, were cancelled or delayed after word of the San Ysabel massacre arrived.<sup>66</sup> No troops were moved to possible danger areas.

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<sup>63</sup>Gilliman to SecSt, ND, Rec'd Jan. 16, 1916, 312.115C96/42, as printed in FR:1916, 659.

<sup>64</sup>Edwards to SecSt, Jan. 27, 1916, 312.115C96/81 as printed in FR:1916, 663.

<sup>65</sup>SecSt to Parker, Jan. 20, 1916, 312.11/7227, as printed in FR:1916, 661.

<sup>66</sup>Border Report, Jan. 15, 1916, USDS, 812.00/17152.

The state's protection against an invasion from Chihuahua consisted of a telephone arrangement set up in the Bavispe River Valley in February as an early warning system.<sup>67</sup>

After Villa's raid on Columbus, New Mexico, on March 9, response from Washington was rapid, more so because of the belief that Carranza's pursuit of Villa had not been sincerely prosecuted. On March 10, President Woodrow Wilson told the press:

An adequate force will be sent at once in pursuit of Villa with the single object of capturing him and putting a stop to his forays. This can and will be done in entirely friendly aid of the constituted authorities in Mexico and with scrupulous respect for the sovereignty of that Republic.<sup>68</sup>

Carranza knew of the American plans and was opposed to any punitive expedition. Obregón had made a hurried trip to Hermosillo early in March to be married; the First Chief had asked him to return as quickly as possible. On his return to Querétaro, Obregón began the demobilization of the Army of the Northwest; on March 13, because of Villa's attack on Columbus and the inevitable American retaliations, he was immediately sworn in as Secretary of War and Navy.

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<sup>67</sup>Border Report, Feb. 19, 1916, USDS, 812,000/17335.

<sup>68</sup>SecSt to all consular officials in Mexico, Mar. 10, 1916, USDS, 812.00/17426a.

<sup>69</sup>Obregón, Ocho mil Kilómetros, 478; Circular, Mar. 14, 1915, AGES, 3062.

The Americans entered Mexico in two columns on March 15 and March 16, with Carranza determined to raise as many diplomatic barriers to their success that he could devise. He had already warned Mexicans to be prepared for any eventuality, including war,<sup>70</sup> and reinforced border garrisons.<sup>71</sup> Calles was notified in mid-February that Carranza was undertaking a campaign against Villa so the state should station men along the border with Chihuahua.<sup>72</sup> Not until after the Columbus raid did Calles mobilize his troops in northeast Sonora.<sup>73</sup>

He moved his headquarters to Agua Prieta and announced that he would cooperate with the United States in exterminating Villa.<sup>74</sup>

Pershing's arrival in Mexico initially caused little stir in Sonora.<sup>75</sup> Telegraphic communications between the capital and the border were cut, supposedly so the state would not learn of Pershing's entry. There was tension in the border towns, but no saloons were open on either side

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<sup>70</sup> Belt to SecSt, Mar. 12, 1916, USDS, 812.00/17458.

<sup>71</sup> Acting SecSt to Rodgers, Mar. 22, 1916, USDS, 812.00/17582b.

<sup>72</sup> Border Report, Feb. 26, 1916, USDS, 812.00/17358.

<sup>73</sup> Simpich to SecSt, Mar. 15, 1916, USDS, 812.00/17453.

<sup>74</sup> Border Report, Mar. 11, 1916, USDS, 812.00/17629.

<sup>75</sup> Simpich to SecSt, Mar. 25, 1916, USDS, 812.00/17629.

of the border, which helped to avert trouble.<sup>76</sup> Word spread along the border that Calles was prepared to defend the state against an attack by the United States, but on March 15 came the order from Carranza that there would be no resistance to the troops pursuing Villa, and for Mexicans to assist them, if requested.<sup>77</sup>

By the end of March Carranza and Obregón thought they would have to request the withdrawal of the American troops if they did not capture Villa soon, because of national politics.<sup>78</sup> Negotiations had accomplished nothing because Carranza wanted them to accomplish nothing.

The American Secretary of State sent a special United States representative, James L. Rodgers, to see Carranza at once, and suggested that a conference between Obregón and General Hugh L. Scott might be of some value in settling differences. He also wanted Rodgers to persuade Carranza to restrict the massive troop build-up in Sonora to the State, in order to prevent a possible clash should these forces encounter United States troops.<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>76</sup>Border Report, Mar. 18, 1916, USDS, 812.00/17754.

<sup>77</sup>Border Report, Mar. 25, 1916, USDS, 812.00/17754. Persistent rumors on both sides of the border said that the Copper Queen Mining Company was paying Calles to move the soldiers from Agua Prieta so if there were trouble they would not loot Douglas.

<sup>78</sup>Rodgers to SecSt. Mar. 31, 1916, USDS, 812.00/17710.

<sup>79</sup>SecSt to Rodgers, Apr. 22, 1916, USDS, 812.00/17966a.

Rodgers tried to see Carranza on April 24 to arrange a conference/early that same morning Obregón had already embarked to meet Scott at a destination not yet named. Carranza's Ambassador-designate in Washington had notified Carranza the evening before of the coming suggestion and Obregón had decided to go secretly to prevent rumors and public unrest.<sup>80</sup> He met Generals Scott and Frederick Funston in Juárez on April 30, with full powers to negotiate a protocol, but with instructions to seek an early withdrawal of United States forces. Scott and Funston also carried full powers and wanted tacit agreement to the pursuit. Wilson instructed them to suggest that American troops could withdraw to the border and constitucionalista forces could advance from the south forcing Villa into American hands. They were not to negotiate on the basis of immediate withdrawal.<sup>81</sup>

Before the decision to attempt negotiations had been reached, Americans in Sonora began to feel the influence of Pershing's presence in Mexico through an increase in anti-American feeling. Although Hostetter in Hermosillo said that the upper classes were trying to stir up anti-Americanism,<sup>82</sup> the Commander-in-Chief of the United States

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<sup>80</sup> Rodgers to SecSt, Apr. 24, 1916, USDS, 812.00/17978.

<sup>81</sup> Adj. Gen. to Scott and Funston, Apr. 26, 1916, USDS, 812.00/18003.

<sup>82</sup> Hostetter to SecSt, Mar. 21, 1916, USDS, 812.00/17661.

Pacific Fleet saw no animosity among the people in Guaymas.<sup>83</sup> Calles returned to Hermosillo from Agua Prieta on April 1, leaving the northern command to General Arnulfo Gómez. Gómez had called Carranza's action in permitting Pershing to enter traitorous, and swore he would resist any American efforts to cross the border. Calles expected trouble, and laid the blame for the troop concentration along the border on Obregón.<sup>84</sup> American military observers thought Obregón might be trying to isolate troops loyal to Calles from his influence.<sup>85</sup> It was also noted that Americans in Sonora appeared to be suffering reprisals and they suspected a concerted effort by the state government to drive them out. Their taxes were raised, concessions and privileges were revoked, crops and stock were seized, and fines were imposed.<sup>86</sup>

Generals Scott and Funston, reporting on the first conference in Juárez, noted that they had evidently come to discuss one matter, and Obregón, another. Obregón had

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<sup>83</sup>There had been an American ship standing by in Guaymas for over a year to evacuate whatever Americans chose to leave Sonora, particularly those from the Yaqui River Valley and the Richardson Construction Company lands, where the Yaquis were a constant menace.

<sup>84</sup>Border Report, Apr. 1, 1916, USDS, 812.00/17818.

<sup>85</sup>Border Report, Apr. 8, 1916, USDS, 812.00/17908.

<sup>86</sup>Border Report, Apr. 22, 1916, USDS, 812.00/18043.

denied that Villa presented any danger, insisting that Villa was dead, or if alive, innocuous.<sup>87</sup> The Mexican government has been insisting either that Villa's band had been dispersed or that there were sufficient Mexican troops to pursue him, although more were being sent.<sup>88</sup> A deadlock appeared certain; the two sides had no common ground for discussion.

On May 1 Funston received a telegram from Colonel W. S. Scott at Douglas which relayed orders issued by Carranza to General Arnulfo Gómez. Gómez was ordered to locate his troops so that they would be in a position to cut off the American troops in Chihuahua after the Scott-Obregón conference. The move was to be made no matter what the outcome of the conference, except for a complete American withdrawal.<sup>89</sup> With Pershing operating in the extreme west of Chihuahua, such action would make clashes inevitable, and Wilson did not want war.

The Generals all agreed that more could be accomplished in a private, less formal meeting where Obregón

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<sup>87</sup> Border Report, Apr. 30, 1916, USDS, 812.00/18020.

<sup>88</sup> E. Arredondo to SecSt, Apr. 13, transmitting a note from Aguilar to SecSt, Apr. 12, 1916, USDS, 812.00/17867. That statement was patently untrue; Pershing remarked on the absolute lack of control, to the point of anarchy, in Chihuahua. Funston to Adj. Gen. transmitting report from Pershing, Apr. 17, 1916, USDS, 812.00/17903. The only troops encountered were the local town guards.

<sup>89</sup> Funston to SecWar, May 1, 1916, USDS, 812.00/18045.



could confer without the hostile staff with him. Mutual friends had approached Obregón and arranged for a private room in an El Paso hotel. There Scott and Obregón met and hammered out an agreement which Scott described as

not altogether satisfactory but if circumstances are considered it will be recognized that it has not been easy to avert a war with Mexico which all believed was imminent.<sup>90</sup>

The agreement, (submitted as a memorandum) noted that the expeditionary force had destroyed or dispersed many of the lawless elements or driven them deeper into Mexico; it accepted as true that the Mexican government was carrying on a "vigorous pursuit" of any further bands and was augmenting its forces to prevent recurrences. In view of the sincere efforts on the part of the Mexican authorities the United States government would gradually withdraw its troops.<sup>91</sup> For his part, Obregón had verbally promised to withdraw the Sonoran troops from Púlpito Canyon.<sup>92</sup>

President Wilson and his Secretary of War, Newton Baker, were pleased with the agreement, and prepared a press release which would be issued when word of

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<sup>90</sup> Scott and Funston to SecWar, May 3, 1916, USDS, 812.00/18097.

<sup>91</sup> Memo of Conference, Scott and Funston, May 2, 1916, USDS, 812.00/18097.

<sup>92</sup> Scott and Funston to SecWar, May 3, 1916, USDS, 812.00/18097.

Carranza's acceptance was received. On May 5 Mexican raiders entered Glen Springs and Boquillas, both small communities along the Rio Grande in Texas, and killed several Americans, including three soldiers.<sup>93</sup> The raids, although not attributed to Villa, made a lie of Carranza's claims to control Chihuahua, but Obregón was told to notify the United States that the entrance of more troops would be prevented.

But Carranza continued to press for an immediate withdrawal date.<sup>94</sup> Scott and Funston told Obregón that they would accept the agreement in spite of the raid,<sup>95</sup> but Obregón again insisted his government would not accept it without a definite date being set. He proposed to send Gomez from Sonora and Treviño from Chihuahua to follow withdrawing United States troops to the border, but Scott and Funston thought the scheme was designed to keep United States troops quiet until Mexican troops were in position to drive them out by force.<sup>96</sup> The Carranza position was

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<sup>93</sup>Blocker to SecSt, May 7, 1916, USDS, 812.00/18073.

<sup>94</sup>Rodgers to SecSt, May 7, 1916, USDS, 812.00/18081.

<sup>95</sup>SecSt to SecWar, May 7, 1916, USDS, 812.00/18098.

<sup>96</sup>Scott and Funston suggested that the National Guard units of Texas, New Mexico and Arizona be called out for border patrol; this added only 990 men in Arizona, 1128 men in New Mexico and 3003 men in Texas. Scott and Funston to SecWar, May 8, 1916, USDS, 812.00/18125. See also Herbert Molloy Mason, Jr., The Great Pursuit (New York, 1970), 174.

emphatically negative and Obregón returned to Mexico City.<sup>97</sup> For the time being, the Carranza government did little to hinder Pershing's search for Villa in Chihuahua, and Sonorans turned their attention to other matters.

With the constitucionalista triumph over Maytorena and Villa, revenge was the order of the day. The prefect of Hermosillo, although well liked and inoffensive, was ordered executed by Diéguez in December, and other officials were jailed.<sup>98</sup> Any of the officials who had served under Maytorena were subject to trial and execution for simply serving, in retaliation for the arrest of callistas in 1914. Jesus Ramos, who had formerly been prefect and had later become treasurer, was tried for exhorting the Yaquis to join Maytorena, and was sentenced to death. His sentence was commuted to twenty years imprisonment because of his health and his age.<sup>99</sup>

In Arizpe, Ignacio F. Pesqueira had been succeeded

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<sup>97</sup>While Obregón was in Juárez, Calles went to see him, and supposedly received orders again to report to Mexico City for some assignment there. Calles protested that he should not be removed until the international question was settled. Border Report, May 27, 1916, USDS, 812.00/18353.

<sup>98</sup>Galaz, Desde el cerro, 113-116; Hostetter to SecSt, Dec. 27, 1915, USDS, 812.00/17053.

<sup>99</sup>Trial records, Jan.-Feb., 1916, AGES, 3090. Consul Hostetter had commented of Ramos that he was a good, but weak, man, Hostetter to SecSt, Sept. 3, 1914, USDS, 812.00/13145.

by Lucas Pico as prefect when the former had to resign for his health. Calles issued an order for Pico's arrest, and Pico was warned by Pesqueira's brother not to go into Arizpe; he went anyway, and was immediately executed.<sup>100</sup>

The fate of Urbalejo, together with several other maytorenista chiefs, is not known. He was taken to Mazatlán in January by Diéguez; sometime about the middle of February he and others were being transferred to the Tres Mariás Island prison colony, when allegedly they were shot and killed and their bodies thrown into the sea.<sup>101</sup>

Calles announced plans to purge his administration of all elements not identified with the revolutionary cause, and toward this end he sent a questionnaire to numerous state functionaries, including school teachers. The questionnaire contained seventeen questions relative to positions held under Díaz, revolutionary activities against Huerta, the relationships with Calles and Maytorena,

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<sup>100</sup> Interviews with Ignacio L. Pesqueira and María Jesús Fuentes. Arizpe's old and important families had been divided in the factional struggle because the major figures were all relatives of one degree or another. The Elías, Pico and Pesqueira families had intermarried. Maytorena was married to Calles' paternal aunt, María Jesús Elías, and Francisco Elías, was her nephew and Calles' first cousin. Manuel S. Corbalá, Rodolfo Elías Calles: Perfiles de un sonorense (Hermosillo, 1970), 46. Everyone knew that there was potential danger in supporting either faction. The Elías family had supported Maytorena and some of the Pesqueiras were callistas. Lucas Pico was a brother-in-law of Ignacio F. Pesqueira, the former prefect and father of Ignacio L. Pesqueira.

<sup>101</sup> Border Report, Feb. 26, 1916, USDS, 812.00/17358.

etc.<sup>102</sup> The answers, from judges, commissioners, councilmen, tax collectors, customs officials, etc., showed a definite lack of revolutionary zeal. Most had taken no active role in any political movement, in fact, admitted to no interest in politics. Some had supported Madero with their opinions, but not overtly. They had preferred to stay in their towns and conduct their private businesses, since most had large families to support and did not have the means to move if the political climate was oppressive

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<sup>102</sup> The questionnaire included the following questions: 1) What employment did you have under Díaz, when were you named, and why did you quit? 2) What were your reasons for leaving? 3) During the political struggle under Díaz, which side did you associate with and how did you participate? 4) What part did you play in the struggle during 1909-1910? Were you a civil or a military participant working for the revolution? Specify concrete actions. 5) What functions did you fulfill under Madero, elected or appointed? 6) How long did you serve, and why did you leave? 7) In which political contest have you figured as a candidate for public office, and which elements aided you? 8) Were you involved as an armed citizen or as a civil element against Huerta; when did you commence and what did you do? 9) have you been an office holder in Sonora? Elected or appointed? 10) Why and when did you leave your above position? 11) What part did you play in the conflict between Calles and Maytorena beginning in 1914 when the military was in Hermosillo trying to combat Maytorena's treason? 12) Why did you remain in territory occupied by the villistas-maytorenistas when Calles evacuated Hermosillo to concentrate in the north, beginning also in 1914? 13) What attitude did you assume toward the Convention's rebellion against Carranza? Mention clearly and precisely your actions. 14) Were you employed under that conventionalist regime or were you on the side of Carranza? Cite dates and happenings. 15) Did you serve the constitucionalistas beginning February, 1913? If yes, how, when and where? 16) Have you left your posts in the constitucionalista government? If yes, why? 17) Have you documents to affirm your acts?

Circular 23, May 11, 1916; Questionnaire both in AGES, 3064. Also contains the responses to questionnaire.

to them. To Calles the general political apathy constituted a sufficient reason for removing all the officials, although in some positions, such as judges and teachers, there was a shortage of qualified personnel.<sup>103</sup>

By the time the answers to the questionnaires were received the governorship had changed hands. Adolfo De la Huerta, who had left Sonora in 1914 as a member of Carranza's cabinet, had been named by Carranza as the new interim governor.<sup>104</sup> Carranza alone knew the motive for the decision, but De la Huerta thought that because of the current international complications, the First Chief wanted Calles and his army prepared for any eventuality.<sup>105</sup> De la Huerta feared that many in the state would be angry over the appointment. Stories circulating in Sonora did hint of discord and opposition to his appointment and there was speculation that Calles would not yield the office.<sup>106</sup>

The rumors that Calles would refuse to turn over the

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<sup>103</sup> A few deportations were recorded in AGES, 3064.

<sup>104</sup> Announcement of the Secretary of Government, Apr. 27, 1916, AGES, 3062.

<sup>105</sup> Report of De la Huerta presented to the legislature in May, 1917, AGES, 3132.

<sup>106</sup> Simpich to SecSt, May 2, 5 & 12, 1916, USDS, 812.00/18052, 18115 & 18139.

government to De la Huerta were not without foundation.<sup>107</sup> When De la Huerta arrived in Agua Prieta he found that the prohibitionist Calles had dedicated himself to a grand binge for the past three days, and was suffering from a phenomenal hangover. Calles' friend, Gabriel Corella, the administrator customs, advised him not to visit Calles, in his current state, Corrella did not believe him to be responsible.

De la Huerta did not think anything would happen, given the friendship between himself and Calles. De la Huerta did not know where to find the Governor, but strolling through town, he encountered an aide of Calles. The aide was reluctant to disclose Calles' location, but De la Huerta told him just to point it out, then to return innocently in a short time. He was guided to a shop selling "Mexican Curios" which was owned by an American woman.

De la Huerta entered and found Calles very drunk. He told him that he had come to take over the governorship from him. When Calles asked why, he responded that it was because of the complaints throughout the Republic about his radical decrees. Calles told him drunkenly to take the governorship.

At that moment the aide returned, and De la Huerta

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<sup>107</sup>The following account of Calles' yielding of the governorship is found in Guzmán Esparza, Memorias, 109-112.

greeted him as if they had not parted moments before. He insisted that the aide take some telegrams which he wanted to send to the municipal presidents, and one to Carranza saying that Calles had turned over the government. When the aide had left for the telegraph office, Calles asked De la Huerta what he was supposed to do. De la Huerta had orders to send Calles to Mexico City, and told him so.

The hotels in Agua Prieta were full, and De la Huerta spent the night on a cot in Calles' room. At one o'clock Calles indicated that he was awake, and De la Huerta asked him if he felt ill. No, but he had been thinking about ways of avoiding going to Mexico City. Calles requested De la Huerta to telegraph Carranza that he would come to Mexico City when he had completed his business as chief of operations in the state. De la Huerta agreed, and Carranza assented.<sup>108</sup>

Enrique Moreno wrote to Calles that he had agreed to remain as Secretary of Government, as Calles and De la Huerta had requested, and promised to work to keep harmony

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<sup>108</sup>The army investigator who prepared the Border Report for the Nogales area assessed De la Huerta as a young man of education and cultural attainment, who made a good impression on Americans. The new Governor had faith in himself and in a peaceful solution to the international problems. Furthermore, he, as a civil governor, could be expected to conduct an energetic campaign for the rehabilitation of industrial and economic conditions in Sonora. He thought that De la Huerta's ideas were good, but many were Utopian and impractical. Border Report, May 27, 1916, USDS, 812.00/18353.



in the government. In the same letter there is a hint that Calles was piqued with De la Huerta's appointment, for Moreno reminded him that it would be a good idea if he notified Carranza and the governors that he had formally yielded the governorship.<sup>109</sup> Calles made the formal announcement, but did not attend the inauguration. He remained as military commander in Sonora.

De la Huerta continued the Calles policy of "purification" of the government by turning over posts to true revolutionaries. By July, in conformity with Calles' desires, he had removed municipal presidents in Cananea, Nacozari de García, Nogales, Hermosillo, Altar, Pitiquito, Santa Ana, Villa de Seris, Ures and La Colorado, and police commissioners in Empalme and Pilares de Nacozari, in addition to other employees.<sup>110</sup> De la Huerta regretted that there were so few constitucionalista elements in the state to fill the positions, as they had either followed Obregón and Carranza into Mexico City or were serving with the state military forces. He declared that rather than use enemies, he would use people from outside the state; a good method, he thought, to diminish the provincialism that

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<sup>109</sup>Moreno to Calles, May 18, 1916, AGES, 3062.

<sup>110</sup>Governor's report for July, 1916 delivered on Aug. 5, 1916, AGES, 3071-1.

existed all over Mexico and to promote a sense of nationality.<sup>111</sup> Because of a lack of qualified revolutionary lawyers, the Supreme Court had to be closed and non-lawyers used as District Court judges until qualified persons came from Mexico City.<sup>112</sup>

International problems impinged on Sonora once more in June as bandit raids into Texas recommended and papers taken from the bodies of bandits killed in the forays identified several as having been members of the constitutionalista army.<sup>113</sup> To compound the growing unease, Mexican and American forces clashed near San Ignacio, Chihuahua on June 15.<sup>114</sup> Two days later, General Treviño, commander of the troops in Chihuahua, informed General Pershing that the central government had ordered him to prevent, by use of arms, any movement of the American forces

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<sup>111</sup> Governor's report of May, 1917, AGES, 3132.

<sup>112</sup> Report for July 5, 1916, and Decree 53, both in AGES, 3071. The Supreme Court was reinstated by Decree 72 of Oct. 25, 1916, as were all district courts, but the Governor named the judges for both in the preconstitutional period. Border Report, Dec. 1, 1916, USDS, 812.00/20041.

<sup>113</sup> SecSt to Rodgers, June 13, 1916, USDS, 812.00/18399; Garrett to SecSt, June 17, 1916, USDS, 812.00/18456.

<sup>114</sup> Garrett to SecSt, June 17, 1916, USDS, 812.00/18469.

forces to the south, east or west. Pershing replied to Treviño that he had received no such restrictions from his own government.<sup>115</sup>

The American consul at Tampico was informed that the entrance of any more soldiers or sailors would be considered an act of war.<sup>116</sup> In Sinaloa the Governor, under Carranza's orders, announced on June 17 that war would be declared on the United States;<sup>117</sup> two days later zealous Mexicans attacked a group of sailors at Mazatlán, and on June 22, American and Mexican troops battled at Carrizal, Chihuahua.

Carranza called for the unity of Mexicans against Americans and ordered the enlistment of volunteers on June 18. In Sonora, there was no immediate rush to volunteer, and on June 20 voluntary enlistments were abandoned and conscription began, reaching the level of ninety percent of the adult males in some districts. Many of the new troops mobilized had just completed active service; those mobilized in the northern part of the state were promised the chance to fight Yankees and loot Yankee towns.<sup>118</sup>

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<sup>115</sup> Funston to SecWar, June 17, 1916, transmits telegrams from Treviño to Pershing and Pershing to Treviño, USDS, 812.00/18544.

<sup>116</sup> Dawson to SecSt, June 17, 1916, USDS, 812.00/18458.

<sup>117</sup> Brown to SecSt, June 19, 1916, USDS, 812.00/18073.

<sup>118</sup> Border Report, July 1, 1916, USDS, 812.00/18709.

Calles apparently received the same word from Carranza as other commanders, but made no public announcement, and he refused to discuss his plans. On June 18, he commanded all railroad rolling stock entering the state at Nogales, Naco, and Agua Prieta, and cut all telegraph wires into the United States. He ordered all Mexican non-combatants to leave for the south and the removal of the archives. The municipal presidents of Nacozari and Nogales handed out arms, supposedly on Carranza's orders.<sup>119</sup> Calles ordered the Chinese in Nogales to ship the merchandise from their stores to Magdalena or Hermosillo; if they did not remove it, the stocks would be confiscated and their guarantee of safety withdrawn.<sup>120</sup>

About 950 non-combatants left the northern border towns in the first few days after Calles ordered them out. They were placed in crowded camps at Magdalena, together with large numbers of soldiers, where they were threatened with hunger until the state government sent free food for the poor.<sup>121</sup>

Obregón had offered amnesty to all former enemies in the state, but the order was suspended and Calles had

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<sup>119</sup>Simpich to SecSt, June 18, 1916, USDS, 812.00/18455.

<sup>120</sup>Simpich to SecSt, June 20, 1916, USDS, 812.00/18512.

<sup>121</sup>Simpich to SecSt, June 21, 1916, USDS, 812.00/18523; Border Report, July 1, 1916, USDS, 812.00/18709; Municipal Report, Magdalena, Feb. 26, 1917, AGES, 3133-1.

orders to arrest them if war started.<sup>122</sup> Censorship was established at Guaymas, and the garrison at Empalme was strengthened.<sup>123</sup>

General Estrada, now commander of the troops in the south, prepared to destroy Empalme if troops landed at Guaymas.<sup>124</sup> Americans were warned to leave the port region, and Estrada supplied an escort and a train for all Americans opting to leave the Yaqui River Valley.<sup>125</sup>

Across the border in Nogales, Arizona, the Mayor worried about the critical situation in his town. There were 8000 Mexican troops within easy striking distance of Nogales, which would be hard to defend because of the terrain. Douglas and Nogales officials requested that the governor declare qualified martial law in the Southern Arizona counties to control the arms traffic, to stop saboteurs and recruiters, and gain military-civilian cooperation. The governor would require presidential help since the state had no troops.<sup>126</sup>

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<sup>122</sup> Border Report, June 24, 1916, USDS, 812.00/18653.

<sup>123</sup> USS San Diego to SecNavy, June 19, 1916, USDS, 812.00/18530.

<sup>124</sup> Border Report, June 24, 1916, USDS, 812.00/18653.

<sup>125</sup> Ops Report, USPF to SecNavy, June 27, 1916, USDS, 812.00/18752.

<sup>126</sup> Simpich to SecSt, June 25, 1916, USDS, 812.00/18563.

The fear of an imminent invasion remained into July, but by the middle of that month Mexican authorities were declaring that the troubles were settled.<sup>127</sup> Calles had received instructions on July 10 from Mexico City saying that the international differences were to be settled diplomatically, and he indicated to the local press that he would demobilize all volunteer forces and send the regulars back to fight the Yaquis. He also invited all Americans to return. The military commitments were all accomplished before the end of the month, but the Americans were slower to act.<sup>128</sup> The government notified the Southern Pacific officials to prepare to resume their control over the railroad.<sup>129</sup>

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<sup>127</sup> AGES, 3071-2 contains numerous references that indicate a definite fear of invasion in July, 1916. The Carranza government and the United States had agreed to send representatives to a meeting to attempt to reach some kind of settlement; however, the differences were far from settled. The commission met in New London, Connecticut on September 6, and the same split motivation was as evident there as in Ciudad Juárez. While the commission met, Villa began rampaging again, attacking Treviño in Chihuahua City. A protocol was signed on November 24, but was rejected by Carranza on December 28. Early in January, the constitucionalistas defeated Villa near Torreón, and gave Wilson, now facing a war with Europe, the pretext he sought for withdrawal. In December, Sonoran troops moved from Agua Prieta to Sahuaripa to defend the state from Villa. Documentation may be found in the 812.00 series.

<sup>128</sup> Ops Report, USPF to SecNavy, July 11, 1916, USDS, 812.00/18878; Border Report, July 22, 1916, USDS, 812.00/18861.

<sup>129</sup> USS Cleveland to SecNavy, July 17, 1916, USDS, 812.00/18898.

Along the border Americans noted rampant rumors of Calles' conflict with Mexico City, with Obregón and with De la Huerta. Brigadier General E. H. Plummer of the United States Army interviewed Calles at Nogales on July 25. Plummer reported that Calles did not know what his future plans were. He might, he told Plummer, go to Hermosillo once the troop movement for the south got underway, and expressed his hope for a command in the Yaqui campaign. Calles' anger with Carranza was obvious during the interview and he bristled when asked of news from Mexico City or Carranza. When Plummer inquired of his alleged orders to go to the national capital, Calles thought a minute, and replied that he was not going; he then said he now had no orders to go. He did admit that Carranza would like him to come, but seemed reluctant to talk about this before others. His departure, Calles stated with a smile, would depend on "complications."<sup>130</sup>

Within a week Calles received another order to report to Mexico City.<sup>131</sup> He did not know who was bringing

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<sup>130</sup>Special Border Report, to Comm. Gen., Southern Dept., July 25, 1916, USDS, 812.00/18834. Plummer gained the impression that Calles was on the verge of being removed from his command and blamed Carranza for his decline. Calles appeared, noted Plummer, to be under a mental strain, and looked worried and worn.

<sup>131</sup>Border Report, July 22, 1916, USDS, 812.00/18861.

pressure to bear against him in the capital, but his friends thought that possibly Obregón was behind it. He was not aware that James L. Rodgers, the special representative to Mexico during the crisis, had pressed Carranza for his removal as military commander in Sonora.<sup>132</sup>

Governor De la Huerta, in the meanwhile, implemented Carranza's numerous political reform decrees. In June, Carranza had convoked municipal elections throughout the nation for Sunday, September 3, and issued two guidelines. Persons who had actively aided hostile factions could not hold offices and councilmen could not be members of the army.<sup>133</sup>

In Decree 64 of July 24 De la Huerta announced the municipal elections for councilmen, municipal presidents, and police commissioners. On August 25, he issued Decree 66 which declared that in the upcoming elections residence in the town was not a requisite. He justified his decree by saying that many people left their towns to fight and lost their local citizenship, but many of those knew best the meaning of the revolution. Moreover, because of the reduced size of the municipalities, the uniformity of the

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<sup>132</sup>Border Report, Aug. 5, 1916, USDS, 812.00/18949.

<sup>133</sup>Decree, June 12, 1916, AGES, 3069-2.



state administration, and the constant interchange among the municipalities, a person from one should know the needs of all.<sup>134</sup> Decree 66 would appear to have offered the government an increased chance for the election of officials friendly to it, but the late issuance date probably limited its effectiveness.

There was little interest in the races.<sup>135</sup> The Governor warned all the municipal presidents to comply strictly with the law, reminding them that all elections were subject to the ratification of his government.<sup>136</sup> Nevertheless, when the Electoral Review Commission met on September 28, it declared that the returns in Caborca, Cananea, Ures, and Magdalena showed "grave infractions" of the electoral law and the towns would have to hold new elections for councilmen on December 3.<sup>137</sup>

The defeated candidate in Cananea claimed that he had been cheated out of office,<sup>138</sup> and the Review Board refused

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<sup>134</sup> Copies of decrees, AGES, 3069-2.

<sup>135</sup> Border Report, Aug. 12, 1916, USDS, 812.00/19038.

<sup>136</sup> De la Huerta to all presidents, Sept. 2, 1916, AGES, 3069-1.

<sup>137</sup> De la Huerta's Report to Congress on the municipal elections, AGES, 3071-2; Decree 75, Nov. 4, 1916, AGES, 3069-2; President, Ures to SecSt, Sept. 9, 1916, AGES, 3069-2.

<sup>138</sup> Doherty to SecSt, Sept. 30, 1916, USDS, 812.00/19362.

to seat the winner, C. Margarito Ríos, claiming that he was not eligible for office. Ríos had not been declared ineligible before the election. Ríos and a number of his supporters took to the mountains.<sup>139</sup> He was declared to be an enemy of the cause, and there was a rumor that he and sixteen friends had been captured and executed, and another that he had fled to the United States, but on October 23 Ríos appeared in Hermosillo and made peace with the government.<sup>140</sup>

In Guaymas, the president elect asked for a leave of absence so that the Governor could name someone to the office; the insinuation was that the arrangement was made beforehand.<sup>141</sup> The president of Nogales, Astolfo Cárdenas, took a leave of absence on October 17 to cover his flight. He told the new United States vice-consul in Nogales, Charles W. Doherty, that he would not resume his duties. Cárdenas spoke of a new anti-Carranza movement, still in its formative stages, which would unite all factions opposed to Carranza and all who had fled Mexico in the past

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<sup>139</sup> Doherty to SecSt, Oct. 1, 1916, USDS, 812.00/19362.

<sup>140</sup> Border Report, Oct. 7, 1916, USDS, 812.00/19628; Doherty to SecSt, Oct. 22 & 23, USDS, 812.00/19605 & 19625; Elías to Knabenshue, Oct. 2, 1916, USDS, 812.00/19612.

<sup>141</sup> C. D. Stearns to SecNavy, Oct. 10, 1916, USDS, 812.00/19597.

six years. Obregón would lead the movement, he said, although many people regarded him as ultra-radical; his assistance would be imperative to obtain army support. The president was unaware of Obregón's ambitions, but the General was known to be ambitious and able and might be patriotic enough to consider the country's welfare before his own.<sup>142</sup>

Cárdenas' departure to follow an embryonic political movement developing around Obregón was illustrative of a general feeling in the state. Presidential elections were sometime in the future; already Obregón was being accepted as the leader. An interview conducted by Captain F. G. Knabenshue, the intelligence officer for the Southern Arizona Military District, with Francisco F. Elías, showed the extent of the disaffection of the intelligentsia with the contemporary political scene.<sup>143</sup>

Elías, who had recently resigned as Carranza's financial and purchasing agent in New York and withdrawn his support of Carranza, told Knabenshue that he had concluded that the future of Mexico with Mexicans in control, was hopeless. Jealousy, incompetence, and the "greedy craving to enhance personal ambition at any cost" was the cause

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<sup>142</sup> Doherty to SecSt, Oct. 18, 1916, USDS, 812.00/19608. Cárdenas' action was mysterious; he was Calles' brother-in-law.

<sup>143</sup> Francisco Elías, a first cousin of Calles, was a wealthy Arizona cattleman, a staunch carrancista who had actively smuggled ammunition in 1913 through 1914.

of the present situation, and the country's only salvation lay with the elevation of Obregón. Elías was not certain whether even Obregón was strong enough to change the conditions in Mexico, and he was the strongest man remaining. Many of the leaders were his friends, he said, but the whole structure of the government was rotten.

Elías pointed to the recent elections in Nogales as an example of corruption in the government, where elected officials were not permitted to retain their office. He analyzed the trouble as originating with the Mexican incapacity for self-government, with the dishonesty of the leaders who rose from the ranks, and with envy and suspicion and the love of power and position. Mexicans, he added, did not trust a friend advanced over them, and would undercut him at every opportunity while claiming a surface friendship.<sup>144</sup>

Prior to the municipal elections, De la Huerta had sought in his utopian fashion to eliminate some of the official graft which he knew had been so much a part of preceding administrations. His Decree 69, of August 31, was designed to make the "public employees faithful servants of the people." The decree required all functionaries and employees of the state and its municipalities

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<sup>144</sup> Knabenshue to District Commander, Oct. 2, 1916, USDS, 812.00/19612.

to disclose all of their properties each September, and to be able to prove the origins of that property. New employees and officials were to make the same disclosure the day they took office. To enforce the decree, the employee or functionary was subject to public denouncement for falseness, evasion, or inexactness. The miscreant could be punished by fines up to fifty pesos in national gold, or a sum equal to the value of the hidden property; moreover, to encourage public watchfulness, the denouncer would receive fifty percent of the fine.<sup>145</sup> Needless to say, the decree found little favor.<sup>146</sup>

The political scene in Sonora continued to be dominated by rumored changes and conflicts between upper-echelon officials. In September there were reports that Obregón was ill with stomach trouble, and the Secretary of War and his wife had remarked to friends that he wanted to get away from the political intrigues of Mexico City and back to his farm in Sonora.<sup>147</sup> Information of an alliance between Obregón and

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<sup>145</sup>Decree 69, Aug. 31, 1916, AGES, 3072-1.

<sup>146</sup>Very few examples of disclosures are found in the archives, and those belonged to minor functionaries, such as clerks. The acceptances of appointments never had disclosures filed with them. Once De la Huerta was out of office the decree was apparently ignored.

<sup>147</sup>Border Report, Sept. 16, 1916, USDS, 812.00/19427. An estrangement between Obregón and Carranza must have been noted in Mexico City; Consul General Hanna reported on October 23 that Obregón's relations with the government were

factions opposing Carranza began to arrive in Sonora together with several Obregón cohorts. General Francisco R. Serrano returned to the state, starting rumors that he had come to relieve Calles, whose independent actions made Carranza doubt his loyalty; one of Calles' officers gave credibility to this report when he stated that Calles would neither give up his command nor leave.<sup>148</sup> Ignacio Corella, who was purchasing agent for the army in Sonora, and a Calles intimate, moved the commissary records across the border on October 19, as if preparing for trouble.<sup>149</sup>

Serrano arrived in Empalme and sent for Calles; allegedly, he ordered him from town at once. Calles was peremptorily removed from his command on October 21 and ordered to Mexico City.<sup>150</sup> No reason was announced for his removal, and when he arrived in Agua Prieta, morose and sullen, he denied knowing the reason for his removal.<sup>151</sup>

He left for Mexico City by way of Douglas and Agua

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believed to be adjusted and that there would be no revolt in Sonora for now. Hanna to SecSt, Oct. 23, 1916, USDS, 812.00/19613.

<sup>148</sup> Doherty to SecSt, Oct. 17 & 19, 1916, USDS, 812.00/19557 & 19559.

<sup>149</sup> USS Raleigh to SecNavy, Oct. 21, 1916, USDS, 812.00/19729.

<sup>150</sup> Doherty to SecSt, Oct. 25, 1916, USDS, 812.00/19644.

<sup>151</sup> Cabrera to Aguilar, ND, USDS, 812.00/19723; Border Report, Oct. 28, 1916, USDS, 812.00/19804.

Prieta on October 25. That night, a group calling themselves legalistas, supposedly a new political party opposing Carranza, crossed from the United States to blow up the train carrying Calles from Nogales to Naco. Calles' train had accidentally been derailed and the mine exploded the next day under a mixed freight train.<sup>152</sup> The United States Department of Justice investigated and arrested numerous men who were legalista leaders. With their arrests, that movement lost impetus.<sup>153</sup>

Calles' sudden departure undoubtedly had political significance. During Calles' absence F. G. Knabenshue interviewed General Serrano and Colonel Jesús M. Garza, both intimates of Obregón, in Huatabampo.<sup>154</sup> Serrano declared that he had been sent "to inaugurate a new order and spirit in Mexico." He represented himself as the first emissary

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<sup>152</sup>Asst. Atty. Gen. to SecSt, Nov. 10, 1916, USDS, 812.00/19868; Border Report, Nov. 11, 1916, USDS, 812.00/29952. Alleged backers of the "legalistas" were such diverse individuals as José Yves Limantour, Felipe Angeles, Manuel Bonilla, Maytorena and other dissatisfied revolutionaries. The party had issued a proclamation near Dolores, Sonora in October and claimed to control the eastern edge of the state. Intelligence officer to Comm. Gen., Arizona Dist., Sept. 16, 1916, USDS, 812.00/19786; a copy of their proclamation may be found in USDS, 812.00/19867.

<sup>153</sup>The following material was derived from an interview of Serrano and Garza by Capt. F. G. Knabenshue, the intelligence officer for the Southern Arizona Military District, which was sent to Army Chief of Staff, Oct. 30, 1916, USDS, 812.00/197114.

<sup>154</sup>Border Report, Oct. 21, 1916, USDS, 812.00/19706.

of a political party in its creative stage, who had been sent to spread the doctrine of conservatism, as opposed to the radicalism of some leaders. To Serrano and Garza, Obregón was still the patriot who had served Madero; they did not believe that he had ambitions, except for his country. Serrano stated that Obregón was building a political organization as an instrument to institute reforms, on the advice of a United States military man. As to his future plans, they could not say, because Obregón kept his own counsel.

Garza said that complaints against Calles had flooded Mexico City as the result of the radical decrees he had issued and his anti-foreign rulings, all of which were without the authorization of Carranza. His anti-foreignism was embarrassing to Mexico at the New London conferences. There was also the question of revenues; Sonora was one of the leading mining states, but turned over little revenue to the central government. Calles had supervised all of the state's revenues, paid his army expenses and transmitted the balance to Mexico City. He and De la Huerta received and spent the state's revenues as they saw fit.

Serrano and Garza charged Calles with disclosure of confidential information from the Secretary of War. One instance cited was the announcement of a military expedition to be sent against the recalcitrant Governor of Baja California. The premature disclosure had embarrassed



Obregón, who was in contact with the Governor; Calles was the only man in Sonora who knew of the plans under discussion.

Serrano was also critical of Sonora's government, saying the state was the worst governed in Mexico, when it should be the most progressive. De la Huerta he called a tool of Calles' whose decrees were "visionary and utopian plans for the rule of Mexico by the masses." Rule by the plebeian classes, Serrano believed, was impossible.

There was rejoicing in some circles over Calles' apparent fall from grace, and there was an immediate scramble to prove loyalty to Serrano, the new state military chief.<sup>155</sup> All such actions were premature; Calles was back in Hermosillo on November 14 and resumed his command the next day, with General Serrano retaining command only of the federal troops in the state.<sup>156</sup> Calles promptly established his general headquarters in Hermosillo and held a conference with his generals. On November 16, he announced his candidacy for governor.<sup>157</sup>

On the day he announced his candidacy, Mexico City

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<sup>155</sup>Doherty to SecSt, Nov. 14 & 15, 1916, USDS, 812.00/19706.

<sup>156</sup>Doherty to SecSt, Nov. 16, 1916, USDS, 812.00/19890.

<sup>157</sup>Ibid.

warned the state that 4000 villistas were massed in Chihuahua ready to march through Pulpito Canyon.<sup>158</sup> Calles hurriedly called for twenty thousand volunteers. Most of the soldiers from Empalme and Hermosillo were rushed to Cananea. Calles was convinced that Villa was coming, and began to recondition the old trenches at Agua Prieta, where he established his headquarters.<sup>159</sup> The harvests were in in the Bavispe River Valley, so the farmers there could answer the call, and the military telegraph line reached as far south as Sahuaripa. There was an ammunition shortage due to a United States embargo, imposed when the trouble with Villa began, and because of the Yaqui campaign and the extravagant use of bullets by Mexican soldiers.<sup>160</sup> The troops who were scheduled to go to the east never went; the expected invasion did not immediately materialize, and by the end of December the state appeared completely indifferent to the problems of Durango and Chihuahua.

When Obregón departed for Mexico City in December, 1915, he declared that a vigorous campaign against the

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<sup>158</sup> Doherty to SecSt, Nov. 18, 1916, USDS, 812.00/19904.

<sup>159</sup> USS Maryland to SecNavy, Nov. 18, 1916, USDS, 812.00/19978; Border Report, Dec. 1, 1916, USDS, 812.00/20041.

<sup>160</sup> Border Report, Dec. 2, 1916, USDS, 812.00/20087.

<sup>161</sup> Border Reports, Dec. 23 & 30, 1916, USDS, 812.00/20235 & 20266.

Yaquis would be pushed.<sup>162</sup> That proved to be an overstatement. General Diéguez, who was left in charge of the campaign, placed troops so as to effectively surround the Bacatete Mountains. Consul Simpich went south early in January to visit the American farmers in the Yaqui River Valley and reported that everything in the area had been cleaned out except the land and the irrigation ditches. The campaign, he noted, was proceeding 'with profound deliberation,' and the number of troops engaged and the energy expended was not as large as official reports indicated. The troops waited; Calles said the campaign would begin as soon as sufficient provisions were on hand. The raids continued, and still the troops waited.

Most of the troops were withdrawn during the international trouble, and Calles again promised that the campaign would begin within three months, and again it did not materialize. The state government issued reports about successes and plans, but these did not reflect what was happening in the field. In August, there were reports of

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<sup>162</sup>The following summary of the Yaqui campaign is derived from Border Reports and Reports of the Commander in Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet beginning with USDS, 812.00/17078 of Jan. 1, 1916 through USDS, 812.00/20170 of Dec. 8, 1916. The Sonoran archives contain little material on the campaigns except occasional letters from citizens complaining that the army should be doing more or asking for assistance against the Yaquis. There is much purchasing data.

peace, but then came the news of a severe mauling that the troops had suffered at the hands of the Indians. The Yaquis raided throughout the area which they claimed traditionally, and, when pushed, many of them retreated along an Indian trail which followed mountain ridges north to Tucson. There they worked on ranches and in mines, using their earnings to buy arms and ammunition, and then headed south in the winter to raid and fight again.

Calles issued several laws during the summer of 1916 in an effort to limit Yaqui mobility and to secure greater knowledge of potential enemies. All Yaquis were required to carry a special passport within the state at all times. They were forbidden to use their customary trails and required to travel only by public road; they could not travel after sunset without special written permission. The mansos ("tame") Yaquis were obligated to advise the authorities of the arrival of any unknown Yaqui at their ranches, and all Yaquis were forbidden to carry arms.<sup>163</sup>

In August, Calles decreed the establishment of a registry of all manso Yaquis in the state, which was to be compiled from information obtained from their employers. After September all mines, municipal presidents, police commissioners, hacendados, chiefs of work camps, ranchers,

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<sup>163</sup> Military Commander of Sonora, June 10, 1916, AGES, 3063.

etc., had to maintain a personal registry of all mansos within his demarcation, and send a monthly copy, revised, to a central registry office. The police passport, which all Yaquis were required to carry at all times, would list each Indian's name, age, residence and personal statistics. Any change of residence had to be registered at both his old and new address. No Yaqui was permitted to buy a railroad ticket; all Yaquis not having passports after October 1 were considered outside the law. Yaquis serving in the army needed no new passports; their army passports would suffice.<sup>164</sup>

By September, however, the Yaqui campaign appeared to be abandoned. The state was negotiating with the Indians, trying to reach a peaceful settlement. An announcement was made of such an agreement on November 10, by which the Indians were to receive agricultural lands, food and clothing; in turn they were to accept the authority of the state, though they were permitted to keep their arms. Serrano continued the talks in an attempt to bring all Yaquis into the agreement, but it was soon evident that

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<sup>164</sup> Notice issued by Calles, Aug. 30, 1916 in Empalme, AGES, 3063. The lists sent by the hacendados were not complete; few apparently complied. From the available lists it did not appear that many Yaquis were in the employ of the haciendas; those who were were usually employees of long standing who had no friendship for the broncos. Monthly reports from the hacendados are found in AGES, 3087.

the peace had been merely a truce. The Yaquis left to confer with others, and each time they returned with greater demands. By the end of the year there was no noticeable progress except that the raids had diminished somewhat.

If Carranza had adhered to the electoral schedule as expressed in the additions to the Plan of Guadalupe of December 12, 1914, he would have called for elections for deputies to the national Congress, which would have incorporated his reform decrees into the Constitution.<sup>165</sup> But somewhere during his peregrinations Carranza had conceived the idea of a new constitution. He had mentioned it casually in the speech made shortly after his arrival in Hermosillo in September, 1913,<sup>166</sup> and had actively propagandized the need for a new constitution in early 1915.<sup>167</sup>

In decrees circulated to the governors on September 14 and September 19, Carranza convoked elections on October 22 for deputies to a convention which would convene in

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<sup>165</sup> The Additions to the Plan of Guadalupe may be found in Fabela, Documentos históricos, IV, 112.

<sup>166</sup> Speech in the Town Hall of Hermosillo, Sept. 24, 1913, as printed in Fabela, Documentos históricos, IV, 88.

<sup>167</sup> Eberhart Victor Niemeyer, Jr., Revolution at Querétaro: The Mexican Constitutional Convention of 1916-1917 (Austin, 1974), 26-29. Niemeyer discusses the movement to convince the constitucionalistas of the need for a new constitution.

Querétaro on November 20 to write a new constitution for the nation. Under the electoral law the states would be divided into districts on the basis of the 1910 census, with each district containing approximately 60,000 people, represented by one deputy. Candidates for deputy had to meet the qualifications established in the Constitution of 1857; in addition they could not have served any of the factions hostile to the constitucionalistas and must have demonstrated, by actions, their adherence to the constitucionalista cause.<sup>168</sup>

Sonora was divided into four electoral districts, centered around Arizpe, Guaymas, Álamos and Altar. Juan de Dios Bojórquez, Flavio A. Bórquez, Ramón Ross and Luis G. Monzón were elected to represent Sonora at the convention.<sup>169</sup> De la Huerta felt that Bojórquez and Bórquez represented his views on labor; moreover, his friend, Froylán C. Manjarrez, the director of his official newspaper, Orientación, was elected to represent a district in

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<sup>168</sup>Decree of Sept. 14, 1916, and Circular 35 of Sept. 19, 1916, AGES, 3069-1.

<sup>169</sup>A few returns may be found in AGES, 3069-1 and 2, and these indicate that candidates were not necessarily districtwide. For instance, Horcasitas was divided into four voting sections. Luis G. Monzón was a candidate in all four sections, R. V. Pesqueira in two, Flavio A. Bórquez in one (where he received five votes) and Eduardo C. García in one. Each voter had to list his age, literacy, occupation, and marital status.

Puebla.<sup>170</sup>

The political situation in Sonora changed abruptly in December. Calles resigned as state military commander, as was necessary if he were to be a candidate for governor, and Serrano took command on December 10. Carranza called De la Huerta to Mexico City, and many expected Calles to be named provisional governor during De la Huerta's absence. Accepting that position would have eliminated Calles from the upcoming governor's race, and he did not accept.<sup>171</sup> Instead, Gilberto Valenzuela, the Government Secretary, was named by Carranza to substitute for De la Huerta.<sup>172</sup>

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<sup>170</sup> De la Huerta's Report to the Congress in May, 1917, AGES, 3132; elections in AGES, 3069-2. Obregón is generally given credit for influencing the radical articles of the Constitution of 1917, but Niemeyer (Revolution at Querétaro, 223-224) believes that his influence has been exaggerated. He was not a delegate and his duties as Secretary of War kept him away from Querétaro most of the time. He was radical, but not as radical as the prominent leaders of the convention, and no committee reports mentioned him. Several delegates asserted that Obregón never exerted any pressure, and his name is not mentioned in the testimonial albums. Only one instance of a cheer for Obregón was recorded by the official newspaper during the two month period. Niemeyer concludes that the Constitution was the work of the delegates themselves, although Obregón's military prestige made him popular and his known political ambitions gave him support from the delegates who were opposed to Carranza. He was closely tied to the radical faction, but his repute as originator of the controversial articles was undeserved, said Niemeyer.

<sup>171</sup> Border Report, Dec. 16, 1916, USDS, 812.00/20192.

<sup>172</sup> Carranza to Valenzuela, Dec. 9, 1916, and notification to the presidents, in AGES, 3062. Enrique Moreno went to Baja California in an official capacity and was replaced by Valenzuela on June 29. Valenzuela resigned in September and was reappointed in November.



The whole of Mexico, not just Sonora, had been experiencing political unrest which was the product of the expected presidential elections. Although no date had yet been set, and they would certainly not be held until after the new constitution was promulgated, the jockeying had begun between the powerful military men, which, as Mexicans knew too well, was the prelude to armed conflict.

Obregón and General Pablo G. González, the two-pre-eminent carrancista generals, had both let it be known that they would be presidential candidates, much to the dismay of Carranza, who felt it was too soon to begin campaigns. It was to counter Obregón that Carranza called De la Huerta to Querétaro in December.<sup>173</sup> Carranza believed himself entitled to the position of president, if only to prove to history that he was a man of order, a characterization that he feared would not be accepted because of his lack of control over some of his revolutionary officers. He requested De la Huerta to persuade Obregón to renounce his presidential aspirations for the present, since the General was still a young man with time to acquire experience that was not wholly military.

De la Huerta and Obregón discussed Carranza's proposal for four hours, and Obregón, after much resistance, yielded.

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<sup>173</sup>The following account of the De la Huerta trip to Mexico City is taken from Guzman Esparza, *Memorias*, 79-81.

De la Huerta informed Carranza of the General's affirmation, but not of his objections. The following day, De la Huerta encountered Obregón and Carranza chatting amiably, and Carranza announced that Obregón had resolved to retire to private life. But, the First Chief added, for his own peace the General wanted the man who succeeded De la Huerta to be one whom he could trust absolutely. Since De la Huerta knew that the candidates for governor in the future election, whenever it should be called, would be Calles and José J. Obregón, he assured Carranza that such would be the case. Carranza demurred, stating that Calles was not a friend of Obregón's. When De la Huerta insisted that he was a friend, Carranza clarified his opposition by the cryptic remark, "Don't forget Naco."<sup>174</sup> De la Huerta protested that Calles had had nothing to do with the incident, but Carranza just as firmly asserted that Calles was involved in planning it, to which statement Obregón assented with a nod. It was a transparent insinuation to De la Huerta that the elections in the state should have a predetermined result. De la Huerta resumed the governorship of Sonora on January 19.

Carranza swore fealty to the new Constitution on

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<sup>174</sup>Before the battle of Naco Obregón declared that he had been the object of an assassination plot. Obregón never mentioned Calles in this context in his book.

January 31, 1917, and under the new Constitution the First Chief had to convoka elections for the presidency and the Congress in the near future.<sup>175</sup> The presidential race attracted little attention, since Carranza had no real opposition, and he was duly elected on March 11.<sup>176</sup>

Three months after the campaigning had begun in Sonora, the new President called for elections for governors. On March 29 De la Huerta announced the call and proclaimed the electoral law, and then convoked elections for governor, legislators, Supreme Court justices and attorney general in an extraordinary election. There would be fifteen deputies chosen who would form a constituent assembly to reform or rewrite the state Constitution in conformity with the Constitution of 1917. The new governor was to hold office from June 30, 1917, to September 15, 1919.<sup>177</sup>

Numerous clubs were formed over the state to promote the candidates. Many expected Álvaro Obregón to actively support his brother, but such did not appear to be the case. Flavio A. Bórquez, ex-delegate to the constitutional

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<sup>175</sup> The president had to be sworn in on May 1, 1917.

<sup>176</sup> Fletcher to SecSt, Mar. 12, 1917, USDS, 812.00/20636.

<sup>177</sup> Decree 91, Mar. 29, 1917, AGES, 3131; Decree 123, Mar. 29, 1917, AGES, 3115. The vice-governorship had been suppressed by Decree 73, Oct. 27, 1916, as being a source of trouble. Decree found in AGES, 3131.

convention at Queretaro, commented on that assumption in a broadside published in March, billed as an "Alert to the Sonorans."

I have heard this commentary frequently, that General José J. Obregón will win because his brother, the Minister of War, will impose him. This is a triple calumny

- 1) because Álvaro Obregón is a true democrat and incapable of such crimes
- 2) to the revolutionary, for his bloodshed for the right to vote has been in vain
- 3) to the People because it considers them still capable of accepting the system of impositions.

Neither Calles nor Obregón are watching those who do not support them.<sup>178</sup>

Bórquez told the voters to vote with confidence for the candidate of their choice.

José J. Obregón's campaigners had very little to offer the public. Their candidate promised to restore saloons and priests and to work harmoniously with Carranza,<sup>179</sup> but José J. Obregón was a nonentity who basked in the reflected glory of his younger brother. He was attacked as a military man who had abandoned Álamos; as a bad municipal president in the Río Mayo area who caused much suffering; as an immoderate politician given to temper when someone disagreed

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<sup>178</sup>Issued in Hermosillo, Mar. 6, 1917, AGES, 3131. Observers in the United States did not believe that Obregón was offering any encouragement to his brother; in fact, they believed that he had asked him to withdraw from the race. Border Report, Apr. 21, 1917, USDS, 812.00/20880.

<sup>179</sup>President, Magdalena to De la Huerta, Feb. 19, 1917, AGES, 3131.

with him. His opponents said his entire political and civil career was a beautiful fantasy forged by paid propagandists, but even they disdained the idea that Álvaro Obregón would lower himself to impose his brother. He had done nothing to fortify the revolution in the state.<sup>180</sup>

Calles, of course, was consistently lauded for his radical decrees, his support of education and the workingman, and as an able statesman and military man. The Francisco I. Madero Club in Hermosillo, formed to back Calles, utilized the slogan, "Education, Land and Work."<sup>181</sup> Troop movements in January caused speculation that they were made in an effort to control the future elections;<sup>182</sup> and there were those who wanted to maintain a large army to better Calles's chances. There was some question that influence from Mexico City, presumably Carranza's, would prevent Calles' election;<sup>183</sup> but some observers thought he would be elected, no matter who his opponent.<sup>184</sup> There was little overt trouble; in fact, the state was quieter than it had been for three years.<sup>185</sup>

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<sup>180</sup>Flyers found in AGES, 3131, and also in 3137-1.

<sup>181</sup>Letter from president of Francisco I. Madero Club, to De la Huerta, Jan. 15, 1917, AGES, 3131.

<sup>182</sup>Border Report, Jan. 20, 1917, USDS, 812.00/20454.

<sup>183</sup>Border Report, Feb. 17, 1917, USDS, 812.00/20602.

<sup>184</sup>Border Report, Feb. 10, 1917, USDS, 812.00/20568.

<sup>185</sup>Border Report, May 12, 1917, USDS, 812.00/20951.

De la Huerta exhorted the voter to be impartial in the elections, and especially emphasized to the officials that they should conduct free elections.<sup>186</sup> It would take more than an exhortation to assure that the elections were absolutely free, and there was campaign harassment. The northern half of the state was generally conceded to be basically Calles country, and Calles concentrated his campaign there; but Cananea was an exception. In March, a group of workers formed the "United Mine Workers of Cananea," a political club to support Obregón; its president was a radical labor leader. A letter to De la Huerta from the club president on March 23 complained of acts of violence on the part of the local authorities, in spite of the call for neutrality, at some of their rallies. At one meeting the authorities prevented them from cheering for their candidate; at another meeting the municipal treasurer was intimidated when he cheered for Obregón. The club considered that the people of Cananea had not been permitted free expression of their thoughts.<sup>187</sup>

In response to De la Huerta's appeal for details, the municipal president stated that it appeared that the partisans of Obregón and Calles were using foul language and

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<sup>186</sup>Orientación Extra, no date, found in AGES, 3137-1.

<sup>187</sup>Border Report, Mar. 24, 1917, USDS, 812.00/20764; Pilar Hernández to De la Huerta, Mar. 23, 1917, AGES, 3131.

were called to order by the police. The president, to prove his neutrality, said that he had heard that a policeman had cheered a candidate, and "as this was irregular, I ordered the Chief to remove him as soon as it could be established who the policeman was."<sup>188</sup>

José J. Obregón complained that a Cananea supporter had been called before the district court, on what he supposed was a political charge, and asked for guarantees for him and other Obregón partisans.<sup>189</sup> The president insisted that the summons was for a purely civil matter, the payment of the professional license fee. The president declared that everyone tried to evade paying their taxes and obligations now by saying demands for payment were politically inspired.<sup>190</sup>

De la Huerta had ordered the presidents to give free rein to the different political factions as long as they did not disturb the public tranquility.<sup>191</sup> The president of Cananea decided that the meetings there had become a

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<sup>188</sup> President, Cananea, to De la Huerta, Apr. 2, 1917, AGES, 3131. The president was a callista, imposed after the September elections.

<sup>189</sup> J. J. Obregón to De la Huerta, Apr. 12, 1917, AGES, 3131.

<sup>190</sup> President, Cananea to De la Huerta, Apr. 12, 1917, AGES, 3131.

<sup>191</sup> First Official in charge of Justice to all presidents, Apr. 11, 1917, AGES, 3131.

threat, and forbade all political rallies because they had become arenas for the mutual exchange of insults. At the last meeting there was a display of arms.<sup>192</sup> The Governor informed the president that he could understand the reasons for his actions, but all demonstrations had to be permitted, they should be kept orderly, and the police should collect any arms in evidence. Political rallies could not be forbidden until May 13,<sup>193</sup> nor could there be a posting of inspectors at the meetings even though it was done at the request of the two factions.<sup>194</sup> The trouble in Cananea culminated with the accusation from the president that one of Obregón's supporters had arrived and was provoking disorders; he thought it would be prudent if De la Huerta called the provocator to Hermosillo before worse trouble ensued.<sup>195</sup> The Governor instructed the Chief of Military Operations to handle the situation.<sup>196</sup>

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<sup>192</sup> President, Cananea to De la Huerta, Apr. 26, 1917, AGES, 3131.

<sup>193</sup> De la Huerta to president, Apr. 27, 1917, AGES, 3131.

<sup>194</sup> President, Cananea, to SecSt, Apr. 17, 1917, AGES, 3131.

<sup>195</sup> President, Cananea, to De la Huerta, May 6, 1917, AGES, 3131.

<sup>196</sup> De la Huerta to president, May 7, 1917, AGES, 3131. The incident at Cananea was the only record of pre-election disturbances found in the state archives.



Election day, however, had no disturbances, and Calles won by a very substantial majority.<sup>197</sup> At six o'clock on the evening of June 29, after verifying an inventory of all properties in the state offices, Calles took the oath of office.<sup>198</sup>

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<sup>197</sup>Based on the incomplete election returns found in AGES, 3131, Hermosillo showed 1271 votes for Calles to 497 for Obregon; Nogales, Calles 628, Obregon 235; Sinoqui, Baviacora, Fronteras, Huepac, Satic, Naco and Cucurpe reported unanimous support of Calles. Obregon carried Alamos, Ortiz and Guaymas. Only Cananea had a real contest; the vote there favored Calles 1422 to Obregon's 1209. One interesting item found also in this file raises the question of official backing for Calles. There is a detailed bill for \$77.65 (pesos) from a Nogales hotel for expenses incurred by Calles during the campaign which was sent to the Governor in October, 1917.

<sup>198</sup>An inventory of the physical properties of the state offices, down to the last spittoon, curtain and inkwell, was customarily made by the departments and signed by the incoming governor, undoubtedly a hangover from the Spanish residencias. A copy of the inventory signed by Calles is in AGES, 3125.

CHAPTER VI  
THE ASCENDANCY OF SONORA IN MEXICAN  
POLITICS: 1917-1920

While De la Huerta was en route from Mexico City in January, 1917, Obregón telegraphed him to find him suitable lodgings in Hermosillo. De la Huerta found a house close to the Government Palace which he thought adapted to the heat of an Hermosillo summer.<sup>1</sup> The renovation of the house opened conjecture about the Secretary's imminent return to help his brother in his campaign.<sup>2</sup> Obregón denied persistent rumors that he had resigned until April when it leaked that he was ill and his resignation would be effective May 1,<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Guzmán Esparza, Memorias, 81.

<sup>2</sup> Chapman to SecSt, Feb. 17, 1917, USDS, 812.00/20599.

<sup>3</sup> Border Report, Apr. 7, 1917, USDS, 812.00/20814; Cobb to SecSt, Apr. 9, 1917, USDS, 812.00/20775. Reportedly, Obregón had resigned for unspecified health reasons four months before, but Carranza had refused to accept the resignation. The reason for his later resignation was also stated as health, and Carranza allegedly agreed to accept it if Obregón would go to Spain. Border Report, May 12, 1917, USDS, 812.00/20951. Another motivation was his possible lack of control over the generals. Pablo González had ordered some soldiers shot in Cuernavaca against Obregón's orders. Obregón had wanted to bring him before a military court, but Gonzalez insisted he had received the telegraphed order after the deed. Lawyers representing Obregón and Carranza discussed the case, then Carranza

De la Huerta notified the authorities in Álamos and Navojoa and the railroad stops south of Guaymas of Obregón's expected arrival date so that they might plan ceremonies for the General's return. Obregón reached Guaymas on June 11 with his family, escorting the body of his old friend, Colonel Alfredo Murillo, for burial in Álamos.<sup>4</sup>

After his quick trip to the south, Obregón reached Hermosillo. He was so angry with the legislature's official proclamation of Calles as governor, that he took out his bad humor on the house chosen by De la Huerta, criticizing the furniture as old and ugly, then declaring, Let's go to a hotel." He stayed several days in the hotel before moving into his sister-in-law's home, where he dictated his book, Ocho mil kilómetros en campaña.<sup>5</sup>

Obregón remained out of the public eye for several months, except to create a stir north of the border with an

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decided to settle it himself. Obregón did not feel that he had the power to enforce military discipline as he desired, and resigned. Carlos Barrera, Obregón; Estampas de un caudillo (Mexico, D.F., 1957) 84-85.

<sup>4</sup>De la Huerta to municipal presidents, Álamos and Navojoa, June 3 and 10, 1917, AGES, 3132. Álamos prepared the celebration and memorial and sent the bill for 222.02 pesos to the state. De la Huerta credited the amount to the treasury account of Álamos, but the town had borrowed the money, so it received permission to take it from town taxes. De la Huerta to president, June, 1917, AGES, 3132.

<sup>5</sup>Guzmán Esparza, Memorias, 81-82.

anti-American speech at a military dinner in Guaymas.<sup>6</sup> His health problem had flared up again and his family urged him to go to New York for treatment.<sup>7</sup> He assented, but before going, he announced the opening of a business office to handle all kinds of imports and exports, giving preference to the export of garbanzos and cattle and to the import of machinery. He would also act as a real estate broker.<sup>8</sup> He went to New York for treatment in November.<sup>9</sup>

The issuance of two radical labor decrees by De la Huerta during his term led to shut-downs in the mines in El Tigre and Cananea during the spring and summer of 1917.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>6</sup>Lawton to SecSt, July 4, 1917, USDS, 812.00/21092. Obregón was quoted as saying that the United States army was insignificant and had no general field officers of merit, including General Pershing. The speech was published in Nogales but was denied by Obregón's friends.

<sup>7</sup>Border Report, July 25, 1917, USDS, 812.00/21221.

<sup>8</sup>Obregón to Soriano, in AGES, 3147. Consul Lawton (Sept. 12, 1917, USDS, 812.00/21282) refers to Obregón's export concession and Calles' opposition to it as if he had been granted an exemption from duties by Carranza. No evidence was found of this; Obregón controlled garbanzo exports through the formation of a cooperative, and was by no means the only broker in Sonora.

<sup>9</sup>Border Report, Nov. 24, 1917, USDS, 812.00/21534. In December, Lawton was assigned by the Department of State to observe and report on Obregón's activities. He reported that Obregón seemed to have no interest in politics at present. He had a badly inflamed leg, which Lawton diagnosed as syphilitic. Lawton to SecSt, Jan. 15, 1918, USDS, 812.00/21668.

<sup>10</sup>Decree 71, Oct. 10, 1916, AGES, 3063; Decree 97, June 16, 1917, AGES, 3129-2.

Calles remained in office only long enough to conduct negotiations with the companies, and succeeded in settling differences at El Tigre.<sup>11</sup> On July 13, the legislature granted him a leave of absence for a hurried trip to Mexico City for a conference on military matters called by Carranza. The legislature unanimously selected De la Huerta to serve as interim governor during Calles' thirty days of leave.<sup>12</sup> De la Huerta took over on July 14, and Calles returned on July 28 to request a prorogation of his leave, which was granted on July 30.<sup>13</sup> De la Huerta had already received orders to report to Mexico City before his July selection, and Cesareo G. Soriano, the deputy from Cananea, was named the new interim governor.<sup>14</sup>

De la Huerta returned to serve as Sonora's First Official in Government once more, but in November, Carranza named him Consul General in New York, after the Mexican consul was expelled for giving Mexican passports to Germans and Austrians. De la Huerta also carried instructions to aid Ambassador Bonillas with problems relating to Mexican

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<sup>11</sup>Lawton to SecSt, July 16, 1917, USDS, 812.00/21141.

<sup>12</sup>Boletín Oficial, July 25, 1917, Laws 2 & 3. First Official of Government to De la Huerta, July 24, 1917, AGES, 3125.

<sup>13</sup>Law 6, July 30, 1917, AGES, 3125.

<sup>14</sup>Serrano to De la Huerta, July 12, 1917, AGES, 3125.

neutrality.<sup>15</sup>

The new acting governor, Cesareo G. Soriano, was known as a Calles man from the days of the conflict with Maytorena, and everyone knew he would be speaking for Calles in everything he did. Calles' leave was a technical resignation, which permitted him to assume military command in the state. Soriano had been the General Customs officer at Naco and Agua Prieta, Calles' campaign manager, and he had directed Calles' program in the legislature. With Soriano in the governor's chair, Calles was preparing for a military campaign; no one knew just where, but presumably it would be against the Yaquis.<sup>16</sup>

The Yaquis had been peaceful during the first four months of the year. They were reported to be demanding the

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<sup>15</sup>Guzmán Esparza, Memorias, 102-105.

<sup>16</sup>Lawton to SecSt, Aug. 4, 1917, USDS, 812.00/21179; Hdqts., Nogales Sub-Dist., Aug. 4, 1917, USDS, 812.00/21206. An article published in Heraldo de Mexico, of Los Angeles, blasted Soriano. It stated that he, as Administrator of Customs at Agua Prieta, together with R. V. Pesqueira, had shipped thousands of cattle of "reactionary origins," by which means they acquired a fortune. In early 1914, a confiscated mining property was put under Soriano's administration. He was supposed to exploit and sell the mine's production and turn over the proceeds to the state. The author of the article, who identified himself as a former member of the garrison at the mine, claimed that the funds turned over to the state, after eight months of bonanza production, were only \$2000.00. Article, no date, received by the Governor's office on Aug. 6, 1917, AGES, 3132.

recovery of their lands held by the Richardson Construction Company, and threatened to unite to drive out Mexicans and foreigners from their lands.<sup>17</sup> They were being fed by the state, but were becoming increasingly restless, and on May 17 they revolted.

The prime reason for the new revolt lay in the failure of the government to supply the provisions promised. The Indians had requested four carloads of provisions; Calles sent one and the Indians accused the distributors of selling the balance in the public markets.<sup>18</sup> There were also reports of a threat to surround the Indians peacefully encamped at Lencho and massacre them.<sup>19</sup> Calles rushed troops south to avert the new war, but in the meantime, Yaquis at Vítam, Tórin, Lencho, Pótam and Cruz de Piedra battled the troops there and took to the hills, carrying off the women and girls of the troops they had been fighting.<sup>20</sup>

Calles began concentrating troops for a new campaign, but he had too few to stop the attacks in the eastern part of the Yaqui territory.<sup>21</sup> Early in October he declared the

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<sup>17</sup>Border Report, Feb. 3, 1917, USDS, 812.00/20536.

<sup>18</sup>Lawton to SecSt, Nov. 26, 1917, USDS, 812.00/21513. Lawton encloses a letter from Luis Espinoza to L. E. Gould in Tucson.

<sup>19</sup>Border Report, June 9, 1917, USDS, 812.00/21044.

<sup>20</sup>Border Report, June 7, 1917, USDS, 812.00/21122.

<sup>21</sup>Border Report, Sept. 1, 1917, USDS, 812.00/21279.

decree of August 30, 1916, again in effect because of the renewed state of war.<sup>22</sup> He also called for volunteers and pledged a war of extermination against the Indians.<sup>23</sup> The call for volunteers caused an exodus of males from the state, and Calles forbade all men aged sixteen to sixty to leave.<sup>24</sup>

Calles' leave was up at the end of October, and he sought an extension; but the legislature was not anxious to grant another. When it was not automatically forthcoming, as it had been in the past, Calles began to apply pressure in the chamber. Calles was angry with the delay, and Soriano reprimanded him for trying to influence the lawmakers. Calles heatedly denied ever applying any pressure to gain their support or to have them name anyone suggested by him for office. He had exchanged ideas with them, as would be done in any group of cohorts, he explained; he swore that he preferred the health of the state to the post of governor and would resign if necessary. Any motives the legislature might have for delay he regarded as trifling.

Later that same morning, Soriano telegraphed Calles that he had talked to the deputies and that they had agreed

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<sup>22</sup>Notice, Oct., 1917, AGES, 3137-1.

<sup>23</sup>Flyer, "To the People of Sonora," Oct. 1917, issued by Calles and Soriano, AGES, 3137-1.

<sup>24</sup>Border Report, Nov. 10, 1917, USDS, 812.00/21485.



to prolong the leave; then suddenly they notified him that they would not. Soriano was as mystified as Calles with their changed attitude, since it was evident that Calles was needed to fight the Yaquis.<sup>25</sup> The problem was solved November 14 after the deputies visited Calles in Nogales.<sup>26</sup> Calles' leave was extended to July 30, 1918, and Soriano remained as interim governor.<sup>27</sup>

Calles' leave was extended in November so that he might continue the campaign against the Yaqui, which so far had resulted in one very bloody encounter at Suaqui de Bátuc. State troops usually lost three times as many men as did the Indians in the encounters, and Calles increased his forces by the conscription of unemployed men in Cananea. He sent word to Cananea that he had work in the south for the unemployed, and when the men reached Guaymas, they were drafted into the army. Word that the first group of conscripts had been sent without training against the Indians and were overwhelmingly defeated stirred hate for Calles throughout the state.

By the end of 1917, conditions in the Yaqui country were much worse than at the beginning of the year; raids

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<sup>25</sup>Calles to Soriano and answer, Nov. 13, 1917, AGES, 3125. The origin of the quarrel can only be assumed; the necessary correspondence prior to Nov. 13 is missing.

<sup>26</sup>Soriano to Calles, Nov. 13, 1917, AGES, 3129-2.

<sup>27</sup>Law 20, Nov. 14, 1917, AGES, 3125.

were continuing, and the army was doing nothing. Often the troops would retire without fighting, saying that they lacked ammunition. Effectively, the territory south of Hermosillo was in Yaqui hands, except along the railroads, and that was not safe from marauders.<sup>28</sup>

With Calles preoccupied in making eternal preparations for a campaign against the Yaquis, the state was politically quiet. Gubernatorial elections were still many months away, Obregón, back from his medical treatment in the United States, was busy with his very lucrative business, and De la Huerta had left to assist Carranza in Mexico. Little constructive legislation was under consideration until the spring of 1918 when new labor laws were passed to conform to the new Constitution, which was promulgated in October, 1917. Except for Yaqui incursions and bandit troubles, the state was quiet.

Calles took Sonoran troops to Nayarit in late May, 1918 to conduct a campaign against the villistas. He then went to Mexico City where he discussed agricultural problems with Carranza.<sup>29</sup> In his absence there were

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<sup>28</sup>Border Reports, Nov. 10 & Dec. 1 & 15, 1917, USDS, 812.00/21485, 21534 & 21592.

<sup>29</sup>The reason for Calles' trip to Nayarit is unclear; he spoke only of a campaign against rebels. Correspondence between Calles and Soriano, June 3 through June 11, 1918; Border Reports, June 10 & 22, July 1 & 20, 1918, USDS, 812.00/22068, 22078, 22102 & 22107. He reported to Soriano on June 26 that he had discussed agricultural matters with

conjectures about who would seek the governorship the following year, and De la Huerta's and Hill's names were mentioned.<sup>30</sup> Current with these were rumors that De la Huerta would seek a senatorial seat, which was denied, then affirmed.<sup>31</sup> Congressional elections were held on July 28, and De la Huerta was elected senator without returning to Sonora to campaign.<sup>32</sup>

Calles returned to Sonora on July 7, and was quickly caught up in a feud with Soriano. Soriano had been receiving numerous complaints from municipal presidents in isolated small towns about confiscations of properties, especially animals, by local garrisons. Soriano in April had requested Calles to restrain General Arnulfo Gómez from intimidating civilians and mixing in civil matters, but the trouble had continued.<sup>33</sup> Later complaints apparently

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Carranza, including an irrigation project around Hermosillo; found in AGES, 3233.

<sup>30</sup> Simpich to SecSt, June 10, 1918, USDS, 812.00/22068.

<sup>31</sup> Border Report, June 29, 1918, USDS, 812.00/22095; Simpich to SecSt, July 1, 1918, USDS, 812.00/22102.

<sup>32</sup> Border Report, Aug. 10, 1918, USDS, 812.00/22107. De la Huerta did not discuss any efforts made by him to be elected; he mentions only that he had a leave of absence, which was apparently immediately granted. The electoral law for the national elections suspended political rights for one year if a qualified male failed to vote without a good excuse. If the voter missed another election within five years he would be fined in addition. Law found in AGES, 3215.

<sup>33</sup> These civilian complaints and responses to them are found in AGES, 3230.

elicited no positive actions from Calles, until Soriano made them public when he left office.<sup>34</sup> He sent a circular telegram to all municipal presidents advising them not to obey any orders given them by military authorities; they were to obey only those emanating from the superior civil government. If the military continued to meddle, the presidents were to notify him so that he could bring the matter before the Chief of Military Operations or the Secretary of War.<sup>35</sup> On July 15, Soriano asked Calles, "in view of the frequency of these crimes in areas removed from high ranking officers, and where they arbitrarily dispose of the goods of humble farmers," to give orders to the effect that those confiscations should cease.<sup>36</sup>

One of Soriano's orders went to the president of Huatabampo, and countermanded an order given by Calles for the arrest of a local citizen, not a military man, on an illegal gambling charge. Several others ordered imprisoned on the same charge by Calles were released. When Calles returned to office, he immediately ordered the documents in the case brought before the legislature, and Soriano was implicated for granting a gambling license and receiving a bribe. His case was assigned to the Supreme

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<sup>34</sup>Border Report, Aug. 3, 1918, USDS, 812.00/22107.

<sup>35</sup>Soriano to all presidents, July 13, 1918, AGES, 3229.

<sup>36</sup>Soriano to Calles, July 15, 1918, AGES, 3230.

Court, as he was a member of the legislature, and the Court granted him an amparo on November 21, 1918.<sup>37</sup> In the meanwhile, General Gómez issued a public statement discounting the charges against himself by playing up the public wrongdoing of others.<sup>38</sup> Calles' return to office did not stop the complaints from municipal authorities; while he promised them to move the offending detachment or remove the commanding officer,<sup>39</sup> little was done.

As 1918 drew to a close, politics became the center of interest once more. More and more De la Huerta's name came to be mentioned as Calles' choice for the governorship; through De la Huerta Calles hoped to perpetuate his hold on the state.<sup>40</sup> Although elected senator in July, De la Huerta was still in New York when he began to receive proposals from his friends that he become a candidate for governor of Sonora. He refused to consider the idea at

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<sup>37</sup> Documentation for the exchanges between the presidents and Soriano, Calles, the legislature and the Attorney General, are found in AGES, 3311. The writ of amparo (literally "justice") has no equivalent in American law; the nearest approach is the writ of habeas corpus. Any Mexican citizen who feels that some legal proceeding impinges on his constitutional rights can appeal to the court to grant him an amparo which would stop such infringement, but not the development of a case against him by the courts.

<sup>38</sup> Manifesto, Aug. 21, 1918, AGES, 3229.

<sup>39</sup> Calles to president, Pílares de Nacozari, Oct. 8, 1918, AGES, 3230.

<sup>40</sup> Border Reports, Nov. 23 & Dec. 28, 1918, USDS, 812.00/22401 & 22448.

first, thinking he could serve Mexico better in New York; but the ending of World War I on November 11, 1918 brought renewed pleas, and he agreed to enter the race. He would not return to Mexico to campaign without the prior approval of Carranza, however, so his friends asked the other Sonoran Senators to speak to Carranza in his behalf. Carranza reluctantly agreed.<sup>41</sup>

In Sonora, many of the old revolutionaries, such as Francisco R. Serrano, Luis Monzón and Juan de Dios Bojórquez, united to form the "Sonoran Revolutionary Party." The new party had a heavy labor representation and De la Huerta was a favorite with the labor element. All of the delegations except one favored his candidacy.<sup>42</sup>

De la Huerta returned to Mexico City from the United States in mid-December; by then other candidates had entered the race in Sonora.<sup>43</sup> General Ignacio L. Pesqueira had retired from the army and announced his candidacy, presumably supported by Carranza; the other candidates were Conrado Gaxiola, the brother of Obregón's business partner;

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<sup>41</sup>Guzmán Esparza, Memorias, 106-107.

<sup>42</sup>Rivera, La Revolución, 496-497. Rivera, who was present at the birth of the party, denied that Calles influenced the delegates. It is not certain that he was a member, although Rivera said that the party asked him for a contribution (Ibid., 499).

<sup>43</sup>Border Report, Jan. 4, 1919, USDS, 812.00/22484.

Miguel Samaniego, who had served under Calles at Naco and Agua Prieta, and Cesareo G. Soriano. The eligibility of De la Huerta and Pesqueira was questionable since under state law a candidate must have been in residence for the past year, but no issue was made of this point. Soriano was quickly eliminated as an important candidate. In an obviously political maneuver, he was recalled by the legislature in January to answer the charges pending against him.

By January, the campaign was well under way, although De la Huerta had not yet arrived in the state. Gaxiola had Obregón's apparent, if not yet public, endorsement, since he traveled in the General's car with his initials "A. O." rather conspicuously marked on the doors.<sup>44</sup> At a rally in Guaymas, Gaxiola was cheered by the civilians present; his speech was followed by that of a military man, who was hissed, and a riot ensued.<sup>45</sup> Gaxiola was a popular candidate, who opposed prohibition.<sup>46</sup> Samaniego also opposed prohibition; in fact, in official circles, he had a reputation as a drunk. A defeat suffered at Villa's hands had been attributed to the fact that he had been drunk when

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<sup>44</sup>Guzmán Esparza, Memorias, 108.

<sup>45</sup>Border Report, Feb. 16, 1919, USDS, 812.00/21614.

<sup>46</sup>Border Report, Feb. 1, 1919, USDS, 812.00/22497.

Villa surprised him.<sup>47</sup>

Carranza had delayed De la Huerta in Mexico City, on one pretext or another, after he made his report on his work in New York. De la Huerta got the impression that the President was trying to delay him until after the elections, which were scheduled for April 27, and so he left for Sonora without advising Carranza. He arrived in Sonora on February 5.<sup>48</sup>

In February, Calles called for more troops to fight the Yaquis; a purely political move, as everyone was aware.<sup>49</sup> State troops, which had been moved hither and yon without apparent reason, crowded Hermosillo, until Pesqueira made a special trip to Mexico City to get Carranza to order Calles to move the troops out for the elections.<sup>50</sup> To everyone's surprise, Calles did move them

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<sup>47</sup> Guzmán Esparza, *Memorias*, 108. De la Huerta maintained that Calles was supporting Samaniego; Obregón admittedly contributed money to Gaxiola.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 108-109. The explanation for Carranza's actions lay in the impending presidential elections. Most Mexicans were aware that Obregón and Pablo González would be candidates for the presidency. The nation also knew that Carranza was inexorably opposed to the military in politics, and neither candidate could expect his support. Sonora, as Obregón's home state, would assuredly support him in the presidential race, unless Carranza controlled the state government. The President, aware of the friendship between Obregón and De la Huerta, knew De la Huerta's support would go to the General.

<sup>49</sup> Border Report, Feb. 21, 1919, USDS, 812.00/22535.

<sup>50</sup> Dyer to SecSt, Mar. 18, 1919, USDS, 812.00/22586.



out, although no one believed they would remain out.<sup>51</sup> Calles began moving in unemployed laborers to replace the soldiers,<sup>52</sup> but most of the troops had returned in time for the elections.<sup>53</sup>

As the campaign entered April, the repressions by the Callista officials became overt. Twenty followers of Gaxiola were arrested in Nogales after several large signs were painted on the cliffs above the town. De la Huerta's followers armed themselves, ostensibly because of fear of the Yaquis,<sup>54</sup> but more probably because of an altercation with Samaniego earlier in Cananea, or the several attempts made on the candidate's life.<sup>55</sup> Later, in Huatabampo, he was attacked by an assailant with a machete, who was killed in the ensuing scuffle when he fell and his own horse stepped on his head.<sup>56</sup> One of Gaxiola's aides was killed

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<sup>51</sup>Border Report, Apr. 5, 1919, USDS, 812.00/22618.

<sup>52</sup>Border Report, Apr. 12, 1919, USDS, 812.00/22618.

<sup>53</sup>Border Report, May 17, 1919, USDS, 812.00/22703.

<sup>54</sup>Border Report, Apr. 19, 1919, USDS, 812.00/22618.

<sup>55</sup>Guzmán Esparza, Memorias, 131-135.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid., 134-135. Dyer reported a fight between two factions in Huatabampo on April 15, with three killed. He also reported circulars saying De la Huerta would not be permitted to speak there or in Navojoa. USDS, 812.00/22626. De la Huerta did not hold a rally; Pesqueira's followers had been in possession of the bandstand since the night before, so De la Huerta spoke in one corner of the square.

in Nogales; another was deported to the United States and his business office searched by town officials in an effort to find some evidence to use against him, which would thereby discredit Gaxiola. A crowd gathered during the excitement, and Obregón, whose office was nearby, spoke to the assembly, declaring that political persecutions must stop and pleading with his followers to maintain peace. There were also reports of a clash at Altar in which several persons were shot, on April 17. News of these incidents reached the ears of the United States' consuls through private sources, for state authorities made every effort to suppress them.<sup>57</sup>

Election day was peaceful. It was assumed that De la Huerta had won, but it was a month before the official announcement of the returns. De la Huerta led the field with 18,528 votes; Pesqueira received 10,079; Gaxiola, 6785, and Miguel Samaniengo, 3152.<sup>58</sup>

Carranza called Calles to come to the capital early in May. The Governor wired Obregón, who was in Huatabampo, on May 5, that he was asking for a leave of absence the next day because he had received "new news" from Mexico City.

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<sup>57</sup>Dyer to SecSt, Apr. 18, 1919, USDS, 812.00/22642.

<sup>58</sup>Dyer to SecSt, May 22, 1919, USDS, 812.00/22732.

In a resolution presented to the legislature on May 6, Calles requested leave for a trip to Mexico City and one hundred pesos daily for expenses. The leave and the expenses were granted for thirty days, and General Miguel Piña, who had been serving as State Secretary, was named as interim governor. Obregón had wanted badly to speak privately with Calles, but the Governor had no time to delay if he were to catch the next boat from Mazatlán.<sup>59</sup>

From Mexico City, Calles wired Piña on May 16 that Carranza wanted to utilize his services as the Secretary of Commerce and Industry. Since he judged it "necessary in these moments to collaborate with the President," he solicited a leave of absence for the remainder of his term; but promised to return and personally turn over his office on September 1. That same day he again wired Piña to tell De la Huerta to come to Mexico City quickly; that he could help the state best by being in the capital.

Piña, however, had bad news for Calles. The deputies, he said, were not disposed to give any further leave because of a fear of the resurgence of Villa's power.<sup>60</sup> But

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<sup>59</sup>Telegrams exchanged between Calles and Obregón, as well as Laws 70, 71 and 72 granting the leave and expenses and naming the interim governor, are found in AGES, 3298. For some reason the officials in Sonora began traveling the long route by boat from Mazatlán to Manzanillo after Perahing entered Mexico, instead of the customary route through Nogales.

<sup>60</sup>There were rumors, which had no apparent basis, that

the fear of Villa was not the main objection. The deputies felt that Calles' place was in Sonora, filling the office to which he had been elected. Calles telegraphed the president of the legislature, reassuring him that there was no danger to the state, and that if something should happen, the President had promised to send him back.

Piña called De la Huerta to talk to the deputies to try to persuade them in Calles' behalf, but he had no success. He reported to Calles on May 17 that they were discussing the subject heatedly, and the concensus was that the Governor should make a quick trip to Sonora to discuss pending business, a matter of twelve days for the round trip. He suggested that Calles could go ahead and accept the appointment, then return and settle state business. Calles objected to coming back, and insisted that all unfinished business could be handled by telegraph. He argued to no avail; the deputies were adamant. They informed Piña on May 17 that they had agreed not to grant an extension. Nevertheless, Calles was sworn in as Secretary of Commerce, Industry and Labor on May 21. He left Mexico City on May 29, arrived in Hermosillo on June 7, and took office as

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the Yaquis were cooperating with the villistas. Those familiar with the Yaquis denied the possibility. Border Report, June 7, 1919, USDS, 812.00/22752. Antonio G. Rivera mentioned the growth of villismo in Chihuahua. Rivera to Calles, May 16, AGES, 3298. Villa was known to be in the vicinity of Ciudad Juárez.

governor again on June 8.<sup>61</sup>

Presidential elections were to be held in 1920, and Obregón opened his presidential campaign in Nogales on the evening of May 20, 1919 with a rally;<sup>62</sup> despite Carranza's plea to wait until closer to election day. Obregón had a slogan, "Do exactly the opposite of what the enemy wants you to do."<sup>63</sup> Assured of the support of the Sonoran Revolutionary Party, which was announced on May 31, he issued a political manifesto to the nation the following day.<sup>64</sup>

In the meantime, De la Huerta had gone to Mexico City to serve a small portion of his senatorial term in the interim between his election as governor and his inauguration. Three of his fellow senators proposed to him in late May that he be a candidate for the presidency of Mexico. He reacted adversely, but found that word of the proposal had

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<sup>61</sup> From a series of telegrams exchanged by Calles, Piña, De la Huerta and various deputies, beginning May 16, 1919, all contained in AGES, 3298.

<sup>62</sup> Dyer to SecSt, May 21, 1919, USDS, 812.00/22733. Dyer did not state how Obregón opened his campaign; it is usually stated as beginning on June 1.

<sup>63</sup> Miguel Alessio Robles, Idolos caídos (Mexico, D.F., 1931), 173.

<sup>64</sup> Telegram from F. R. Serrano, director of the SRP to the president of the Liberal Constitutional Party in Mexico City on May 31, 1919, as printed in Alfonso Taracena, La Verdadera Revolución Mexicana: sexta etapa (1918 a 1920) (Mexico, D.F., 1961), 111. A copy of Obregón's manifesto may be found in USDS, 812.00/22815.

spread. Carranza, despite the deterioration of their old relationship, now encouraged De la Huerta's candidacy, saying such action would satisfy a Republic that longed for a civilian government. But De la Huerta refused.<sup>65</sup>

Observers of the political scene conjectured that De la Huerta was in Mexico City in behalf of Obregón, noting that as a friend of both Carranza and Obregón he had adjusted differences between them in the past.<sup>66</sup> Their differences were now past adjusting. Obregón had notified Carranza, not unexpectedly, on June 1, that he intended to be a candidate. His political manifesto to the nation, published on the same day, charged Carranza's government with corruption and lack of zeal in pursuing revolutionary goals; needless to say, Carranza was hurt and angry. The President met with the prominent Sonorans in the capital and reproached them for not having told him ahead of time of Obregón's planned attack, but they pleaded that they had not known of his strategy either. Carranza told them that until the publication of the manifesto, he would have supported Obregón.<sup>67</sup>

Carranza acted immediately to counter Obregón. The

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<sup>65</sup> Guzmán Esparza, Memorias, 138-139.

<sup>66</sup> Border Report, June 21, 1919, USDS, 812.00/22752.

<sup>67</sup> Miguel Alessio Robles, Voces de Combate (México, D.F., 1929), 230-231.

"Civil Party" had been formed shortly before, and he and the party founder discussed what avenues to follow. Aid from the army was ruled out; no one knew yet what General Pablo González thought of Obregón's candidacy. Carranza decided that the Civil Party could secure the affiliation of many Sonorans if he offered the candidacy of another Sonoran. De la Huerta had already refused, and Carranza concluded that Ignacio Bonillas, a man of known probity, a sensible, upright man and an intimate friend of Obregón's, would meet their needs. The President thought that even Obregón could support Bonillas.<sup>68</sup>

Although neither Obregón nor González would consider supporting Bonillas, neither was there any love lost between the two generals. González was known to be seeking the presidency, and he and Obregón were soon feuding. González had asked Obregón to sign a pact agreeing to respect the decision of the Congress in the next election and not to use illegal methods for obtaining the vote.<sup>69</sup> Obregón judged the proposal indecorous and "a wound to the democratic spirit," and refused to sign.<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> Alessio Robles, Idolos, 174-175.

<sup>69</sup> Telegram from González to Obregón, June 25, 1919, as printed in Taracena, Sexta etapa, 119.

<sup>70</sup> Obregón to González, July 5, 1919 in Taracena, Sexta etapa, 121-123.

On July 17, the directors of the Liberal Constitutional Party, which had once actively supported Carranza, announced that Obregón would be their candidate, in a meeting held in the home of General Benjamín Hill. Then in September, the smaller Cooperatist Party announced its support as well.<sup>71</sup> In the meantime, De la Huerta had resigned from the Senate at the end of June. He did not return to the state, however, until the end of August, possibly remaining in the capital to serve as a political observer for Obregón. He took the oath of office as governor of Sonora on September 1.<sup>72</sup>

Calles left for Mexico City to assume his cabinet post on October 2.<sup>73</sup> Obregón went to Hermosillo to formally

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<sup>71</sup>For information on the origins and membership of the LCP and the Cooperatist Party, see Cumberland, The Constitutionalist Years, 361-362; and John W. F. Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico; A Chronicle of the Revolution, 1919-1936 (Austin, 1967), 20-21. Hill was possibly one of the party's founders, although little factual material is available about its founding. The party supported Obregón, although he had not solicited its endorsement; indeed he had indicated that he wanted no party endorsements. In July, he did consent for the party to announce its support.

<sup>72</sup>What De la Huerta was doing for two months in Mexico City is open to speculation. Information on his return to Hermosillo is found in AGES, 3298, and includes telegrams exchanged between Calles and Senator Flavio A. Bórquez. Calles, for an unknown reason, urgently desired to contact De la Huerta, who had left the capital.

<sup>73</sup>Yost to SecSt, Oct. 6, 1919, USDS, 812.00/23147.



initiate his campaign.<sup>74</sup> De la Huerta was not among the welcoming committees, nor did he attend the reception given in Obregón's honor. When De la Huerta met him in the central plaza during the Governor's customary evening exercise, Obregón's greeting was chilly. De la Huerta explained that his presence at the reception would have given the meeting an official stamp of approval, and he believed that the governor should appear impartial. In response, Obregón angrily showed him a flyer, printed on the state press, which supported General González. De la Huerta naturally denied knowledge of the publication, but Obregón's rudeness forestalled any attempt at explanation and De la Huerta left abruptly.

The Governor realized what had happened. Two colonels had recently arrived in Hermosillo, commissioned by the Secretary of War to give military instruction in the schools. De la Huerta had furnished them with a house located near the government printing office, and the officers had made friends with the employees. The Governor now knew the truth about their mission.

The following day, Obregón and several friends came to the governmental offices to accuse the Governor's staff of raising the taxes of the obregonistas. De la Huerta

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<sup>74</sup>The following account is derived from Guzmán Esparza, Memorias, 145-146.

explained that the tax increase had been general and applied to everyone, not just obregonistas. Obregón did not believe him, and when he left the state on October 28, did not bother to say goodbye to De la Huerta.

Earlier in October, Carranza, with his retinue, had visited his abandoned properties in Cuatro Ciénegas, Coahuila. The President had continually tried to lure De la Huerta from Obregón's camp with offers of a ministry post. He had sent Roberto V. Pesqueira to invite the Governor to come to Coahuila, but De la Huerta refused to go. He saw this as just another effort to win his endorsement for Carranza's candidate, who would be, Mexico knew, Ignacio Bonillas, ambassador to the United States.<sup>75</sup>

Rumors of Carranza's offer spread through Sonora, and brought protests from the municipal presidents. They pleaded that De la Huerta stay and see the state through the economic crisis it was then undergoing as a result of the Yaqui campaign and a mining slowdown. De la Huerta, who had received extraordinary powers to handle the financial crisis on September 27,<sup>76</sup> replied to all that although he would consider it an honor to serve the President, he was inclined to remain in the state to see it through its

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<sup>75</sup>Guzmán Esparza, 139.

<sup>76</sup>De la Huerta to deputies, Sept. 17, 1919, and Law 3, Sept. 27, 1919, AGES, 3287.

difficulties.<sup>77</sup>

The presidential campaign continued in Sonora amid rumors of weapons stockpiled by Obregón for use if his candidacy should meet serious opposition from Carranza.<sup>78</sup>

There were rumors of a possible clash between Obregón and General González, of Obregón's courting the Yaquis and talk of an uprising to favor Obregón.<sup>79</sup> De la Huerta publicly affirmed his support of Obregón on January 8.<sup>80</sup> But, officially, Obregón could not be a candidate; Carranza had not accepted his resignation from the army, a necessary constitutional preliminary.<sup>81</sup> After Carranza continued to ignore him, Obregón announced he no longer considered himself in the army.<sup>82</sup>

A conference of governors was called for December 20 in Mexico City, supposedly to outline plans for the organization of rurales in all the states; but Carranza's opposition said the purpose was to place the country on a war

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<sup>77</sup> Presidents to De la Huerta, Oct. 13-30, 1919, with replies to each in form letter, AGES, 3298.

<sup>78</sup> Border Report, Oct. 4, 1919, USDS, 812.00/22844.

<sup>79</sup> Border Reports, Oct. 25 & Dec. 27, 1919, USDS, 812.00/23147 & 23307.

<sup>80</sup> Border Report, Jan. 10, 1920, USDS, 812.00/23332.

<sup>81</sup> New York Times, Dec. 18, 1919.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid., Dec. 19, 1919.

footing.<sup>83</sup> De la Huerta said the meeting was called to force the governors to agree on who they would support in the elections. The Governor of Sonora did not attend; he stated he could not without the prior consent of the legislature.<sup>85</sup> He did not state whether he had asked for permission to go.

General Manuel M. Diéguez became the Chief of Operations on the Pacific Coast in February and came to Sonora on an inspection tour at the end of the month.<sup>86</sup> Contemporary with his arrival, new federal troops began to enter the state in small batches, the assumption in the state being that they were there to give Carranza political control of the state. Officers accompanying the troops believed that there would soon be a clash between the state and the federal government.<sup>87</sup> The true purpose of the Diéguez mission was to persuade De la Huerta to demobilize all state troops, which he would not do. Diéguez toured the state by rail amid growing unease and rumors that Carranza intended to set up a military government.

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<sup>83</sup> Ibid., Dec. 7, 1919.

<sup>84</sup> Taracena, Sexta etapa, 199.

<sup>85</sup> Dyer to SecSt, Feb. 9, 1920, USDS, 812.00/23386.

<sup>86</sup> Border Report, Mar. 6, 1920, USDS, 812.00/22890.

<sup>87</sup> Border Report, Mar. 13, 1920, USDS, 812.00/22844.

Calles, from his vantage post in Mexico City, wrote De la Huerta in October, 1919 that

from the moment I arrived in Querétaro, where I met the Chief, I received a strong and disagreeable impression that the Chief of State and all the politicians that accompany the presidential train are entirely against all partisans of General Obregón.<sup>88</sup>

On February 1, he handed his resignation to Carranza, and in a letter to De la Huerta written the same day he noted the President's opposition to Obregón and accused Carranza's administration of being the most corrupt ever to rule Mexico.<sup>89</sup> Carranza accepted the resignation, and Calles returned to Sonora.

The campaign against the Yaquis had continued through 1918 and 1919 as it had in previous years; there were many promises from the government, and little action; in fact, the Yaqui campaign was described as "the richest gold mine in Sonora," a reference to the known graft.<sup>90</sup> The Yaquis were quiet during the cold months of early 1918, but as the weather got hotter, the raids became more and more frequent.

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<sup>88</sup> Calles to De la Huerta, Oct. 27, 1919, as printed in Clodeveo Valenzuela and Amado Chaverri Matamoros, Sonora y Carranza (Mexico, D.F., 1921), 72. Few of the telegrams and documents found in Valenzuela are to be found in the Sonoran archives.

<sup>89</sup> Calles to De la Huerta, Feb. 1, 1920, as printed in Valenzuela, Sonora y Carranza, 77-78.

<sup>90</sup> Taracena, Sexta etapa, 157.

Calles announced that the Yaquis had been defeated and were fleeing early in May,<sup>91</sup> but his announcement, as usual, was premature. Yaqui raids continued.

Depredations became more frequent in December, and there were numerous complaints from the civilians that the troops would not move against the Indians. It was charged that the troops would do nothing because the elimination of the Indians would eliminate the need for troops.<sup>92</sup> The Indians began to raid in the Arizpe district in January, 1919, although the number of raids was exaggerated in the telling, but the rumors served to keep the northern part of the state upset. There were also constant promises that more troops would be sent, but they never arrived.

Federal troops had been in the field against the Indians and had accomplished as little as the state troops. Calles called for more volunteers in February, 1919, but most observers saw the call as a political move.<sup>93</sup> In May, Carranza sent a military inspection team to visit all the states to determine their military needs, and in Sonora, to give special attention to the Yaqui problem.<sup>94</sup> In

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<sup>91</sup>Border Report, Apr. 11, 1918, USDS, 812.00/21885.

<sup>92</sup>Border Report, Feb. 21, 1919, USDS, 812.00/22425.

<sup>93</sup>Border Report, Feb. 21, 1919, USDS, 812.00/22535.

<sup>94</sup>Dyer to SecSt, May 18, 1919, USDS, 812.00/22719;  
Border Report, May 24, 1919, USDS, 812.00/22752.

November, Carranza authorized the formation of a state militia of 2500 men, to be armed and paid for by the central government, for duty against the Yaquis.<sup>95</sup> De la Huerta was in charge of the recruiting, and General Juan Torres S., the federal commander, was named Commander in Chief.<sup>96</sup>

For the first time, in November, 1919, the Yaquis raided to the east of the Bavispe River, in an area which they considered to be outside their territory.<sup>97</sup> By the middle of that month there were indications that the De la Huerta government was making serious attempts to reach a peace settlement with the Yaquis. De la Huerta contacted consul Francis J. Dyer in Nogales to have him try to obtain United States' aid in persuading Carranza to give authority to negotiate with the Indians. The Yaquis, he said, would value United States' approval of the proposed conference. Thirty chiefs and sub-chiefs had attended preliminary meetings already, near Tucson.<sup>98</sup>

De la Huerta wanted the authority from Carranza so that the treaty would be considered faithfully executed and legally binding, since the state would need the help of the

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<sup>95</sup>Border Report, Nov. 8, 1919, USDS, 812.00/22844.

<sup>96</sup>Border Report, Nov. 8, 1919, USDS, 812.00/22844.

<sup>97</sup>Border Report, Nov. 1, 1919, USDS, 812.00/22890.

<sup>98</sup>Dyer to SecSt, Nov. 15, 1919, USDS, 812.00/23205.

government to carry it out. Dyer wanted to assist De la Huerta, but the Secretary of State thought it inadvisable.<sup>99</sup>

De la Huerta received Carranza's assent, and preliminary negotiations began between the government--represented by the new military commander in the state, General Juan José Ríos, the outgoing commander General Torres S. and Francisco Manzo, representing De la Huerta--and the Yaqui chiefs at Oroz Station on January 17. Formal talks took place on January 25.<sup>100</sup> The results were not publicly announced, but it was understood that the national government would not back the state's efforts to make peace with the Yaquis.<sup>101</sup> De la Huerta had guided, cajoled and accommodated the Indians. He had designated the places of concentration for the talks, administered the money and the food to the assembled tribes, chosen the lands that the tribes would divide and arranged the most reasonable, complete and acceptable treaty with the Yaquis that had yet been produced. But as he feared would happen, Carranza disavowed his efforts.<sup>102</sup>

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<sup>99</sup>Dyer to SecSt, Nov. 19 & 21, 1919, USDS, 812.00/23229 & 23205.

<sup>100</sup>Yost to SecSt, Jan. 22, 1920, USDS 812.00/23345.

<sup>101</sup>Dyer to SecSt, Jan. 29, 1920, USDS, 812.00/23369.

<sup>102</sup>Valenzuela, Sonora y Carranza, 60.



De la Huerta had proposed to put the Indians, who immediately accepted, on a confiscated estate for one year to teach them farming, and then to settle them permanently on other government lands.<sup>103</sup> The government was to assist them with mules, equipment and implements, and to supply them with food and clothing. De la Huerta pledged to return women and children captured in government raids and he did so promptly; he also showed his good faith by issuing the called-for supplies immediately. He seemed sure that the Indians would live up to the treaty, although the Indians had some doubt about accepting the promises without federal support. De la Huerta disbanded the militia formed the previous autumn to fight Yaquis.<sup>104</sup>

The internal divisions among the Yaqui tribes made the value of a peace negotiated by a few chiefs uncertain, but as Sonora entered the month of April, 1920, the Indians were quiet, so quiet that the question was raised whether the peace were not a political truce.<sup>105</sup>

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<sup>103</sup>Dyer to SecSt, Mar. 16, 1920, USDS, 812.00/23517.

<sup>104</sup>Yost to SecSt, Mar. 3, 1920, USDS, 812.00/23497.

<sup>105</sup>Yost to SecSt, Mar. 8, 1920, USDS, 812.00/23506. De la Huerta is given credit by the Yaquis to this day for the peace with the government. Under his presidency his treaty was confirmed; there was no trouble with the Yaquis until Obregón went through the area in 1926 during his re-election campaign. His train was delayed by General Luis Matus, a Yaqui who had fought with the General, for talks about the return of Yaqui lands which were still going to outsiders. Word spread that Obregón had been kidnapped

By the time the Yaqui settlement was made, Carranza and Sonora were fixed on a collision course. Early in March, a railroad strike in Sonora was being discussed, with obregonistas supporting it.<sup>106</sup> De la Huerta tried to arrange a conference between company officials and the workers, but the railroad told him that the state had no right to interfere.<sup>107</sup> The workers, who sought a ten-hour day, the recognition of their union, and overtime pay at regular rates, gave a strike notice for April 3.<sup>108</sup> Despite a federal court injunction the strike began on schedule.<sup>109</sup>

The federal government issued an ultimatum declaring that if the trains were not running in seventy-two hours, they would be seized and operated with soldiers. State

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and troops entered, to begin a campaign that lasted almost a year. Many Yaquis sought political asylum in the United States, and captives were impressed into the army for out-of-state service. It was not until the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas, who had fought the Yaquis successfully for a short time in 1917, that a more or less permanent arrangement was made. Edward H. Spicer, Cycles of Conquest (Tucson, 1962), 82-85; Spicer, Pótam: A Yaqui Village in Sonora, American Anthropological Association, V. 56, No. 4, part 2, Memoir No. 77, August, 1954. For reminiscences on Yaqui culture during this period, familial relations and life in exile see Resalio Moisés, Jane Holden Kelley and William Curry Holden, One Tall Candle (Lincoln, Nebraska, 1971).

<sup>106</sup> Border Report, Mar. 13, 1920, USDS, 812.00/23503.

<sup>107</sup> Border Report, Mar. 6, 1920, USDS, 812.00/22890.

<sup>108</sup> Dyer to SecSt, Mar. 29, 1920, USDS, 812.00/23535.

<sup>109</sup> Dyer to SecSt, Apr. 3, 1920, USDS, 812.00/23542.

leaders warned that such action would result in revolution, and De la Huerta forestalled any federal action by taking over the railroads and running them with the strikers, to whom he conceded all demands.<sup>110</sup>

Another friction point between the state and Carranza was the nationalization of the Sonora River. Carranza had angered the state when he decreed that the river was the property of the nation, basing his arguments on Article 27 of the Constitution of 1917. The state had fought the same battle with Díaz, and won, but Carranza was more persistent. Calles' protests that the move was illegal were ignored, as were De la Huerta's. The President discounted all evidence that the river was not subject to control by the federal government, and nationalized the river in February, 1920.<sup>111</sup>

De la Huerta warned Carranza at the end of March that the Sonorans were alarmed and restless over the threat of more troops being sent, especially since the state, including the Yaquis, was quiet. He added that if Diéguez returned with troops it would occasion rebellion by the

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<sup>110</sup>Times, April 7, 1920.

<sup>111</sup>Correspondence between De la Huerta and central government relative to the Sonora River, as printed in Valenzuela, Sonora y Carranza, 24-43. Nationalization gave the federal government control of all projects developed along the river and the sale of the water for irrigation.

Yaquis, who were completely hostile to him.<sup>112</sup> Diéguez, who was in Guadalajara with his army, hastened to assure the municipal presidents in Sonora that if he came, it would only be for military purposes, not to depose the government or to influence the elections.<sup>113</sup>

The Governor sent a long telegram to Carranza on April 4 enumerating actions of the national government which had led to Sonoran convictions that there would be a federal takeover. He listed the indiscreet transfer of the customs house funds to the American side, always a prelude to trouble; the withdrawal of the funds and suspension of pay for state soldiers and the arrival of naval forces in Guaymas with orders to pacify the already peaceful state. Moreover, De la Huerta noted, the official press of the central government openly stated in editorials that the President would be justified in sending troops into the state to depose the governor and to replace him with a man satisfactory to the government.<sup>114</sup>

The climax of the war of words began on April 6 when the legislature telegraphed Carranza that the Diéguez circular of April 3 to the municipal presidents confirmed that

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<sup>112</sup>De la Huerta to Carranza, Mar. 31, 1920 as printed in Taracena, Sexta etapa, 210-211.

<sup>113</sup>Diéguez to presidents, Apr. 3, 1920, AGES, 3367-1.

<sup>114</sup>De la Huerta to Carranza, Apr. 4, 1920 as printed in Valenzuela, Sonora y Carranza, 159-161.

the federal government had ordered the mobilization of troops for an invasion of Sonora. The people of Sonora, warned the deputies, "find in the mobilization an immediate and direct attack on its Sovereignty," and that if Carranza persisted, he alone would be responsible for the consequences.<sup>115</sup> The telegraph wires were cut, and customs house funds were sent to Hermosillo.<sup>116</sup>

On April 9, the Sonoral legislature passed Law 30 which declared:

Seeing that the Federal Executive has dictated a series of agreements and resolutions in financial, political and military matters, notoriously hostile to Sonora and with the deliberate proposition of attempts against her independence and sovereignty, this federal entity assumes all the powers necessary for the defense of the expressed attributes, and will exercise them while the danger persists.

The law further recognized Mexican laws as being the law of Sonora, but gave the Governor extraordinary powers in the field of finance and war until September 1, when the law would expire.<sup>117</sup>

The Governor and the deputies addressed a broadside to the public reviewing the events leading up to the

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<sup>115</sup>Congress of Sonora to Carranza, Apr. 6, 1920 as printed in Valenzuela, Sonora y Carranza, 166.

<sup>116</sup>Dyer to SecSt, Apr. 7, 1920, USDS, 812.00/23546.

<sup>117</sup>Law 30, Apr. 9, 1920, AGES, 3367-1.

proclamation of Law 30. In it, they promised that all civil rights would be respected, that there would be no forced loans or arbitrary requisitions and that commerce and business would not be interfered with. He added that the military would be punished for abuses, but the citizens had to cooperate with the state government and complain in order for the authorities to be aware of the abuse.<sup>118</sup>

Carranza responded to state actions by refusing to discuss the troop movements, and pointed out that state resistance was tantamount to the declaration of an insurrection and the breaking of the federal pact. For that reason, he could not suspend his orders to mobilize the troops.<sup>119</sup> Unintimidated, De la Huerta peacefully assumed the administration of the federal offices within the state on April 11, replacing the personnel who would not declare themselves in favor of the state move.<sup>120</sup> Most chose to retain their jobs. Commercial agents and consuls were named, and a Department of Propaganda was established.<sup>121</sup>

Calles had placed himself at De la Huerta's orders on

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<sup>118</sup> Broadside, "A los pueblos de Sonora," Apr. 10, 1920, AGES, 3367-1.

<sup>119</sup> Carranza to Congress of Sonora, Apr. 9, 1920 as printed in Taracena, Sexta etapa, 216-217.

<sup>120</sup> Notice, Apr. 10, 1920, AGES, 3367-2.

<sup>121</sup> Organizational efforts are covered in AGES, 3368-1.

April 9,<sup>122</sup> and the next day, De la Huerta appointed him as military commander of the state, "to assume command of the military forces that are presently here, and to prepare the defense of the sovereignty of the state."<sup>123</sup> De la Huerta ordered the superintendent of the Ferrocarril Sud-Pacífico to obey the dispositions of Calles.<sup>124</sup> He named recruiters for the various districts, and a committee established a just quota of men to be raised, voluntarily, if possible, in the municipalities. If the voluntary quota could not be met, the residents of the town were to meet to decide whom to send to fill the quota.<sup>125</sup>

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<sup>122</sup>Calles to De la Huerta, Apr. 9, 1920, AGES, 3369.

<sup>123</sup>De la Huerta to Calles, Apr. 10, 1920, AGES, 3369.

<sup>124</sup>To the superintendent of the Ferrocarril Sud-Pacífico, Apr. 10, 1920, AGES, 3369.

<sup>125</sup>The Sonora River Valley was in the middle of the harvest, and the recruiters there had less than complete success in securing recruits. The recruiter for the lower Valley, Jesús M. Padilla, telegraphed Calles from Huépac on Apr. 14, to say that the people there needed some prodding from the government to encourage enlistments, for the municipal authorities were not lending their assistance. Calles urged the presidents to encourage enlistments. In Banámichi, Padilla had no more success. The people, he said, were waiting for the harvest and were not interested in service, even with the promise of one peso a day for the families while they were gone. The council in Banámichi said that Padilla blamed it for his lack of success and wanted to seize all arms in the area, to which De la Huerta replied that no coercion must be used. The council finally made up a special committee to plead with the residents to supply food, clothing and arms, even if not men, but they were not inclined to contribute those either. Finally, on May 20, with the harvests in, the council reported that it had raised a small contingent. The force marched to

Sonora reacted calmly to the new crisis, with little apprehension and much satisfaction.<sup>126</sup> The movement quickly found support in other states; by April 20 there were pledges of support from thirty-two generals, and the state governments of Michoacán, Hidalgo, Guerrero, Colima, Jalisco, Zacatecas, Tabasco and Sinaloa all openly supported Sonora.<sup>127</sup> General Ríos and his family left Sonora for Mexico City leaving behind his army to join the new movement.<sup>128</sup> And in Mexico City, Benjamín G. Hill told the American Ambassador confidentially that most of the federal troops would support Obregón, but a cuartelazo was not contemplated. He said the matter would be settled within a few weeks by a revolution that was already planned.<sup>129</sup>

Meanwhile, Obregón had been touring Mexico in his

Cananea, but on May 28, they were back home, the conflict with Carranza being over.

The residents of Arizpe threatened to take up arms against the recruiter named for that area, whom they disliked intensely; but that was the limit of their military inclinations. Correspondence relative to recruiting and the establishment of the quotas is found in AGES, 3369.

There was a call for volunteers in Guaymas on April 12, and it met the same unenthusiastic response. Yost to SecSt, Apr. 13, 1920, USDS, 812.00/23682.

<sup>126</sup> Dyer to SecSt, Apr. 13, 1920, USDS, 812.00/23573.

<sup>127</sup> Dyer to SecSt, Apr. 17 & 20, 1920, USDS, 812.00/23605 & 23661.

<sup>128</sup> Dyer to SecSt, Apr. 12, 1920, USDS, 812.00/23571.

<sup>129</sup> Hanna to SecSt, Apr. 12, 1920, USDS, 812.00/23574.



role as candidate for the presidency. In Monterrey, he received a summons from the Minister of War ordering him to Mexico City to answer questions on an allegedly treasonous letter mailed to him, but intercepted by the government.<sup>130</sup> Although his associates feared a trap, Obregón went to the capital, and while he was there Sonora's conflict with Carranza developed into open rebellion. Obregón, knowing the old friendship between De la Huerta and the President, declared the whole thing to be a farce. When he realized that the rebellion was real, he censured the movement and the attitude of the Sonorans for complicating his position in the capital. Obregón complained to friends that Calles had deliberately offended the central government to take advantage of the political situation.

Obregón made a courtroom appearance on April 11, and was scheduled to appear again the next morning. That evening, however, he received a coded telegram from Calles informing him that Sonora was withdrawing its recognition of Carranza. He prudently decided that the time had come to leave Mexico City, and with the help of Miguel Alessio Robles, at whose home he was staying, Rafael Zubarán

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<sup>130</sup>Obregón's escape is one of the most familiar stories from this period. His personal account, related for Valenzuela, is printed in *Sonora y Carranza*, 183-185. Margarito Ramírez, the railroad man who assisted Obregón, also related his own version for Valenzuela, 179-183. Miguel Alessio Robles recounts the history in *A Medio Camino*, 41-53.

Capmany, and a young labor leader, Luis N. Morones, he eluded the surveillance of Carranza's trailing agents, and escaped to safety in Guerrero.

Sonora's revolution was already evoking echoes in other states, but it still lacked the customary plan. This was remedied by the issuance of the Plan of Agua Prieta, which was published on April 23 after a meeting of military chiefs and three civilians, who discussed and approved a plan presented by Calles. The Plan of Agua Prieta stated that Venustiano Carranza had violated the laws of the country, and that the people, after exhausting legal recourse, must assume sovereignty. The Plan declared Carranza deposed, repudiated officials installed by him, recognized the Constitution of 1917 as the fundamental law, and declared Adolfo de la Huerta to be the Supreme Commander, pro tempore, of the Liberal Constitutionalist Army. Upon the occupation of Mexico City by that army, De la Huerta would call a special session of Congress to elect a provisional president.<sup>131</sup> De la Huerta took a leave of absence from the governorship, accepted the Supreme Command, and appointed Calles Minister of War.<sup>132</sup> Obregón, acting independently in Guerrero, issued a

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<sup>131</sup>Copy of Plan, AGES, 3369.

<sup>132</sup>Dyer to SecSt, Apr. 26, 1920, USDS, 812.00/23725.

Manifiesto calling for a return to the Constitution of 1857. Since he was opposing Carranza, and Carranza was associated with the Constitution of 1917, such a move was logical; but De la Huerta opposed the principles of the manifesto and would not allow its publication in Sonora. Obregón then retracted his disavowal of the Constitution and in a second manifesto from Chilpancingo,<sup>133</sup> placed himself at the orders of the Governor.<sup>134</sup>

In Mexico City, the press naturally denounced the revolt, as did Ignacio Bonillas and the Supreme Court. Bonillas held that the revolt was a personal conflict between Obregón and Carranza. He maintained that Sonora had attempted to obstruct the circulation of campaign literature for himself and General González, and that federal

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<sup>133</sup>Chapman to SecSt, Apr. 29, 1920, USDS, 812.00/23768.

<sup>134</sup>*Ibid.*; Taracena, *sexta etapa*, 219. During a dinner with González which was held for propaganda value on April 11, Obregón said that those in Sonora had acted without his knowledge and attributed all to him. When De la Huerta asked Obregón why his manifesto denounced the Constitution and called for a return to the Constitution of 1857, the General replied that that had been his first thought, in order to disassociate himself from Carranza. Obregón said that most people associated the Constitution of 1917 with Carranza, although insiders knew that in actuality, he had opposed much that was radical in it. De la Huerta did not believe that was the true reason; he thought that Obregón might have made compromises with factions not approving the Constitution, either inside or outside Mexico. Obregón retracted the manifesto before it received wide publicity. Guzmán Esparza, *Memorias*, 147-148.

troops had been sent to the state to guarantee to each candidate proper facilities and free elections. The Supreme Court rejected Sonora's claim that her sovereignty was violated, and with much truth asserted that the trouble stemmed from the determination of Obregón's followers to win the election by any means, fair or foul.<sup>135</sup>

Carranza's military support had melted rapidly; with the desertion of Pablo González at the end of April, General Diéguez was the only officer of prominence remaining loyal. Carranza, a large retinue, numerous troops and the nation's treasury entrained for Veracruz on May 7. A revolt in Veracruz closed that port city to him. There were several encounters with pursuing troops, the only fighting in the rebellion, and Carranza and a small group of followers fled into the mountains.

Carranza left Mexico City only hours ahead of the advance forces of General González. Two days later, González and Obregón, by prior agreement, made a triumphal entry into the capital. When Obregón learned that Carranza appeared to be trapped, he gave orders that the President should be taken prisoner and treated well. But on the night of May 21, in a native hut in a settlement called Tlaxcalantongo, Carranza was assassinated in a suspicious

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<sup>135</sup>Times, Apr. 15, 16 & 18, 1920.

manner by a former federal officer.<sup>136</sup>

De la Huerta had met with his advisors on May 4 in Naco to choose a cabinet. Calles remained as Minister of War, General Francisco R. Serrano became Chief of Staff; General Salvador Alvarado, Minister of Finance; General Pascual Ortiz Rubio, minister of Communications; Enrique Estrada, Minister of Agriculture and Alberto Pani, Minister of Industry and Commerce.<sup>137</sup> With the occupation of Mexico City, De la Huerta prepared to go to the national capital. His friends advised him not to hurry, but to be certain that all was functioning smoothly, because the trip would be arduous and slow, with stops at every station and hamlet to secure the support of the public.<sup>138</sup> On May 12, De la Huerta was given an extended leave of absence and Flavio A. Bórquez, his old adversary from his days as a deputy, but a man whom De la Huerta trusted, became the interim governor.<sup>139</sup>

From Hermosillo, De la Huerta ordered the convocation

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<sup>136</sup>There are numerous accounts of Carranza's death, among them Roberto Blanco Moheno, Crónica de la Revolución Mexicana (México, D.F., 1959), 197-199; Librería de Quiroga, ed., La Verdad sobre la muerte de Carranza (San Antonio, Texas, N.D.); and Ramón Beteta, Camino a Tlaxcalantongo (México, D.F., 1961).

<sup>137</sup>Times, May 5, 1920; Dyer to SecSt, May 6, 1920, USDS, 812.00/23856.

<sup>138</sup>Dyer to SecSt, May 12, 1920, USDS, 812.00/23949.

<sup>139</sup>Dyer to SecSt, May 12, 1920, USDS, 812.00/23948.

of the national Congress to name an interim president in conformity with the Plan of Agua Prieta.<sup>140</sup> He submitted three names to the Congress for consideration; in addition the Congress injected his name, and those of three governors. On May 24, the day that Carranza's body was interred, the Congress met to choose an interim replacement. By a vote of two hundred and twenty-four to thirty-one, they chose De la Huerta to complete Carranza's term, and ordered him to appear before a joint session of Congress on June 1 to take the oath of office.<sup>141</sup>

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<sup>140</sup>Summerlin to SecSt, May 14, 1920, USDS, 812.00/23033.

<sup>141</sup>Diario Oficial, May 27, 1920.

## CHAPTER VII MONEY AND TAXES

Circulating money in Mexico had always been metal: gold and silver and copper coins with fixed ratios and intrinsic value. In 1905 Mexico gave up bimetallism (parallel gold and silver standards) and adopted the single gold standard; while the federal treasury issued convertible gold notes after that date, the medium of exchange for most of the Mexican people remained metal coins. There was no disruption of the monetary system under Madero nor with Huerta in the areas which he controlled. But in the rebellious areas of the north a new money was necessary and that new money was unsecured paper. There were numerous emissions by the constitucionalistas, by the rebel states and by the armies, in addition to the paper issued by banks and United States currency. All were legal tender in Sonora until the first rupture between Carranza and José María Maytorena. After the schism the old constitucionalista issues continued to circulate as did new state issues of Chihuahua. In Sonora, Maytorena's Executive Decree 13 of August 27, 1913, had authorized the printing of two million pesos in provisional paper money backed by the state's tax revenues, although not all of the authorized amount had been

issued. Unfortunately all of this paper money had two defects: it quickly became virtually worthless, and it was easy to counterfeit.<sup>1</sup>

By early 1915 widespread counterfeiting had strengthened the public's innate distrust of paper money and the Governor had to respond. The problem of discovering which bills were counterfeit required enlisting the help of several government bodies. A circular of January 30 described the legal money in detail to the municipal presidents, so that they could distinguish between good and bad money.<sup>2</sup> Maytorena decided he would hire an able detective to discover the origin of the false bills and he furnished to all banks and businesses a complete description of the counterfeit bills.<sup>3</sup> He ordered custom-house inspectors to record a complete description of every person crossing the border, and to ask each if they might be carrying counterfeit money. If the answer was "no", the guards did nothing unless they suspected the answer was not the truth, in which case they searched the person carefully.

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<sup>1</sup>The first fiat in Sonora was issued September 16, 1913, because of a lack of small currency, which the Chinese were accused of hoarding; the Mexican silver peso was the standard currency in China. The government, of course, made it illegal to refuse to accept the money. Simpich to SecSt, Sept. 17, 1913, USDS, 812.00/8887; Hostetter to SecSt, Sept. 14, 1913, USDS, 812.00/8940; Report of Agent, Dept. of Justice, Sept. 20, 1913, USDS, 812.00/9044

<sup>2</sup>Circular, Jan. 30, 1915, AGES, 3024.

<sup>3</sup>Maytorena to Treasurer, Feb. 10, 1915, AGES, 3024.



Persons found with false money in their possession were questioned again about the source of the money, and could be handed over to the courts. If the person presented his money voluntarily and some was found to be false, he underwent the same process.<sup>4</sup> To enforce this order to the custom houses Maytorena decreed on February 10, 1915 that

- 1) Makers of false money would be judged in military courts and if found guilty were to be executed;
- 2) Everyone entering the state had to present false money for stamping as such. Those who did not would be considered as passers and subject to the penalty of the law.
- 3) Anyone who aided in making or introducing the false money would be subject to Article 1.<sup>5</sup>

The postal service was also utilized in the effort to track down counterfeiters. The Governor forbade all common carriers, such as Wells Fargo, from bringing any Mexican paper money into the state. But if for some reason it became necessary to do so, the carrier had to present the money to the local postal administrator for certification. The administrator checked the description of all bills; if some were found to be false, he punched two small holes in the center and stamped "false" in indelible ink across the bill. The bill was then returned to the carrier. The administrator also had to register all packages which entered the state through

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<sup>4</sup>Circular to Customs Administrator, Feb. 10, 1915, AGES, 3024.

<sup>5</sup>Decree, Feb. 10, 1915, AGES, 3024.

the mails. These were opened and checked for counterfeit, which, if found, was turned over to the police for investigation.<sup>6</sup>

These actions by Maytorena served more as impositions on personal privacy than as efficacious means to eliminate the illegal money. By March, 1915 counterfeit made up an estimated fifty percent of the circulating money.<sup>7</sup> As a solution to the joint problems of counterfeiting and monetary depreciation, the governor announced the issuance of new money, printed by the American Bank Note Company of New York, to reduce the likelihood of counterfeiting. The new emission was for two million pesos, originally authorized in 1913, with notes valued at twenty-five centavos, fifty centavos, one peso, five pesos and ten pesos. The old provisional money was to be retired from circulation as quickly as possible.<sup>8</sup> Moreover, the governor declared illegal the use of money issued by the constitucionalistas after September 20, 1914.<sup>9</sup>

Maytorena's efforts to reenforce his money were fruitless. The new emission quickly dropped in value; on April 3, a

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<sup>6</sup>Circular sent to the postmasters, Feb. 12, 1915, AGES, 3024.

<sup>7</sup>Hostetter to SecSt, Mar. 23, 1915, USDS, 812.00/14757.

<sup>8</sup>Remission of new money by Sect. of State, Mar. 10, 1915, AGES, 3024.

<sup>9</sup>Decree 67, Art. I, Mar. 30, 1915, AGES, 3024.

Sonoran paper peso was worth only five cents in United States' gold in Nogales. (Prior to the Revolution, the Mexican peso was worth fifty United States' cents.) Officials verifying money resorted to stamping some legal money as false to reduce the amount in circulation.<sup>10</sup> Wartime conditions contributed to the devaluation with stagnant trade, prohibitive export duties on state products, delinquent taxes, and the flight of capital. The state was collecting only one-fourth of its normal revenues.<sup>11</sup> The paper money thus had little backing and little value in international exchange, and the large number of counterfeits served to weaken it further. Maytorena mentioned this last again when he published a decree of Villa's which stated that in all transactions involving one thousand or more pesos, the bills should be certified as legal before local authorities. Villa condemned the counterfeiter to death, as had Maytorena.<sup>12</sup>

The problem was compounded by the certification process. Under the circular of January 30, the municipal president was charged with verifying the bills in accordance with a published description of the various characteristics of the legal bills. But these criteria were not necessarily accurate, as the

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<sup>10</sup>T. P. Magruder to Comm. in Chief, USPF, May 26, 1915, USDS, 812.00/15204.

<sup>11</sup>Simpich to SecSt, Apr. 6, 1915, USDS, 812.00/14863.

<sup>12</sup>Decree, Apr. 3, 1915, AGES, 3024.

presidents found. In Magdalena the president examined and certified five hundred pesos brought to him by merchants as tax payments. Judged by the circular they were good and he stamped them with the municipal seal, but when they were sent to the State Inspector in Hermosillo, two hundred and sixty-five of the five-hundred bills were found to be false. When the merchants learned of this they tried to refuse the notes in their stores, even notes certified by the municipal president. The Magdalena president appealed to the state treasurer for new instructions and sent him the false bills. The Treasurer admitted they appeared to be legal when judged by the circular. The confusion had arisen because the counterfeiters had perfected their bills!<sup>13</sup>

The money now had to be recertified, which presented another difficulty. The state had only two employees located in Hermosillo to re-stamp the money, and they were too busy to travel. The towns had to collect the local paper money and entrust it to someone to carry to Hermosillo for recertification.<sup>14</sup> For those towns without access to the railroad this was an arduous and dangerous task.

All businesses had accepted the paper money only reluctantly from the beginning. With its depreciated value and

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<sup>13</sup>President, Magdalena, to Maytorena, Mar. 30, 1915; reply, May 13, 1915, AGES, 3024.

<sup>14</sup>President, Rayón, to Maytorena, May 15, 1915; reply, May 31, 1915, AGES, 3024

the presence of so much counterfeit money, large numbers of businesses refused to accept it at all, although they could not legally do so. Many Guaymas merchants closed their doors rather than accept the paper, though some reopened after Maytorena attempted to certify the money again. But stocks remained low and prices very high as the merchants bought for gold and sold for paper.<sup>15</sup> From all over the state the governor received complaints against merchants who, like those in Guaymas, refused to honor the paper.

To such complaints the governor answered that he had dictated dispositions relative to legal money and it was the responsibility of the local authorities to enforce them; anyone who would not take the money should be punished. In July he set fines of five to fifty pesos for those who refused to take the money.<sup>16</sup> But the municipal governments were virtually impotent. The uncooperative merchant could be brought before the courts but such action did not solve the immediate problem of purchasing food. To ease the plight of the needy, the Treasurer could exchange the money, issuing good for bad, but only for the needy. The cost of this program was charged to the government of the Convention.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>15</sup>Ops Report, USPF, to SecNavy, May 1, 1915, USDS, 812.00/15055.

<sup>16</sup>Presidents, Saric and Altar, Apr., May, July, 1915, AGES, 3024.

<sup>17</sup>Notice, Apr. 21, 1915, AGES, 3024.

The municipal authorities had other problems with the paper money aside from certification. Local taxes were paid in the depreciated bills which had to be accepted at face value under Decree 14 of 1913. When false money was accepted in payment of taxes, it was the municipality's loss. The only hope held out to them by Maytorena was that some agreement would be reached in the Convention at Aguascalientes, or with the central government or the states, on redemption.<sup>18</sup> This was to be a vain hope. Municipal salaries still had the silver peso as a basis; they were paid at face value in paper pesos. Merchants discounted these at twenty-eight to thirty percent, if they took them at all.<sup>19</sup> The Convention did decree the free and unlimited coinage of gold, silver and copper money, but this offered no solution to Sonora's problems.<sup>20</sup> Villa's own troops pressured him for payment in American gold before they would leave for Sonora, because the Villista paper was so depreciated no one would take it except at bayonet point.<sup>21</sup>

The State's economic situation continued to worsen.

Maytorena entered the United States on September 30, leaving

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<sup>18</sup>President, Guaymas, to Maytorena, May 10, 1915; reply, May 21, 1915, AGES, 3024.

<sup>19</sup>Consignment of Alejandro F. Farin and associates, under suspicion for the falsification of money. Statement of the local Justice, etc., San Javier, July 21, 1915, AGES, 3024. The municipal officials used the process to display their discontent with economic conditions.

<sup>20</sup>Periódico Oficial del Estado Libre y Soberano de Aguascalientes, July 4, 1915, Decree 10, AGES, 3024.

<sup>21</sup>Rivera, La Revolución, 453.

Carlos E. Randall as governor facing the same problems. Merchants still would not accept the paper money; again they were warned it was a crime to refuse it as legal tender. Randall decreed that paper money could be used in all credit contracts. It could be used by debtors to pay banks and their agencies, even when the contract called for payment in metal, unless it were signed prior to March 22. If the creditor declined payment in paper, the debtor had recourse in the courts.<sup>22</sup> In towns such as Cananea, where control varied from week to week, or sometimes day to day during the last months of Maytorena's administration, the confusion was tremendous.<sup>23</sup>

When the constitucionalistas gained control over various areas of the state from Maytorena the old villista-maytorenista paper money there immediately lost its legality, and the population was left with, if anything, only the old constitucionalista currency and various metallic currencies as legal tender. The entire financial structure broke down; districts had collected taxes in the old currency and that money was now illegal. Residents did not have the new currency with which to pay their taxes, and the towns needed officials to certify that any old constitucionalista paper still in circulation was not counterfeit. The municipalities need financial

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<sup>22</sup>Decree 80, Oct. 18, 1915, AGES, 3024; Border Report, Oct. 2, 1915, USDS, 812.00/16457.

<sup>23</sup>Montague to Simpich, Apr. 13, 1915, USDS, 812.00/14909.

help.<sup>24</sup>

The constitucionalista state government did nothing to alleviate the sufferings of the people or the problems of the municipalities. Calles did decree in August that current taxes must be paid in silver pesos of Mexican coinage or their equivalent in another kind of currency in conformity with the rate of exchange then current.<sup>25</sup> But the problem was that there were few coins and little other currency circulating in the largely agricultural state and Calles controlled only a very small area. Banks, which had most of their holdings in maytorenista money, were forced to close. Troops passing through the state left behind some of the new money for supplies; many poor were paid in food, especially the women who worked as household servants in the homes of the wealthy. Most of these latter had assets in the United States. The influx of money was slow to reach the self-subsistent areas of the state.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>24</sup>Moreno to Calles, Aug. 25, 1915, AGES, 3045-2.

<sup>25</sup>Circular 4, Aug. 30, 1915, AGES, 3064.

<sup>26</sup>The constitucionalistas did not accept responsibility for any debts incurred by the maytorenistas, whether the debt had been willingly or unwillingly made. This was carried to ridiculous extremes in some cases. In Cananea, where control had seesawed back and forth between the two factions, the resident who had the contract to dig graves opened four graves while the villistas occupied the town. The callista president refused to pay for his services to the other faction. The gravedigger thought he should be reimbursed, because his work was completely apolitical. The Secretary of State, Moreno, who handled the complaint, said that it was just that he should



It was not until after the climactic battle of Hermosillo, on November 22, that Calles could turn his attention to the monetary difficulties of the state. He had returned to the use of the silver peso as a tax basis and for salary payments because of the high cost of merchandise and the depreciation of paper money; it was not to the state's advantage to accept the paper money at face value. On the other hand, Decree #14 issued by Carranza December 28, 1913 stated unequivocally that the constitucionalista paper peso would have the same value as the silver peso. Calles recognized that changing economic conditions had caused fluctuations in the value of money, but he was uncertain whether new laws had superceded Decree #14 because of lack of certain communications with Mexico City for over a year.<sup>27</sup> Whether or not the decree was still in effect, Calles proceeded to usurp powers which presumably belonged to the central government. On December 16 he announced that the silver peso was the equivalent of fifty cents United States' gold or ten pesos in constitucionalista unfalsifiables.<sup>28</sup> Six days later he notified the municipal presidents that all future municipal taxes were to be collected in silver pesos

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be paid for his work, but he did not think it just that the work ordered by others be paid for by a government which was not in accord with the government ordering it done. Correspondence, Jan. and Feb., 1916, AGES, 3052.

<sup>27</sup>Governor to Sect. of Treasury, Dec. 11, 1915, AGES, 3057-1.

<sup>28</sup>Decree 24, Dec. 16, 1915, AGES, 3057-1.

or their equivalent established December 16.<sup>29</sup> However, he altered the exchange rate on January 1, 1916, lowering the value of the silver peso to forty cents in United States' gold but retaining the value of the paper at five cents United States' gold.<sup>30</sup>

Calles attempted to stabilize the currency by insisting on payment of wages and salaries in silver or its equivalent, but he was defeated by one important factor: the shortage of legal circulating currency. The largest single source of silver currency was the mining industry, and many of those coins went to the local merchants for products which were bought outside the state. In the isolated and self-sufficient agricultural communities, where most of the population lived, salaries were paid in paper at face value, ignoring the ratio set for silver and paper. There was little circulating money because crops were usually subsistence crops with few salable surpluses. And 1915 crops had been much smaller than average because of the disastrous floods in December, 1914. Municipalities, then, found it almost impossible to collect taxes. For taxes Calles offered no alternative form of payment to silver and its equivalent in paper except United States gold.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>29</sup>Circular telegram to all presidents, Dec. 22, 1915, AGES, 3057-1.

<sup>30</sup>Circular 14, Dec. 30, 1915, AGES, 3057-1.

<sup>31</sup>President, Baviácora, to Calles, Feb. 24, 1916; reply, Mar. 11, 1916, AGES, 3057-2.

In line with his silver-for-salaries policy, Calles promised the federal workers in Sonora that their salaries would be paid in silver. To Carranza he explained that this was necessary because of the low value of paper money and the impossibility of living on their salaries.<sup>32</sup> He maintained that Sonora's economic situation was unique. Carranza objected to his promise of paying in silver, and Obregón, who also had received a copy of the notice, proposed a monetary commission to study the economic situation in the state. Calles insisted that if federal government employees in the state were not paid in silver, services would be interrupted, because they could not exist on their salaries.<sup>33</sup> Carranza did not think Sonora's situation was unique; Coahuila, Nuevo León, and Tamaulipas were all border states with similarly high costs of living. As to the salaries, he curtly answered, "If there are some who cannot continue serving as they have been, tell me and others will be substituted who can subsist on the assigned salaries."<sup>34</sup> Calles was forced to notify the federal employees later in January that the First Chief had dictated that they would continue to be paid in paper, contrary to what he had

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<sup>32</sup>Calles to Carranza, Jan. 14, 1916, AGES, 3057-1.

<sup>33</sup>Calles to Carranza, Jan. 21, 1916, AGES, 3057-1.

<sup>34</sup>Carranza to Calles, Jan. 24, 1916, AGES, 3057-1.

dictated as military commander of the state.<sup>35</sup>

The use of silver for the salaries of state employees continued to cause ill-feeling between Carranza and Calles, delayed economic recovery in the state, and caused labor unrest as most workers continued to receive wages in almost valueless paper. Federal border customs' employees refused to work until their salaries were doubled with an additional grant of rations for a family of five.<sup>36</sup>

At the 4C's the mining unions effectively prevented the use of the bilembiques (paper money which derived its name from Bill Becker, a former paymaster at the 4C's, when workers were paid in company script) and Manuel M. Diéguez, formerly a labor leader there, called the unionists "agitators." Soldiers too, wanted their pay in metal, and in December 1915, their pay was doubled. The increase afforded little relief because merchants refused to take the fiat money.<sup>37</sup> Business was poor due to the currency situation and continued to get worse during the early part of 1916.

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<sup>35</sup>Circular telegram to all presidents, ND, 1916, 3057-1. The original of the telegram was slightly different from the one sent, and expressed Calles' pique at Carranza. It read:

Notwithstanding pleas made by this governor, the First Chief as well as General Obregón has dictated that the offices and charges would continue to be paid in paper money, contrary to what I dictated as military commander of the state in this respect....

<sup>36</sup>Border Report, Mar. 11, 1916, USDS, 812.00/17592.

<sup>37</sup>Border Reports, July 8 & 16, 1916, USDS, 812.00/17112.

Municipal incomes were based on monthly levies on all real estate, cattle industries and commerce, plus professional and vehicular licensing fees and fines. Many towns reported to the state treasury in January and February, 1916 that they were without funds.<sup>38</sup> But the state could offer no help. Some towns had instituted charges for such things as the inspection of cattle and hides which passed through their jurisdictions. Calles had to tell them that these were forbidden; such internal taxes had long been abolished. Towns were forbidden to collect any tax payments in gold.<sup>39</sup>

Flavio A. Bórquez, the state treasurer, told Calles in March that the state was without funds, already owed 70,000 silver pesos, and could not meet current, ordinary expenses. There was no money to pay the state employees nor the teachers. He suggested to Calles, who was in Agua Prieta, that he approach the mining companies for forty or fifty thousand dollars; but if he could not get that much, to try for ten or twenty thousand dollars. The mining companies at Nacozari owed their export taxes for a part of January and all of February, which had been delayed because of assay problems, so Calles could ask for an advance on the basis of those, without mentioning other taxes. Calles' persuasion was partially successful,

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<sup>38</sup>Municipal reports may be found in AGES, 3056-1.

<sup>39</sup>Treasury Dept., Feb. 3, 1916; Circular 40, Apr. 8, 1916, AGES, 3056-1.

and with payments assured from the companies he could wire his state secretary, Enrique Moreno, that he would have ten thousand dollars at his disposal in the First National Bank in Nogales, Arizona.<sup>40</sup>

As the fiat money continued to decline in value, a new emission became inevitable. In February a paper peso brought only three to three and one-half cents in Nogales;<sup>41</sup> by late March it brought only two cents, and the troops were again complaining.<sup>42</sup> The new emission was to occur in May, but on April 29 the states were notified that the printing of the new money in small denominations would be delayed. To provide for fractional money, which was short because of metallic hoarding, the public offices were authorized to accept the old money of one or two peso values at one-half its face value<sup>43</sup> for payments of less than five pesos. Another notice of the same date guaranteed the new pesos to

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<sup>40</sup>Bórquez to Calles, Mar. 16, 17, 20, 1916; Calles to Moreno, Mar. 26, 1916, AGES, 3054. Carranza requested information on the monthly budgets, including those of the municipalities, in March. Bórquez told him that the monthly budget called for 200,000 pesos, silver, including education, the orphan's school and extraordinary expenses. Income had averaged only 30,000 pesos, silver, for the past three months. Carranza to Calles, Mar. 6, 1916; Bórquez to Calles, Mar. 28, 1916, AGES, 3071-2.

<sup>41</sup>Special Border Report, Feb. 19, 1916, USDS, 812.00/17334.

<sup>42</sup>Border Report, Apr. 22, 1916, USDS, 812.00/18043.

<sup>43</sup>Circular 79, Apr. 29, 1916, AGES, 3057-1.

be worth twenty centavos in national gold. The old issue could be used in commerce until June 30.<sup>44</sup> A series of circulars of late April made laws for money the state did not have. Circular 77 stated that debts contracted before May 1, 1916 were to be paid in the old money; circular 75 announced the new emission would be divided among the states on the basis of their monthly budgets and that it would only be used to pay employees.<sup>45</sup> All metallic money in circulation was to be turned over to the treasury and would be covered by new money.<sup>46</sup>

In a late bid to shore up the depreciated older issues Carranza ruled that it could be used in payment of import taxes, which only three weeks before he had ruled must be paid in gold. The old paper was to be used at the rate of ten paper pesos to one peso in national gold.<sup>47</sup> Carranza was pegging the peso artificially high: in Mazatlán, Sinaloa on March 20, one American gold dollar bought forty paper pesos;<sup>48</sup> the Mexican gold peso was usually figured at one-half the value of the American gold dollar.

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<sup>44</sup>Telegram to all governors, Apr. 29, 1916, AGES, 3057-2.

<sup>45</sup>Circulars 74-77, Apr. 27, 1916, AGES, 3057-2.

<sup>46</sup>Bórquez to Calles, May 16, 1916, AGES, 3057-2.

<sup>47</sup>Circular 83, May 6, 1916, AGES, 3057-2.

<sup>48</sup>Moreno to Wohler Bartming Sucs., Mar. 19, 1916; reply, Mar. 20, 1916, AGES, 3057-1.

According to Carranza's instructions, all federal and state employees were to receive their salaries in the new issue. The Secretary of Treasury was to set up an account for each state and would credit to that account all the old issues turned over to the treasury. The national government would advance to each state the money necessary to cover salaries. The governors were to pay the salaries, taking into account the reductions the state could make because of the high value of the new money. The state government would continue to receive taxes in the old money, but Carranza recommended that the governors raise local taxes in order to obtain at least twice the total they would spend in the new money. The old money thus obtained was to go to the Treasury for credit to the state accounts and retirement from circulation.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>49</sup>Moreno to Calles, Apr. 30, 1916, AGES, 3057-2. There was a private effort made to retire the national debt and strengthen the currency. In March, Veracruz originated the idea of contributions from citizens, and the idea spread. A central commission was formed in Hermosillo in April, with branches in the other towns. Contributions could be paid in all kinds of money. If constitucionalista paper was used, it was to be torn in half with the donor keeping the right half; for other money, receipts were to be given. All that the donors received was their name in the newspapers, but theaters donated parts of their receipts from certain showings, clubs were formed, state employees had their donation deducted from their salaries, and in some cases, quotas were set. Most of the donations were spontaneous, however, and reflected the lack of circulating money in the state. Sáric sent fifty centavos in silver, two pesos in bank notes, seventeen pesos in fiat, and six dollars and twenty-five cents in United States currency. By far the largest sum raised was the 10,499.50 pesos in fiat from the First Infantry Brigade. AGES, 3115.



Moreno warned the municipal presidents that speculators and some businessmen would try to take advantage of the monetary confusion to try to discredit the new paper money. If they raised the prices excessively on essential consumer items, thus disobeying the legal rates fixed for the money, the presidents were empowered to punish them.<sup>50</sup>

De la Huerta arrived in the state knowing it would be his task to impose the new emission. He knew he would have to face protests because of the deep aversion to paper money and to the financial system which had been forced on the nation by the revolution. He knew, too, that Sonorans were accustomed to metal, but that they would have to conform to the system of the rest of the nation.<sup>51</sup>

The process for the retirement of the old issues from circulation was complicated and confusing. Certain taxes were payable only in metallic money, some only in paper. Beginning on June 5 the one-hundred peso, fifty peso, and twenty peso notes were to be retired, but they would be accepted in the payment of taxes payable in paper. If they were not needed to pay those specific taxes the bills should be taken to the Treasury, the principal stamp offices, the Monetary Commission or its branches, or the National Treasury for deposit, but only during June and July. The one, two, five

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<sup>50</sup>Circular 27, Apr. 16, 1916, AGES, 3057-2.

<sup>51</sup>De la Huerta's Report to the legislature of May, 1917, AGES, 3132.

and ten peso notes and the old fractional coinage would circulate until June 30; after that they could not be used in private transactions, but could be used to pay the non-metallic taxes or deposited. The deposited money was to be verified in triplicate and removed from circulation. Certificates of deposit were non-transferable. In October, 1916 the government would begin redemption of the certificates in national gold at the rate of ten centavos national gold for each peso deposited. The debt incurred was to be amortized over five years at par. After the end of 1916, the old issues would no longer be legal tender.<sup>52</sup>

The states were bombarded with decrees and circulars explaining and limiting the use of the new money. On June 9, it was announced that all municipal taxes, state taxes, import-export taxes, or business taxes were to be paid in the new money.<sup>53</sup> Already, on June 5, the qualified departments had been notified to exchange the old issues of twenty, fifty and one-hundred peso notes for the new notes at the rate of eight old for one new peso; but only for the needy classes, only in quantities not to exceed one hundred pesos<sup>54</sup> and only until July 10. Certain import-export duties were payable only in metal, such as those on ore concentrates, petroleum and

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<sup>52</sup>Circular telegram to all presidents, May 31, 1916, AGES, 3057-1.

<sup>53</sup>Decree 58, June 9, 1916, AGES, 3057-2.

explosives, all of which were of vital importance to the state mining industry. Some taxes could be paid only in the new paper, some in either metal or new paper.<sup>55</sup> By July 1, all transactions were to be made in the new money, and prices were to be set in terms of it.<sup>56</sup> The dates for the redemption of the small bills was set back to November 30,<sup>57</sup> and municipal taxes could not be paid in gold.<sup>58</sup>

De la Huerta lowered the salaries of the state employees by twenty percent on June 1, although the cut did not apply to pensioners, or low-paid workers.<sup>59</sup> Even with the cut in salaries the state could not cover expenses; the salaries were paid when possible, but if the income did not cover them, what income there was was divided proportionately among the state employees.<sup>60</sup>

There was immediate resistance to the new emission, and immediate depreciation. Uncertainty over what must or could not be paid in metal was widespread; the federally run telegraph and post-office in Guaymas refused to take paper money.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>55</sup>Notice from Tax Dept., June 28, 1916, AGES, 3057-1.

<sup>56</sup>Notice from Dept. of Credit and Commerce, June 28, 1916, AGES, 3057-1.

<sup>57</sup>Notice, Oct. 16, 1916, AGES, 3057-1.

<sup>58</sup>Notice, July 11, 1916, AGES, 3057-1.

<sup>59</sup>Decree 60, June 1, 1916, AGES, 3060.

<sup>60</sup>Decree 62, June 28, 1916, AGES, 3060.

<sup>61</sup>USS Chattanooga to Comm. in Chief, USPF, June 6, 1916, USDS, 812.00/18549.

The mining companies continued to pay in silver, although De la Huerta insisted that fiat money be used.<sup>62</sup> The district court employees in Cananea complained that their salaries were inadequate; due to the depreciation of the new money they received only one-third to one-fourth of what they would be making if they were paid in silver. Their problem was that in Cananea, although the mine workers were paid in silver, the prices were set in the paper equivalent of silver. There was very little paper in circulation, since only the federal and state employees were paid in fiat, and prices were very high. The complaint netted nothing.<sup>63</sup>

The problems of Horcasitas were more typical of what was happening throughout the state. Town employees were paid in fiat at the official exchange rate of twenty centavos national gold for each fiat peso. On the street those same pesos were worth only five centavos per peso. The merchants conducted their business in metal and then bought cheap paper pesos in Hermosillo or Nogales to pay their taxes. All town employees resigned because of the money problem, and finding new employees was difficult. The town wanted permission to use metal.<sup>64</sup>

United States Hostetter in Hermosillo reported that De la Huerta had issued a decree notifying the merchants that it was not necessary to take the new fiat, with a consequent improvement

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<sup>62</sup>Hostetter to SecSt, June 7, 1916, USDS, 812.00/18420.

<sup>63</sup>Correspondence, July, Aug., 1916, AGES, 3057-2.

<sup>64</sup>President, Horcasitas, to De la Huerta, Oct. 24, 1916, AGES, 3060.

in business,<sup>65</sup> but there was no truth in this widely-believed report. On the northern border Calles told the merchants that they did not have to accept fiat except in the case of soldiers and their families, and then, only when necessary for their daily needs. De la Huerta, who was in Cananea on an inspection tour, ordered Calles to report to him immediately in person, but Calles furiously refused to go.<sup>67</sup> Calles' defiance was useless; on July 24 De la Huerta decreed that prices had to be posted in national gold with the understanding that all transactions could be made in fiat, and he forbade the use of American currency, silver or gold.<sup>68</sup> The exchange rate was pegged at ten pesos per American dollar, although the international exchange rate for that same peso was only three cents. Such an anomalous condition could not do other than affect business adversely; merchants were forced to sell a

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<sup>65</sup>Hostetter to SecSt, July 15, 1916, USDS, 812.00/18970.

<sup>66</sup>USS San Diego to Comm. in Chief, USPF, July 21, 1916, USDS, 812.00/19063.

<sup>67</sup>Border Report, July 22, 1916, USDS, 812.00/18861. The state treasurer, Flavio A. Bórquez, a Calles man, ignored the legal rate; possibly it was his action which led the merchants and consuls to believe the decrees had been abrogated. Bórquez notified De la Huerta on July 17 that he had paid a military bill at the local flour mill, using pesos at the rate of six cents, American gold, per peso. De la Huerta rescinded the agreement on July 24 to avoid depreciation of the new money, and was backed by Mexico City. Bórquez to De la Huerta, July 17, 1916; Sect. of Treasury and Public Credit, July 24, 1916, AGES, 3057-2.

<sup>68</sup>Circular 39, July 24, 1916, AGES, 3083.

five-dollar imported item for fifty pesos, and those same pesos could be bought for one dollar and fifty cents on the border.<sup>69</sup>

The strict enforcement gradually became lax as it became more apparent that nothing could keep the new money from depreciating, although government salaries continued to be paid in it -- though not without protests. Teachers, telegraphers and soldiers all complained. Merchants refused to buy supplies which would be paid for in gold and sold in fiat, and food prices rose. The federal government finally decided that it could not legislate to meet the wide variety of economic situations throughout the Republic. On November 10 Carranza authorized the governors to regulate the method by which government salaries and wages would be paid on a gold basis, when the current law was not considered equitable.<sup>70</sup> A new exchange rate of thirty-four fiat pesos per gold peso was set on November 12; on November 20 Carranza notified the governors that a new exchange rate would be fixed every ten days. By the end of December the rate was down to one hundred and fifty pesos fiat for each gold peso, and falling.<sup>71</sup>

The floating exchange rate complicated matters even more. A law of November 20 authorized the governors to collect all local taxes on the basis of fifty percent national gold and

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<sup>69</sup>Border Report, July 26, 1916, USDS, 812.00/19112.

<sup>70</sup>Circular 7, Nov. 10, 1916, AGES, 3060.

<sup>71</sup>Correspondence, Nov., 1916, AGES, 3060.

the remaining fifty percent in any legal specie using the exchange rate set each ten days. Rural properties were included, if the owners received rents on those properties in gold.<sup>72</sup> Since the municipal taxes were paid monthly or every four months the collectors constantly had to recompute tax rates. Budget planning became impossible.

In December, pending the promulgation of the Constitution, debtors and creditors were granted a moratorium. Creditors did not have to receive paper money against their will, nor did debtors have to make payments, unless the contract had been made before September, 1914 and specified metallic payment. All suits involving contracts then before the courts were suspended; and leasing contracts written in paper money could be rescinded by either party with previous notice.<sup>73</sup>

Mexico returned completely to the gold standard when the federal government finally decreed in December, 1916, that with the beginning of the new year the salaries and wages of all private employees and general workers, would be paid in gold or its metallic equivalent, taking as a base the salaries and pay rates of the fiscal year of 1912-1913.<sup>74</sup> Federal salaries however, would be paid one-half in gold and one-half in gold certificates, which were merely paper money with a

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<sup>72</sup>Notice, Nov. 16, 1916, AGES, 3060.

<sup>73</sup>Decree, Dec. 14, 1916, AGES, 3060.

<sup>74</sup>Tax Dept., Dec. 9, 1916, AGES, 3060.

different name, at the same rate as in 1912 and 1913.<sup>75</sup>

Other decrees revised the existing financial structure in the states and provided for assured revenues. The state property tax, the "direct ordinary contribution," was based on real property and cattle, and, traditionally, the large landed proprietors had evaded payment, leaving the tax burden to fall on the small commercial establishments and town property owners. In response to a decree issued by Carranza, Calles had promulgated a new law for the inventory and evaluation of properties for fiscal purposes in December, 1915. The law provided for a physical survey of all properties, with the delineation of all districts, municipalities and real estate divisions according to titles and deeds submitted to the surveyors.<sup>76</sup> The inventory established new evaluations which were the necessary prelude to new tax rates to be applied in the collection of the direct ordinary contribution. Calles set new rates, to be effective as the inventory was completed in each area, which were designed to force the proprietors of large holdings to pay taxes, evaded in the past by the expedient of not cultivating the land. Under the new rating system, arable lands which were not cultivated would be taxed at the rate of cultivated land plus a surcharge. The surcharge applied as long as the land remained uncultivated; when one-

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<sup>75</sup>Circular 139, Dec. 1, 1916, AGES, 3122.

<sup>76</sup>Decree 15, Dec. 23, 1915, AGES, 3069-1.



quarter of the acreage was under cultivation the owner could request a discount for the newly cultivated portion.<sup>77</sup>

Landowners and businessmen suffered from the new tax rates, and would have suffered more if they had been strictly enforced. The complaints from owners all over the state led De la Huerta to form a commission for the re-evaluation of real estate just before he went to Mexico City in December, 1916. Foreign landowners who held lands in Sonora formed an association in Los Angeles; together, the three hundred members held 5,778,500 acres. Feeling that the tax rate as set by Calles was beyond the capacity of their lands to earn, especially under the current political conditions, they sent a representative to ask De la Huerta to return to equitable taxation for cattle and agricultural lands. They also complained that the government had compelled payment only from Americans; they were threatened with confiscation for non-payment while Mexican landowners were not immediately

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<sup>77</sup>Decree 17, Dec. 23, 1915, AGES, 3069-1. The tax rate on town properties and cattle varied from eight pesos per one thousand peso evaluation up to twelve pesos per one thousand evaluation, rising in one peso increments for each five thousand pesos in value. Cultivated lands paid eight pesos per one thousand hectares. Cattle lands, or lands not suitable for cultivation, paid between six and twenty pesos per thousand pesos of value. The sharp rise in evaluations for these lands discouraged large holdings.

The surcharge on untilled land was twenty pesos per one thousand hectares above the normal eight pesos charged for tilled land. Churches were exempted from tax payment, since, by law, they were the property of the federal government. Widows and other poor women, and orphans, with a capital of less than two thousand pesos were exempted, as was capital invested in mining or smelting operations, including the buildings.

threatened. The large Mexican landholders had met to determine the rate they would pay, which was one-half of the rate established by Calles, and the De la Huerta commission endorsed the lower rate.<sup>78</sup> Economic conditions, however, prevented De la Huerta from making any tax adjustments at the time.<sup>79</sup>

Owners got the chance to protest their evaluations again in late 1919. Up to that time the full rate apparently had seldom been paid, with arbitrary discounts of from fifty to seventy-five percent granted by the government.<sup>80</sup> Municipalities set their own rates under the evaluation established for the direct ordinary contribution, and their problems echoed the state problems.<sup>81</sup>

In addition to the direct ordinary contribution, the state had other enumerated sources of income established in December, 1916. A two-percent charge was made on settlements

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<sup>78</sup>Border Reports, Jan. 13 & Feb. 3, 1917, USDS, 812.00/19459 & 20536.

<sup>79</sup>De la Huerta's Report to the legislature, May, 1917, AGES, 3132.

<sup>80</sup>Documentation in AGES, 3283.

<sup>81</sup>Examples of municipal plans may be found in AGES, 3056-2. Consul Lawton in Nogales reported that the inspector counted the number of electric lights for an annual tax on lamps for the municipality, and also wanted a copy of the rent receipt to make sure that the landlord was paying the right tax rate. Lawton to SecSt, July 16, 1917, USDS, 812.00/21141.

reached in courts and on the sale and purchase of real estate; mines paid one and one-half percent on the value of their products. A tax was imposed on public papers, including any complaint or petition to the governor, and on inheritances and legacies. Smelting plants, which escaped taxation under the direct ordinary contribution, paid an unenumerated tax, as did metallurgic offices. The state received two pesos for each cattle brand registered, ten pesos for each registration of a professional title, and four for each certification of that title. One-third of the income from lands designated as vacant (without title) went to the state, as did the entire income of vacated inheritances. Revenue was also derived from fines, from the state printer, from the certification of documents in public archives, from legalizations made by the state judiciary, and, in varying rates, for the publication of matrimonial acts. Finally, the railroads paid the state ten centavos for each passenger and for each tonelada (metric ton) of freight carried.<sup>82</sup>

The numerous decrees and the tax reforms did not put money in the state coffers, because there was no economic resurgence, even with a truce reached in the money battle. Strikes caused mining shutdowns at a time when copper prices were rising due to the entrance of the United States into World War I. Some farming areas had not recovered from the

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<sup>82</sup>Decree 18, Dec. 31, 1915, AGES, 3060.

disastrous floods of December, 1914; in others drouth destroyed the wheat crop and killed the cattle. The United States also had a poor wheat year and needed its surplus for the war. Almost all products from the United States were embargoed under the Trading-with-the-Enemy Act of October, 1917, causing scarcities and high prices in Mexico. In the summer of 1917 the United States prohibited the export of American currency; Sonora, which did much banking in Nogales and Tucson, Arizona, then had to get special permission from Washington for each disbursement in Mexico. Gold exports from the United States were also forbidden.<sup>83</sup>

The town councils had made their budget for 1917 before the conversion to gold, and incomes very seldom came up to expectations. Álamos had announced in August, 1916 that the town government could not cover its expenses even after some employees had been suspended and the salary of the president cut.<sup>84</sup> The story was the same at the end of 1917; the town did not have an income sufficient to cover the necessary expenses laid out in its budget.<sup>85</sup> Naco, which had proposed a modest budget of 17,024 pesos for 1918, could not raise the

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<sup>83</sup>y. Bonillas to Soriano, Apr. 17, 1918, AGES, 3191.  
M. G. Gutiérrez to Soriano, Sept. 13, 1917, AGES, 3113.

<sup>84</sup>President, Álamos, to De la Huerta, municipal report of Aug., 1916, AGES, 3072-1.

<sup>85</sup>President, Álamos, to De la Huerta, municipal report, Dec. 3, 1917, AGES, 3122.

funds, "because of the crisis caused by the paralyzation of works in general and the lack of funds."<sup>86</sup> The budget was trimmed to 7,392 pesos per year by retaining on the payroll only the local judge and the police commissioner.<sup>87</sup>

Other towns faced the same problems, but the state could offer little help, as it could not meet its own expenses. De la Huerta had planned an ambitious program for the state's economic recovery. He initiated a harbor-front improvement program in Guaymas which was supposed to eliminate unhealthy swamps and provide about thirty blocks of new land;<sup>88</sup> it began with 300,000 pesos obtained from the federal government. Three factories making clothing for the army were encouraged to move to Hermosillo; they paid for themselves and yielded a profit. De la Huerta formed a cooperative society for the establishment of a steam laundry, and pushed the construction and repair of roads for vehicular traffic.<sup>89</sup> The steam laundry De la Huerta had hoped would give employment to numerous poor women who had been displaced from their

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<sup>86</sup>Naco was classified as a comisario, which has as its chief official a police commissioner who functions as mayor, tax collector, etc. Five hundred residents were required to qualify as a municipality, by Decree 6, Aug. 30, 1915, AGES, 3069-1.

<sup>87</sup>Police commissioner to Soriano, Oct. 6, 1917, AGES, 3122.

<sup>88</sup>De la Huerta's Report to the legislature, May, 1917, AGES, 3132.

<sup>89</sup>De la Huerta's Report to the legislature, July 5, 1916, AGES, 3071-1; May, 1917, AGES, 3132.

jobs as domestic servants to Chinese immigrants.<sup>90</sup> The laundry, however, proved expensive to the state and was closed by Soriano. Other public works projects died for lack of money.<sup>91</sup> The state owed 75,000 pesos to teachers, but there was not enough money to pay them. While the treasury received 54,000 pesos in mid-June, 30,790 pesos was already owed in addition to the teacher's salaries.<sup>92</sup> When Carranza inquired how much the state had helped the municipalities during the fiscal year, Soriano had to answer that the state had set nothing aside to help them.<sup>93</sup>

By the end of 1917 it was becoming evident that being on a gold basis worked well, if there was gold circulating. Mexico did not have enough to satisfy currency demands, so an embargo was placed on the export of Mexican money and bars of gold.<sup>94</sup> A mining company that shipped out gold in any metallic concentrate of more than six grams gold per tonelada had to reimport the same amount of gold or gold money. The

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<sup>90</sup>De la Huerta's Report to the legislature, May, 1917, AGES, 3132.

<sup>91</sup>De la Huerta's Report to the legislature, Sept. 24, 1916, AGES, 3071-1.

<sup>92</sup>Acuna to Soriano, June 12, 1917, AGES, 3119.

<sup>93</sup>Carranza to Soriano, Sept. 1, 1917; and reply, Sept. 5, 1917, AGES, 3122.

<sup>94</sup>The measure was passed just a few weeks after the United States embargo, and appears retaliatory, as well.

same rule applied to silver if the concentrate contained fifteen grams or more.<sup>95</sup>

With the shortage of gold coins American money became the circulating medium in northwest Mexico. By April, 1917 it was estimated that eighty percent of the available money in Sonora was from the United States, both bills and gold, and a few fractional coins.<sup>96</sup> The lack of gold worked a real hardship since it was the only acceptable payment for taxes, although other money was legal.

Merchants and tax collectors could refuse to accept American money because it was not legal; and the buyer or tax payer had no recourse except persuasion in areas where this was the only money in circulation.<sup>97</sup> Carranza faced the

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<sup>95</sup>Decree, Sept. 27, 1917, AGES, 3115.

<sup>96</sup>Border Report, Mar. 31, 1917, USDS, 812.00/20793.

<sup>97</sup>President, San Felipe, to De la Huerta, Mar. 20, 1918; and reply, Mar. 29, 1918, AGES, 3243. In September, the president of Arizpe wrote of complaints that the merchants had no fractional money with which to make change; the president accused them of hoarding the smaller currency, to keep only gold circulating and prices up. Soriano advised him to use persuasion or "any means you deem prudent," to keep prices down. President, San Felipe, to Soriano, Sept. 17, 1917; reply, Sept. 19, 1917, AGES, 3147.

The president of Caborca had complained in June, 1916, that the "people are becoming servile to Gringos, because they are convinced that American gold, silver and American money is superior to ours. As if they were not extracted from our mines and as if our government could not honor its seal." The trouble arose from the paper money; although scarce, they could feel the price rise it caused. But of conditions he noted that business was paralyzed, the mines deserted, commerce decadent, and labor in short supply. President, Caborca, to De la Huerta, municipal report, June 14, 1916, AGES, 3072-1.

problem only partly when on May 14, 1918 he legalized the use of foreign gold money in the North and West, due to the shortage of metallic Mexican money caused by irregular communications.<sup>98</sup> In June, 1918 the use of American money was so prevalent in Sonora and Sinaloa that the state offices began receiving the dollar bill in payments at the rate of two gold pesos to one dollar, but federal offices would not take it.<sup>99</sup> Governor Soriano pleaded with Carranza to permit the federal stamp offices to accept dollar bills but Carranza reminded him that their use was illegal. Numerous towns wrote of their difficulties in collecting taxes because there was no gold available for payment, so Soriano took matters into his own hands. In July he decreed that, in view of the scarcity in the state of both Mexican and American gold and all silver, tax administrators, the fiscal agencies, and other tax offices should accept and keep on deposit the federal tax in silver or American dollars until the central government resolved the problem of circulation in Sonora.<sup>100</sup> Soriano was quickly informed that

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<sup>98</sup>Decree, May 14, 1918, AGES, 319301.

<sup>99</sup>Various circulars from the Dept. of Treasury and Public Credit, May 14 to Oct. 25, 1918, AGES, 3193-1.

<sup>100</sup>Correspondence of Carranza and Soriano, May 30 to June 25, 1918, AGES, 3193-1; Decree, July, 1918, AGES, 3189. All state and municipal tax offices collected a federal tax equal to twenty percent of their tax; thus a taxpayer owing twenty pesos to the municipality paid a total of twenty-four pesos to the town treasury. This federal tax was later raised to sixty percent.



the central government was not pleased with his decree, and he was ordered to withdraw it.<sup>101</sup> By then, however, Calles was back in office. The Governor may have officially withdrawn the decree, but he notified the tax office in Guaymas in September that they were to accept American bills in payment of taxes.<sup>102</sup>

Complaints about the difficulties in acquiring gold to pay the federal taxes continued to reach the Governor's office. Cananea, the state's most prosperous town, reported that its treasury was empty and the town still owed a large debt to the 4C's for the purchase of the municipal offices and schools. The town could not obtain the gold to pay the federal taxes.<sup>103</sup> Under Sonoran pressure Carranza finally

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<sup>101</sup>Pasqueira to Calles, July 25, 1918, AGES, 3189.

<sup>102</sup>Calles to tax collector, Guaymas, Sept. 10, 1918, AGES, 3193-1.

<sup>103</sup>President, Cananea, to Calles, municipal report, Sept. 19, 1918, 3193-1. The Transvaal Mining Company in Cumpas presented another facet of the common problem. The one-third of its yearly tax due totaled 9063.00 gold pesos, which at the current exchange rate of two for one equaled \$4531.50 in American money. The company could not export gold money from the United States, and the tax stamp agent in Agua Prieta could receive only gold. Therefore, the company had to purchase the gold on the market in Agua Prieta, which cost \$5571.86, a considerable increase in cost which was not of benefit to the Mexican government, which had no exchange houses in Sonora. The company, too, pleaded for the use of the American bill which was on par with the gold dollar in the United States. Leo G. Cloud to Mexican Consul, Douglas, Oct. 16, 1918, AGES, 3189. Cloud's letter was written after Carranza's change of heart, so Calles could give him an affirmative response.

faced the problem squarely, but with an alibi.

Owing to the scarcity of gold money in Sonora and Sinaloa that causes transactions to be made without stamps, using the lack of gold as a pretext, this Secretariat decrees that beginning in October the tax offices in Sonora and Sinaloa can receive dollar bills or money orders on New York.

The United States paper money was accepted on a par with American gold.<sup>104</sup>

No monetary reform would put money into the state's treasury unless it effected an economic recovery, and that did not happen. The end of the war in Europe in November, 1918, caused an immediate drop in the price of copper; by February 15, 1919 it was down to sixteen cents per pound. With the drop in price went the curtailment of mining operations and layoffs. Two thousand workers were discharged in Cananea in early February,<sup>105</sup> followed shortly by the discharge of six hundred workers in Nacozari.<sup>106</sup> There was no hope of immediate relief in the northeast, where the companies were feeding their idled employees. Calles proposed to the Nacozari companies that if they would pay their employees ten dollars in gold, he would make arrangements for the railroad to move them to Culiacán for resettlement.<sup>107</sup> The mine owners agreed, although some miners crossed the

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<sup>104</sup>Circular 48, Sept. 30, 1918, AGES, 3189.

<sup>105</sup>Border Report, Feb. 15, 1919, USDS, 812.00/22497.

<sup>106</sup>Border Report, Feb. 28, 1919, USDS, 812.00/22552.

<sup>107</sup>Border Reports, Feb. 15 & 28, 1919, USDS, 812.00/22497 & 22552.

mountains to seek work in Chihuahua mines; many did take advantage of the chance to move elsewhere. The crisis in the mining industry was relieved slightly by the central government's encouragement of the production of silver, and the consequent reopening of old mines where production had not been economically feasible.<sup>108</sup> Copper prices began to rise again in May, and the mines began to reopen;<sup>109</sup> but labor troubles, the support of De la Huerta for labor's demands, and falling prices threatened continued production late in 1919.<sup>110</sup> By the end of 1919 all of the important producing mines in the state were closed down.<sup>111</sup>

By the end of Calle's term, the state government was bankrupt, due in part to inefficient tax collection. The government once again was borrowing from the mining companies, giving one-third discount for paying taxes in advance. Such actions did not solve the problem; the crisis was only put off to be faced later.<sup>112</sup> At the end of February, the Treasurer approached the 4C's and La Democrata in Cananea, and the El

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<sup>108</sup>Border Reports, May 17 & June 6, 1919, USDS, 812.00/22703 & 22805.

<sup>109</sup>Dyer to SecSt, May 31 & June 30, 1919, USDS, 812.00/22772 & 22876.

<sup>110</sup>Border Reports, Nov. 1, 1919 & Jan. 4, 1920, USDS, 812.00/22844 & 22890.

<sup>111</sup>Statistical survey for Sect. of Commerce and Industry, Nov. 13, 1919, AGES, 3245.

<sup>112</sup>Border Report, June 7, 1919, USDS, 812.00/22752.

Tigre mines for a loan of \$100,000.00, to which they would subscribe proportionately, even though he knew there was no copper demand. The La Democrata representative said the loan would be impossible, since his company had not sold any copper since November. The 4C's offered \$40,000.00, to be repaid in six months, with a thirty-five percent discount on the company's tax bill.<sup>113</sup>

State salaries were not being paid; some teachers had received nothing for three months of the spring term. For those who had no local family or resources it was a critical situation, and the state was urged to pay them first. To the repeated pleas for a portion of their salaries the government employees were told that when the state received any money it would be divided among the employees. Government employees other than teachers had not been paid either, including the legislative deputies; yet they were chided for not paying their bills, as that was demeaning to the administration. The Governor posted public notices warning the hotels and restaurants that government employees had not been paid, so they were risking a loss if they served them.<sup>114</sup>

Despite the negative monetary conditions there was some recovery in 1918 in parts of the state not threatened by

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<sup>113</sup>Corella to Calles, Feb., Mar., 1919, AGES, 3284-1.

<sup>114</sup>Correspondence and circulars Jan. through Sept., 1919, AGES, 3290-2.

constant Yaqui raids. Municipal reports from the north indicated that the towns had begun the repair of public buildings, the reopening of schools, and street repair. The larger towns in the Mayo River Valley area were relatively safe, and prosperous from fine garbanzo harvests. Huatabampo began the installation of water pipes to houses and buildings, and formed a police force. Navojoa was the only municipality in the state which had not had to beg for funds from the state; the town built a new jail and plaza, and repaired the streets. Etchojoa bore scars from the maytorenista era, but did install public lighting (oil lamps) in the plaza and downtown and repaired the flood-damaged jail.

In population centers in the Yaqui range the story was different. Around Movas there had been almost no planting and the cattle had been taken by the Indians. Many residents immigrated to larger towns, and the remaining men formed squads to protect the village. There had been no federal office or municipal tax office there for five years, and no state tax office for some time. Similarly, Nuri had no funds and no public improvements, and people there also had formed a band to protect themselves. Pótam, and Bácum and the other villages echoed their complaints.<sup>115</sup>

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<sup>115</sup>Municipal reports, Aug., Sept., 1918, all in AGES, 3220.

## CHAPTER VIII MINING AND LABOR

The mining industry, as the largest single source of income in the state, bore the full brunt of tax changes made to increase state and federal revenue; as the largest single employer in the state it was subject to specialized tax and labor legislation. Tax laws for the mining industry were a confused mass of state and federal decrees. The taxing of minerals was left to state jurisdiction under Circular 43 of November 7, 1915; taxes could be levied in either national gold or its silver equivalent. Calles had imposed a one and one-half percent tax in December, 1915; this was modified in a lengthy assay law in April, 1916, and De la Huerta made changes in July, 1916, which were declared to lie in the jurisdiction of the federal government and were therefore unconstitutional. The 4C's protested the Calles law as being an abrogation of their contract of 1908 which granted them tax exemptions for their copper production for a period of twenty years, and the Moctezuma Copper Company pointed to features of the law which would abrogate its contract made in 1907; any changes roused protests.<sup>1</sup> The American mine owners complained that

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<sup>1</sup>Decrees and protests for 1916 are found in AGES, 3056, parts 1 & 2.

they were paying taxes ten to thirty times higher than in 1912, and could do so only because of the high price of copper. The high taxes paid did have one advantage; because of them the state would furnish protection not given to lesser industries such as cattle ranching.<sup>2</sup>

In November, 1919 De la Huerta added another tax burden: the state levied a two percent tax on the value of gold and silver produced and a fifty percent surcharge on the federal export tax on minerals. The smelters also paid five pesos per thousand for their properties and machinery; but municipalities were prohibited from imposing any tax.<sup>3</sup>

The federal government utilized import-export taxes to gain its share of the mineral wealth. A new import tax on oil and coke went into effect November 1, 1916 which directly affected the mining interests. The 4C's refined low grade ore that would have been unprofitable if produced in the United States, and had been granted a concession for the free import of the two fuels. The tax would add substantially to their production costs.<sup>4</sup> In the midst of labor troubles in the summer of 1917, the companies were informed that all imported mining supplies would be taxed.<sup>5</sup> The federal government

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<sup>2</sup>Simpich to SecSt, Sept. 10, 1916, 812.00/19122.

<sup>3</sup>Law 11, Nov. 21, 1919, AGES, 3287.

<sup>4</sup>Border Report, Oct. 21, 1916, 812.00/19706.

<sup>5</sup>Border Report, June 16, 1917, 812.00/21094.

variously taxed or prohibited the export of different metals to make the tax picture even more confusing.

The mining industry had been relatively free of labor unrest since the strike in 1906. The discontent caused by the monetary problems affected the mine laborers not at all after Calles permitted them to be paid in silver in late 1915. Wages were seldom the subject of discussion because the Sonoran miners were still the highest paid workers in the country. In January, 1916 the 4C's notified Calles that, because of the rising price of copper the company wanted to raise the daily wage by twenty-five centavos, with the idea being that with a drop in prices the wage could be lowered again. Calles assured the 4C's that he would be glad to cooperate.<sup>6</sup>

Carranza had never particularly favored organized labor, although the exigencies of fighting a war had forced him to make concessions to the proletariat. Labor laws in the pre-constitutional period were issued piece-meal by military commanders and governors in areas under their control, but Carranza had not issued a comprehensive labor decree. In the summer of 1916 Mexico was enwrapped in an economic crisis, and, under those conditions, Carranza resented labor machinations to the point of decreeing the death penalty for any

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<sup>6</sup>George Kingdon to Calles, and reply, Jan. 8 & 10, 1916, AGES, 3087.



strike affecting public service.<sup>7</sup>

Calles' actions in the strike at Cananea in 1914 did not indicate any great sympathy for the workers, and he gave no official encouragement to labor organizers. His only labor decree, in 1916, established the minimum pay for a day laborer at one and one-half pesos in silver, or its equivalent in the currency in circulation.<sup>8</sup> Miners already made twice that wage in the American-owned mines.

It was left to De la Huerta to issue a comprehensive labor law for Sonora. He did not believe that the worker's needs could be satisfied within the existing political structure, since legislative bodies had to satisfy too many demands and local officials were seldom competent to handle workers' problems. He therefore decreed the creation of a special body, the "Labor Chamber" whose sole function was to study subjects relative to the working classes. To form the Chamber, a representative was to be elected for each thousand workers by the workers themselves; the representatives were to intercede with the state government in behalf of labor in all questions involving labor. The Chamber was organized like the state legislature, met twice a year in two-month sessions,

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<sup>7</sup>On August 2, 1916, Carranza announced that the Juárez law of 1862, which permitted the execution of certain enemies of the state, was extended to all of those associated with inciting work stoppages in all public service industries. Cumberland, The Constitutionalist Years, 266.

<sup>8</sup>Decree 25, Jan. 10, 1916, AGES, 3069-1.

and received pay during the sessions equivalent to that of the deputies.

De la Huerta's decree also framed the criteria for labor legislation: an eight-hour day and a six-day week, a minimum age of fourteen for employment, one and one-half pesos per day as the minimum wage, and on-the-job accident indemnification.<sup>9</sup>

The immediate reaction from management and labor in the mines seemed to indicate that the law would quickly lead to strikes and the closure of the mines. The workers were not sure whether the eight hour day meant that they could work only eight hours; they did not favor that idea. The miners wanted to know if their lunch hour and ascent and descent time was to be included in the eight hours. De la Huerta ruled that ascent-descent time was included, but not the lunch time. The miners should eat in the mine with their lunches sent in at a scheduled time.<sup>10</sup> Companies also had to post a schedule for the ascending and descending times for

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<sup>9</sup>Decree 71, Oct. 10, 1916, AGES, 3063. Copies of the labor decree were sent to Samuel Gompers and labor leaders in the Chicago area, and De la Huerta was gratified with their congratulations. He wrote that the Decree had not been issued exactly as he had wanted it; he specified that workers should be at least fifteen years old and the workers should be able to appeal their firing to the Chamber. De la Huerta to Benitez, Oct. 10, 1916, AGES, 3063. He also stated that he had modeled the bill on the Adamson Act, an emergency measure to prevent a railroad strike. Border Report, Nov. 4, 1916, 812.00/19880.

<sup>10</sup>According to the wording of the correspondence, the company would send the meal in, but it is doubtful that it was supplied by the company.

the different mine levels and work classifications.<sup>11</sup>

The predicted strikes did not develop, nor did the mines close as a result of Decree 71, and De la Huerta followed it with another decree on November 22. The new decree forbade companies, associations or private employers to dismiss any of their personnel without a just cause, and listed the just causes: fraud or abuse of confidence, lack of ability or notorious negligence, neglect of a job to serve others and a deep lack of respect for the owner and his family. In case of dismissal without cause the worker was to be paid two-months salary or his daily wages, one-half in metal, one-half in fiat, within twenty-four hours.<sup>12</sup>

The Chamber convened early in 1917 and submitted a series of regulations governing labor, which were applicable at the time only to the American mines in the northeast. The labor leaders proposed to abolish the use of machine drills in mining, abolish individual contract labor, abolish pay by the inch or millimeter, and abolish ore extraction contracts based on the ore's metallic contents. They also proposed that all parties covered by a contract should receive equal pay or stand the losses equally, that all doctors and pharmacists employed by mining companies should be able to read, write and speak

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<sup>11</sup>E. Andrade to Governor, Nov. 10, 14, & 16, 1916; Schedule for El Tigre, Nov. 7, 1916, other correspondence, all in AGES, 3063.

<sup>12</sup>Decree, Nov. 22, 1916, AGES, 3063.

Spanish and should pass a public examination as proof, and that the night shift be limited to seven hours. The Chamber also proposed to forbid the employment of Chinese in hospitals.<sup>13</sup>

Conflicts between the mining companies and their workers began to develop in March, 1917, when the workers at the 4C's demanded the removal of two foremen who allegedly mistreated laborers. The laborers appealed to the municipal president to intercede; but the company refused to dismiss the foremen, saying it would not allow labor to dictate company policy.<sup>14</sup> The entrance of the United States into the war in Europe brought an increase in labor agitation, with Germans advocating strikes in order to cut the United States metal supply.<sup>15</sup> Professional organizers from the International Workers of the World were also present to keep the unrest at a boiling point, and on June 1, 1917 the workers at El Tigre went on strike.<sup>16</sup>

The miners had three principal demands: that the mining company not be allowed to determine a fair day's work; that Mexican employees not be fired without the consent of the Chamber, and that the Labor Chamber fix the number of hours in a working day. The complaint over the working day rose from

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<sup>13</sup>Border Report, Mar. 17, 1917, 812.00/20739.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>Border Report, Apr. 12, 1917, 812.00/20951.

<sup>16</sup>Border Reports, May 5 & June 16, 1917, 812.00/20931 & 21094.

the company's limiting the laborers to eight hours. The mine was fined for imposing an inhuman task on the workers, in requiring that in hard ground the miner should drill thirteen and one-half feet in an eight hour day, for which he was paid thirty-five cents a foot; in soft ground, the miner was expected to drill seventeen and one-half feet per day at twenty-five cents per foot. The company had not had a chance to present its case in a hearing before the fine was set.<sup>17</sup>

The Chamber regulations appeared to be aimed directly at the 4C's, trying to bring into disrepute practices long common in the mining industry. The object of one such attack was the use of contract miners. The large mining companies owned numerous claims and numerous mines; at Nacozari there were 145 mines, of which Moctezuma Copper held 45. Cananea had 79 mines, with five companies. Many of the smaller mines, and possibly parts of the larger mines, were worked by contractors who were paid on a tonnage basis. The contractors, in turn, had men to work for them, and an enterprising contractor could make substantially more than the daily wage.<sup>18</sup>

When the company corrected an error in a contract after it had been signed, an error which favored the contractor, the contractor reinstated the error. The company refused to honor his version of the contract, and he complained to the Chamber,

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<sup>17</sup>Border Report, June 23, 1917, 812.00/21098.

<sup>18</sup>Exchange between 4C's and Labor Chamber, April, 1917, AGES, 3153.

where he found a sympathetic ear. The company thought the affair was none of the Chamber's business; it was interfering in a contract. The 4C's declared that the Chamber had its mind made up before the investigation was conducted, and that its attitude was antagonistic rather than conciliatory.<sup>19</sup>

As a result of the Chamber's action, contractors whose contracts had long expired, who had not profited from their contracts, came forward to make claims against the company; as a result, the 4C's suspended the contract system. Emboldened by the Chamber's attitude, there was a deluge of claims for old accidents, including one from eight years before from a man cured at company expense who received half-pay during his recovery. Current rumors hinted that a member of the Chamber had offered to hand down a decision favorable to the claimant in exchange for a portion of the settlement. The company considered arbitration by the Chamber as interference; it preferred to deal with its employees without a third party.<sup>20</sup>

The Chamber and the 4C's remained at odds. At the end of May, the Chamber filed a report on the violations of its dicta still being practiced by the 4C's, a report that supported the company's contention that the Chamber was persecuting it. The Chamber found that the company still used American doctors

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<sup>19</sup>The Chamber apparently decided in favor of the contractor, although the decision was not stated in the correspondence.

<sup>20</sup>George Young to De la Huerta, Apr. 25, 1917, AGES, 3153.

who did not speak fluent Spanish, the night shift still worked eight hours, the laborers were paid bi-weekly instead of weekly, the company had posted no ascent-descent schedules, it did not pay the legal rate for overtime, foreigners still had preference and still made more than natives, etc.<sup>21</sup>

The company asserted that it had tried to comply with the laws, but in an operation the size of the 4C's, it took time to comply with laws as radical as the recent labor legislation. Considering the laws and the recent activities of the Labor Chamber, the company wondered if the time had not come to suspend operations. The Chamber would permit no excuses and ignored the threat of closure.<sup>22</sup>

The incessant pressures on the mining companies from the Sonoran government for loans, combined with the labor demands and the new federal taxes on mining supplies, caused the United States Ambassador to Mexico to protest to the Sub-Secretary for Foreign Relations. He said that the treatment of the American mine owners in Sonora appeared to be a deliberate plot to force the suspension of work in the mines. The United States' government sympathized with the plight of the workers, he emphasized, but there should be just interdependence between labor and management, with management having the

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<sup>21</sup>Labor Council to De la Huerta, May 31, 1917, AGES, 3153.

<sup>22</sup>Labor Council to Young, May 31, 1917; Young to president, Cananea, forwarded to De la Huerta, June 1, 1917, AGES, 3153.

right to determine its own policies. The result of the interference in management by labor would be a shut-down with the consequent shut-off of funds to the local, state and federal governments.<sup>23</sup>

The Sub-Secretary sent the Ambassador's protest to De la Huerta, who was in office again for two weeks. In his reply, the Governor accused the companies of misinterpreting the laws. He denied that the state was attempting to destroy or impede the function of capital, even though the large businesses had become accustomed in the past to controlling the workers and the government. The function of the Labor Chamber, he claimed, was to serve as a consultive body to the government, furnishing it with specialized knowledge, to show the needs of labor and to give opinions. The Chamber had also functioned as a council of arbitration, thus benefitting the same companies.

Naturally, there is going to be resistance to change by the great interests. In Sonora, the government has returned to the working man what is his, without taking anything from the capitalist except privileges they had come to think of as legitimate.<sup>24</sup>

After the El Tigre mines went on strike on June 1, Mexican officials took over the mines and attempted to work them, but the plant was electrically powered, and the power was furnished by the Copper Queen Smelter in Douglas, which proceeded to

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<sup>23</sup>Henry P. Fletcher to Sub-Secretary of Foreign Relations, June 15, 1917, AGES, 3153.

<sup>24</sup>De la Huerta to Fletcher, July 19, 1917, AGES, 3153.



shut off the electricity. The striking workers at El Tigre were furnished with food from the company stores on government orders. The miners at Nacozari were still working, except one night shift, and De la Huerta unsuccessfully ordered that restored.<sup>25</sup> The 4C's was still attempting to comply with labor regulations in mid-June, but finally decided that a shut-down was the company's only choice. La Democrata, one of the two other large mines in Cananea, had suspended production on April 15, and was involved in a one million peso program of repairs and additions. The Calumet and Sonora of Cananea Mining Company, the third largest mine, also was closed.

The mines were closed by labor conflicts; at a moment when the price of copper was skyrocketing the state's largest source of revenue was not furnishing the much needed income. De la Huerta approached the management of La Democrata with the proposal that they take charge of the properties of the 4C's and operate the mines, but the La Democrata management replied that, frankly, they could not afford the operations, and gave De la Huerta a breakdown on the monthly economics of the 4C's. The nominal monthly cost for labor at the 4C's was approximately 500,000 pesos. The bill for supplies such as timber, explosives, etc. added another 200,000 pesos; in addition there was a monthly cost for coke and fuel. From

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<sup>25</sup>Border Report, June 30, 1917, 812.00/21123.

the date of arrival of the raw ore at the smelter until the completion of the refining process there was an interval of at least thirty days; then the product had to go to the buyers and payment was made thirty days after it was sold. Ninety days after the product left Cananea the company received income from ore mined four months before, so it was necessary to have on hand a 2,100,000 peso reserve for labor and supplies. None of the above included the freight costs of \$9.06 (American gold) per tonelada; the \$20.00 per tonelada cost for refining and separation, nor the import-export duties and production taxes.

A takeover of the 4C's facilities such as proposed by De la Huerta would have to be done with the consent of the 4C's, or there would be an immediate embargo on the importation of the company's products into the United States. La Democrata management had no desire to face the United States courts on charges arising from a takeover.<sup>26</sup>

In the middle of the chaos wrought by the earlier phase of his labor program, De la Huerta issued a law on indemnification in June, 1917 which amounted to a coup de grâce for the mining companies. The decree set rates for death benefits (6000 pesos if instantaneous, 5500 pesos if within six months), for paralyzation, for the loss of limbs and the loss of eyesight.

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<sup>26</sup>G. E. Hoffman to De la Huerta, June 27, 1917; De la Huerta to president, Cananea, June 22, 1917, AGES, 3153.

In all cases of on-the-job accidents, the company had to pay the employee's hospital care, food, medicines, and fifteen percent of his daily pay. If he were hurt on the job but not in fulfillment of his own duties, he was not entitled to it if he entered an area denoted as dangerous, although his funeral expenses would be paid if he were killed under such conditions. All accidents involving injuries were to be reported to the Chamber, which would then help the worker to secure his indemnification; if the worker were killed and left no heirs, the money went to the state's educational fund. The Chamber also was to deal with all evasions by the companies.<sup>27</sup>

The mines remained closed. When Calles returned to office at the end of June, he told the municipal authorities at Nacozari and El Tigre to expel all labor agitators, and, before he left office, promised that De la Huerta would not molest the mines.<sup>28</sup> He ordered the labor force at El Tigre back to work at the former pay scale, and the mines there reopened.<sup>29</sup> Calles forbade the removal of all food articles from Cananea and ordered the distribution of meat and provisions to the value of two pesos per day to the families of men without work.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>27</sup>Decree 97, June 16, 1917, AGES, 3129-2.

<sup>28</sup>Border Report, July 21, 1917, 812.00/21243.

<sup>29</sup>Border Report, July 14, 1917, 812.00/21153.

<sup>30</sup>Pro-Patria, July 25, 1917, AGES, 3138. There is a question of whose supplies were used. The consul said the food came from company stores. Border Report, June 30, 1917, 812.00/21123.

He arranged for a daily train to be put at the disposition of any workers who desired to leave Cananea; between July 4 and July 11 some 5463 persons had obtained passes which would take them to other parts of the state or to agricultural lands in Sinaloa.<sup>31</sup>

Calles' arrangements with the railroad were haphazard, and there had been no final determination of which state agency was to bear the cost of transporting the workers. The state was to pay for the train rides, but it insisted on a discount. Many of the workers arrived in Guaymas, where there was no work for them, but Calles had told them that in Guaymas they would receive passes to continue to Sinaloa. The passes had not been arranged, and De la Huerta had to authorize the president of Guaymas to give the transient workers passes. Many of the workers congregated in Magdalena, which had no jobs, either. The president there urged Soriano to give passes for them to go to the south so that Americans seeking labor for the agricultural districts in the United States would not lure them north. For the workers stuck in Guaymas, Soriano instructed the president to provide passage only to those who absolutely needed it, and not to any other person.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>31</sup>Secretary of State to president, Cananea, July 4, 1917, AGES, 3153.

<sup>32</sup>Correspondence between De la Huerta, presidents, Soriano and the railroad, July-August, 1917, AGES, 3153.

One of the grievances of the mine owners was removed in August. Article 123 of the Constitution of 1917 called for the formation of committees of arbitration and conciliation; in May the Secretary of the Interior told the governors to begin organizing their committees without delay and questioned whether the Labor Chamber fulfilled the functions required of the committees.<sup>33</sup> De la Huerta thought that the Chamber did function in that capacity.<sup>34</sup> Nonetheless, Calles gave Soriano instructions to suppress the Chamber, and his orders were carried out with the issuance of Law 9 on August 21, 1917. In Law 9 the legislature declared Law 71 of 1916 abrogated in favor of a new law which would conform exactly to the Constitution. De la Huerta's liability law was also nullified.<sup>35</sup> In September, after the abrogation of these laws, Soriano warned the companies that a work shutdown without cause made them liable to intervention.<sup>36</sup> After continuous negotiations with the state government, and then with the federal government, the 4C's reopened in February, 1918.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>33</sup>Circular 1, May 23, 1917; Secretary of State to De la Huerta, May 23, 1917, AGES, 3207.

<sup>34</sup>De la Huerta to Secretary of State, June 1, 1917, AGES, 3207.

<sup>35</sup>Soriano's Report to the legislature, Sept. 24, 1917, AGES, 3071-1; Decree, AGES, 3153.

<sup>36</sup>Border Report, Oct. 10, 1917 & Feb. 9, 1918, 812.00/21421 & 21592.

<sup>37</sup>Circular 32, Sept. 7, 1917, AGES, 3153.

The legislature raised the minimum wage to two pesos, national gold, in May, 1918, but Soriano thought the raise was unconstitutional, and a special commission was appointed to study the raise. Minimum wages, under the Constitution and Law 9, were to be within the jurisdiction of a special committee formed in each municipality under a central state committee of conciliation. Since this labor structure did not yet exist, the wage law was declared unconstitutional.<sup>38</sup> Not until September, 1918, did the legislature pass a law creating the Central Committee of Conciliation and Arbitration and the Municipal Committees of Conciliation.

The Municipal Committees were made up of a representative of the workers, a representative of the employers and a representative from the town council, who would function as president. When the Committee was needed, the president would call on the factions to name their representatives; if they did not comply he would appoint the representative for each, who would present his faction's opinions before the Committee.

The function of the Municipal Committee was to be strictly conciliatory. It was to hold two or three sessions: the first two, if necessary, for investigation of the problem, and the last session for conciliation, with suggestions from the Committee. If no agreement could be reached, the problem

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<sup>38</sup>Report of the Special Commission, May 29, 1918, AGES 3208.

was then referred to the Central Committee for arbitration. The Central Committee could act as a tribunal and impose its decisions when the problem could not be resolved otherwise. In cases of jurisdictional conflicts between two municipalities, the Central Committee handled the case, as it did if there were a strike involved.<sup>39</sup>

A new law of indemnifications was passed in October; the "Union of Red Socialists" and "Day Laborer's Union" held a general assembly and decided to petition for its repeal and the reinstatement of De la Huerta's law, with no success. Rules were formulated for the formation and regulation of the Central Committee in December, and the following March, 1919, a new labor law was issued, which for the first time covered agricultural workers.<sup>40</sup>

De la Huerta's campaign for the governorship in 1919 appealed to the working classes, and American mine owners labeled him as a Bolshevik, a label then in vogue in the United States. The mine owners were not soothed by the presence of IWW organizers in their towns, but with copper prices down and the mines closing, workers had other worries aside from organization, and the state remained quiet until the railroad strike in 1920.

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<sup>40</sup>Decree 52, Oct. 1918; Ruling, July 19, 1919; Law 67, Mar. 31, 1919, AGES, 3291-1.

## CHAPTER IX FOOD AND LAND

The revolutionary years were disruptive of the all-important agricultural life of Sonora. In the isolated areas where small-scale farming was the rule, it was not so much the loss of manpower that hurt the farmer, but rather the incursions by the soldiers of both factions who took whatever was edible. Whatever receipts were given for farm products were hard to redeem; bonds that were given for property taken by the maytorenistas became worthless with Maytorena's fall. Large-scale farmers were hurt by the manpower loss together with the other losses. An Ures widow spoke for her neighbors and for many other northern farmers when she petitioned Calles for tax relief in December, 1915:

Since Maytorena rebelled against the government of Carranza, this town was constantly oppressed, robbed and sacked by numerous rebel parties passing through, with the villistas and maytorenistas taking more than 1800 cattle, 350 horses and more than 200 saddles. Our cowboys are on foot, and our farm workers and servants were taken by the war, paralyzing all kinds of work. In the last days we were despoiled of all kinds of provisions--coffee, sugar, lard, beans, flour, corn, wheat, etc., even our clothes and our indispensable tools.

It is unnecessary to say that business is paralysed and that even with hard work, we remain in misery.

She pointed out that the citizens no longer received any



protection for their taxes; that the values of property had diminished and the old tax bases were no longer valid, so the contribution expected was no longer just; that because of the economic conditions it was impossible to pay anything anyway.<sup>1</sup>

Municipal reports filed by the reorganizing governments after the triumph of the constitucionalistas consistently described local agriculture as in a "lamentably decadent state," with abandoned lands, young, unmarketable cattle and insufficient harvests.<sup>2</sup> A commission sent by Calles to the far reaches of the Ures district in December, 1915 to reorganize the governments there affirmed the lamentable condition of the stripped land, which lacked food for humans and animals. The police commissioner of San Pedro de las Cuevas pictured that community, which just a few weeks before had lost most of its male population, as a sad town which could not help the families who had lost everything since their neighbors had nothing to give. The floods of 1914 had already destroyed the lands; previous villista forays had stripped the townspeople of provisions, and then came the massacre. The people there believed that they were entitled to some extraordinary aid and relief from the government.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Eloisa R., Vda. de Campilo to Calles, Dec. 22, 1915, AGES, 3055.

<sup>2</sup>Reports of municipalities on the conditions in their vicinities for the summer of 1916 are found in AGES, 3072-1.

<sup>3</sup>Jesus Romo to First Official, Secretary of Government, Feb. 15 & Feb. 23, 1916; his commission, Dec. 16, 1915, all in AGES, 3063.

The misery of the area north of Hermosillo was obvious and the conditions in the lower Yaqui River Valley were well known. But the upper reaches of the Yaqui were isolated by the destruction of the railroad in the floods of 1914 and by the almost complete lack of vehicular roads; there were no telegraph lines to the area and the mails had been suspended. The true state of affairs in this vast area--encompassing the Álamos district, the Sahuaripa district and the southeastern portion of the Ures district--was unknown until mid-1916, when De la Huerta sent a special commission under his old professor and friend, Epifaneo Vieyra, to make a thorough tour of the region, to give public relief where it was necessary and to correct administrative problems where they existed.

Vieyra travelled from Hermosillo through La Colorado and Mazatán eastward to Sahuaripa, Bacanora and Arivechi, and south to Nuri. He described it as a region of desolation and hunger completely out of the mainstream of modern life. Nuri, in the Sierras, was distinguished for its clerical education and its adherence to caciquismo (local despotic rule) and was untouched by the revolutionary movements. The day laborers there still received fifteen centavos as a daily wage, and paid two silver pesos for a decaliter (approximately 2.8 bushels of grain). Suaqui Grande, in the midst of a fertile area, had little cultivated land because of fear of the Yaquis. None of the public buildings

there were usable; only mounds of ruined walls marked their location. The village of Bacanora, whose name had become a synonym for Sonoran mescal, had become decadent with the advent of prohibition. The floods of 1914 had devastated much of its farmlands and left them covered with river rocks. Sahuaripa suffered from an omnipotent and arbitrary military despot who imprisoned the residents on whimsey; it had never lived up to its promise of being a revolutionary center. Vieyra removed corrupt or capricious officials and installed suitable revolutionaries, where they were available. He distributed food grains and clothing, and left a supply of seeds for planting.<sup>4</sup> The government aid was given with propaganda in mind, and did little to help the region to recover.

Food, and the lack of it, became one of the state's primary concerns after the floods in December, 1914. The floods played havoc with the food supply, and conditions were made worse by the presence of the non-productive troops and the monetary crisis. Prices spiraled ever higher as a result of the shortages and the depreciation of the currency, putting some foods, such as meat, out of the reach of the ordinary consumer. Horse and burro meat made their appearance in the butcher shops in Hermosillo in 1915, but their prices rose quickly, putting them beyond the reach

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<sup>4</sup> Reports of Epifanio Vieyra to De la Huerta, beginning July 4, 1916, all in AGES, 3063.

of the poor.

To combat the high prices in Hermosillo, Maytorena opened two government subsidized expendios (markets) in April, 1915, to provide food at cost, to the poor only.<sup>5</sup> The food program was expanded in June under the office of the Purveyor General. The number of expendios was increased to three in Hermosillo; tickets were issued to the poor so that they might use paper money to buy flour, sugar, coffee, salt and meat.<sup>6</sup>

When the constitucionalistas occupied Hermosillo, they found it necessary to continue a pricing program, and formed a regulatory body to fix the prices of the prime necessities so that they could be sold for the lowest possible price to the public. But food remained in short supply and the prices in most parts of the state remained high even after the fighting ended, forcing Calles to undertake a campaign to lower the prices, which he thought were raised maliciously by merchants in order to blame the new administration for the economic ills of the state. Applying the Hermosillo idea to the state, Calles, in Decree 20, established a Commercial Regulatory Commission which was to study the economic situation and try to conciliate the

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<sup>5</sup>La Voz de Sonora, April 2, 1915.

<sup>6</sup>Galaz, Desde el Cerro, I, 63-64.

interests of the consumer and the seller.<sup>7</sup> The Hermosillo body continued to function, and in March decided that, in order to make the prime necessities available to the proletariat at reasonable cost, the government should establish expendios in various sections of the town, and the idea was approved by Calles. The Hermosillo commission was given permission to name personnel for the expendios and to acquire the necessary articles, in other states, if necessary.<sup>8</sup>

The state Regulatory Commission also agreed that the formation of expendios throughout the state could best serve the needs of the consumer, and activated a committee to purchase food. Secretary of State Moreno raised a loan of 100,000 pesos in constitucionalista money for their supplies, but learned with surprise that there was another body with the same assigned function, the "Sonora Purveyors." Obregón and the secretary of Treasury had commissioned the rival group and had named a purchasing agent; one million pesos had been put at its disposal, but no purchases had been made.

Upon investigation, the Regulatory Commission was able to inform Moreno that Obregón's group had brought no supplies into Sonora because bringing merchandise in from outside the

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<sup>7</sup>Decree 20, Jan. 3, 1916, AGES, 3069-1.

<sup>8</sup>Information on the founding of the Regulatory Commission from Comercio #2, AGES, 3083.

state would not solve the problem of high food prices; the costs of the food would prevent its sale at prices lower than that of the local merchants. The state Commission suggested two ways of obtaining foodstuffs cheaply. The Sonoran government could create a state monopoly, which would require the expenditure of much money; or it could resort to the forced acquisition of provisions where they could be found, for sale at moderate prices to the proletariat. If the first method were used, a fund with regular income would have to be established; if the second, a decree would have to be issued that could prevent abuses.

A combination of the two was used. Calles proposed to pay for the purchase of foodstuffs by selling cattle to the United States, to raise dollars to buy the food there-- whereas two months earlier he had been pleading with Obregón to do something to stop the large-scale sale of cattle to the United States because of the escalating meat prices in Sonora.<sup>9</sup> The purchase of food in the United States and in the other Mexican states did not suffice to end the shortages which were only alleviated. Calles' government also commandeered growing crops, with the result that fewer crops were planted that spring, and a portion of the flour ground

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<sup>9</sup>Calles to Obregón, transcribes a message from the Administrator of Customs in Nogales, February 28, 1916, AGES, 3054.

was seized at the mills.<sup>10</sup>

There was nothing to stop the municipalities from establishing their own price control systems, and some did so. Altar limited the margin of profit to fifteen percent on items of prime necessity, and to thirty percent on other retail sales. To prevent hoarding of goods such as coffee, sugar, and rice, these were to be sold only in small quantities to each customer. If a storekeeper hid these products to increase their scarcity and thus their prices, the president could confiscate the items and sell them for the established prices.<sup>11</sup>

Guaymas established five expendios of its own, under the direction of the town council, by furnishing to trusted merchants goods sent by the Regulatory Commission, from its central warehouse in Hermosillo, for sale in Guaymas at low prices.<sup>12</sup> Through June and July the prices remained moderate in Guaymas, but a shortage of supplies caused closures early in August.<sup>13</sup> Guaymas merchants had raised 85,000 pesos

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<sup>10</sup>Border Report, Apr. 8, 1916 & May 20, 1916, USDS, 812.00/17098 & 18284.

<sup>11</sup>Notice posted by the president of Altar, June 5, 1916, AGES, 3057-2.

<sup>12</sup>President, Guaymas, to De la Huerta, July 8, 1916, AGES, 3083. Contains a list of products furnished.

<sup>13</sup>Reports from Guaymas, June, July, August, 1916, AGES, 3071-2.

late in June, and sent an agent to Sinaloa to buy food. He returned empty-handed because the merchants there would not take paper money. The scarcities caused the imposition of an embargo on the shipment of all food out of Guaymas; even so, it was doubted that food supplies would last until September 1.<sup>14</sup>

Due to the rising cost of meat, Calles had tried to stop the export of 16,000 head of cattle in February by the Cananea Cattle Company, which had obtained a special export tax rate from Carranza. The company had contracted to acquire most of the cattle from the Arizpe district and part of the Moctezuma district. Calles, convinced that the large exportation would be the ruin of the future cattle industry in the state, beseeched Obregón to intercede with Carranza for the cancellation of the permit. It was already very difficult to purchase cattle for the army, and those available brought high prices. Calles thought that the border towns would soon be forced to buy meat in the United States, and meat prices over the state were prohibitive to most of the populace.<sup>15</sup>

The cattle had not yet been purchased nor rounded-up when Calles contacted Obregón, and when the company applied

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<sup>14</sup>Border Reports, Aug. 26, 1916, USDS, 812.00/19112.

<sup>15</sup>Communications between Calles and G. Corella, Feb. 28 and Mar. 1, 1916, AGES, 3054.



for a permit that exempted them from paying a state tax in April, only 10,000 were mentioned. Calles delayed the sale as long as he could. On April 1, he decreed that all cattle exported would be considered by the law as sold and would be liable for a sales tax of fifty percent of the value of the cattle, a tax which was merely an export tax in disguise, and therefore forbidden by federal law. Calles set the values for the cattle at twenty-five silver pesos for an animal of one year; thirty pesos for a two-year old, and forty for those of three or more years. Moreover, any authority who permitted the export of animals without ascertaining the prior payment of the sales tax was subject to arrest and fines.<sup>16</sup>

The export of the cattle was still pending when De la Huerta was appointed governor, and Calles could delay a bit longer by dumping the resolution of the exportation into his lap, since Carranza had never sent a formal decree ordering the tax cut. De la Huerta, in line with Carranza's wishes, permitted the crossing of the first 3000 head at Naco on June 26 with the payment of the two percent federal export tax. The cattle had been waiting there since May 16.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>16</sup>Decree 42, Apr. 1, 1916, AGES, 3056-2.

<sup>17</sup>Correspondence between Calles, Carranza, Moreno and De la Huerta found in AGES, 3056-2. Calles' motives must be questioned since in April he proposed the sale of cattle in the United States; if he bought the cattle for the state the profit margin would be increased by not having to pay the

The autumn harvests in 1916 eased the food problems in most towns, but the prices rose steadily. The east central area still suffered from hunger, and the Sahuaripa area was subsisting on vegetables, cheese and milk.<sup>18</sup> Expendios had not been established in those distant areas.

In January, 1916, Calles had called for the planting of all arable land by its proprietors, or its lease to those willing and able to work the land, in order to increase the desperately short supply of cereal grains. To this end he had issued Decree 27 which permitted the use of uncultivated land by anyone seeking land if the season for cultivation passed without its planting by the owner.<sup>19</sup> Implementation

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export tax. Moreover, consular reports indicated the cattle were in bad condition, but plentiful in the north. Border Report, July 22, 1916, 812.00/18861. Carranza forbade the imposition of a state export tax on cattle on Dec. 20, 1916, AGES, 3056-2.

<sup>18</sup> Border Reports, Sept. 23 & Nov. 14, 1916, USDS, 812.00/19458 & 19880; USS Raleigh, Oct. 10, 1916, USDS, 812.00/19597.

<sup>19</sup> Decree 27: The country needs cereal grains desperately, and there are many lands lying uncultivated, and many men who want to work, but proprietors would rather lands produce nothing than let them be worked on easy terms.

1) The lands should be immediately worked because of public need.

2) Owners of irrigable lands have the obligation to cultivate them or have them planted in proper season.

3) Lands not planted in time of season will be considered abandoned and can be planted immediately by whatever person desires to cultivate them wholly or in part by applying before the municipal authority or commissioner in whose jurisdiction they lie.

4) The occupant of the land cannot be molested from the

of the decree began with the summer planting season of 1917, when De la Huerta exhorted the municipal presidents to urge all farmers to cultivate all of their land. The lands not planted would be ceded to those who requested their use, so that the state would have the best harvest possible.<sup>20</sup>

De la Huerta's concern resulted from news he had lately received from Arizpe. The president there had asked if he might have permission to stop the movement of wheat out of the municipality due to the shortage of flour there. De la Huerta could do nothing which would interfere with the

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moment he begins working the land until the harvest; the owner can then reassume his rights, and has one-half of the year to work the lands; if he does not the land can be newly denounced.

5) Occupation of the land will be for one harvest only and does not confer proprietary rights; the land is simply loaned.

6) The owner cannot charge rent for the season, nor the government collect any tax.

7) The occupant must maintain the land in good condition and is responsible for any destruction that is his fault.

8) Betterments that he makes will be for the benefit of the land and he cannot expect compensation from the owner.

9) The administrators of confiscated lands will try to get those lands under their care cultivated, with preference to the poor.

10) Owners will not be exempted from paying the taxes of Decree 17 unless they cultivate the lands.

11) The farm laborers and day laborers who have lost their jobs without just cause will be preferred when granting the lands of their employers.

January 15, 1916, AGES, 3069-1.

<sup>20</sup>To all presidents, June 19, 1917, AGES, 3147.

internal commerce of the state without permission of the central government, but the threat of shortages might demand drastic action. He inquired of the municipal president as to the quantity of wheat expected from the autumn harvests and the quantity usually consumed; the president's forecast predicted even more shortages. He computed that the harvest would yield 5000 sacks of flour at ninety pounds each, but normal consumption would demand 6000. His response caused the Governor to telegraph the other municipal presidents to learn if their towns faced the same prospect.<sup>21</sup>

The answers were not assuring, and De la Huerta pressed the presidents to tell all who wanted to farm uncultivated lands that the government would do all it could to help them. If the lands desired had never been farmed, the government would assure their occupation for three years instead of the one harvest occupancy granted under Decree 27, despite any future action of the state legislature, then in the process of writing a new constitution. If someone desired a piece of land, the president was to issue a permit for its use. All lands already being prepared for planting were absolutely excluded from outside demands.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>21</sup>Telegrams exchanged by De la Huerta and the president, Arizpe, June 11-17, 1916, and telegram to all presidents, June 17, 1916, all found in AGES, 3147.

<sup>22</sup>Circular 1A, July 7, 1917 and Circular 5A, Aug. 16, 1917, AGES, 3147.

The entry of the United States into the European war made apparent that if Mexico suffered from food shortages, there would be little relief from the neighbor to the north. The United States prohibited the export of foodstuffs to all neutrals on July 15, but within a few days Carranza was notified that Mexico had been excepted.<sup>23</sup> However, shortages of wheat from a bad harvest in the United States and the needs of Europe raised the prices of all foodstuffs, making it more than ever imperative that Mexico become self-sufficient.

The exhortations and promises made to encourage increased planting came too late to affect the autumnal harvests. In August, San Pedro de la Cueva began begging for flour and other foods, and Soriano's government promised flour and beans. Beans, however, were unavailable, and the state had to substitute garbanzos, not a customary part of the Mexican diet. The bean shortage was not a local phenomenon, and the affected states elicited the cooperation of Mexico City; the export tax on black beans was raised to a prohibitive level to discourage export.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>23</sup>Obregón to De la Huerta, July 15, 1917; Valladores to De la Huerta, July 24, 1917, AGES 3119-1.

<sup>24</sup>President, San Pedro de la Cueva to Valenzuela, Valenzuela to president, Ures, Aug. 23 to Oct. 20, 1917, AGES, 3124-1; Circular 119, Secretary of Treasury, Sept. 9, 1917, AGES, 3054.

Mexico had early frosts in autumn, 1917, and a large part of the corn crop was lost.<sup>25</sup> Pressure increased for the full utilization of all lands and for an early harvest of all grains which might substitute for corn. To encourage more of the landless to take over uncultivated lands, Carranza reiterated a guarantee made earlier in the year that the crop belonged exclusively to the planter, and he alone would enjoy its benefits, without prejudicing the rights of the landowners.<sup>26</sup>

The food situation in Caborca affords an illustration of the problems which Soriano was forced to face in December, 1917. In that month the municipal president declared to the Governor that food was scarce and prices were high; to the point that laborers could not afford to buy. The harvests were bad, and any sales that took food out of the district would leave the residents hungry; yet 3000 sacks of corn had been contracted for sale outside the district when the total corn harvest had been scarcely 4000 sacks. He wanted permission to cancel the contract.

Soriano gave the president permission to block the removal of the corn, and the president was shortly protesting

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<sup>25</sup>Pastor Rouaix to Soriano, Oct. 6, 1917, AGES, 3147.

<sup>26</sup>Circular, Secretary of Development, Oct. 31, 1917, AGES, 3147; this had been previously issued on June 26, 1917, AGES, 3123.

the sale of beans outside the municipality to the 4C's. Soriano talked to the deputy from the Altar district who told him that there was a surplus of beans in the area and that the Governor could safely permit them to leave. Because of the discrepancy in the supply projected by the deputy and the president, Soriano had the president form a committee of merchants and farmers to investigate the true state of the supply and the prospective harvest.

The committee made a rapid survey and decided that the amount of the bean harvest in the district should total 211,662 pounds. With a minimum of 3000 inhabitants consuming approximately 15.75 ounces of beans in three daily meals, and six months until the next harvest, the minimum needs for the district amounted to 178,200 pounds. There would then appear to be a surplus of 33,462 pounds, but the amount of seed needed for the next planting was calculated to be 39,600 pounds. So the apparent surplus was not enough to seed the fields. Furthermore, the committee noted, a part of the harvest should not be counted because it would be lost as contraband to the United States, which was common at all times, but with prices so high in the United States was certain to be worse now.

As for the corn and wheat harvest, the area raised some of each, but the amount was insignificant and never enough to satisfy the local demand. The president reminded Soriano that the Caborca population was growing due to an influx of

Mexicans leaving the United States because of the war. The company which had purchased the corn asked permission to remove their produce since they had already paid for 1000 bushels. They assured Soriano that the district had ample corn. Soriano, who believed that the corn was for export, denied the permit until he was certain that the corn was destined for another town within the state. His granting the permit provoked protests from the town council and a petition from the citizens. Soriano then revoked the permit; in addition he told the 4C's that they would have to buy their beans elsewhere.<sup>27</sup>

Cattle exports were prohibited in January, 1917 but special permits were readily obtainable by application to Carranza. Smuggling was commonplace; the war raised cattle prices in the United States to make the risk well worthwhile. Soriano complained to Carranza that the export of cattle had raised the price of meat out of the reach of the poorer classes and requested that the government stop giving permits, at least temporarily. Carranza agreed in principal, but those permits already issued could not be retracted, and he would only promise a review of future permits. The President could try to end smuggling, which also meant a

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<sup>27</sup>All pertinent telegrams, letters and the petition are found in AGES, 3243, dated Dec. 6, 1917 to Jan. 17, 1918.



loss of government revenues, so the Customs Police (rurales) were reorganized and a fifteen mile zone created along the border within which there could be no north-south movement of cattle without a permit from the Secretary of Treasury, even to change pastures.<sup>28</sup>

Poor harvests and ever-increasing shortages with their consequent price rises made new controls mandatory by the end of 1917. Soriano ordered the town presidents to determine precisely the probable supplies of corn, wheat, beans, lard and other prime necessities in their areas; in addition they were to estimate the probable food expenses of the residents until the next harvests. In order to accomplish this task as quickly as possible the president could assign the project to a committee, named by him.<sup>29</sup> Until the food stocks in each municipality were known the municipal presidents were instructed to forbid corn, beans and flour from leaving the state.<sup>30</sup>

Soriano had little response from the municipalities, and to obtain the desired data, he established a Public Subsistence Council in February, 1918 with four deputies as members. In addition to determining the available supplies

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<sup>28</sup>Circular 123, Secretary of Treasury, Oct. 5, 1917, AGES, 3054; Carranza to Soriano, Sept. 20 to Oct. 5, 1917, AGES, 3115.

<sup>29</sup>Circular 287, Jan. 19, 1918, AGES, 3244.

<sup>30</sup>Soriano to presidents, Jan. 25, 26 & 28, 1918, AGES, 3243.

and to estimating the monthly consumption, the Council was to determine whether the state could export any foodstuffs. The method for obtaining the necessary data was left to the Council, but once the data was obtained, the members were to decide if price controls were required to aid the public.<sup>31</sup>

The Council judged the food shortage to be critical, and restricted the movement of flour, beans and corn. These products could only be transported from state municipalities having a surplus to those having deficits, but not from the state. All supplies of these commodities had to be deposited in Council warehouses to assure that the needs of local consumption would be met. If it was calculated that the town had a surplus, the surplus plus thirty percent of the quantity necessary for local consumption could be shipped elsewhere; the remaining seventy percent was divided proportionally among the depositors on the basis of their original deposits.

Prices for flour and beans were set at forty centavos per kilo (2.2 pounds), but no price was set for corn because of the many local factors in pricing. The proceeds of the sales were to be divided proportionally among the depositors of the supplies, as were expenses. For shopkeepers who did not manifest correctly the stock on hand when they were

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<sup>31</sup>Instructions for the Functioning of the Public Sub-sistence Council, Feb. 19, 1918, AGES, 3244.

surveyed, the difference between the manifested supply and the real supply would be confiscated and the proceeds of the sale divided between the state and municipal governments. The denouncer of hidden supplies would receive twenty percent of the sale price.<sup>32</sup> Municipal presidents were charged with strict vigilance for prices higher than those set by the Council and with reporting all infractions to the Council.<sup>33</sup>

Enforcing the rulings of the Council required much time and effort on the part of the town governments and the merchants. In Fronteras, for example, the president had to give an accounting each Monday morning at ten o'clock, beginning March 18, of the amount of beans, flour and wheat sold during the week. If the sales had been for less than one sack (twenty-five pounds) the storekeeper did not have to record the name of the buyers, but if they were greater, he had to show a receipt signed by the buyer of the sack or sacks. All prices were to be posted in gold or its

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<sup>32</sup>The extent of the violations is not evident from the archival material. Two were reported from Fronteras where the president was particularly vigilant; "decommissioned" were fifty-two sacks of corn, twenty-one of beans, and fifty arrobas (one arroba is approximately twenty-five pounds) of flour, all from Chinese stores. President, Fronteras, to Soriano, Mar. 12, 1918, AGES, 3243.

<sup>33</sup>Notice, published by town council of Guaymas, Mar. 8, 1918, AGES, 3244. The reason for the permission to export an extra thirty percent was not explained; the Council possibly felt that the supplies then in the hands of the residents would equal thirty percent, or possibly felt that shortages of that amount could be borne by the population without undue complaint.

equivalent in other legal money.<sup>34</sup>

Because of the scarcities of beans, flour and corn in Fronteras, it was shortly necessary to limit sales of these items. To each family, with no size specified, the merchant could sell each week one sack of flour, one-half sack of corn and about seventeen pounds of beans. The seller had to keep a register for each family that bought food there, to ascertain that the purchases did not exceed the established limits. Any person from outside the town would have to obtain a permit from the president before he could purchase food.<sup>35</sup>

The Council had quickly assumed for itself more tasks than were assigned in the instructions for its functioning, and invaded Hermosillo's municipal jurisdiction. The town council of Hermosillo had refused to obey the Council's dictates because, according to the Council, its members were "reactionary elements, conservatives and enemies of our Social Reform." Not only did the Council warehouse commodities; it decided the priorities for their use. Thus, flour could be used for bread and tortillas, but not for such second or third class foods as spaghetti or macaroni.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>34</sup>Public Subsistence Council to president, Fronteras, Mar. 27, 1918, AGES, 3243.

<sup>35</sup>Telegrams to Chinese merchants in Fronteras, Mar. 27, 1918, AGES, 3243.

<sup>36</sup>Quong Tong y Cia. were pasta makers in Hermosillo

The demand of the Council that corn, beans and flour be delivered to the government warehouses brought a protest and a threat from the British government. The British consul charged that the forced deposits violated the Mexican Constitution by preventing the growers and holders of those crops from disposing of them as they wished. Endangered by this controversy was the supply of jute bags to garbanzo and other seed growers, because the British government, through The Textile Alliance, controlled all jute sacks. The British government was now asking for all purchasers of jute sacks to sign a guarantee that the sacks would not fall into enemy hands, and the signatures would mean nothing if the grower could not control the destiny of his product.

The consul reminded Soriano that the government was now considering the request for 500,000 jute sacks, and if the garbanzo growers did not obtain them it would mean an income loss to the state of 10,000,000 pesos in gold. The British government, he said, did not want to impose hardships, yet "the final disposition of sacks, and other jute products, is of the greatest of importance to the British government and the Allied Cause."<sup>37</sup>

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whose flour was seized at the mill. Quong Tong requested the return of his flour from the Council, and when they refused, he wrote the Governor, who ordered it returned. It was not done, however. Letters exchanged between Quong Tong y Cia., Soriano, and the Council, Mar. 16 to Apr. 2, 1918, AGES, 3244.

<sup>37</sup>British vice-consul to Soriano, Mar. 9, 1918, AGES, 3243.

Soriano, who was aware of the imminent need for the jute sacks, declared to the consul that the functioning of the Council would be transitory, only until the next harvest, to assure food supplies for the state. He did not see any reason to believe that British interests were endangered, nor could he see what business the British had in trying to influence Mexican internal affairs.<sup>38</sup>

Undoubtedly, Soriano received advice and pressure from Obregón in the matter of the jute sacks, because they were desperately needed for the garbanzos then in the fields. Obregón was at the moment negotiating to buy 200,000 sacks in the United States, and he still had not obtained them early in April.<sup>39</sup> On the other hand, Soriano would have to answer to Calles, as will be seen.

Whether the conflict over the jute sacks had anything to do with the suppression of the Council on April 1 is uncertain, but suppressed it was. Soriano explained to the municipal presidents that the deputies who had made up the Council now had legislative work to do and no longer had time to carry on the Council's work. The ban on the export of beans, corn, wheat and flour remained in effect, but the

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<sup>38</sup>Soriano to British vice consul, Mar. 18, 1918, AGES, 3243.

<sup>39</sup>Border Report, Mar. 23 & Apr. 4, 1918, USDS, 812.00/21862 & 21865.

prices fixed by the Council were no longer valid.<sup>40</sup>

Calles, who was then in Lencho making his interminable preparations for the Yaqui campaign, demanded to know Soriano's reasons for the suppression. Calles thought that the only failing of the Council was its lack of radicalism in seizing all supplies of flour; as usual, he said, the rich would benefit. He praised the work of the Council in determining food supplies; from its work, he had learned that only in Hermosillo and Altar was there any surplus of flour--a small surplus, it was true, but sufficient to provision his troops for two months. Once his army took the supplies it needed, there would be scarcely enough to provision the two districts.<sup>41</sup>

Soriano explained his abolition of the Council on the basis of reports given him by the deputies from various districts. The deputies did not give him a picture of a state dying from hunger, he claimed, and, furthermore, sometimes a beneficial idea could become counterproductive when it

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<sup>40</sup>Circular 32 to all presidents, Apr. 1, 1918, AGES, 3243. In banning the shipment of foods out of the state, Soriano had a problem with the railroad, which took orders only from the Secretary of Communications. Soriano suggested to the railroad that it could simply refuse to take food destined for out of state, but the railroad viewed that as interference with free commerce. The resolution of the problem is not documented. Correspondence between Governor and RR, and to Sect. of Government to intercede with Sect. of Communications, Jan. to Apr., 1918, found in AGES, 3243.

<sup>41</sup> Calles to Soriano, April 2, 1918, AGES, 3243.

lost impetus. He agreed with Calles that the Council was not radical enough, but stated that it should not be blamed for the failings of town councils which had not cooperated fully. Since the setting of uniform prices over the state had not been successful, Soriano told Calles, he was considering a project whereby each town council would regulate prices, a more equitable practice, he thought.<sup>42</sup>

Calles was angry because the dissolution of the Council interfered with his acquisition of supplies for his troops. The Council representative in Pitiquito (in the Altar district) had purchased flour for the troops by requisitioning a part of the needed amount from several millers. With the Council gone, the millers holding the flour in Caborca refused to fill their quotas at the Council price, all of which perturbed Calles greatly, since his troops needed provisioning immediately in order to be across the mountains by April 10. He believed that the terms originally set should be adhered to.

Calles vented his anger on Soriano.

If I had known that the civil government was not sufficiently energetic to maintain its dispositions, I would have worked in another form, and I again insist that the dissolution of the Council is the first serious breach that we have had with political organization, and the results are already evident. I am sure nobody will make a case for the government.

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<sup>42</sup>Soriano to Calles, Apr. 7, 1918, AGES, 3243.



Since for no reason should my military operations that cost lives and sacrifices be interrupted, if the merchandise is not delivered, I am going to put one hundred men at the disposition of Carmelo (the Council representative) in order to take the flour. I don't want to have to go to such extremes, but I am forced to do so because every time, you have valued the screams of those who thirst for riches over those who scream from hunger and our forces who are dying for those who conspire against them.<sup>43</sup>

Soriano hastened to soothe Calles with assurances that in Hermosillo there was flour, intended for the municipal expendios, available for his troops; since furnishing the flour to the expendios had not kept the prices down, Calles could have it.<sup>44</sup> Soriano also ordered the president in Pitiquito to fill the Calles contract, as it had been made under the Council; if it were not done, he told Calles to use his men to take the food, and be welcome to it. He also promised Calles an equal quantity of surplus flour from Hermosillo for future use, should he need it.<sup>45</sup> Later in April Soriano became irked with the populace of Caborca, when the town president asked for permission to stop flour from leaving the municipality after Calles had taken his share. Soriano replied that there was free traffic

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<sup>43</sup>Calles to Soriano, Apr. 2, 1918, AGES, 3243.

<sup>44</sup>Soriano to Calles, Apr. 2, 1918, AGES, 3243.

<sup>45</sup>Soriano to "La Unión" mill, Apr. 2, 1918, AGES, 3243.

among the municipalities and he could not stop it.<sup>46</sup>

The Governor followed up his promise to Calles with the creation of local juntas for the control of prices. The municipal president was empowered to name a junta of from three to ten residents, none of whom could be large-scale merchants or farmers. After a conscientious study the junta was to set prices for articles of prime necessity, principally flour, beans, wheat and corn, but including such others as they felt were necessary. The prices could not remain fixed, but had to respond in some degree to the fluctuation of supply and demand. Goods originating outside the town were to have prices set on the basis of the invoice price plus the freight charge and a fair profit.

The junta was to learn from each merchant exactly what he had in stock, and then ration the stock to each family or resident. Junta members were to try in every way possible to prevent the merchants from raising their prices. If the town completely lacked some commodities, the junta was to convoke a group of the wealthier residents and collect the funds from them to invest in the purchase of merchandise from any place it might be available. If the situation became truly calamitous, the government had to be consulted for a solution.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>46</sup>President, Caborca to Soriano, Apr. 20, 1918 and reply, Apr. 22, 1918, AGES, 3243.

<sup>47</sup>Circular 35, Apr. 11, 1918, AGES, 3243.

The response to the call for juntas was slow and not all towns ever got around to creating one. Arizpe named its junta in April, one of the earliest to do so, but the president there saw no need for it. The price of flour and beans was high there, but there had been no complaints. His district produced a modest surplus, and despite some shipments out of the district, there did not appear to be any shortages.<sup>48</sup> On the other hand, Pótam, in the heart of the fertile Yaqui River Valley, needed corn and asked for permission to secure it from Navojoa. The Governor gave his permission, and notified the president in Navojoa that it had been given. The president in Navojoa in turn informed Pótam that Navojoa had no corn, but that Álamos still had a good supply.<sup>49</sup>

Calles was in Mazatlán preparing a campaign against the villista rebels in Nayarit, and he requested that flour be sent for his forces. Soriano was reluctant to fulfill the order because he did not want flour to leave the state in violation of his own ruling, fearing that others might make similar demands. Calles reminded him that the flour would be used to feed Sonoran troops and affirmed that he supported the ban on the commercial export of flour. Soriano permitted the shipment, but by that time the harvests were

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<sup>48</sup>President, Arizpe, to Governor, Apr. 17, 1918, AGES, 3243.

<sup>49</sup>Presidents of Pótam and Navojoa and Governor, May 12, 16, & 24, 1918, AGES, 3243.

beginning to come in and the food situation had eased.<sup>50</sup>

The effort to keep food in the municipalities and prices down lost its momentum in April, and enforcement of the pricing structures became arbitrary, like the rest of the program. The municipal juntas were abolished in June, when harvests of cereal grains promised to suffice for ordinary consumption, and complete freedom of movement was permitted within the state.<sup>51</sup> The ban on the export of food-stuffs from the state remained in effect until December, although so many exceptions had been made that the law was in virtual abeyance months before.<sup>52</sup>

The governors of all Mexican states had available to them another method to encourage food production, the distribution of lands. Under Carranza's Additions to the Plan of Guadalupe of December, 1914, and the Agrarian Law of January 6, 1915, the restoration of ejidal lands was

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<sup>50</sup> Correspondence between Soriano, Calles and García, June 3 & June 11, 1918, AGES, 3243. Calles was involved in a campaign against rebels in Nayarit, presumably villistas, but this is the only mention made of his campaign in the archives, aside from his cryptic remark that he "had to be provisioned and over the Sierras by April 10," when he was demanding flour from Pitiquito. He was not over the Sierras by April 10; according to American reports he went to Nayarit in June with 1200 Yaqui troops; whatever he did was of short duration for he was back in Hermosillo with his troops on July 7. Border Reports, June 10 & 22, 812.00/22068 & 22078; Simpich to SecSt, July 1, 1918, 812.00/22102; Border Report, July 20, 1918, 812.00/22107.

<sup>51</sup> Circular 71, June 29, 1918, AGES, 3243.

<sup>52</sup> Permits, etc. are to be found in AGES. 3244.

promised. The Agrarian Law stated that the governor or military commander of any state controlled by the constitutionalistas was authorized to restore or create agricultural communes through the expropriation of private lands. Villages that wanted the restoration of their illegally seized communal lands, or those which needed lands without having any claims except need, could petition the governor; the governor would consult with the state agrarian commission created under the same law, and decide on the petition.

The law was vague in many respects, leaving many questions unanswered. The term ejido was not clearly defined until June, 1916, when the National Agrarian Commission stated that the term applied strictly to agricultural villages.<sup>53</sup> There were no guidelines established for the seizure of the lands, no definition of the amount or the nature of the lands subject to expropriation, and the seized lands were granted only provisionally, creating uncertainty and insecurity for the receiver.

The ejidal definition did not apply to many Sonoran towns, which had developed as mining camps or without agricultural lands, such as the border towns of Nogales and Naco, and Cananea. La Colorada was one of those which had originated as a mining camp. There were no ejidos to which

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Circular 6, June 30, 1916, AGES, 3088.

the municipal authorities could grant lands. The land all belonged to the company, and there was much vacant land in the center of the town which could have been used, but only the company could grant a valid title. De la Huerta had the local agrarian commission persuade the company to cede the lands to the town council as a legal fund, from which would be furnished lots for agricultural purposes as well as town lots.<sup>54</sup> Property from the legal fund was sold, except in cases where the recipient was impoverished and the town council gratuitously ceded ownership. However, La Colorada had another problem that still prevented the utilization of the agricultural lands: the Yaquis.<sup>55</sup>

Álamos, although originally a mining camp, had had lands donated for the use of the people by a private citizen. The town council had divided the lands in 1890 and approved their sale in 1899; many of the lands were sold in 1905 and 1906. The residents and president of Álamos petitioned De la Huerta for the return of the ejidal lands, and De la Huerta declared the sales null and void on the basis of the Carranza law and Calles' Circular 19, which implemented the law in Sonora.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>54</sup>President, La Colorada, to De la Huerta, May 27, 1916; Local Agrarian Commission to president, Jan. 10, 1917, AGES, 3154.

<sup>55</sup>De la Huerta to Serrano, June 19, 1917, AGES, 3147.

<sup>56</sup>Circular 19 of Apr. 7, 1916 declared null the

The legal complexities of returning the lands were immense because the titles were often traditional or oral, and if written, often had boundary discrepancies. These, together with the vagueness of the law as originally written, delayed land return for many years. Agua Prieta received ejidal lands in 1918 and granted them provisionally until

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alienation of lands, waters, and pastures belonging to the people made by a political chief, a governor, or any other authority under the law of June 25, 1856; all concessions, compositions, or sales of lands made by the Secretaries of Development and Treasury or other federal authority after December 1, 1876, in which they illegally invaded the ejidos, their divisions, or other properties, etc. Also declared null were surveys and delineations made by companies, judges, or other state or federal authorities. AGES, 3064.

Some of the ejidal lands of Álamos were sold by the town council in 1906 to the Urrea brothers. The lands which they purchased had been stripped of trees and vegetation prior to the purchase; the trees had been used for timber for the mines and for fuel, and the pasturing of an excessive number of cattle had stripped the land of grass cover. The land was so poor that cattle pastured on it died of starvation; their bodies and the soil washed into the stream running through Álamos, befouling it and causing sickness, since the water was used for drinking and cleaning. The Urreas planted trees and let the land lie fallow, ending the erosion and thus cleaning up the stream.

The residents of Álamos had not protested the sales of the worthless lands in 1906, but in 1917 they decided that they wanted the land back. The Urreas claimed it was because the land was again productive, and they wanted it simply to despoil it again. They protested the return of the lands by De la Huerta, with no luck. The long legal decision stated that the lands could not be sold by the town council; the town council was merely the administrator of the public lands. The Urreas could only count as recompense any money they had made from the land while they held it. Documentation and decision, 1917, AGES, 3154.

the titles could be cleared.<sup>57</sup> Calles personally ordered the local agrarian commission to cede lands quickly to the small community of El Torreón near Hermosillo; the commission attempted to comply but soon was stalled by the legalities.<sup>58</sup>

De la Huerta preferred to use a different method of giving land to the people and increasing agricultural production. Calles had issued Decree 32 in January, 1916, which provided for the expropriation of properties from reactionaries or those who aided the reactionaries, and all rural properties seized under the decree were destined for division in conformity with the agrarian laws. Under the existing agrarian law the state could not grant ownership of the lands. The agricultural colonies envisioned by De la Huerta were cooperative societies working lands whose ownership remained vested in the state. De la Huerta proposed the formation of eight agricultural colonies whose workers would be associates, not simply paid labor. The state would

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<sup>57</sup>Municipal report, Agua Prieta, Aug. 26, 1918, AGES, 3220. The town had its eye on lands near Cabullona, in the same municipality, and the president was disgusted because the lands, which had been intervened, had been rented to several Chinese who consequently controlled the water rights. The president remarked on the insecurity of the settlers on the ejidal lands, saying that they feared that they would be taken away from them.

<sup>58</sup>Calles to president, Local Agrarian Commission, July 11, 1918 and reply, August 9, 1918, AGES, 3154.



furnish the land and a part of the necessary implements and seeds, and receive five percent of the profits. Fifty percent of the profits were to be divided among the associates, who also received one and one-half pesos per day in wages; the remaining forty-five percent went to the manager who received no other pay.

The most ambitious of the cooperatives was at Santa Ana in the Magdalena district. The lands there had been intervened, but instead of turning them over to the local people who desired lands, the state government gave them to outsiders to create the colony.<sup>59</sup> The lands were divided into seven main farms with a manager for each; these in turn were subdivided among a total of thirty-seven associates.<sup>60</sup> Santa Ana raised wheat, corn and beans, but its chances for success appeared dubious in its first year of its existence. Management was apathetic and funds were not adequate; lands were watered without preparation and the water was not divided equitably; and machines were not properly maintained. The associates who worked hard, though, did produce good

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<sup>59</sup>De la Huerta, Report, May 19, 1916, AGES, 3132; Petition from residents of Santa Ana to De la Huerta, June 25, 1917, AGES, 3147. The residents were aggrieved that they had been shoved aside for outsiders, and asked that contracts for the lands be invalidated. They needed lands quickly because corn had to be in the ground by July 26 so that they could plant beans afterward. The Governor told them to find other lands close by. Calles to C. Elizondo, July 7, 1917, AGES, 3147.

<sup>60</sup>Inspector's report, no date, 1917, AGES, 3148.

crops that would profit the state.<sup>61</sup>

Sonora's agrarian law, Decree 27, conferred no ownership of lands; it simply opened unused lands to those who would utilize them for the production of foodstuffs. The law was not effective because the applicants for the lands were too poor to afford the seeds, implements and animals necessary to work the land. The petitions for lands usually included pleas for the state to furnish all of these, and the state treasury was in no condition to stand such expenses.<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>61</sup>Inspector's report, AGES, 3148-1. There had been a colony proposed for lands near Bahía Kino, which was to have as settlers thirty-one German families from the United States. De la Huerta hoped that it would become a model colony to inspire and stimulate Sonoran farmers. Supposedly wells were dug for irrigation, but whether the colony was founded is unknown, since the developer of the colony, Major Richard Schwierz, a member of Calles' staff, was also the first manager at the Santa Ana colony. De la Huerta dreamed of planting a colony along the Colorado River, emulating the successful American farm colony at Yuma. Some engineering work was done, and canals planned, but a negative engineering report and probably a lack of money ended that project. Reports and plans found in AGES, 3123.

<sup>62</sup>Typical of the pleas for aid was that of Tomás Espinoza of Arizpe, who in March, 1917 said that he wanted to work some land but lacked certain elements for farming. He attached a list of the articles needed, which he said could be repaid with the first harvest. Besides beans and corn for seeding, he requested two small plows, two pairs of harnesses, one small cart, one pair of mules, eight rolls of wire for fencing, 1000 feet of wood for a house and eight rolls of tarpaper to roof the house. Espinoza received a promise of two hundred gold pesos from De la Huerta on April 3, but when he had not received the money by April 13, he wrote again. The order to pay him was sent by the treasurer on April 24; presumably he received the money. Espinoza was unusual; usually there was only a polite letter in response. Pertinent letters plus other solicitations found in AGES, 3148-1. A group of residents from Cananea requested lands

De la Huerta, who more than the other governors encouraged the use of Decree 27 to acquire lands, could only advise the applicant to arrange for what he needed with local merchants, with the state guaranteeing the obligation.<sup>63</sup>

One of the faults of Decree 27 was that it set no dates by which the lands had to be planted, probably due to the fact that planting dates varied from locale to locale and would have to be determined individually. However, it could have bypassed such complications by simply stating that after so many days past the customary planting times in the area, the uncultivated land would be available to those who wanted to use it. Dates were critical when two crops a year were planted on the same land, as was customary in most of Sonora. In the Ures municipality, for instance, corn was planted before June 15 to be matured by August 10; the lands then had to be readied for the planting of beans,

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in Cocospera in the municipality of Imuris. The Governor told them that the lands were theirs if they were uncultivated. As it happened, the lands had an owner, who offered to rent them to the group, which refused. The leader of the group was very angry at the president of Imuris for his attempts at reconciliation; he wanted to sue him for the profits of the crops he did not make and for a nervous illness which he said the president caused. Documentation in AGES, 3154.

<sup>63</sup>In response to persons from Cananea and Oquitoa who sought assistance to begin farming, the Governors suggested that they seek their implements from local merchants, and the government would guarantee the obligations. Correspondence of July and August, 1917 found in AGES, 3123.

between August 15 and August 30.<sup>64</sup> If those seeking lands had to delay much longer, there would be no chance for maturation of the beans.

Aside from the problem of planting dates, the decree overlooked some of the other realities of agriculture. It made no provision for the fact that many lands needed to lie fallow because they lacked humus, as no organic matter or fertilizer was ever applied. As previously mentioned, there was no provision for the acquisition of the tools and seeds also needed by the poor farmer who needed the land, and there were no banking facilities to finance the farmers. There was no punishment promised for those who deceived the government into thinking that the lands they received would be planted; nor was there punishment for those who took lands under Article 27, without rents, and leased them to others, something quite possible given the collusion of local authorities.

Moreover, anyone taking the lands was uncertain of his tenure. If the owner decided to plant, he could demand the return of the lands after the first harvest; he could

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<sup>64</sup>A. G. Rivera to Soriano, ND, 1918, AGES, 3246. Soriano, who had been petitioned for lands in the Ures area, knew that there was much unplanted land there, and he decided that owners must be notified during the planting season of their obligation to plant; if they did not, the council could begin to divide the lands the day after the customary date had passed. Soriano to president, Ures, June 6, 1918. Workers petitioned again on June 25, so the council must have been dilatory.

either plant them himself, or rent them to a tenant who paid part of the crops as rent. Either of these was certainly more profitable to the owner, and either would satisfy the state, which wanted the lands planted. But the impermanence of the arrangement made by the state would discourage improvements by the tenant, since he would not be reimbursed by the owner should the latter decide to plant.

Just how successfully Decree 27 fulfilled its purpose cannot be determined with exactness, but a survey conducted by the state for the federal government late in 1917 indicated that the response to the decree had been something less than overwhelming. The survey revealed little real progress, if this were measured in terms of the law's contribution to bettering the food situation in the state, or in terms of economic betterment. Numerous towns reported that they had made no grants under Decree 27, most because there had been no requests for land, and a few because the town had no lands to give. Of the one hundred sixty-three land grants reported, the sizes, where given, were small: five to twelve acres. Of the few that were reported as producing, the expected harvest was small. In Oquitoa, no one had heard of Decree 27. Most lands were planted by their owners; where land was available to the poor they had no resources for planting it.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> Examples of the abuses and problems may be found in

Sonora made another attempt at the distribution of lands in 1919. A special session of the state legislature met on February 15 to write a new land law, which became effective on July 27. The new law called for the confiscation of all land holdings in excess of 25,000 acres. The confiscated lands would be divided into smaller tracts and sold to the poor on a twenty-year basis, with payments of five percent of the purchase price each year. If there were arable lands within the denoted limits, anyone could settle on and work up to seven hundred fifty acres.<sup>66</sup>

In addition to the return of ejidal lands, the establishment of agricultural colonies, and Decree 27, Sonoran land reform involved the Calles tax law which imposed exorbitant taxes on uncultivated lands--though its usefulness remained a moot point because of the general tax picture. Some municipalities carried the idea even further; in 1915 Fronteras required the farmers there who did not want to plant to get a ruling from the municipal president and the water judge. In 1918 in the same community, a farmer who did not want to plant had to pay a five peso per hectare fine to the judge.<sup>67</sup>

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AGES, 3246, agricultura. Answers in response to the Governor's request for information on Oct. 20, 1917 is found in AGES, 3245.

<sup>66</sup> Border Report, July 26, 1919, USDS 812.00/22890.

<sup>67</sup> Fronteras, Taxing Plan, 1916 & 1918, AGES, 3060 & 3195.

The total effort to increase the state's food supply had little effect. When Calles, as Secretary of Commerce and Industry, asked about the state's bean harvest in December, 1919 in order to learn what was available for export, the state prognostication was gloomy; town after town answered that they had had bad harvests, frosts, sick plants, and that there was scarcely enough for local consumption or not enough for local consumption. There were few, if any, prospects for exports, but much need for imports.<sup>68</sup>

None of the state agricultural laws passed during this period to increase food production took into account two basic factors which limited agricultural production--the generally primitive farming methods and the lack of water. The modernization of farming methods lay within the government's competence but, with the exception of De la Huerta, the governors had shown no inclination toward this. The prevailing farming methods were those used by the Indians before the conquest, and only education could alter them. The farmers waited for the rains, and if they came and the lands were well watered, the seed was poked into the ground. There was no prior preparation of the ground, and no fertilization. Everything was left to nature. Among the

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<sup>68</sup> Calles to De la Huerta, Dec. 13, 1919, and responses from presidents, AGES, 3322.

majority of the native farmers anything approaching scientific farming was absolutely unknown, including dry farming as practiced on the Central Plains of the United States and on the Central Mesa of Mexico.

De la Huerta had established an agricultural school in Villa de Seris, utilizing a hacienda which had been seized from an enemy of the revolution. Cattle were donated from state herds, orchards planted and numerous improvements made to the grounds and buildings, making the hacienda suitable for use as an experimental school. The school began functioning in late 1916, but when Soriano took charge of the government he suspended all operations on Calles' orders, pleading economic necessity. In September, 1917 the entire estate, except the school building, was leased to a military man for 3000 gold pesos per year for four years. Although the suspension was supposedly temporary, the school was not reinstated.

The basic limiting factor in Sonoran agriculture was the lack of water. Cultivable lands were distinguished as being either tierras de riegos, lands with water rights, or temporales, those which depended on rain. The riegos were located along the rivers or the systems of canals which had

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<sup>69</sup>Becerril to Calles, Aug. 16, 1918, AGES, 3246; information on the agricultural school is found in Soriano's Report, Sept. 24, 1917 and De la Huerta's Report of Oct. 5, 1916, both found in AGES, 3071-1; the temporary suppression in Law 11, Sept. 10, 1917, AGES, 3151; the contract between Soriano and Lt. Col. Florencio Fimbres, AGES, 3113.



developed over the state since before the conquest, and the water rights to these lands were minutely delineated in long codes and were the subject of much litigation. The municipalities controlled the water rights, each through its town council and water judge, who settled all disputes over the taking of water from the canals and its proper distribution among the farmers. The town council charged water rates based on the amount of water the canal could carry; in addition, it could charge a tax on the water, as Fronteras did.<sup>70</sup> Any enterprise using water for power, usually mills, paid a fee for the use of the water, and all water users paid an honorarium to the water judge, in advance, which if not paid meant the loss of water rights.<sup>71</sup> There was much controversy because of the legal variations from municipality to municipality and conflicts over the allocation of water. The governors appointed canal inspectors whose duties included seeing that the canals were clean and free of weeds, overseeing the distribution of water to the landholders, and also the distribution of expenses for the maintenance of the canals.<sup>72</sup> The entire situation was further complicated by declarations from the federal government over the entire revolutionary period that one river

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<sup>70</sup>Fronteras, Taxing Plan, 1918, AGES, 3195.

<sup>71</sup>Banámichi, Taxing Plan, 1916, AGES, 3060.

<sup>72</sup>Appointment of Inspectors, Apr. 19, 1915, AGES, 3061-2.

after another was nationalized. Nationalization meant that the federal government had to approve all water projects.<sup>73</sup>

There was not always enough water to permit the opening of new lands to agriculture; sometimes it was taken at the expense of previously used lands. Banámichi, which claimed to have given fifty plots to farmers under Decree 27, complained that the waters from the Sonora River had scarcely watered the old fields, and now they were expected to stretch them to cover more lands. As a result of the extra water used in Banámichi, the farmers down the river at Huépac had been unable to irrigate.<sup>74</sup> Conflicts were most serious where there was even less water, as in the conflicts between Pitiquito and Caborca over the waters of the Altar River, where agricultural colonies had been

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<sup>73</sup>A classic circular from the section of the Secretariat (or Dept.) of Agriculture and Development, which handled the problems related to water, illustrated one of the reasons for the slow resolution of many of the petitions sent to the department. The circular noted that too often the petitioners did not know the laws relative to water, and there were numerous errors and omissions. Moreover, in the solicitations, there was

with great frequency, a defect that should be pointed out: the tendency to make the solicitations too long, too pompous, too full of high sounding phrases that add nothing to the same solicitation.

And the worst thing, the circular continued, was that after spending so much time reading so much that meant nothing, the employee found that the petition was not in compliance with the law and it was necessary to return it. Direction of Waters, June 12, 1918, AGES, 3199.

<sup>74</sup>Municipal report, Banámichi, 1918, AGES, 3220.

formed without a thorough prior investigation of the water rights associated with the lands.<sup>75</sup>

The practices of the Mayo Indians along the Mayo River were a source of worry, albeit relatively minor. The Indians had a process that they called "making land," which did just that. They drove a line of high stakes from the river bank out into the river bed at low water, and interwove them with branches. During the seasonal floods, great masses of organic material collected among the branches, hindering the stream flow, and then sand and lime settled out of the eddy created before the blockage. When the floods receded they left small plots of fertile land, which the Indians then farmed. This practice created havoc with the river course, and was accompanied by the destruction of other lands as the river shifted. Moreover, canal intakes were frequently left beyond the reach of water, to the dismay of the farmers depending on them.<sup>76</sup>

The most important irrigation project in Sonora was that being developed by the Richardson Construction Company in the lower Yaqui River Valley to water their 650,000 acres, some of the finest agricultural lands in all of Mexico. Contracts had been made in 1909 and 1911 with the

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<sup>75</sup>Documentation for conflicts, May, 1918, in AGES, 3199.

<sup>76</sup>Gustavo González to Agent, Agriculture and Development, May 25, 1918, AGES, 3199.

federal government, since the Yaqui River, with permanent water, had long been nationalized. The contracts set forth the company's obligations to its subscribers, and a "Regimen for Waters" was approved by the Secretary of Development in the latter year. In fulfillment of the contracts, the company had built an extensive canal system and subdivided the land into large tracts which were mostly held by American farmers, either as owners or lessors.

With the outbreak of the revolution and the increased Yaqui troubles, many Americans left the area. The waters assigned to the vacated lands were sold back to the Richardson Construction Company by the agent for the Administration of Absentee Properties, in 1913. Some of the vacated lands, however, were assigned to small farmers who, because of the insecurity of their position, did little to develop them. The lands were eventually returned to their owners, although, in some cases, the Mexicans departed reluctantly.<sup>77</sup>

The general political conditions in Sonora and the continuous Yaqui warfare had also prevented the company from fully developing the large holdings it had retained. The company became disturbed in April, 1918 with the granting

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<sup>77</sup>President, Guaymas, to Obregón, Oct. 15, 1913, AGES, 2897; W. B. Casperton to SecNavy, Aug. 21, 1916, USDS, 812.00/19087.

of its unused lands to others by the state government in 1911; the state grant stipulated that new landholders were entitled to water from the company system, and the planting of more lands would mean that there would not be enough water available to the old landholders. Therefore, the company announced it would refuse waters to those cultivating lands under Decree 27. The company explained its position to the president of C6corit, who had been generous in handing out permits to cultivate its land, and asked that no more be given.

The president of C6corit appealed to Calles to persuade the company to rescind its decision, saying that 5000 acres of corn and beans would be lost for lack of water. He refuted the company's claim about the lack of water by a personal tour of the river. Lack of water in the river was not the problem, he said; the river carried plenty of water, but one-half did not find its way into the company canals because of the condition of the intakes. He was sure that with little cost, and three or four days of work, there would be enough water for all.<sup>78</sup>

Soriano insisted that the company was obligated to supply water, not to the owners or landholders, but to the land. The only way the company could rightly refuse to deliver water was if the river carried none. However, the same

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<sup>78</sup>H. A. Sibbett to Soriano, Apr. 26, 1918; Calles to Soriano, Apr. 24, 1918, AGES, 3199.

day, Soriano ordered the president of Cócorit not to give out more lands because the failure of the water could spell disaster.<sup>79</sup>

The report of the canal inspector, made later in May, tended to support the company's position in some aspects. He reported that the water had diminished from the beginning of April, and it had become very hard to divide it equitably because there were now so many users, some of them very small and others of bad faith. The lands around the towns were much divided and the system of apportioning water did not work well. Moreover, the main canal was not large enough to carry the needed water for all the lands now under cultivation.

The farmers of BÁCUM and San José had agreed to buy 8000 square meters of water per hectare, and ended up using 30,000 per hectare, and the farmers could not afford the expense. The lateral canals were not clean and the main canal was in bad condition and had a regular water loss. But it was not entirely a company problem, for the inspector noted that many of the farmers leased the lands to plant only one crop, therefore had no vested interest in the canals' condition and did not maintain their canals as they were supposed to.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>79</sup>Soriano to Sibbett, May 10, 1918, AGES, 3199.

<sup>80</sup>Canal inspector's report, May 26, 1918, AGES, 3199.

On June 1, the Richardson Construction Company posted notices at various areas in the Yaqui River Valley saying that, effective that same day, it would begin strict adherence to the Regimen for Waters which had been approved by the Secretary of Development in March, 1911, and that users of water would have to pay in advance for the season's waters. The landholders wrote to H. A. Sibbett, the company manager whose offices were in Los Angeles, asking that the farmers on each system be given time to discuss the situation and propose a ruling to the Secretary of Agriculture, but Sibbett said no.

With this answer the farmers rebelled. The company, they felt, had not taken care of the system, so they refused to accept its ruling. When the company learned that the farmers would rather lose their crops than give in, the laterals were ordered shut, thus depriving them of water at the time when the rice and corn crops needed it most.

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The inspector, José M. Herreros, was himself the object of the wrath of some of the farmers, who were trying to have him removed. The municipal president defended him, saying that he was not completely competent, but had helped the farmers. The president of Bâcum had had to intervene to reinforce his decisions because of the petty jealousies and the attempts to evade his decisions. The farmers had complained that he was partial, but the president did not think that was true, because, when they had real complaints they usually came to him. President, Bâcum, to Soriano, May 10, 1918. The inspector was relieved on June 25. The relationship between the inspectors, the Agrarian Commissions, the juntas created in June, and the water judges, is nowhere made clear; they appeared to have had overlapping jurisdictions. Documentation in AGES, 3199.

The farmers complained to the presidents of BÁCUM and CÓCORIT, and the presidents sent representatives to talk to the company, but the farmers still got no water.<sup>81</sup>

The Governor ordered the company to furnish water to all lands, but despite his orders, the water was withheld. The president of BÁCUM, who had not been as generous with the granting of lands as the president of CÓCORIT, became the object of reproaches, since it was known that he was friendly with company officials.<sup>82</sup> Calles, when he returned to office, satisfied his constituents by notifying the presidents that lands could not be denied, and the company that water must be furnished to those lands; if water were not supplied, he threatened, the government would be forced to take steps to remove the company from management of the water.<sup>83</sup>

Meanwhile, to deal with the mounting protests against the company's arbitrary delivery of water, the branch office of the Secretariat of Agriculture and Development in Hermosillo established a new regimen for the use and distribution of the waters of the Yaqui River to the areas around CÓCORIT, BÁCUM and San José in June, 1918. Under

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<sup>81</sup>Report of agent, Agriculture and Development, Sept. 11, 1918, AGES, 3199.

<sup>82</sup>Don Evodio Rojo to Calles, July 10, 1918, AGES, 3199.

<sup>83</sup>Reply to Rojo, July 20, 1918; Calles to presidents, July 22, 1918, AGES, 3199.



the new regimen the three villages would choose a delegate, and the three delegates together would constitute a directive junta for the canal system. The delegate was to represent the interests of his town on the junta, which was to look after all water interests, to listen to all complaints, to know how much water each landholder had bought and to hire necessary employees. The junta would hire a representative who would deal directly with the Richardson Construction Company, would take requests for purchasing water, and keep track of all purchases so that he could request funds from the junta treasury to settle accounts with the company. The junta would also hire a secretary-treasurer and three collectors.

The representative had other duties. He would note how much water was carried through the canals each day and check his accounts against company accounts to correct any company errors. He was to oversee the division of all water to the individual holders, proportioning the water according to the acreage held. He would set the times for the opening and closing of sluice gates, and notify the owners of their specific hours of use. To aid him in ascertaining that the users adhered to the schedule and took only the apportioned amounts, he could name aides to oversee the action on the laterals. Only the representative could open and close the main sluice gates.

The regimen declared further that when the main canal did not carry sufficient water for all three towns to use

water concurrently, they were to alternate days of use, with these days designated by the junta and its representative. If a farmer missed his turn, he had to wait until his town's next day to use the water.<sup>84</sup> Under the new ruling the company dealt only with the representative named by the junta, and through him learned of the needs of the users. To charges that water was still not being furnished late in July, the company answered that all users named by the representative had been furnished with water.<sup>85</sup>

Because of the immediate critical need for water the president of BÁCUM asked that an agricultural engineer be sent to settle the problem.<sup>86</sup> Calles ordered that an engineer and a member of the State Agrarian Commission go; in addition, since the company had no local representative with authority, to open the sluice gates, Calles instructed the president of Cócórit to open them.<sup>87</sup>

The Commission member and the engineer could not go, so the local agent for the Secretary of Agriculture went to Esperanza to talk to the company chief of the department of irrigation. The chief said he had closed the sluices on

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<sup>84</sup>Ruling for Water, June 13, 1918, AGES, 3199.

<sup>85</sup>Richardson Construction Company to Calles, Aug. 2, 1918, AGES, 3199.

<sup>86</sup>President, BÁCUM, Aug. 3, 1918, AGES, 3199.

<sup>87</sup>Calles to Richardson Construction Company, Aug. 3, 1918; Calles to agent, Agriculture and Development, Aug. 3, 1918, AGES, 3199.

orders from Los Angeles, and there was no one in Sonora with authority to order him to open them. The company, he said, was disposed to obey the dispositions of the federal government, but only the federal government. Because of the company's lack of cooperation with the farmers and the urgent need for water, the state agent for the Secretary of Agriculture ordered that the water be distributed immediately as it had been for the past eight years.<sup>88</sup>

The agent added his complaints to those piling up against the company. The company was in violation of its contract by not having a local authorized representative and for not sending out notices of the subdivisions made or copies of the sales contracts. When he promised troops to protect the settlers and properties from the Yaqui raids, which the company claimed had prevented the full development of the lands, Sibbett declared that this, alone, would not insure further development, since the company also had monetary problems. That statement convinced the agent that the company had no interest in its landholders and only wanted their money; it was very mysterious, he said, that the company lacked the resources to complete its work.<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>88</sup>Report of the General Agent of the Secretary of Agriculture and Development, Sept. 11, 1918, AGES, 3199.

<sup>89</sup>Ibid.

Calles reiterated the protests against the company's lack of care for the canal system to the federal Secretary of Agriculture and Development in November, suggesting to the Secretary that he study the feasibility of cancelling the Richardson contract.

It is not just that the richest agricultural region in the state is stalled by an odious concession and by the arbitrary whims of a foreign company that has not fulfilled its contract.<sup>90</sup>

Calles added that people were leaving the region because of the company, but made no mention of the long Yaqui war in that area.

The Secretary had visited Sonora earlier that year and observed the conditions alluded to by Calles; on his return he had ordered a study made of the culpability of the irrigation company. He had already notified the company that it had two months in which to prepare a defense.<sup>91</sup> In its defense the company contended that for the past seven years the region had received no protection at all from the federal government against the Indian incursions and depredations, and from the state little more. Moreover, the state government had acknowledged the Indian troubles through

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<sup>90</sup>Calles to Pastor Rouaix, Nov. 27, 1918, AGES, 3291-2 (also found in 3292).

<sup>91</sup>Pastor Rouaix to Calles, Nov. 30, 1918, AGES, 3291-2.

messages and proclamations; it had been these troubles which had prevented the completion of the irrigation systems and caused the existing canals to be neglected.<sup>92</sup> Apparently, the abnormal conditions in the state carried no argumentative weight with the federal government; the contract was cancelled as of March 26, 1919. The government retained the 10,000 peso deposit made in 1909 as a construction bond.<sup>93</sup>

With the contract cancelled the federal government promised to allot 10,000 pesos per month for the rehabilitation of the Richardson canal system. Calles proposed that the first 10,000 pesos he used to clean and repair a canal serving 7400 acres which the owners had not been able to work for four years. He thought that the irrigation work would encourage colonization that would contribute to the pacification of the Yaquis. Moreover, the state needed the income from the land, since the mining industry was in the doldrums.<sup>94</sup> Calles became increasingly impatient as the time between the promise and the receipt of the money lengthened. June passed, and with it the hope that the canals could be readied for the planting of the crops in

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<sup>92</sup>US Sub-Secretary of Foreign Relations to Calles, Mar. 6, 1919, 3291-2.

<sup>93</sup>Secretary of Agriculture and Development, Direction of Waters, to Calles, Mar. 31, 1919, AGES, 3291-2.

<sup>94</sup>Calles to Pastor Rouaix, Apr. 16, 1919, AGES, 3291-2.

October; work finally began in August.<sup>95</sup> The takeover by the federal government did not solve all the problems involved in watering the lands. The complaints about the lack of water recurred in October, 1919, when the president of C6corit again reported that the lands were not being planted for lack of water and the colonizers were leaving.<sup>96</sup>

Sonora had two important exportable agricultural products, cattle and garbanzos, in addition to numerous products of lesser importance such as tomatoes, garlic, watermelons and oranges. The garbanzo crop, grown on the irrigated lands in the south, was of far greater importance to the state treasury than any other. The garbanzo growers had always sold independently or as small cooperative societies, negotiating the best price they could with brokers

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<sup>95</sup>The money came to the state as a loan. The total cost would be paid by the users of the water in three annual payments, with the first payment being due on July 31, 1922, and then in 1923 and 1924. Each would be for one-third of the original cost plus five percent annual interest. The cost would be collected by the state treasurer from the water users and would be divided on the basis of the acreage watered. Ownership of the lands must be proved to obtain water. Only 25,000 acres would be watered by any canal, and ejidal lands would be given preference. The users would have to construct their own laterals and sluice gates. Terms under which the federal government gives money for repairs, July 1, 1919, AGES, 3291-2.

<sup>96</sup>President, C6corit, to De la Huerta, Oct. 15, 1919, AGES, 3291-2.

from the United States, who bought the crop for resale to Europe. In May, 1916, however, the Governor intervened in the sale of the crop and sent an agent to arrange for the sale to the government.<sup>97</sup> That same month Carranza lowered the export tax on the shipments, and promised that a part of the tax collected would be returned to the municipalities of origin, which were desperately in need of the funds.<sup>98</sup>

In spring, 1917 De la Huerta attempted to persuade the garbanzo growers, who were concentrated principally in the Mayo River Valley southward into Sinaloa, to form cooperative societies to negotiate for higher prices for their crop. There was interest in the project, but reluctance to form a union, which was not what De la Huerta had in mind anyway. He wanted the farmers to work to obtain prices through collective bargaining without the interference of the government.

When Obregón arrived in the state in 1917 he immediately used his influence in the Valley, where he also

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<sup>97</sup>Expedient 1, May 17, 1916, AGES, 3083.

<sup>98</sup>G. Valenzuela to A. B. Sobarzo, May 22, 1916, AGES, 3083. Municipalities also collected a tax; Huatabampo already was collecting five centavos per sack in 1916. Taxing Plan, 1916 Huatabampo, AGES, 3060. Carranza gave them an additional one-third of the export tax, which was divided proportionally on the basis of the number of sacks produced in each municipality. Circular 91, Director General of Customs, May 26, 1916, AGES, 3115.

farmed, to create such a cooperative group, which controlled a large portion of the garbanzo production, but by no means all.<sup>99</sup> Obregón acted as marketing agent for the "Syndicate of Garbanzo Planters of Sonora and Sinaloa," as the new cooperative was called, and through his efforts the growers marketed their crops for the highest price they had ever received, twelve dollars, American gold, per sack. For his efforts he received a commission of twenty-five United States cents from both the producer and the buyer.<sup>100</sup>

The entrance of the United States into the war in Europe caused much uncertainty among the garbanzo growers in spring, 1918, not only because of the shortage of jute sacks and the United States' prohibition on the export of money, but also because they were not sure if the United States would permit the crop to enter.<sup>101</sup> Obregón personally conducted negotiations in behalf of the growers to get permits for both the entrance of the crop and the remittance of payment, and then was accused by nationalists of selling the crop to Herbert Hoover's food administration. These charges, of course, were not true; he had merely

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<sup>99</sup>Correspondence between De la Huerta and various officials relative to the formation of the cooperative, and the efforts of Obregón, April and July, 1917, are found in AGES, 3115. There is no evidence that De la Huerta was acting in behalf of Obregón, although it is unlikely that his action in the same direction was coincidental.

<sup>100</sup>Border Report, July 21, 1917, USDS, 812.00/21243.

<sup>101</sup>Soriano to Bonillas, May 6, 1918, AGES, 3188.



obtained the permits from Hoover.<sup>102</sup> The price obtained in 1918 was even higher than in the year before, fifteen to eighteen dollars gold per sack, with a three-dollar export tax going to the government.<sup>103</sup>

The garbanzo syndicate changed its name to the "Sonora and Sinaloa Agricultural Cooperative Society, Limited," in the summer of 1918, and expanded its objectives. The Society now pledged to seek the betterment of seeds and the improvement of packing methods, to act as an agency to deal directly with the implement dealers, and to make direct contact with the principal markets of garbanzo consumers. It was to provide financial aid to growers to increase garbanzo production but not to the point where the competition would cause advance sales and the lowering of prices. In addition, the society sought to control all crops for

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<sup>102</sup>Bonillas to Soriano, May 6, 1918, AGES, 3188; Border Report, Apr. 4 & May 18, 1918, USDS, 812.00/21855.

<sup>103</sup>The business was very profitable to Obregón. In 1918, from Cajeme (today Ciudad Obregón) the syndicate exported 640,016 kilos, which were packed in ninety pound sacks, or 7000 sacks on which he received commissions. From Esperanza the syndicate alone shipped 411,700 kilos. Documentation in AGES, 3191. In addition, the syndicate counted as members all the garbanzo growers in the Bâcum-Côcorit area, who shipped through Esperanza. In 1918 CÔcorit said it would easily ship 6000 to 7000 sacks, Huatabampo, 79,600, and Bâcum, only 37,950 sacks, an estimated one-fifth of the production possible if they had had water. Letters from presidents to Governor, Aug. 22, 24, Sept. 4, 1918, AGES 3188.

export through purchase or by controlling their marketing, in order to keep prices up for the grower. To carry out its work the members were to pay to the syndicate one and one-half dollars for each sack sold through the syndicate.<sup>104</sup>

Despite the impressive sales figures, the garbanzo growers were unhappy. As with other export items, the state government sought to increase its income by raising taxes. Sonora could not collect an export tax, and sales were made outside the state, so Soriano in May, 1918 imposed a production tax of sixty centavos per ninety-kilo sack on wheat and garbanzos. Calles not only rescinded the tax on wheat but returned it to the shippers in September, 1918; but he left the tax on garbanzos. In May, 1919 the tax was raised to one centavo per kilo, or ninety centavos per sack, because of the state's critical economic situation caused by the shutdown of the mines. Calles declared the tax was only just, since the sale was made outside of the state, thus depriving the state of the income from a sales tax.<sup>105</sup>

The growers had protested the tax in 1918, and the passage of the new tax hit them hard. They petitioned the

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<sup>104</sup>Project for the Constitution and Statutes, presented by A. Obregón, June 21, 1918, AGES, 3245.

<sup>105</sup>Law 76, May 23, 1919, AGES, 3287.

legislature for relief, explaining the economics of garbanzo raising as an argument. Most of the growers were renters, not proprietors, and many of them sold their crops in the fields to assure a sale, an action that the Society was trying to prevent. The lands had produced year after year with no rest, were now plagued by weeds, and production was down. First class lands, which theirs no longer were, could produce only sixty sacks per hectare. Machines should be used and the lands should be owned by the producers, but seldom was either the case.

The renter paid from twenty-five to thirty percent of his production as rent each year, and the cost of producing a sack of garbanzos was figured at from eight to ten pesos, gold. In addition, the producer had to pay

to the state.....	1.00/100 kilos
60% federal tax on above.....	.60 "
2% on sales to the state.....	.60 "
60% federal tax on above.....	.36 "
municipal tax of 1%.....	.30 "
60% federal tax on above.....	.18 "
to railroad.....	2.00 "
packing.....	1.00 "
storage.....	.50 "
handling.....	.10 "
commission.....	1.00 "
<u>Export duties.....</u>	<u>4.00 "</u>

Total

11.64/100 kilos<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>106</sup>The two percent state sales tax was the regular tax, but Calles had declared that it was not collectable, so its inclusion is not understood nor explained.

"How could the garbanzo growers make money?" they asked. The growers were leaving the fields because they could not fight nature, capital and the government. They asked the lowering of the tax to twenty-five centavos per sack.<sup>107</sup>

The legislature took no action on the petition, and it awaited De la Huerta when he took office. He could not accede to their request because of the continuing economic crisis, but promised that as soon as the treasury had recovered he would dictate some disposition about the tax. He assured them that something would be done before the spring harvest, if nothing unforeseen happened.<sup>108</sup> Unfortunately, something did happen.

The other major agricultural exporters, the ranchers, suffered more from the vagaries of the central government, than from the state government, which encouraged foreign sales except in years when meat was in short supply. Prohibitions on sales were imposed and removed by a quixotic central government, which was not always cognizant of the economics of its actions. The Sonoran cattle industry produced mostly for home consumption, except for the large American-owned ranches in the north, which arranged for reductions in the high export rates with the Carranza

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<sup>107</sup>Petition to Congress, May 28, 1919, AGES, 3287. Among the list of petitioners were several Obregóns, all garbanzo growers in the Mayo River Valley.

<sup>108</sup>De la Huerta to petitioners, Nov. 6, 1919, AGES, 3287.

government.

The war in 1917 increased the demand for meat in the United States, and an enterprising Mexican-American in San Francisco saw the demand as an opportunity for Sonora to sell butchered cattle, since United States ranchers had long objected to the import of cattle on the hoof. He made such a proposal to Soriano who saw it as a chance to aid the cattle raisers by the formation of a meat packing industry in Sonora, which would benefit not only the rancher but would also create new jobs. The proposal was sent to all of the large ranchers in the state for their comments in February, 1918.<sup>109</sup>

One of the prominent ranchers of the Arizpe area thought that the packing plants were a good idea, but noted that the industry in that area was in a sad state, as a result of the theft of cattle by each vagrant band passing through the Sonora River Valley since the revolution began. He thought that the government could help the Sonoran ranchers more by removing the prohibitions on the shipment of cattle and permitting free export. Ranchers in his area had been forced to sell their cattle to the large companies which had obtained concessions for export; although their prices were laughable, he said, they were still higher

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<sup>109</sup>Secretary of Government, 639, Feb. 11, 1918, AGES, 3188.

than the local butchers were willing to pay. Since cattle were their way of life, they had to sell. The rancher was not certain that packing houses were the answer to the problem.<sup>110</sup>

Soriano agreed with the rancher and excoriated the large seller who had, he claimed, no concern for the Mexican consumer. Their sales kept the price of meat up and out of the reach of the poor Mexican. The Governor appealed to the central government for restrictions on the sale of cattle less than three years old for a period of ten years, so that the cattle industry could recuperate.<sup>111</sup>

The manager of the Cananea Cattle Company spoke for the large companies in his reply to Soriano, and pointed out some of the realities of the Sonoran cattle business. The proper management of meat products required the installation of expensive buildings and machinery, and the potential market in the United States was not that good, given the condition of Sonoran cattle. The only market in the United States for fresh meat was for prime fat butchering cattle and there were few of those in Sonora. The Cananea Cattle Company was, as the manager pointed out, one of the

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<sup>110</sup> Ygnacio E. Elías to Governor, Mar. 4, 1918, AGES, 3188.

<sup>111</sup> Soriano to Secretary of Industry and Commerce, Mar. 18, 1918, AGES, 3188.

best cattle ranches in Sonora, but no ranch in the state produced pasture sufficient to fatten meat for its immediate consumption in the United States. There was only a three-month period in which cattle could be expected to fatten, usually August, September and October, after the onset of the rains in July. By mid-October, Sonoran cattle were usually at their best, but after the frosts in the north killed the grass in November, they became thin again. In frost-free areas, the lack of rain had the same result; A young bull raised in Sonora weighed about six hundred and fifty pounds at the age of three years, whereas the same young bull sent to the United States at the age of one year and pastured in good grass weighed from nine hundred to eleven hundred pounds at three years, and brought a much better per-pound price than thin cattle. For that reason the Cananea Cattle Company preferred to send cattle across the border while they were young, in direct contrast to the program usually proposed for Sonora. Because of the lack of exportable cattle, except during a short period of one year, the manager did not believe that the packing house would be economically feasible.<sup>112</sup>

The central government did not remove the ban on the

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<sup>112</sup>Charles E. Wiswall to Soriano, Apr. 17, 1918, AGES, 3188.

export of cattle that was then in effect. It continued until July, 1920, when President De la Huerta once again permitted free export, without permission from the central government, with the shipper simply paying an export tax of ten to fifteen pesos per head.



## CHAPTER X SONORAN "PROGRESSIVISM"

During the four years following the Maytorena-Villa insurgency, Sonora restored the shattered civil functions of the state and enacted several reforms which could be termed "progressive," in keeping with the vast reform movement then making itself felt, particularly in the United States and Great Britain. The worker's discontent was calmed with wage and hour laws, accident indemnification and the right to strike. De la Huerta had created the innovative and radical Labor Chamber, a body of arbitration and conciliation, later dismantled by Calles. The entire labor code, however, had been designed for the male worker and voter; there were few specific provisions for the female or child laborer. Children were still earning as little as twenty-five centavos for a twelve-hour workday in Opodepe and fifty centavos per day in Bacanora in 1918,<sup>1</sup> although presumably, the women earned the minimum one and one-half pesos per day.<sup>2</sup>

Calles imposed two reforms on the state in 1915 which were in the progressive mood, but which encountered the same

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<sup>1</sup>Presidents, Opodepe and Bacanora, Mar. 8 & 13, 1918, AGES, 3207.

<sup>2</sup>There are no separate statistics on women workers or child workers in the state archives.

opposition in Sonora as similar measures encountered in the United States. They were the state-wide ban on alcoholic beverages and gambling. Calles was a man whose background furnished him with full knowledge of the evils of alcoholic beverages. Raised by an uncle who ran a small grocery business and who was fond of drink,<sup>3</sup> Calles, himself, developed a reputation for intemperance during his career as a schoolmaster and as a town official in Guaymas, and at one time had been a bartender in his brother's hotel in Guaymas.<sup>4</sup> As a military commander he was familiar with the discipline problem associated with drinking in the army camps. When he holed-up in Agua Prieta in 1914, he closed the saloons to maintain discipline among his bored troops; his first decree when he began functioning as governor in August, 1915, forbade the importation, sale and manufacture of alcoholic beverages.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>Manuel S. Corbalá, Rodolfo Elías Calles: Pírfiles de un sonorense (Hermosillo, 1970), 58-59.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.; Galaz, Desde el cerro, 45-48; Muñoz, Verdad y mito, 50-55. Munoz says that when he was military judge in Hermosillo in 1921 he found more than forty entries in the jail registry for Calles for drunk and disorderly conduct. Sonora had a high alcoholism rate prior to 1910, with twelve deaths per thousand being attributed to alcohol. Daniel Cosío Villegas, Historia moderna de México (México, D.F., 1955-1972), IV, 72.

<sup>5</sup>Decree 1, Aug. 8, 1915, AGES, 3069-1. The decree declared:

- 1) The importation, sale and manufacture of intoxicants is prohibited.
- 2) Any drink containing any alcohol will be considered as an intoxicant.
- 3) Persons violating Article 1 will be punished with five years in prison, which this executive

Decree 1 was effective only for the small areas then held by the constitucionalistas: later it was observed by General Diéguez when he took Guaymas.<sup>6</sup>

Circular 11 of December 1, 1915 made the necessary provisions for implementation. All saloons were ordered closed immediately and owners of all alcoholic beverages were given thirty days to move their stocks outside of the state.<sup>7</sup>

All products containing alcohol were banned from sales and manufacture.<sup>8</sup> Druggists, who used alcohol as a base for many of their tonics and common remedies, had to obtain a permit from the governor's office to buy the needed beer, wines and liquors. Anyone requiring a prescription containing alcohol had to have a doctor's prescription showing the recipe for the mixture. The acquisition of all industrial alcohols, such as those used for furniture varnish, or by printers or jewelers, required a government permit. A copy of the permit went to the chief of police from the governor's office, and

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will impose until the judicial branch is re-established. Accomplices will be sentenced to three years and concealers, to two years.

4) The crime of drunkenness will be punished by this executive according to the Penal Code until the judicial branch is re-established.

<sup>6</sup>Ops Report, USPF, Nov. 9, 1915, USDS, 812.00/16483.

<sup>7</sup>Circular 11, Dec. 1, 1915, AGES, 3064.

<sup>8</sup>All information concerning the enforcement of Decree 1 for 1916 is from AGES, 3062, unless otherwise noted. Contained in the file is correspondence and permits, but the functioning of the law is never clarified.

all sellers of alcohol had to have permits covering their diminished stocks. In some cases the police were ordered to maintain vigilance over the use of the alcohol, and some permits contained annotations that something should be added to the alcohol to prevent its use as a drink.

There were no provisions in the circular for enforcement agencies or for the disposal of seized caches, but the state was quickly divided into districts with one inspector assigned to the vigil over each, a monumentally impossible task, given the geography of the state.<sup>9</sup> Once the grace period of thirty days had passed, the disposal of the alcohol became the inspector's province. If the owners had not shipped their supplies out of the state, the alcohol could be taken to state warehouses where it was sometimes destroyed, either by dumping or by burning. At times, the discovery of a cache was followed by its on-the-spot destruction.

Although it was not mentioned in the circular, the owners had another option: they could deposit their alcohol in government warehouses where it would be stored at their expense until such time that an out-of-state buyer could be found and the supply shipped. The problem with this method

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<sup>9</sup>The archives yielded no information on the enforcement structure aside from the fact that there were inspectors reporting to Moreno and Calles. Their number could not be determined, nor the areas they covered. Apparently, the number varied, but never seems to have exceeded four at any one time. Occasional complaints and warnings by Calles lead to the assumption that the inspectors were easily led astray.

was the mysterious disappearances and breakage that steadily diminished the liquor in storage.<sup>10</sup> In addition, some seized alcohol was stored by the state, and at least occasionally, sold, either to out-of-state buyers or to professionals, such as druggists, within the state, with the proceeds accruing to the orphan's industrial school.<sup>11</sup> The state also occasionally benefitted from deposits which were ceded to the state by the owners.<sup>12</sup>

Sonora had only one beer brewery. The agent for the brewery wrote to Carranza about selling beer in the state, and Carranza replied that he would urge Calles to allow sale of beer in the saloons. Carranza's attempts met firm rejection from Calles, who declared that no saloons were permitted in Sonora. The brewery could keep producing beer as

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<sup>10</sup>In April, 1916 on Senora in Soyopa, where Decree 1 was not published until February, deposited seventy-two demijohns of mescal with the president until she could obtain an escort to take her property safely through the Yaqui territory. Two of the containers were immediately reported broken; in May, when sixteen more were missing, she sought a permit to move them from the state, which was granted. Sra. Artemisa D., Vda. de Bringas, June 6, 1916, AGES, 3062.

<sup>11</sup>The Guaymas inspector mistakenly sold some of the privately stored liquor in April for two hundred and seventy-five dollars. Calles was angry because the sale did not bring money to the state because it had to be paid to the owner; moreover, the liquor was sold for one-third to one-fourth of its value. Gilberto Valenzuela, president of the legislature, questioned the honesty of the inspector. Correspondence, April-July, 1916, AGES, 3062.

<sup>12</sup>There are no hints of why this would be done, but Manuel P. Carrilla, who, from his inventory list, seems to have been a large-scale dealer in liquors and wines, did so, for which he received a letter of thanks from Moreno on April 14. It was probably more economical to give them to the state than to pay storage or seek a market. At the time, both Arizona and Sinaloa were dry.

long as it was sold in the state only by permit, or shipped out.<sup>13</sup> The large German colony in the Guaymas, area, however, wrote to De la Huerta in July, 1916, requesting that they be permitted to purchase twenty-five cases of beer each month for their own use, since the consumption of beer was a part of their cultural heritage, to which De la Huerta acceded. Military officers frequently received permits for beer, and occasionally, municipal presidents obtained them.<sup>14</sup> The granting of permits for beer for resale was arbitrary: when a charitable group in Alamos asked if they could sell beer at their kermess to raise funds, Soriano would not grant it because "the government is doing everything possible to combat alcoholism."<sup>15</sup> Yet, later the same month, he notified the president of Navojoa that a civic betterment group had received a permit to import and sell beer,<sup>16</sup> and a group in Nogales received a permit to sell beer at a kermess on October 2.<sup>17</sup>

Decree 1 was quickly modified in practice. Moreno, with

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<sup>13</sup>Some of the medicines packaged by the pharmacists required the use of beer since it was often on the list of alcoholic items that they sought permits for; besides; it seems to have been prescribed alone.

<sup>14</sup>The same names appeared month after month on the list of permits granted for beer and wines.

<sup>15</sup>Rafaela G. de Marcor to Soriano, Sept. 3, 1917; reply, Sept. 4, 1917, AGES, 3124-1.

<sup>16</sup>Soriano to president, Navojoa, Sept. 29, 1917, AGES, 3124-1.

<sup>17</sup>Soriano to president, Nogales, Oct. 2, 1917, AGES, 3125.

Calles' knowledge, gave the military commander of Guaymas the right to import table wines which did not contain alcohol on March 23, 1916; but in May permission was granted to a gentleman in La Colorada for the import of table wines for private use, with no mention being made of alcoholic content. Flavio Bórquez, the state treasurer, received permission for the import of forty cases of fine Spanish wines in April, and De la Huerta permitted the owner of a Hermosillo hotel to purchase red and white wine and some liquor for cooking.

The history of the enforcement of Decree 1 was one of evasion and arbitrariness. For the Decree to be effective, the cooperation of all authorities was necessary, but the opposite appeared to be the rule. Calles was the chief military officer in the state, but he had no respect for his own law; he was inebriated when De la Huerta came to relieve him of his office in 1916. His officers and the officers of the federal army stationed in Guaymas repeatedly flouted the law. The commanding officer of the USS New Orleans, visiting in Guaymas, reported that the army officers there appeared to have plenty of money, and passed their time gambling and drinking, being the only ones who had easy access to liquor, which was resold by them at high prices.<sup>18</sup>

Persistent rumors in the northern border towns in the summer of 1919 accused Calles of giving permits for the sale

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<sup>18</sup>USS New Orleans to Comm. in Chief, USPF, Jan., 18, 1917, USDS, 812.00/20486.

of beer and wines to men of his selection, with a part of the profits to be given to "Cruz Galvez," the orphan's industrial school.<sup>19</sup> When seventeen liquor dealers and their lawyers were arrested in Nogales in July, Calles' brother-in-law, who also sold liquors, was not one of them, and he continued to sell his wares.<sup>20</sup> Such reports led the United States consul to conclude that the enforcement of Decree 1 was a fraud designed to give Calles control of the liquor market. The General refused to others permits for sales to the general public, but saw to it that his family and friends received them, although they were supposed to be illegal. Druggists could buy medicinal alcohol at high prices, and the soldiers at Agua Prieta could purchase all the alcoholic beverages they could afford to buy.<sup>21</sup>

However, Calles defended the Decree to the United States consul at Guaymas, pointing out that during the years 1910, 1911 and 1912, there had been eight hundred seven murders in the state; in 1915, 1916 and 1917, there were only one hundred two. As for the economic question, the state had produced 467,667 liters of liquor, nine-tenths of it mezcal, (often referred to as "wine"), before the issuance of the Decree, with an income to the state of 217,717 pesos.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>19</sup>Border Report, Aug. 23, 1919, USDS, 812.00/22844.

<sup>20</sup>Border Report, July 5, 1919, USDS, 812.00/22890.

<sup>21</sup>Border Report, July 19, 1919, USDS, 812.00/22890.

<sup>22</sup>Calles to US consul, Guaymas, Apr. 22, 1919, AGES, 3292.



Calles apparently did not consider the loss of this revenue to be of any consequence.

General Serrano, who had fined liquor sellers in Nogales in December, 1916, accused the civil authorities of malfeasance in tolerating such activities, and wanted De la Huerta to declare Nogales a military camp, so that he could impose military law. The Nogales president responded that he was forced to tolerate the lawbreakers; they were military officers over whom he had no jurisdiction.<sup>23</sup> Serrano was also charged with removing the president of Guaymas, a prohibitionist, because he opposed Serrano's selling liquor in the port town. Serrano allegedly paid six dollars for a typical case of liquor and resold it for thirty dollars; no one else was permitted to sell.<sup>24</sup>

The municipal president of Cananea issued liquor licenses to raise money for civic betterment, and the commander of the local garrison arrested all who received them. The town council wanted to resign because of the scandal, and Calles feared that their resignation would cause an even greater scandal, so he notified Gilberto Valenzuela, the interim-governor, that the commander had acted hastily. Valenzuela ordered the license holders freed.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>23</sup>De la Huerta to president, Nogales, Apr. 2, 1917; reply, Apr. 3, 1917, AGES, 3125.

<sup>24</sup>USS New Orleans to Comm. in Chief, USPF, Feb. 10, 1917, USDS, 812.00/20652.

<sup>25</sup>Calles to Valenzuela, Dec. 28, 1916; reply, Dec. 28, 1916, AGES, 3125.

The Álamos and Sahuaripa districts had produced approximately one-half of the mezcal distilled in Sonora prior to Decree 1.<sup>26</sup> In addition, their isolation and their locations on the southern and eastern borders of the state made them ideal havens for smugglers and illicit distilleries. The Álamos district had access to the Gulf of California as well as to the railroad from Sinaloa.<sup>27</sup> Calles commissioned the area's liquor inspector to travel into the Sierras to stop the liquor traffic and destroy the stills. He had to police the border with Sinaloa and watch over the trains entering the district, all this without an aide.<sup>28</sup> From 1917 to 1919 the reports from the district indicated widespread disobedience of prohibition laws.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>26</sup>Calles to US consul, Guaymas, Apr. 22, 1919, AGES, 3292.

<sup>27</sup>Calles wrote to Governor Ramón F. Iturbe of Sinaloa on August 18, 1917, saying that he was saddened to learn that the state now permitted the sale and manufacture of alcohol. "It is too bad that brother states have opposite ideas. If you are a revolutionary in ideas and legislation, you will want the men of the revolution to be men of health. I am sure you will have to reconsider and nullify the decree that goes against the tendencies of the civilized world. AGES, 3124-1.

An anonymous letter to Calles in February, 1918, stated that mezcal was being shipped in by train in cans marked as "gasoline," in boxes of tomatoes, and in containers in the jars of chiles carried aboard the trains. "A friend of your government," to Calles, Feb. 25, 1919, AGES, 3292.

<sup>28</sup>Correspondence between Inspector Barraza y Tirado and Soriano, Nov. 14-21, 1917, AGES, 3124-1.

<sup>29</sup>Reports from the inspectors relative to the Álamos and Sahuaripa districts may be found in AGES, 3124-1, 3230 and 3292.

Although Decree 1 called for imprisonment for those caught selling liquor, in practice that punishment was rarely meted out. Calles and the other governors preferred the imposition of heavy fines benefitting the state treasury, which they considered strong deterrents. Arrests could be made by the liquor inspector or by local officials, but once the arrest was made, the governor's office had to be notified. With the notification of arrest the inspector or president informed the governor of the offender's financial status. The governor then ordered the offender turned over to the local police authorities, and told the president how much the fine would be. There was no predetermined schedule of fines for either drunkenness or illegal trafficking; the amount of a fine depended on the whim of Calles, as military commander, or the governor, and on the ability of the offender to pay. Of the fines collected, the municipality retained those below a certain amount, which were usually imposed for simple infractions, such as drunkenness; over that amount, the fine went to the state treasury. All major infractions fell within state jurisdiction.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>30</sup>Notice to the presidents, Nov. 10, 1917, AGES, 3124-1. In one case, Francisco Morales of Navojoa was caught with five demijohns of mezcal, and the Governor set his fine at 1000 gold pesos. The liquor inspector assured Soriano that Morales was a prosperous businessman and could pay the fine, but the president told the Governor that Morales would be ruined if forced to pay it. Soriano told the president to convince Morales of the evil of the thing he had done, and let him go. Correspondence between the inspector, Soriano and the president, Navojoa, Sept. 7-27, 1917, AGES, 3124-1.

Soriano announced that the state government would reward all who denounced violators of Decree 1 to their town presidents; when the acts were proven, the informer would be paid an assigned sum.<sup>31</sup> The use of informers had already been tried unsuccessfully in Cananea, where the president said that it was his opinion that as long as fines were the only punishment, nothing would be effective in enforcing prohibition.<sup>32</sup> The president of Nogales had asked permission from Governor Soriano to make examples of persons caught selling liquor, by imposing a heavy fine coupled with two months imprisonment. Soriano consulted Calles, who preferred that either one or the other be used, not both, despite the insistence of the president. In line with Calles' wishes, Soriano prescribed fines of 1000 pesos or five years in prison for some offenders and 500 pesos for others, according to the seriousness of the offense; the president was to inform him who could pay the fines.<sup>33</sup>

The national constitutional convention in 1916-1917 did not adopt an article on prohibition, although such a measure was discussed and voted on, and received strong support from

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<sup>31</sup>Governor to all presidents, Sept. 7, 1917, AGES, 3124-1.

<sup>32</sup>President, Cananea, to Soriano, Sept. 13, 1917, AGES, 3124-1.

<sup>33</sup>Telegraphic conference between Soriano and the president, Nogales, Aug. 24, 1917, AGES, 3124-1.

the Sonoran delegation.<sup>34</sup> Nor did the constituent congress of Sonora include such an article in the new state constitution; Calles apparently did not push for one.<sup>35</sup> The legislature did begin consideration of a law governing alcohol in 1917, studying the prohibition law of Arizona; a bill was proposed, which went to a study commission on October 22, 1917. It was still pending in June, 1918 when the president of the legislature suggested that the session be prolonged until some action was taken,<sup>36</sup> but it was to be more than a year before the lawmakers could agree on a measure.

Prohibition was a minor issue in the campaigns in 1919, when Gaxiola, Samaniego and Pesqueira openly favored its repeal, and Pesqueira proposed a referendum to settle the question.<sup>37</sup> In May, 1919, with Calles in Mexico City, the press in the United States and Mexico City announced the repeal of the prohibition decree; Consul Dyer reported that by an eleven to three vote the state legislature had agreed to the sale of wines and beer.<sup>38</sup> Governor Piña was deluged

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<sup>34</sup>Niemeyer, Revolution at Querétaro, 181-197. Niemeyer gives an excellent discussion of the attempts to include an article on prohibition in the Constitution.

<sup>35</sup>Times (El Paso), Aug. 24, 1917.

<sup>36</sup>Speech, June 13, 1918, AGES, 3199.

<sup>37</sup>Border Report, Jan. 15, 1919, USDS, 812.00/21614.

<sup>38</sup>Dyer to SecSt, May 18, 1919, USDS, 812.00/22719.

with requests for saloon licenses; business may have shown few signs of recovery and capital was supposedly short, but the Chinese had money to invest in saloons. The Governor was forced to deny that any such law had been passed; the legislature was not even considering repeal.<sup>39</sup>

Calles was aware that there was much illicit traffic in liquors; he knew that there were hidden stills in the mountains of the Álamos district where the Yaquis celebrated true orgies; he also knew that such activities could not be carried on except in connivance with the local authorities. On his return to Sonora in June, Calles ordered the municipal presidents, in Circular 158, to advise all local residents, so that they could not plead ignorance of the law, that any makers or sellers of alcoholic beverages would be shot, beginning immediately.<sup>40</sup>

The drastic new ruling was never applied; Calles cancelled it on June 20.<sup>41</sup> News of the imposition of the death penalty did not reach Mexico City until July; on July 5 Manuel Aguirre Berlanga of the Ministry of Government telegraphed to learn if the penalty had indeed been imposed. Calles answered that the punishment had been repealed, and explained to Aguirre Berlanga that he had issued the circular

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<sup>39</sup>Documentation in AGES, 3292.

<sup>40</sup>Circular 158, to all presidents, June 10, 1919, AGES, 3292.

<sup>41</sup>Circular 163, June 20, 1919, AGES, 3292.

to "avoid public disorders that could have had consequences." He expected the public disorders to arise from the villista activities on Sonora's border and around Ciudad Juárez; in addition, the Indians had committed serious crimes in the past few months, and he wanted to destroy the unity between them and the illicit still operators. All the statements being made against him in Mexico City newspapers were politically inspired, he declared.<sup>42</sup>

The legislature had not agreed on a prohibition law when De la Huerta took office, and he decided to promulgate a stop-gap measure in October, 1919. Law 6 of October 18 cancelled Decree 1; it declared that beer, table wines, cider and champagnes would not be considered as intoxicants; that the governor would make rulings controlling the sale, traffic and making of those products and set the penalties for infractions; and that twenty percent of the fines collected would go to the towns where the offense occurred.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>42</sup>Calles to Aguirre Berlanga, July 6, 1919, AGES, 3292. Calles used the villista activity as an excuse, yet two weeks before issuing the decree, when seeking an extension of his leave of absence, he had sworn to the legislature that the villistas were not a threat. Calles' telegrams to Mexico City were inexplicably delayed; Calles' message of July 5 did not reach there until July 14, so that on July 11, Aguirre Berlanga told Calles that if the decree did in fact exist, he must withdraw it because it was unconstitutional. All originals of these telegrams are found in AGES, 3292. The press in Mexico City and elsewhere evidently played up the story of executions for infractions, and Calles always carried the reputation as having implemented it.

<sup>43</sup>Law 6, Oct. 18, 1919, AGES, 3291.

Law 6 was to be effective for the remainder of 1919, but it was superceded on November 14 by Law 9, passed by the legislature to enforce Decree 1. Law 9 prohibited the sale of alcoholic beverages with an alcoholic content of more than six percent, with the exception of grape table wines, cider and champagne. Alcohol could be manufactured for scientific, medicinal or industrial uses. Violations were to be punished by sentences of from two months to two years in prison and a fine of two hundred to two thousand pesos. All alcohol confiscated under the law was to be sealed in the presence of the offender and, after verification of the crime, was to be destroyed publicly. The governor was given provisional powers to regulate the traffic and sale of legal alcohol.<sup>44</sup>

De la Huerta, using the power granted him under Law 9, ruled that the drinks could be sold in sealed bottles only in shops licensed by the government, and could not be consumed on the premises. Restaurants and inns could serve the drinks at fixed hours, with a permit, and drinks could be sold at public festivities, with a permit. Twenty percent of the tax collected was remitted to the municipality in which the infraction occurred, and the state received the rest.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>44</sup>Law 9, Nov. 14, 1919, AGES, 3292.

<sup>45</sup>Decree 21, Dec. 21, 1919, AGES, 3292. Decree to be effective Jan. 20, 1920.



Restaurants or inns wanting to obtain a license for the sale of legal alcoholic beverages were required to post bonds varying from one hundred to one thousand pesos, according to the "importance" of the business. The bond was demanded to insure that prohibited liquors were not sold, that drunks would not be tolerated and that order would be maintained.<sup>46</sup>

Saloons still were not permitted; the legal beverages were sold by the bottle in state licensed expendios. Expendios in Nogales posted bonds of from two hundred to four hundred pesos; in Hermosillo, the average bond was two hundred pesos and in Guaymas, five hundred.<sup>47</sup> De la Huerta ordered all expendios closed on April 16, 1920 because of the conflict with Carranza, but they were permitted to re-open on May 8.<sup>48</sup>

The liberalization of Decree 1 did not put an end to infractions of the law, especially not in the Álamos district; in fact, from the complaints by the inspector assigned to the Mayo River area it would appear that all the officials of the region aided and abetted the illegal traffic. One member of the town council in Navojoa had just completed a storage cellar for liquors beneath his house; the liquor collected by the council went to the president who allegedly

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<sup>46</sup>Circular 191, Jan. 1920, AGES, 3261-2. Decree 64 of December, 1920 permitted sales by the drink.

<sup>47</sup>List of expendios, Jan. 1920, AGES, 3261-2.

<sup>48</sup>De la Huerta to presidents, Apr. 16 and May 8, 1920, AGES, 3261-2.

sold it to the houses of prostitution operating under his protection. In Etchojoa, liquor was sold publicly in the hotel, and Huatabampo, Álamos, Cajeme and Bacabachi all had well-known bootleggers. The police in Navojoa checked all trains from the south and confiscated liquor; they destroyed some of it publicly, but the greater part was resold on the same train or turned over to the president. One of the police agents was an acknowledged toper. The misdeeds of the officials were public knowledge; the difficulty lay in acquiring adequate proof.<sup>49</sup>

Calles' other major ban was on gambling. Decree 4, issued August 27, 1915, announced that beginning September 1, 1915, the legal sports and games in the state would be chess, billiards, bowling, ninepins, racing (either of horses, bicycles, autos or on foot), dominoes, all forms of ball and skeet shooting. Even these were prohibited if gambling were involved or when they rated as hazardous or a public nuisance. The games were forbidden in all public places except during town fairs, and infractions were punishable by fines of one hundred to three hundred pesos. The police were given the power to investigate prohibited games in private houses.<sup>50</sup> In addition, Carranza forbade bullfights

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<sup>49</sup>Telegrams exchanged between Inspector, Governor and presidents, Dec. 24, 1919 to Mar. 4, 1920, ASES, 3261-1.

<sup>50</sup>Decree 4, Sept. 1, 1915, AGES, 3046.

on October 11, 1916 until civic order was restored.<sup>51</sup> Card games and raffles, dear to the heart of fund raisers, were not on the permitted list, so were thereby excluded.

Possibly because of the economic disorganization of 1915-1916, possibly because of the lack of enforcement, or possibly because the closing of the saloons eliminated much public gambling, the law apparently offended few, since it stirred no controversy.<sup>52</sup> The national lottery was reinstated in 1917, but Calles refused to permit the lottery tickets to be sold in Sonora since all lotteries had been prohibited.<sup>53</sup> But beginning in 1918, permission was frequently given to towns to hold lotteries or raffles to raise money for civic betterment projects as long as money was not the prize. There were occasional problems with enforcement of the lotteries because the zealous inspectors of alcoholic beverages, whose job was expanded to include gambling, sometimes arrested participants in lotteries sanctioned by the governor.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>51</sup>Sect. of Government, Oct. 11, 1916, AGES, 3069-1.

<sup>52</sup>It could not be determined to what extent gambling was a social problem in Sonora. It was certainly common among the troops, but was not necessarily a socially important factor, except among the Chinese. Bullfighting and horse-racing, as organized sports, have never been important in Sonora, but baseball was being actively promoted as early as 1903-1904 and the government, with its limited resources, was purchasing baseball equipment in late 1916. Telegrams relative to purchase of baseball needs found in AGES, 3069-1.

<sup>53</sup>Information on the national lottery is found in AGES, 3137-1.

<sup>54</sup>Information on the state raffles and lotteries from AGES, 3228.

The anti-gambling law was probably aimed at the Chinese<sup>55</sup> since gambling, together with opium smoking, was a traditional form of recreation among them. The town councils quickly saw the law as a potential source of revenue, either from fines from arrests or from permits granted to the Chinese for gambling clubs. The Chinese, in years past, had been accustomed to having their own gambling casinos with payments for licenses going to the town treasury, and combination saloons and gambling halls held numerous licenses from the state.<sup>56</sup> In early 1917 the Chinese again solicited permission for the formation of such clubs where admittance would be granted only to Chinese nationals, but De la Huerta refused to grant any permits.

The president of Cananea was especially persistent in seeking permission for the Chinese to operate clubs in his town, and he thought that he at last stood a chance when he learned that Nogales had a gambling house. He irately wrote De la Huerta that his town's needs were more pressing than those of Nogales, and Nogales had a casino to help raise money for civic betterments. He told De la Huerta that he knew there was a casino in Nogales because he had been given a current pay ticket from there. De la Huerta

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<sup>55</sup>Calles was known as a Sinophobe and desired the expulsion of the Chinese, which was accomplished when his son Rodolfo was governor in 1931.

<sup>56</sup>AGES, 2897 contains complaints against the town authorities because of misappropriation of funds received from Chinese casinos. Permits for 1913 from AGES, 2903.

informed him, however, that any casino in Nogales was operating without authorization from him and was functioning only through the disobedience of the president. He asked him to turn the ticket over to the proper authorities for investigation, and warned, "We do not foment vices of foreigners nor nationals."<sup>57</sup>

The lack of a sanctioned casino in Cananea did not stop the Chinese from gambling and smoking opium, and forty-eight Chinese were arrested by De la Huerta's troops late in May. The president was highly insulted by De la Huerta's actions, and reminded him that the town had civil authorities to handle the arrests. De la Huerta rebuked him for invoking the municipal laws, saying also that he considered it dangerous for the local police to attempt to arrest so many Chinese. He set a three hundred peso fine for each of the arrested men and instructed the president to tell them that when the entire fine was paid all would be freed, but not until then. The town councilmen then announced that they felt hurt by De la Huerta's lack of confidence in them. They agreed that the Chinese should be punished, but they thought the fines imposed too high. These men were poor, they explained, and what was the town to do if they could not pay the fine? It was costing Cananea money to hold them in jail. The president paid a personal visit to De la Huerta

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<sup>57</sup>President, Cananea, to De la Huerta, Mar. 15, 1917; and reply, Mar. 16, 1917, AGES, 3137-1.

to resolve the problem satisfactorily.<sup>58</sup>

The pressure on the Governor for the permits increased after Soriano took office. The president of Cananea complained to Soriano in October that he had been trying to get a concession from De la Huerta to open a casino which would cater only to Chinese, and De la Huerta had refused even when the town offered half of the income from the casino to pay the salaries for the schoolmasters in Cananea, a field always short of funds. But now he had learned that the president of Magdalena had received such a permit, and he would make his request again, with the Governor understanding that one-half of the income would go to the orphan's industrial school. To further entice Soriano, he noted that the Chinese casino had paid the town, in normal times, 7000 pesos monthly; of course, it would be less now than before. Again, the Governor denied the petition and told the president that Magdalena did not have a permit either.

Soriano demanded that the Magdalena president inform him if he had given permits for the playing of forbidden games and the smoking of opium by the Chinese population. The president had not given a permit for forbidden games, only for legal games, and the income from that permit was designated for civic improvements. Three days after his answer

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<sup>58</sup>Telegrams exchanged between De la Huerta, president, and town council of Cananea, the Tax Administrator, Cananea, May, 1917, AGES, 3137-1. The resolution of the case is not given since it was reached in private discussions.

the liquor inspector announced that he had surprised a group of card players playing for stakes in the local hotel. The gambler who ran the game showed a letter of permission from the president for the game. Acting on the Governor's orders, the inspector consigned the players to the police.

Soriano asked Enrique Campbell, the president of Magdalena, why he had issued the permit, and Campbell sent him the permit he had conceded. It permitted only the opening of a house of recreation for the one month of September, and only legal games. An unsigned note had been added to the bottom of the permit saying the permit had been extended to cover October as well, but Campbell denied adding it. The only fault with the permit was that it had not been publicly announced. The Chinese who had received it had made a four hundred peso contribution to the city for improvements, and the money had been entered in the town books and spent on street improvements. He rationalized the acceptance of the money with the fact that the streets had been impassable so that the permit had been issued out of necessity; moreover, the Light Company had been threatening to turn off the town's lights since Magdalena owed 1500 pesos for electricity. The city had no funds to pay its water bill, either. Soriano ordered him to withdraw the permit; the president replied that it had expired the last day of September.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>60</sup>Correspondence between Soriano and E. Campbell, Oct. 4-Oct. 17, 1917, AGES, 3137-1.

Apparently, Soriano and Calles decided that the state might as well benefit from the Chinese propensity to gamble, for Soriano's opposition to the casinos suddenly ended in December, 1917. The first permit went to Agustín Chan, for a casino in Hermosillo; in return for the permit he promised to "donate" eight hundred and seventy-five pesos, gold, per month to the state for the support of the orphanage, and as a concession from the state, a like sum went to the municipal treasury. In addition, the owner paid the local police to station a policeman at the door of the casino to ascertain that no Mexicans were admitted. By the end of December, 1917, Chan had opened additional casinos in Guaymas, Magdalena, Nogales and Cananea. The donation for the casino in Hermosillo was raised to one thousand pesos per month in March, 1918.<sup>61</sup>

In March, Jim Joe opened casinos in Agua Prieta, Nacozeni, Fronteras and El Tigre, and on March 14 the president of Cananea sought permission for a second casino which would pay two thousand pesos per month for the benefit of public education. Soriano refused to permit another casino, saying that it would cause trouble with the proprietor of the other casino. This was not always a rule; in May he refused to

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<sup>61</sup>A few days later Soriano gave the casino a permit to import ten kilos of opium for use in the casino, for which the state treasury received two hundred pesos gold. Permit, Mar. 6, 1918; also contains copies of letters permitting the opening of casinos, AGES, 3311.



grant an exclusive privilege to a casino in Huatabampo. Some of the proprietors also sought licenses for the sale of wines and beer; these were refused.<sup>62</sup>

The open break between Soriano and Calles grew from a conflict over gambling, but not from the permits given to the Chinese.<sup>63</sup> In July, 1918, when Calles returned from his trip to Nayarit and Mexico City, he opened a strong anti-gambling crusade. In Navojoa the president and several prominent persons were arrested for gambling, and all of the players thought that the houses where they were playing had gambling and drinking permits from the Governor. They did have permits, but the president had issued them himself; they brought more than twenty-five pesos daily to the town government and an equal amount for himself. Calles, as military commander, ordered the arrest of the president, and appointed an acting president.

Soriano sent a telegram to the presidents telling them not to obey the commands of the military on July 13, and the president of Huatabampo was in a quandary. He had received a telegraphic order from Calles telling him to arrest a local resident and send him to Hermosillo to testify in the gambling case in Navojoa; he wanted to know whose orders to obey. Soriano told him to ignore the orders from Calles.

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<sup>62</sup>AGES, 3228 contains all documentation and permits.

<sup>63</sup>Documentation for the Soriano case may be found in AGES, 3311, dated from July through November 21, 1918.

because the "law of the state and the General Constitution of the Republic is greater than General Calles." He told him to free his prisoner and tell Calles that the arrest of presumed criminals had to be done through legal channels. He also instructed the president to make his statement public. Then obeying his own precepts, Soriano freed the president of Navojoa who had been remanded to the state penitentiary, on his personal recognizance. The next day, Calles took over again as governor.

Because of the implication of a deputy, Calles sent the documents in the case to the legislature and ordered the witnesses to appear before the deputies, the day after he took office. The question was raised of Soriano's involvement in granting secretly permits for the prohibited games, and when the witnesses appeared before the legislature they all swore that Soriano had authorized the games for the payment of 5000 pesos. The deputy originally involved was removed from office, and Soriano, who was also a deputy, was assigned to the Supreme Court for investigation. On October 22 the legislature declared that Soriano was guilty of being an accessory, and an alleged check for the payoff was displayed. Calles also accused him of receiving money destined for the orphanage. Soriano sought an amparo for protection, which was granted by the Supreme Court against the legislature on November 21.<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>64</sup>The final resolution of Soriano's case is unknown. He disappeared completely from state politics, and there is no further record in the archives of any trial. Soriano

Calles continued to issue permits to the Chinese for gambling. In October, Agustín Chan opened a casino in La Colorada, which could pay only one hundred pesos per month each to the state and town, because the local Chinese population was small. Calles guaranteed that the town would receive its fifty percent for the next year, so when he announced to all casinos in May, 1919, that beginning on June 1 the fifty percent paid to the municipality would instead go to the state orphanage, the Cruz Galvez industrial school, for the construction of new buildings, La Colorada protested. The town was in the process of rebuilding its electric light plant and needed the funds, but Calles haughtily told the council that the school, which he founded, was more important. In December, 1919, with De la Huerta's permission, the president of La Colorada closed the casino.<sup>65</sup> The state would collect 10,450 pesos from the Chan casinos each month, 1100 pesos from the Jim Joe casinos and an additional 150 pesos from an independent casino in Huatabampo. The high quotas set for the gambling houses hurt them, and independent

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had been attacked by the Hermosillo newspaper Orientación for his issuance of gambling permits in 1917. The Governor had challenged the editor, Alberto Healy, to publicly support the charge. The two men met in the Plaza in Hermosillo, and Healy not only supported them, he amplified them. Soriano answered in an airy manner, tempers became heated, and pistols were drawn. Only the intervention of the police commander averted a tragedy. Galaz, Desde el cerro, 55-56.

<sup>65</sup>Correspondence between Calles and the president, La Colorada, May 25 and 28, 1919, and Dec. 28, 1919, all in AGES, 3311.

owners could seldom remain open for long, but they paid for the new buildings at the orphanage.

Aside from the labor laws, prohibition, and the ban on gambling, progressive reforms made no more headway in Sonora than they did in the other parts of Mexico. Health and sanitation regulations, dear to the heart of the progressive reformer, found few echos in Sonora, and pure food and drug laws were of small concern in a state that had no food preserving industry, except for one small factory in Magdalena. Health laws were designed to meet a specific crisis, rather than to correct conditions and prevent future problems. There was one exception: Calles recognized what a perfect breeding ground for disease a school could be, and decreed that all teachers must have medical certification to guard against possible epidemics.<sup>66</sup> Even as the Decree was issued, smallpox had reappeared in the state.<sup>67</sup>

By the end of 1915 the latest smallpox outbreak had reached proportions severe enough to warrant governmental notice. Calles ordered a general clean-up in the state, the quarantine of known cases and inspection of homes to ascertain their sanitary state.<sup>68</sup> But there was no demand for compulsory vaccination, although the government did conduct

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<sup>66</sup>Decree 2, Aug. 28, 1915, AGES, 3069-1.

<sup>67</sup>Nacozari reported a case on Aug. 30, 1915, AGES, 3046.

<sup>68</sup>Circular 13, Dec. 24, 1915, AGES, 3046.

a campaign encouraging vaccination and supplied vaccine purchased in the United States. Railroad ticket agents in Hermosillo, where the number of infected persons was especially high, were ordered not to sell tickets to persons without a vaccination certificate.<sup>69</sup> The epidemic spread and was a serious threat, despite the sanitary measures ordered by the Governor and his successors, until it faded in the summer of 1917.<sup>70</sup> Magdalena was one of the least touched of the towns because of an intensive vaccination program; approximately 4800 persons were vaccinated with vaccine furnished by the state, and the town had only twenty-one cases with eight deaths. Most of those infected arrived there from Santa Ana or Imuris.<sup>71</sup> Still, there was no move toward vaccination of the entire populace of Sonora.

Some of the health measures with seemingly progressive intent were directed specifically against the Chinese, based on unreasoning prejudice rather than scientific fact. Chinese immigration into the state was temporarily suspended in March, 1916, by Calles for "health reasons," which were

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<sup>69</sup>Moreno to railroad agent, Dec. 22, 1915, AGES, 3046.

<sup>70</sup>USS Denver to Comm. in Chief, USPF, May ?, 1916, USDS, 812.00/18299. Consular reports, reports of ships at Guaymas and the US Army border reports until June, 1917, report outbreaks of smallpox over the entire state; all found in USDS, 812.00/17078-21044. Municipal reports from Cocorit, Bacum and Estacion Esperanza tell of the spread of the disease south, where there were few doctors and no medication. AGES, 3071-2.

<sup>71</sup>President, Magdalena, report, Feb. 26, 1917, AGES, 3133-1.

undefined.<sup>72</sup> The Chinese, long established in the food business, had customarily sold groceries, vegetables, fruits, fish and meats in the same shop, but with each product in a separate section. Suddenly, in May, 1916, the town council in Cananea decided that such a combination was unsanitary and dangerous to health, and banned the sale of fresh items in conjunction with canned or dried foodstuffs.<sup>73</sup>

Before the end of the year a new market opened in Cananea and the Chinese vendors moved into it; shortly, they were selling all the food products under the same roof as before. The town council refused to ban them from any site as long as they obey the sanitary code, so Mexican businessmen were soon complaining to the council and to the Governor about the filth of the Chinese stores, because they could not compete with the Chinese.<sup>74</sup> Frequent attempts by the town councils to isolate the Chinese in separate residential areas were justified with the belief, widespread in Sonora, that the Chinese people were the dirtiest and most degenerate

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<sup>72</sup>Sect. of St. for Foreign Affairs to Calles, Mar. 7, 1916, AGES, 3072-1.

<sup>73</sup>Calles upheld the right of the town council to so rule, and told the Chinese that they should comply, and they did. Correspondence found in AGES, 3083.

<sup>74</sup>Correspondence between De la Huerta, presidents and businessmen, Feb. 12 to Feb. 27, 1917, AGES, 3147. The president admitted that his predecessor had ruled against the sales of fresh products in combination with dried and canned foods only to aid the Mexican merchants.

in the world, and that they carried contagious illnesses for which other civilized nations in the world isolated them.<sup>75</sup> Since many Chinese usually resided in a single small dwelling, the Mexicans were certain that the domiciles were pig styes and focii of infection. Hermosillo residents accused the Chinese of being the source of the smallpox epidemic in 1916, not only because of the alleged filth of their residences, but because of their "horrible vices," and appealed to the Governor to force them to live apart.<sup>76</sup>

The president of Agua Prieta ordered that all businessmen selling certain food items be given a physical examination; it just happened, he later assured Calles, that all who sold the items were Chinese. The Chinese protested, since the examination included checking the genitals. The president could defend his decree as being general in application, but since he added to his defense the statement, "It is disgraceful the way the Chinese take advantage of our hospitality," it was obvious that the ruling was designed more for harassment than for safeguarding health. Calles,

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<sup>75</sup>Petition, C6corit, Jan. 31, 1916, AGES, 3061-2. C6corit did not pretend that the separation was for health reasons. But later petitions received the same answer that the Governor, under pressure from the federal government, had given C6corit, that such barrios violated the treaty of friendship between China and Mexico. Later petitions may be found in AGES, 3124-1.

<sup>76</sup>Petition from residents of Hermosillo with businesses in the municipal market, ND, 1916; reply, Feb. 13, 1916, AGES, 3061-2. Moreno said Calles would do all he could to aid the Mexican merchants against the Chinese.

however, upheld the president, agreeing that the sanitary ruling was justified because it was a general disposition made to benefit the public.<sup>77</sup>

Proposals to make the isolation of the Chinese in barrios for hygeinic reasons a part of the state's internal law brought protests from the Secretary of Government in Mexico City to Calles in March, 1919. In his answer to the Secretary, Calles revealed that the basis for the proposed laws was his strong antipathy for the Chinese, and repeated as truth the widely accepted beliefs that the Chinese were a menace to public health.

The terrible illness called "beri-beri," tuberculosis, tracoma and many others, considered as indigenous to the Chinese, present more proof of the noxious effects of this immigration. They are found in the best Mexican families in this capital, no doubt spread by the Chinese through the unsanitary conditions of themselves and their shops.

In Society, the Chinese is inadmissable and repulsive, not only because he is feared as the carrier of contagious diseases....<sup>78</sup>

The Secretary of Government did not accept the statement, and flatly told Calles that all actions against the Chinese were based on commercial jealousy.<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>77</sup>President of Chinese colony, Agua Prieta, to Calles, Oct. 9, 1918; Calles to president, Agua Prieta, Oct. 10, 1918; Calles to president of Chinese colony, Oct. 10, 1918, AGES, 3230.

<sup>78</sup>Sect. of Government to Calles, Mar. 31, 1919; reply, Apr. 12, 1919, AGES, 3315.

<sup>79</sup>Sect. of Government to Calles, Apr. 24, 1919, AGES, 3315. Despite prior failures of other towns, Magdalena and Bâcum tried to establish barrios in 1919 for health reasons. AGES, 3292.



Consumer protection fell within the jurisdiction of the municipalities, and it was under that guise that the towns sought to ban the Chinese. The towns had the power to establish regulations not only for the sale of foods and medicines, but also to assure sanitary and healthful conditions in factories, and to oversee the town's sanitation and hygiene.<sup>80</sup> The towns of the state had few hospital facilities. Cananea had a municipal hospital established by the 4C's, and Guaymas had a relatively well-equipped hospital, lacking in sterilization equipment.<sup>81</sup> Hermosillo's hospital functioned as a state hospital, with the small towns sending their seriously ill there for care, including mental patients.<sup>82</sup> There were

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<sup>80</sup>Police Proclamation, Altar, 1919, AGES, 3292. The proclamation was typical. The town council was given responsibility to make sure that public buildings and private homes were not sources of infection, and that hotels met standards for the town. Foods were to be clean, pure and well-preserved, without adulterants, coloration or modification. Grocers were required to use screens to keep out flies and dust. Sick animals were not to be sold for public consumption; milk could not be stored in copper utensils; and fruits had to be ripe. Chicken pens and wash houses could not be built along the canal that furnished water to the town. Animals, such as cows and horses, were to be stabled outside the town; it was forbidden to kill buzzards or carrion birds; and the town designated a trash dump and a site for the dumping of dead animals.

<sup>81</sup>USS Yorktown to SecNavy, Aug. 18, 1917, USDS, 812.00/21271.

<sup>82</sup>Various data on Hermosillo's hospital may be found in AGES, 3156-2. The staff for the Hermosillo hospital in 1918 consisted of a medical director who made two hundred pesos per month, one aide to the director who was paid one hundred pesos per month, one head nurse who received seventy-five pesos per month (raised from sixty), and one aide to the nurse who received fifty pesos per month. Hermosillo budget, AGES, 3195.

no specialized facilities for the care of mental patients, nor were there facilities for the blind or other handicapped persons.

A beginning was made in prison reform. Calles abolished the infamous underground isolation cells in the state prison in Hermosillo;<sup>83</sup> De la Huerta opened a school for the prisoners and equipped machine shops. Prisoners could earn the minimum daily wage in the shops and thus contribute to the support of their families.<sup>84</sup>

Mexico was not yet ready to accept the idea of equal rights for women, although there was a fledgling feminist movement in Latin America at the time. Sonora's first female union was founded in 1913 in Cananea, but the idea did not spread.<sup>85</sup> De la Huerta encouraged the development of enterprises in which women could find employment, and expected to see them participate more in the economic development of the state. His purpose in founding the clothing factories in Hermosillo was to protect the widows of soldiers by offering them a place to work and a share of the profits of industrialization.<sup>86</sup> Yucatán had a strong feminist

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<sup>83</sup>Decree 13, Nov. 10, 1915, AGES, 3069-1.

<sup>84</sup>De la Huerta's Report to the legislature, May, 1917, AGES, 3132.

<sup>85</sup>Galaz, Desde el cerro, II, 134.

<sup>86</sup>De la Huerta's Report to the legislature, May, 1917, AGES, 3132.

movement, and the governor, Salvador Alvarado, called a feminist congress in November, 1916. Sonora sent no delegate, but the delegate from Guanajuato also represented Sonora at the congress, which presented to the constitutional convention demands for female suffrage.<sup>87</sup> The convention did not seriously consider the question, although the idea did have some supporters.<sup>88</sup>

The expulsion of the clergy from Mexico cannot be seen as a reform; rather it was an affirmation of the principals of Mexico's nineteenth century liberals who had issued the Reform Laws for the Church, stripping it of its lands and the functions which most modern states regarded as falling within their jurisdiction. These laws did not call for the expulsion of the clergy, and the priestly exile, when it came, was not formalized in law.

The anti-clericalism of the revolution did not originate with Carranza, who as a nineteenth century liberal could be expected to fulfill the Reform Laws of Juárez. The anti-clerics of the revolution were the younger men, the military commanders and governors, who mistreated and expelled the clergy and looted Church property. As a result, most of the priests and the hierarchy went into voluntary or involuntary

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<sup>87</sup>Report by Elena Torres, Dec. 19, 1916, AGES, 3129-2.

<sup>88</sup>Niemeyer, Revolution at Querétaro, 206-210, contains a discussion of the feminist movement in Mexico and at the constitutional convention.

exile. Obregón's army had done its share of the looting and the destruction of properties, and when Obregón moved into Mexico City on the heels of the Convention government in 1915, he had imprisoned numerous priests and demanded a large donation from the Church for their release. The priests, although ridiculed and verbally mistreated, were not physically harmed, and the action did not become a standard practice of Obregón's.

Obregón's anti-clericalism, if indeed it was that, had not been on display in Sonora, and his actions in Mexico City had no echo in Sonora, although there had been casual enforcement of some of the Reform Laws under Maytorena. An occasional will was declared invalid under Maytorena, usually to the benefit of the state, because of property left to a Catholic church or priest, but animosity was lacking.<sup>89</sup> When anti-clericalism became a policy, there was no accompanying violence; government actions were aimed at the Roman Catholic Church as an institution with little hostility towards individual priests.<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>89</sup>Last Will and Testament of María Trinidad Escalante, died, 1913. Declared null under Article 3297 of the Civil Code, Sect. 8, of the Organic Law of Additions and Reforms of Dec. 14, 1874, AGES, 2903.

<sup>90</sup>The Protestant churches were closed also, or at least placed under custodial care, as shown in the registry found in AGES, 3112. Just exactly how they were affected is unclear; all Protestant ministers did not leave. Sonora had the largest percentage of non-Catholic population in Mexico in 1910, when over three and one-third percent professed to be other than Roman Catholic. Cosío Villegas, Historia moderna, IV, 475.

The opening move against the Roman Catholic Church in Sonora began with the confiscation of church properties together with private property under the aegis of the Administration of Absentee Properties. Under the Reform Laws of Benito Juárez of 1859, the Church properties had been nationalized, but Díaz had never pressed for control. General Diéguez, on his occupation of Hermosillo in 1915, seized the buildings as public property and the priests began to leave.<sup>91</sup>

There was no formal decree exiling the clergy from Sonora. Calles simply notified Moreno and the military commanders on March 21, 1916, that he had resolved to expell the clerics for their "criminal participation in the anti-patriotic work of the state's enemies. He ordered the commanders to notify the priests that they had two days in which to leave the state. Moreno, however, did not think that a blanket expulsion was just, because all priests were not bad; many were enemies of the revolution, but there were those who had given it support. He did not believe the good Mexican priests should be jailed or exiled for what others had done.<sup>92</sup>

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<sup>91</sup>Border Reports, Dec. 18, 1915 & Jan. 1, 1916, USDS, 812.00/17030 & 17078. Diéguez' anti-clericalism found more expression after he became governor of Jalisco.

<sup>92</sup>Calles to Moreno, and reply, Mar. 21, 1916, AGES, 3129-2. Only the hand-written copy of the Calles telegram is found in the archive and it carries no date, but since Moreno's reply was marked "very urgent" it was surely sent the same day.

Moreno offered the only protest from within Calles' official family.

The priests left quietly, and the buildings remained empty and uncared for, since there had as yet been no legal provision for their care. Not until May 23, 1917, after the physical properties were again declared to be possessions of the nation under Article 130 of the Constitution of 1917, was it announced that all temples should have a person responsible for maintaining the laws on religious discipline and the objects belonging to the cult. Municipal authorities were instructed to establish a registry of their local temples, and another for those charged with their maintenance.<sup>93</sup>

Had it not been for the women of Sonora, the abandoned buildings would have stood open to human depredation and the weather. Even before the provision for the care of the buildings, the women had looked after them, guarding the sacred objects and cleaning the buildings, and even after the issuance of the circular, it was rare to find a building under a man's care. A few of the buildings had been converted to secular use; for instance, the sole church in La Colorada was functioning as a military hospital, and troops were quartered in the church at Tecoripa. Nogales had only one Catholic temple, which had been closed long before the expulsion of the priests. The president wanted to use the

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<sup>93</sup>Circular 2, May 23, 1917, AGES, 3112.

building for a night school since no other building was available. Calles said that as far as he was concerned, it could be so used, but the federal government would not permit such use because it was the only Catholic church in Nogales.<sup>94</sup>

The church in Caborca had been completely neglected, and a flood on July 31, 1917 washed away the river bank and caused the collapse of a portion of the central nave and main chancel. The doors were broken and the church served as a public toilet; when two sisters asked if they might utilize the remaining areas for a private school and residence, the Secretary of Government assented.<sup>95</sup>

Numerous towns sought the return of their priests in 1917, and could plead on the basis of the Constitution of 1917, which guaranteed religious freedom. To all of them, Soriano replied that the state government was not an enemy of religion and did not want the Catholics to have difficulty practicing their religion. However, he added, the government could do nothing until the legislature passed a law setting the number of curates who would be permitted within the state, in accord with Article 130 of the new federal Constitution. He sent the petitions on to the legislature with a note

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<sup>94</sup>Correspondence, June 25 to Sept. 14, 1917; listing of churches, their current use and their caretaker, June and July, 1917, AGES, 3112.

<sup>95</sup>Matilde Valenzuela to Calles, Aug. 5, 1917; Soriano's reply, Sept. 7, 1917, AGES, 3112.

instructing the lawmakers to limit the number of priests to fifteen, if they would allow any to return.<sup>96</sup>

Catholics were not barred from practicing their religion, but they had to do it without their priests. Services had to remain within the church, without the traditional outside manifestations of belief.<sup>97</sup> Protestants, on the other hand, continued to hold regular services. The pastor for the Evangelical sect in Hermosillo conducted an active conversion campaign in other parts of the state in 1917, to the extent that one of the presidents in the Sahuaripa district wanted to jail him for the strange religious theories and actions he brought to the area. De la Huerta reminded the president that he had to permit religious freedom, which meant that he could not interfere in the free practice of a religion as long as it was not done in public.<sup>98</sup> The same minister received permission to preach in Cananea in December.<sup>99</sup> However, unhappy Catholics interrupted Evangelical services in Hermosillo with

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<sup>96</sup>Soriano to petitioners, Oct. 26, 1917; petitions and note to legislature, AGES, 3192-2.

<sup>97</sup>Circularstelegrams to presidents, Mar. 20, 1917; De la Huerta to president, Moctezuma, Mar. 25, 1917; President, Tórin, to De la Huerta, Mar. 12, 1917; reply, Mar. 13, 1917, AGES, 3228.

<sup>98</sup>Judge, Sahuaripa, to Calles, July 11, 1917; De la Huerta to president, July 27, 1917, AGES, 3137-1.

<sup>99</sup>Soriano to president, Cananea, Dec. 30, 1917, AGES, 3228.



epithets and loud noises, until Calles was forced to station guards in the neighborhood to stop them.<sup>100</sup>

Soriano and Calles had used the lack of a law as an excuse for maintaining the expulsion of the priests, while no law was being contemplated. In the opening session of the legislature in 1918, the deputy from Ures, Antonio G. Rivera, introduced a bill which, when enacted into law, would satisfy Article 130 and reopen the churches. The bill was attacked by political opponents in an effort to make it appear that Calles opposed it, and it remained under discussion until May, 1919, when it was finally passed.<sup>101</sup>

Even before the introduction of the Rivera bill, Calles and Soriano had begun to waiver in their resistance to the presence of the clerics in the state. Curates conducted Masses in C6corit and Guaymas in January and February, 1918, with several extensions of the time originally conceded to them. Official policies were erratic while the Rivera bill continued to be in a state of limbo, arbitrarily acceding to or prohibiting the presence of priests. Soriano refused to admit a priest to attend to the dying mother of an Altar man in April, 1918 because "there is no law on this subject, but one will be expedited shortly." Word came from Calles' headquarters that Soriano could admit the priest since he had

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<sup>100</sup>J. G. Grijalva to Calles, Aug. 24, 1918; reply, Aug. 28, 1918, AGES, 3228.

<sup>101</sup>Rivera, La Revoluci6n, 495.

done so on similar occasions, and Soriano complied. By then, it was too late; the woman had died.<sup>102</sup>

To the petition of two hundred three women from Tubutama asking for a priest to celebrate a Mass on the day of the town's patron saint and to baptize their children, he replied that there was no law.<sup>103</sup> However, Soriano and Calles authorized priestly visits to Hermosillo and Magdalena in July, while concurrently rejecting a petition from the women of Álamos. Pleas were denied in August and September, but beginning late in October, they usually received a positive answer, although time limitations were still imposed. All refusals carried either of two excuses; that there had been no law passed setting the number of priests, or its alternative form--the governor did not have the power to accede to the petitions.<sup>104</sup> Calles refused to allow a man to have a priest for one hour for final rites for his elderly sister because priests were enemies of the government, but three days later changed his mind and conceded permission for a priest for that one hour.<sup>105</sup> However, when the Pesqueiras requested a priest for their mother on November 7, Calles

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<sup>102</sup>A. Escalante to Soriano, Apr. 5, 1918; Hdqts. to Soriano, Apr. 6, 1918, AGES, 3207.

<sup>103</sup>Petition; Calles' reply, June 13, 1918, AGES, 3207.

<sup>104</sup>Requests, permissions and refusals may be found in AGES, 3207.

<sup>105</sup>Calles instructed the president that the permit was strictly limited to one hour, but when the priest arrived the women begged that he be allowed to stay for one day to baptize the children. Calles refused. The president informed Calles

agreed on the same day.<sup>106</sup>

An incident in Álamos early in November, 1918, pointed up the unpopularity of Calles' anti-clerical policies among the general public, and his contempt for the clergy despite his superficial change of attitude. Calles permitted a priest to go to Álamos to perform two weddings, but after the ceremonies the cleric began to baptize young children at the request of their parents and accepted the fees for the service. The local military commander, Colonel A. B. Ortega, spoke to him privately, asking him to stop the baptisms because of the attention he was receiving. The priest answered with what Ortega interpreted as haughty remarks and declared that he would act as his conscience dictated. Ortega hit him several times; for that reason the priest refused to baptize more children.

Ortega sought permission from Calles to hang him because the people had been incited to riot by the "injustices" the priest was committing.<sup>107</sup> Exactly what the injustices were, he did not make clear; he might have meant the fees charged or the discontinuance of the baptismal rites. Calles would

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that he had complied fully with his instructions, but the priest, after he left town, passed through several ranches where he baptized children and confessed old ladies. Correspondence, Sept. 6 to Sept. 13, 1918, AGES, 3207.

<sup>106</sup>Calles to I. Pesqueira, Nov. 7, 1918, AGES, 3207.

<sup>107</sup>The disturbances, in all probability, were caused by his pressures on the priest which caused him to cease baptizing, rather than by any priestly action.

not permit such drastic action, but ordered the town president to expell the prëst. The people, on hearing this, became even more angry because they wanted the priest to continue the baptisms, and Ortega asked Calles what to do to calm them. Calles then told the president to order the priest to continue to baptize, without fees, for two days,<sup>108</sup> Even after all the furor in Álamos, the priest was not expelled from the state immediately; he went to Navojoa at the request of the people there, but Calles cautioned the president to keep a strict vigil over him because he had proven himself "rude and inhumane."<sup>109</sup>

Later in November and in early December a priest visited Altar, Tubutama, Caborca, Atil and Trincheras, for three or four days each, to perform the ceremonies which many people still considered essential. Cananea had been denied a priest in February, 1918, because of the lack of a law, as had Naco in July and Arizpe in September. Baviácora asked for a priest late in November, and Calles sanctioned a priestly visit for the festival of the town's patron saint; the same priest was then authorized to visit other towns in the same district. In all of the ceremonies conducted in the Caborca district, as well as in the Arizpe district, it was understood that fifty percent of the funds collected by the priests would be

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<sup>108</sup>Calles and Ortega telegrams, Nov. 5, 1918, AGES, 3207.

<sup>109</sup>Calles to president, Navojoa, Nov. 8, 1918, AGES, 3207.

ceded to the state.<sup>110</sup>

Calles revealed in March, 1919, that his dislike for the clergy had not lessened. Several hundred Álamos residents, both men and women, dissatisfied with the Governor's refusal to respond to their pleas, chided him for depriving them of their priests for three years, and stated their belief that after two years under the new Constitution the time had come for the government to recognize and guarantee their religious rights. Calles rebuked them sharply, declaring that his government did not have to answer to them for its actions, because their passions on the subject prevented reasoning. He again asserted that the clergy had displayed a hostile and cowardly conduct toward the constitucionistas, but that they could not have been judged for their actions prior to the enactment of the new Constitution. Priestly actions had been anti-religious and traitorous to the nation, he stated.

You say that the people suffer horribly without the clergy, when all the time the clergy has raised a respectable cult as a barrier, has extorted from the suffering people, submerging them in the deepest obscuritism. Congress has to legislate under Article 130 of the National Constitution. Until today, no group of workers has asked for their return. Women alone have petitioned and were answered in the form you have considered evasive.<sup>111</sup>

The long awaited law permitting the return of the clergy was finally passed in late April, 1919, and the number of

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<sup>110</sup>All permits and denials found in AGES, 3207.

<sup>111</sup>Calles to petitioners, Mar. 10, 1919, AGES, 3300-1.

clergymen to be permitted in the state was fixed at twenty-six.<sup>112</sup> Re-entry was only the first step. The churchmen next had to seek the use of the churches which had been serving other public needs, a long legal process involving appeals to the national government, a problem not yet resolved in 1920 when De la Huerta became president.<sup>113</sup>

Although education had been encouraged in Sonora under Ramón Corral and his contemporaries, subsequently it had been neglected to the extent that its development under Calles and De la Huerta can be seen as reformatory. Calles, as a former schoolmaster, could legislate on education with some authority, and it received early attention. He instructed Moreno to send a circular to all presidents asking each to give the number of schools in his jurisdiction, the number of teachers and their salaries, a description of the available facilities, and the names of the members of the local boards of education.<sup>114</sup> Later the same month, he made all employers of isolated laborers responsible for the education of their employees' children. Decree 8 proclaimed that in all ranches, haciendas, agricultural colonies, mining camps, or in any area where there were families with an aggregate

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<sup>112</sup>Calles to president, Pitiquito, May 7, 1919, AGES, 3300-1; Dyer to SecSt, Apr. 18, 1919, USDS, 812.00/22719.

<sup>113</sup>Letters of appeal for June, 1920 in AGES, 3349.

<sup>114</sup>Circular 2, Aug. 12, 1915, AGES, 3064.

of twenty children of both sexes of school age, it was necessary that a school be founded. All businesses, such as commercial farms, mines or other industries, and ranches, whether company or privately owned, had to establish schools at their expense; a night school for their workers and other schools, as necessary, for the children of their workers. The state government, through local political authorities and school inspectors, was to enforce the law.<sup>115</sup> Teachers were to receive the salaries assigned to them by the budgets which had been in effect in 1913.<sup>116</sup>

Decree 11 called for the establishment of public libraries in the seats of all municipalities, libraries which were to be operated at public expense under the direction of the state Director of Instruction. To support the libraries, Calles set up a special fund made up of contributions of one percent of all the salaries of municipal and state employees, private contributions and fifty percent of the proceeds from vacant inheritances accruing to the state. The same decree provided for adult education in night schools in the towns.<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>115</sup>Decree 8, Sept. 24, 1915, to be effective on Oct. 1, 1915, AGES, 3046.

<sup>116</sup>Circular 9, Sept. 13, 1915, AGES, 3064.

<sup>117</sup>Decree 11, Oct. 19, 1915, AGES, 3046. The one percent tax was abrogated in Decree 31, Jan. 22, 1916, AGES, 3069-1.

Decree 12 established the state's first orphanage and an associated school of arts and trades, which was to be named after the martyred president, Francisco I. Madero. Admission to the orphanage was at first limited to the children of military men killed in the field, without political consideration, but Calles promised that when funds were adequate all orphans would be admitted. The children, who were separated by sex, would receive a primary education as well as vocational training. To support the orphanage and school, the state would use part of the educational funds contributed by the towns.<sup>118</sup>

Decree 14 established a normal school in Hermosillo for the training of teachers for the primary and secondary schools. To be admitted the candidate had to have finished a complete course of primary education, had to be fifteen years old, in good health, and had to have a record of exemplary conduct. Calles promised to furnish twenty-five scholarships to those who met the conditions, and he called on each municipality to support one or more young students at the school.<sup>119</sup>

Teachers who had served the state for twenty-five or thirty years were entitled to a pension, but each had to apply individually, and a decree was necessary for each pension grant.<sup>120</sup> As an honor, retired teachers who had

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<sup>118</sup>Decree 12, Oct. 29, 1915, AGES, 3046.

<sup>119</sup>Decree 14, Dec. 23, 1915, AGES, 3046.

<sup>120</sup>Decrees 28, 34, etc., AGES, 3069-1.



served thirty years were given an honorary seat in the Chamber of Deputies, but the seat carried no other enumerated privileges.<sup>121</sup>

The state had formerly ceded one-third of the sales tax to the town councils and police commissioners for the support of education, but beginning February 1, 1916, the towns had to pay ten percent of their income each month into the state coffers, which was earmarked for general education.<sup>122</sup> From this, the state paid the teachers' salaries; but the school buildings, their equipment and maintenance were the responsibility of the towns. In addition to the ten percent from the towns, educational funding came from the gambling tax, later from fees paid by foreigners for travel visas and from the sale of confiscated properties.<sup>123</sup>

The unstable political economic conditions had interrupted the normal educative processes in the state, and recovery, in large part, depended on the attitude of the municipal authorities and the local citizens. Magdalena, which had two schools, founded four more in 1916, with assistance from Calles. The town president boasted in 1917 that Magdalena's schools could well be the best in the state, and

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<sup>121</sup>Decree 36, Jan. 27, 1916, AGES, 3069-1.

<sup>122</sup>Decree 30, Jan. 21, 1916, AGES, 3069-1.

<sup>123</sup>Visa information found in AGES, 3215. Decree 32, relative to the properties of absent owners, Jan. 27, 1916, stated fifty percent of the income from sales of such properties would go to education. AGES, 3069-1.

that state help had continued under De la Huerta. Attendance in Magdalena's schools had almost doubled, owing to the fact that the authorities had urged parents to send their children and had hired special police to stop truancy. To assure attendance, the punishment for truancy was inflicted on the parents.<sup>124</sup>

In contrast, in nearby Atil, there was only a school for boys open in 1918; the new School Inspector there had no great enthusiasm for his job.<sup>125</sup> Granados, in the Sierras east of Moctezuma, reported that the town needed school equipment for two hundred children. De la Huerta told the townspeople that if there were no school it was their own fault; the families should meet and choose someone to direct a school so the government could send a teacher.<sup>126</sup>

In the isolated southeast, still subject to Yaqui raids, more than decrees and money was required to restore the schools. Professor Epifanio Vieyra, on his tour through the area in the late summer of 1916, found educational conditions almost hopeless. Campo Verde, near La Dura, had never had a school; in Mazatán the buildings had not been designed as schools and were inadequate, as were the teachers. Tecoripa had had no

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<sup>124</sup>President, Magdalena, municipal report, Feb. 26, 1917, AGES, 3133-1.

<sup>125</sup>President, Atil, municipal report, Sept. 18, 1918, AGES, 3220.

<sup>126</sup>President, Granados, municipal report, Apr. 24, 1917, AGES, 3133-1.

schools for several years, and there was no hope of one opening soon because the scarcity of teachers made it very difficult to secure personnel willing to face the dangers of an area subject to Indian raids. In Suaqui Grande, the school building was a mountain of ruins; there had been no school for boys for three years; the girls had had none for seven. The locale had one hundred ten boys and one hundred fifteen girls of school age (six to fourteen years). The schools of Nuri had been closed for several years, and neglect was beginning to destroy the town's excellent educational facilities. Tonichi had a mixed school with forty-one boys and forty-three girls, but lacked necessary equipment and furniture. Bacanora lacked buildings, furniture and other equipment; Vieyra managed to secure a teacher and reopen a school there.

Sahuaripa had recently reopened its schools, but there were only ten boys in attendance when Vieyra visited the school for boys. He asked the municipal president the reason for the low attendance and learned that the local families generally ignored the school, and that older boys refused to attend because a woman taught the classes. In the girls' school Vieyra found fifty girls, but there was no registry nor any attendance records kept because there was no paper in the town. The girls' school had a young director and three assistants, too many personnel for so few students, but Vieyra thought they would be necessary if all the students attended who were required to do so by law. Vieyra also remarked that too many of the teachers in the remote areas spent too much of their

time acting as shyster lawyers in judicial matters and exploiting the ignorance of the people, and too little time teaching.<sup>127</sup>

Caborca complained about its educational system in April, 1916. The schools there were badly attended because the teachers were incompetent, although they were paid the full salary. The girls' school director was not only incompetent, but of loose morals, and spent more time taking care of her animals than at the school. She had three aides, all like their director, and no girls in the school. Parents would not send their daughters because they did not like the teachers and did not want their daughters to waste their time in attendance.

The boys' school had two female teachers, both very young, who were products of the local school, and therefore not well prepared. If anything, instruction in the boys' school was worse than that offered in the girls' school. The two teachers were daughters of one of the local councilmen.<sup>128</sup> It was not a case of nepotism, however, for the councilman did not approve of his daughters teaching. He told Calles in June in his council report that the girls were not teachers, but did the best they could, and that they gave instruction

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<sup>127</sup>Report of Professor E. Vieyra to De la Huerta, Aug.-Sept., 1916, AGES, 3063.

<sup>128</sup>A. Ramírez to Calles, Apr. 26, 1916, AGES, 3071-2.

only in the first and second years. They were conducting classes at the request of the School Inspector, and their father had been seeking a qualified teacher to replace them since April.<sup>129</sup>

Calles budgeted 250,000 pesos for public education in December, 1915, with an additional 30,000 pesos to teach reading and another 5000 to pay for books and subscriptions to periodicals for the schools. To found a library in Hermosillo, he set aside one hundred twenty pesos per month to pay a librarian and one thousand pesos to purchase books and for library expenses.<sup>130</sup>

The depreciation of the money made all salaries inadequate, and teachers, already in short supply, became even more difficult to hire. Calles notified the presidents in March that he was bringing in teachers from outside the state, and that some would go to areas where the state's generous salary would still not be sufficient for living. Therefore, he requested that the residents contribute what they could to a collection for the teachers--a free-will contribution, not a tax.<sup>131</sup>

Calles' orphanage and school, with its name now changed to the "Cruz Galvez School of Crafts and Trades" to honor one

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<sup>129</sup>President, Caborca, municipal report, June 14, 1916, AGES, 3072-1.

<sup>130</sup>Boletín Oficial,<sup>ca</sup> Dec. 31, 1915.

<sup>131</sup>Ibid., Mar. 25, 1916. Telegram sent by Calles on Mar. 21, 1916, reprinted.

of his soldiers who had died in the unsuccessful assault on Maytorena in autumn, 1915, began preparing early in 1916 to receive students. Necessary furniture for the dormitories and classrooms was bought in the United States in the first three months of the year.<sup>132</sup> The school opened on March 28, 1916, with seventy-one students culled from a much larger group, most of whom did not meet the prerequisites. The opening had been delayed because of the shortage of teachers. By August, 1916, the number of students had risen to one hundred sixty, of whom ninety-six were boys and sixty-four were girls. Of the students, fifty-two were Yaquis, thirty-two boys and twenty girls.<sup>133</sup>

The boys' orphanage and the girls' orphanage were run as two completely separate units with separate infirmaries, kitchens, bakeries and dormitories. By the summer of 1917, the school was turning down requests for admission because of overcrowding, and Calles had launched a fund raising drive to build new buildings. After August, few children were admitted, and those few who were admitted entered on the direct order of Calles.<sup>134</sup>

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<sup>132</sup>Expenses for January, February and March, 1916, found in AGES, 3086.

<sup>133</sup>These children were seldom orphaned of both parents. They often had a mother, sometimes a camp-follower, who could not, or would not, sustain them.

<sup>134</sup>For some unknown reason, three of Calles' daughters were enrolled at the Cruz Galvez in November, 1917, but their names do not appear on the roll in December. AGES, 3136.

The new school was faced with several problems. Children too young to attend classes were mixed with older students with discipline problems; an unhealthy situation. Some of the students had had some schooling, others had had none, and they all had to be classified. Many of the children had been sent directly from military camps to school, so children with very bad habits were common; since the state had no correctional institutions for juveniles, the school was obliged to apply harsh punishments in combating criminal habits. The director of Cruz Galvez School thought that a correctional school should be founded so that children unsuited to the orphanage would not have to be thrown out into society again.

The school facilities were completely inadequate because the buildings had not been designed as schools and presented serious health hazards. The lack of a set of school regulations issued by the state made the school more difficult to administer; the lack of competent personnel, the economic difficulties of the state, and the unreasoning and systematic opposition of the state's General Director of Education added more woes for the school's director.<sup>135</sup>

A charter for the boys' school was finally issued on August 12, 1918. It noted that the school was open only to children under state orders, and would be supported exclusively by the state. The age of admission for boys ranged from six to eighteen years. The school was organized on a

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<sup>135</sup>Report by the Director, Aug. 31, 1918, AGES, 3225.

military regimen, and divided into four sections: Primary, Interns, Correction and Arts and Trades. As an intern, a boy received military instruction and could receive special instruction in handwriting, natural science and physical science, drawing, accounting, English, mathematics, telegraphy and gymnastics. Third and fourth year students attended classes for four hours each day, devoting the rest of their time to learning a trade. After they finished primary school, they devoted more study to perfecting their trade.<sup>136</sup> Older students were accepted with the understanding that they would attend the state Normal School in Hermosillo, and were conceded those hours away from the school each day.<sup>137</sup>

If the registries for the elections in 1916 were a true indicator of the literacy rate for the state, the rate had risen very slightly from the thirty-four percent who could read in 1910 to thirty-seven percent in 1916.<sup>138</sup> In 1917 spending rose sharply, as it did in subsequent years, over the amount set in Calles' budget. De la Huerta, in his term of office, spent 771,121 silver pesos and 3,047,778.20

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<sup>136</sup>General Ruling for the Cruz Galvez School of Crafts and Trades for Boys, issued on Aug. 12, 1918; originally written, Apr. 20, 1918, AGES, 3225.

<sup>137</sup>Memo, ND, 1918, AGES, 3228. How the school functioned as a correctional unit was not discussed.

<sup>138</sup>State voting registries were not complete, but of the 2618 men on record, 1687 could not read, approximately sixty-three percent. Registries found from Tubutama, Arizpe, Pótam, Villa de Seris, Magdalena, Cumpas, Ures and San Pedro de la Cueva. In Section 7 of Ures district, eighty percent could not read. AGES, 3068-2.



pesos in constitucionalista paper money for public instruction. This included furniture, repairs, the costs of the Normal School, the Agricultural School and the Cruz Galvez School, but there had not been sufficient money to cover all salaries in the state.<sup>139</sup>

At the beginning of De la Huerta's term there were twenty-four first-class elementary schools functioning in the state, fifty-five second-class elementary schools, seventy-seven third-class elementary schools and eight night schools.<sup>140</sup> Two years later, the number had increased to one hundred thirteen primary schools for boys, one hundred seven schools for girls and seventy-five mixed elementary schools. In addition, there were eighty-two schools which could teach only the rudiments; the number of first-class elementary schools had decreased, to twenty-two.<sup>141</sup>

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<sup>139</sup>Average pay for school teachers in 1917 was one hundred pesos per month, although a female teacher was paid less in some towns. The aides made anywhere from ninety pesos per month down to forty-five pesos--there was no standard. Municipal budgets, 1917, AGES, 3123. The female teachers at the Cruz Galvez received one hundred twenty-five pesos per month, but the women technical instructors received only fifty, sixty, or seventy-five. AGES, 3225.

The tax collector in Magdalena decided that the teachers there made excessive salaries and refused to pay extra for night classes. Most teachers who taught the classes did so for the extra pay, since salaries were being paid at the 1913 rate in paper money; however, after Nov. 10, 1916, teachers could be paid seventy-five percent in metal and the rest in paper. Correspondence found in AGES, 3060.

<sup>140</sup>De la Huerta, Report to the legislature, July 5, 1916, AGES, 3071-1.

<sup>141</sup>Soriano to T. Gómez, July 15, 1918, AGES, 3225.

The schools were still experiencing financial difficulties and numerous administrators were released as an economy measure. Because of the continuing shortage of teachers, the Governor conceded permission to the new teachers to take their examinations and enter the profession immediately from the Normal School, without the six-month preliminary internship which had previously been necessary.<sup>142</sup>

As for the public libraries proposed by Calles, by 1919 only two were functioning, one in Hermosillo and a much smaller one in Nacozari.<sup>143</sup>

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<sup>142</sup>Correspondence, July and Sept., 1918, AGES, 3225.

<sup>143</sup>Calles to Sect. of Government, Jan. 6, 1919, AGES, 3279-2. Magdalena opened a public library with one hundred five volumes on November 5, 1916, but it must have closed, or Calles surely would have taken credit for it. Announcement of opening made by municipal president in his report, Feb. 26, 1917, AGES, 3133-1.

## CHAPTER XI CONCLUSIONS

The revolution in Sonora had political origins. Madero and many of his followers might have been influenced by ideas of personal morality expounded by the Progressive reformers in the United States, but the maderistas in power in Sonora after the overthrow of Díaz hardly fitted his ideal. Maytorena, leader of the new "liberals," effected no political reforms; indeed, as well as could be determined, he had promised none. Although Sonora had visionaries, such as Salvador Alvarado and Adolfo de la Huerta in the ranks of the maderistas, they were lesser figures, and their ideas and ideals were generally ignored, or even ridiculed. Madero had promised the restoration of their traditional lands to the Yaquis, and did make overtures, but his good intentions lacked a realistic plan. The only real political change made by the Sonoran maderistas was the replacement of the porfirista officials by the maderistas.

The death of Madero elevated Álvaro Obregón and Plutarco Elías Calles to importance in the state. Obregón had gained some prominence as an able leader against the orozquistas, but the choice of a leader for the state troops lay with Maytorena, and if relations had not been cordial between the

two men, it is doubtful that Maytorena would have named him. If he had so desired, Maytorena could have assumed command of his state forces, thereby relegating Obregón to a lesser role. Maytorena probably realized that he would also lose the services of the troops raised by Obregón should he choose not to select him as a commander, but he later proved that he could successfully attract Yaqui troops to his aid. Obregón never acknowledged his debt to Maytorena, and insisted that the break between them resulted from Maytorena's bitterness at not receiving the over-all command from Carranza.

Calles was a less than successful military commander. When his military exploits are examined carefully it can be seen that he originated no important campaigns and his gains were made under the direct command of Obregón. During the orozquista rebellion, he was a police commissioner in Agua Prieta and raised a small force, but the force never engaged in any important battles; if it did, they were not noted by the American consul or in the memoirs of Calles contemporaries. It could not be determined if his later salley against Maytorena at Nogales had been intended as a campaign against the Governor, or as a feint, or whether the move had been planned by Obregón to distract attention from the arrival of Diéguez in the south.

Maytorena's refusal to lead Sonora into a conflict with Huerta gave other power-seeking factions their perfect opportunity to seize power. Calles took advantage of his absence to initiate the slanderous attacks on Maytorena, who was no

worse as a governor than his predecessors or his successors; the comments of the intellectuals around Carranza, who felt no obligation to either Maytorena or Calles, indicated that power and personal gain were the factors behind the opposition to Maytorena, not any great moral indignation.

The opposition to Maytorena made a joke of constitutionalism in Sonora. Maytorena was the constitutionally elected governor, and it was customary for the governors to obtain leaves of absence, yet his absence suddenly became of paramount importance, simply because it offered his opposition a perfect entree into the government. His supporters, who had been maderistas, came to find themselves called huertistas or cientificos, and became exiles and outcasts subject to all persecutions used against those who did not agree with the callista philosophy. Various charges against his practices were made against him; most arose from his filling offices with men loyal to himself. But the political game was still played by the old rules in spite of Madero's idealism, and the victors still got the spoils; only the names changed.

Obregón did not fully explain why he chose to back Maytorena's return to office, and the answer could possibly lie in his original appointment as commander, or in a growing pique with the Calles faction, which--he indicated to De la Huerta in December, 1916--he suspected of originating an assassination attempt against him during the campaign for Naco in 1913. His support might have been the repayment for

his appointment, but all answers are mere speculations; his statements about the meetings in Nogales are the only ones available. The others who attended did not choose to comment.

Carranza could have eased the tensions developing in the state while he was present, and it was privately known that he did not approve the vicious actions by the callistas, but he took no public stand against them. Carranza probably foresaw what would happen after he left, and saw the future clash between the two factions as a way to tie one of them to himself. Certainly, while they were fighting among themselves they would offer little real threat to him. Maytorena's quarrel was with the Calles-Pesqueira faction to begin with, but when they made themselves the representatives of legality, his fight became rebellion against the Carranza government. Even then, Carranza could have ended the quarrel by the simple expedient of moving Calles out of the state, as Obregón had ordered previously. Obregón's stand in the situation appears strangely ambivalent: on the one hand he appointed Calles commander of the state forces, surely knowing that Maytorena would view the appointment as a deliberate affront; the appointment was strange also in that Calles had demonstrated no outstanding ability as a military man. Obregón knew what the end result was likely to be, yet he did attempt to recall Calles after the trouble began. Perhaps Obregón and Carranza had agreed beforehand that the First Chief would not permit Calles to be transferred, and Obregón made the

gesture to deceive Maytorena into believing it was an attempt to regain his good will, and thus delay further action by Maytorena.

After Obregón's appointment as commander of the Army of the Northwest, his importance to Sonoran politics apparently diminished as he became more absorbed in organizing and moving his armies. But because of his position he still had much influence; that he, too, could be guilty of pettiness was amply demonstrated by his treatment of General Felipe Angeles. Although it cannot be ascertained to what extent the virtual blackmail of Carranza by Obregón and the generals under him affected the First Chief's treatment of Angeles, it is clear that Obregón's stated reasons for their opposition were rationalizations of his actions made especially for his memoirs, which were written and published four years later. His memory of the telegram sent was at variance with the memory of Miguel Alessio Robles, and Carranza's reaction was also depicted differently by the two men. Angeles was a career officer and his record was exemplary; his past career gave no hint of what his future would hold, except the assurance that he would remain loyal to his leader. The constitutionalistas did not object to accepting the services of other former federal officers. Carranza's making him into a lackey must have stung Angeles' pride, but even then there was no question of disloyalty. Carranza and Obregón and the other officers of the Sonoran command must bear a portion of the blame for Angeles' later desertion.

Had Maytorena had any military expertise the constitutionalista faction could have been quickly pushed from the state, and his claim to national power would have been as legitimate as Carranza's. But Maytorena alienated the state with his use of the Yaquis and the excesses of his clique, although survivors of the era claim that the state had little interest in any of the revolutionary factions, including Madero's. The questionnaire sent to public functionaries in 1915 bore out this statement, as did the reaction of the state to the orozquista rebellion and the move to overthrow Carranza in 1920. Sonora was, and is, a state of small farmers, each with a world that was confined to the river valley in which he farmed. Any declaration by writers of the popularity in Sonora of one or another revolutionary figure, or of his widespread support, especially during the 1910 to 1920 years, must be taken with a grain of salt; their names often were unknown outside the very small middle class in the larger towns.

The series of agreements signed by Villa and Obregón, which established a truce during the maytorenista-callista conflict, and which achieved nothing concrete except delays beneficial to the constitucionalistas, appear to be a series of Obregón's clever manipulations. After each signing he found a valid reason for the nullification of the agreement just signed and argued convincingly for a new agreement. The last accord was probably what he had in mind at the beginning, but he managed to convince Villa that each new step



was a logical addition to the previous step, and that the sum total was a truce they could both live with. In actuality, there was no real commitment in the final truce arrangement. For one thing, it was not clear whether one agreement superceded the prior agreement. The first treaty called for the forces under the command of Calles to be put under the command of Maytorena, but nothing was said of whether Calles would continue to command under him. In the second agreement, the Calles troops were put under Hill's command; in the third, Juan Cabral was to replace Maytorena as military governor and the troops that had been under Calles would be moved to Chihuahua. Again, there was no mention of the replacement of Calles. The sincerity of Carranza and Obregón in making the agreements may be called into question. They both probably saw the agreements as a fortuitous route to the creation of a schism between Villa and Maytorena. The Governor could see that Villa, by signing agreements not beneficial to him, did not truly support his movement. The agreements also were a stall for the time necessary for the newly successful constitucionalistas to consolidate and strengthen their position before the break with Villa, which Carranza was not only certain would occur, but which he promoted with his actions.

When Calles became military governor he issued a series of decrees and circulars which accepted several of Carranza's proposed reforms for Sonora, including the restoration of the ejidal lands. But a prognosticator, reviewing Calles' land

program in 1920, would have had difficulty predicting what Calles would do to effect land reforms if he arrived at the presidency. His position could not be determined with certainty from his actions in Sonora. His Decree 27 was designed to encourage food production and permitted non-landholders to use idle lands, but the use did not alter the ownership of the lands. He did encourage the restoration of a small quantity of ejidal lands, and he fought the dominance of the Richardson Construction Company in the Yaqui River Valley. But his land programs appeared to have few practical results and were not pushed. He did not suggest any means to help the poor obtain the implements, animals and other equipment necessary to farm the land he made available to them. De la Huerta's program of cooperatives was more practical, but again the program did not receive the careful study and planning necessary to avoid conflicts and pitfalls. Obregón, although a farmer himself, had not committed himself on land reform.

Calles, known for his intemperance, issued Decree 1 which prohibited the manufacture, sale and transport of alcohol in Sonora, and Circular 158 which decreed the death penalty for infractions of the law. The enforcement of Decree 1 contributed to Calles' harsh image in Mexico and the United States, however undeserved the image might be. Circular 158 was never enforced, but the fact that it had been issued blackened Calles' name. Too, many suspected that prohibition had been decreed merely to line the pocketbooks of himself and

his friends. Certainly the appointment of only four inspectors to cover the state, which had isolated borders perfect for smuggling, hinted that the efforts at enforcement were something less than sincere. His opposition to gambling is also suspect since the net effect was to put money into state coffers. De la Huerta liberalized the prohibition, and under him prohibition was finally codified, but the failure of both De la Huerta and Calles to push national prohibition at the Constitutional Convention again raises the question of sincere belief. Obregón's position can only be guessed; his candidate favored the abolition of prohibition in the 1919 election campaigns.

A radicalization of the labor movement could have been expected with the ascent of De la Huerta to the presidency, for he had proposed really radical labor laws in Sonora in 1916 and 1917. Unfortunately, his program had the effect of alienating the state's only major industry and delaying economic recovery. Calles more realistically saw the need for mining revenues in both the state treasury and the pockets of the workers, and ordered that De la Huerta's laws be expunged without offering anything to replace them until forced to by Carranza. Calles' anti-labor stance in Sonora, his actual persecution of the workers in some instances, gave no indication of his future alignment with labor. Obregón's future support might have been assumed, not from any actions in Sonora, but from his use of battalions formed by labor groups in his military campaigns.

The 1920 reviewer could have expected that there would be trouble with the Church if Calles became president because of his widely known antipathy to all clerics. There is no explanation, other than anti-clerical zeal, for Calles' role in preventing the passage of legislation implementing the religious articles of the Constitution of 1917 in Sonora, and his relaxing of the ban on the clergy seemed to result more from public outcry than from any predilection for leniency. But since the clergy was wanted and demanded by the citizens of the state, especially the women, the clergy could contribute something to the state's treasury. Obregón, too, was an anti-cleric, but his anti-Church actions lacked Calles' constancy and were never as virulent. Obregón's candidate in the 1919 election was not anti-clerical. As for De la Huerta, he enforced the existing ban more consistently than did Calles, but never did he express openly any personal anti-clericalism.

The observer of the political scene in 1920 could guess that if Calles achieved national power he would grasp it tenaciously. In this, he did not differ from his predecessors prior to the revolution. During his reign in Sonora Calles used his power to suit his whims; it cannot truthfully be said that he cared what the public thought about his rule, and his laws that benefitted the public often did so against its will. His power was also used to eliminate possible political competition, as in the case of Soriano. Calles relied on the army more than did Obregón to sustain him in power, and to

maintain his power his army had to be kept intact and content. To remain intact, there had to appear to be a need for it, and the interminable campaign against the Yaquis admirably fulfilled this need, for seldom was there an engagement which could destroy the Yaqui threat or endanger the lives of many of the soldiers. Moreover, supplying the army left open endless opportunities for graft. As state military commander from 1913 to 1919, with an interruption for eleven months during which he actually functioned as governor, Calles kept the army intact and ignored the economic consequences to the state.

Obregón's use of power was largely veiled, and, because of the unavailability of records touching his career, it is still impossible to determine with assurance when and how he used it. Occasional evidence hints that he did try to influence Carranza in behalf of Sonora on some occasions, but Carranza's fear of him as a potential political rival might have placed limitations on what he achieved. Yet, in a sense, Carranza's fear was balanced by Obregón's strong military position, so that the First Chief could not safely afford to offend him. It is not clear whether Obregón's public attitude, vis á vis the United States, reflected his thinking or his adherence to a line laid down by Carranza. His attempts at diplomacy within Mexico, the truce agreements made with Villa and his persuasion of the villistas to attend the Convention at Aguascalientes, demonstrated his ability to stay ahead of the opposition and make it believe that the arrangements made were completely satisfactory.

Obregón is generally assumed to have been the power behind the writing of the Constitution of 1917, but his role is now subject to reinterpretation. His Sonoran origins contain no hint of radicalism, and his revolutionary zeal may even be questioned. As a small farmer and businessman, and later as a prosperous businessman, he could be expected to be a conservative, or perhaps at the most, a conservative "liberal."

De la Huerta was the least known publicly of the triumvirate, yet he was the most sincere revolutionary of the three. Unfortunately, as with many idealists and dreamers, he could not always successfully translate his dreams into reality, oftentimes because he overlooked the need for careful planning. De la Huerta was not a great originator of revolutionary ideas, but he was a loyal supporter of the programs of Calles and Carranza. During the callista-maytorenista conflict, he served Carranza outside the state. In this instance Carranza made no use of De la Huerta's negotiating abilities, although De la Huerta maintained good relations with all factions, and tried to keep them at peace with one another. It was evident even before he attained the presidency that he played well the role of peacemaker. He did not have the stature of Obregón in 1920--he usually followed and enforced instead of leading--but he was friendly to all.

The effects of the rule of the Sonoran triumvirate in their home state were not entirely negative, but the conflict between the callistas and the maytorenistas, more than

any other aspect of the revolution, severely damaged the state's economy. The triumvirate's suggested remedies lacked comprehensive studies and no long-range plans were made; the state government, like the central government, tended to formulate stop-gap measures. But along the way, some thought was given to the betterment of the lives of the working class; there was concern over the price of food and there were attempts to remedy the farm shortages. Education was encouraged and Decree 1 contributed in small measure to public safety and well being. But Sonora, ten years after Madero began his campaign and five years after the triumph of the constitucionalistas, still had not experienced a revolution: there had been only a political change.

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
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I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

  
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